



Options for Enhancing Nordic–Baltic Defence and Security Cooperation

An Explorative Survey

Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch
Kristian Søby Kristensen
Gary Schaub Jr.
André Ken Jakobsson
Mark Winther

May 2017

This report is a part of Centre for Military Studies' policy research services for the Ministry of Defence and the political parties to the Defence Agreement. The purpose of the report is to identify and explore options to enhance defence and security cooperation among the Nordic-Baltic countries on the basis of an analysis of existing patterns of cooperation.

The Centre for Military Studies is a research centre at the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. The Centre undertakes research on security and defence issues as well as military strategy. This research constitutes the foundation for the policy research services that the Centre provides for the Ministry of Defence and the political parties to the Defence Agreement.

This report contains an analysis based on academic research methodology. Its conclusions should not be understood as a reflection of the views and opinions of the Danish Government, the Danish Armed Forces or any other authority.

Read more about the centre and its activities at <http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/>.

Authors:

Senior researcher, Dr. Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch

Senior researcher, Dr. Kristian Sjøby Kristensen

Senior researcher, Dr. Gary Schaub Jr.

Research assistant, Dr. André Ken Jakobsson

Military Analyst, Major Mark Winther

ISBN: 978-87-7393-800-3

Denne rapport er en del af Center for Militære Studiers forskningsbaserede myndighedsbetjening for Forsvarsministeriet og de politiske partier bag forsvarsforliget. Formålet med rapporten er at identificere og udvikle optioner for at styrke forsvars- og sikkerhedssamarbejdet mellem de nordisk-baltiske lande på baggrund af en kort redegørelse for eksisterende former for samarbejde.

Center for Militære Studier er et forskningscenter på Institut for Statskundskab på Københavns Universitet. På centret forskes der i sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitik samt militær strategi. Forskningen danner grundlag for forskningsbaseret myndighedsbetjening af Forsvarsministeriet og de politiske partier bag forsvarsforliget.

Denne rapport er et analysearbejde baseret på forskningsmæssig metode. Rapportens konklusioner er ikke et udtryk for holdninger hos den danske regering, det danske forsvar eller andre myndigheder.

Læs mere om centret og dets aktiviteter på: <http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/>.

Forfattere:

Seniorforsker, ph.d., Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch

Seniorforsker, ph.d., Kristian Søby Kristensen

Seniorforsker, ph.d., Gary Schaub Jr.

Videnskabelig assistent, ph.d., André Ken Jakobsson

Militæranalytiker, major Mark Winther

ISBN: 978-87-7393-800-3

Abstract

The Nordic–Baltic region is located as a geopolitical buffer zone between the great power interests of the East and the West. As external pressures are rising with an assertive Russia to the east and uncertainties about US NATO guarantees to the west, compounded by an uncertain EU, the region is challenged to respond, particularly in the areas of defence and security. This report begins with the regional demand for enhanced defence and security cooperation. This was the background for a workshop that was held at the Centre for Military Studies in March 2017 consisting of 25 regional experts, all weighing in on the current status and possible future venues for Nordic–Baltic defence and security cooperation. The report reflects this, as it provides a brief institutional survey of the main regional defence and security collaborations and follows up with numerous options for future Nordic–Baltic cooperation. These options are presented through four dimensions of defence and security cooperation: Political level options, force generation options, force employment options and security and resilience options, all of which comprise concrete, policy-oriented ideas that can either be implemented as is or – more ambitiously – will inspire new ideas. The report suggests a Nordic–Baltic ‘Schengen for Defence’, Baltic NORDEFECO membership, adaption of NB8 to be the principal regional venue for defence and security dialogue, Nordic–Baltic table-top exercises and numerous other options.

Dansk resumé

Den nordisk-baltiske region ligger placeret som en geopolitisk bufferzone mellem østens og vestens stormagtsinteresser. Det ydre pres mod regionen er stigende med et mere selvhævdende Rusland mod øst og usikkerhed om USA's NATO sikkerhedsgarantier til Vesten, hvilket yderligere kompliceres af et EU i krise. Dermed udfordres regionen til at formulere svar på især det forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitiske område. Denne rapport tager udgangspunkt i en regional efterspørgsel på forøget forsvars- og sikkerhedssamarbejde. På den baggrund arrangerede Center for Militære Studier i marts 2017 en workshop bestående af 25 regionale eksperter, der bidrog til at udrede nuværende status samt mulige fremtidige veje for nordisk-baltisk forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitisk samarbejde. Rapporten afspejler dette, da den først giver en kort institutionel gennemgang af de vigtigste regionale forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitiske samarbejder og følger op med adskillige alternativer for det fremtidige nordisk-baltiske samarbejde. Disse muligheder præsenteres gennem fire dimensioner af forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitisk samarbejde: Det politiske niveau, styrkegenerering, styrkeanvendelse og endelig det sikre og robuste samfund. Alle dimensioner omfatter konkrete, policy-orienterede ideer, der enten kan implementeres, som de fremstår eller – mere ambitiøst – inspirere yderligere idégenerering. Ideerne fremsat i rapporten inkluderer et nordisk-baltisk "Schengen for Forsvar", baltisk NORDEFECO-medlemskab, NB8 som hovedforum for regional forsvars- og sikkerhedsdialog, nordisk-baltiske table-top øvelser samt mange andre.

