デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ
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デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ. / Jensen, Rasmus Thybo.
I: Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan, Bind 28, 2012, s. 1-10.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning
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TY - JOUR
T1 - デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ
AU - Jensen, Rasmus Thybo
N1 - A version of this paper is to be published in a Japanese translation in the Proceedings of the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Phenomenological Association of Japan.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Recently a number of authors have appealed to the early works of Merleau-Ponty in a critique of the picture of perception presented by McDowell. This debate has been focused on McDowell’s claim that conceptual capacities are essentially involved in our perceptual experiences. In this paper I wish to draw attention to what I consider an additional potentially fruitful meeting point between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and McDowell, namely their critique of a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. My aim is to demonstrate how both authors regard a certain conception of nature rather than some independent epistemological project as the background assumption which gives the Cartesian picture its attraction. Furthermore I want to bring out how they share a general conception of the nature of the problem generated by this background assumption. They both regard the problem as a transcendental problem as opposed to a merely epistemological problem
AB - Recently a number of authors have appealed to the early works of Merleau-Ponty in a critique of the picture of perception presented by McDowell. This debate has been focused on McDowell’s claim that conceptual capacities are essentially involved in our perceptual experiences. In this paper I wish to draw attention to what I consider an additional potentially fruitful meeting point between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and McDowell, namely their critique of a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. My aim is to demonstrate how both authors regard a certain conception of nature rather than some independent epistemological project as the background assumption which gives the Cartesian picture its attraction. Furthermore I want to bring out how they share a general conception of the nature of the problem generated by this background assumption. They both regard the problem as a transcendental problem as opposed to a merely epistemological problem
KW - Det Humanistiske Fakultet
KW - Merleau-Ponty
KW - McDowell
KW - disjunctivism
KW - transcendental argument
KW - cartesiansim
M3 - Tidsskriftartikel
VL - 28
SP - 1
EP - 10
JO - Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan
JF - Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan
ER -
ID: 38386858