Moore's paradox and epistemic norms
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because violating norms.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology |
Vol/bind | 5 |
Udgave nummer | 4 |
Sider (fra-til) | 445 |
Antal sider | 464 |
ISSN | 2069-0533 |
Status | Udgivet - 2014 |
- Det Humanistiske Fakultet
Forskningsområder
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