In this article, I trace and critique the discourse of “The Superweapon Peace”—the long-standing and enduring idea that weapons of radical destructiveness, both nuclear and non-nuclear, can force an end to war by rendering it too destructive to contemplate. The Superweapon Peace, I argue, is constituted by three elements. The first is an assumption of war as a controllable and resolvable problem. Within this formulation, superweapons function as disincentivizers, “solving” war by raising its destructive cost to an unendurable level. For all its intuitive appeal, this logic is flawed, grounded in a certitude of control that fails to comport with empirical reality. The second element of The Superweapon Peace is utopian ambition. Its proponents hold that through the threat of mass violence, war can be overcome in a fundamental sense. This, I argue, gives license to a ruthless consequentialism at odds with conventional morality, which restricts the use or threatened use of violence against those not liable to such an end. The third and final element of The Superweapon Peace is silver-bullet thinking, which
frames the superweapon as the most effective, and likely only, method by which to eliminate or significantly mitigate large-scale armed conflict. This mode of thinking has overly narrowed the scope of possibility regarding alternative remedies to war. The Superweapon Peace, I ultimately conclude, is a false promise, giving license to modes of thinking and action that imperil rather than facilitate peace.