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION: DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE NORDIC–BALTIC REGION	1
2. CONTEXT AND OVERVIEW OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE NORDIC–BALTIC REGION	3
3. CURRENT DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE NORDIC–BALTIC REGION	6
3.1 NATO	6
3.2 NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)	7
3.3 NORDEFECO.....	7
3.4 European Union	8
3.5 Nordic–Baltic Eight (NB8)	9
3.6 Northern Group	10
3.7 e-PINE.....	10
3.8 Towards future Nordic–Baltic defence and security cooperation	11
4. OPTIONS FOR FURTHERING NORDIC–BALTIC SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION	12
4.1 Political level options	13
4.2 Force generation options	16
4.3 Force employment options	19
4.4 Security and resilience options.....	22
5. FINAL REMARKS	25
6. APPENDIX	26
7. NOTES	28
8. REFERENCES	33

1. Introduction: Defence and security cooperation in The Nordic–Baltic region

The security environment of the Nordic–Baltic region is rapidly changing as outside pressures mount and new, internally founded responses are being fleshed out. Revanchist Russian behavior, multiple challenges to the European Union and the uncertainties of changing American policies have greatly increased the stakes for defence and security cooperation in the region. The Nordic–Baltic countries therefore now find themselves in a situation where there is a greater incentive for defence and security cooperation.

With this incentive in mind, the May 2017 NATO meeting in Brussels will be the venue for the Nordic–Baltic region to address common challenges and collective answers. Based on the heterogeneous institutional affiliations of the states in the region, these answers must also unfold outside the membership circles of NATO. Increasing Nordic–Baltic regional defence and security cooperation is also likely to have a high priority in light of the politics of the Wales Summit pledge to raise NATO member defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2024. Enhancing Nordic–Baltic cooperation is one obvious way of obtaining a higher return on investment that will multiply both output and outcome through, for instance, enhanced regional awareness, multinational lessons learned, procurement cost reductions and efficiency gains in training and operations.

In order to map the institutional defence and security structure of the Nordic–Baltic region and to point towards future potential, the Centre for Military Studies (CMS) convened a workshop in Copenhagen on 9 March 2017, bringing together 25 experts from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the United States. The workshop was aimed at establishing an overview of current Nordic–Baltic defence and security cooperation and to advance debate in this area through expert idea generation. This resulted in the options for furthering cooperation on defence and security presented in this report.

The workshop was initiated through a read-ahead that had scouted out institutional set-ups for Nordic–Baltic defence and security cooperation and served as a basic starting point for the experts at the workshop to build on and help identify the most relevant activities. Four working groups were established spanning two sessions: one reviewing the institutional status quo of the region and another brainstorming on future paths for new or increased cooperation. The workshop finished with a plenary session in which prioritized ideas were discussed and

elaborated on. Finally, an informal report on the workshop's findings was distributed to participants for use in further research and national policy development.¹

Given the high policy relevance of defence and security cooperation in the Nordic–Baltic region, the time is right to take stock of existing forms of cooperation and to further explore potential options for enhancing regional defence and security cooperation. The objective of this report is therefore to identify such options for enhancing the cooperative endeavours and to present relevant details about them. The aim is to develop substantive, policy-relevant ideas that can boost the effectiveness, efficiency, breadth and depth of cooperation amongst the states of the region, ultimately inspiring for further idea generation.

The next section provides context for understanding the Nordic–Baltic space and its destiny as the geopolitical buffer zone between West and East. It also offers an overview of national memberships of regional defence and security institutions. The third section examines these six institutions – NATO, EU, NORDEF, NB8, Northern Group and e-PINE – in greater detail by identifying the purpose, effect and material undertakings of relevance to the Nordic–Baltic region. The fourth section presents concrete options for furthering regional cooperation on defence and security in relation to four dimensions: political level options, force generation options, force employment options, and finally options for security and resilience cooperation.

2. Context and overview of defence and security co-operation in the Nordic–Baltic region

The Nordic–Baltic region as a whole has first recently come to share a liberal democratic regime type. It has vastly dissimilar historical experiences of national sovereignty and plays host to a wide array of unique cultures. As such, the Nordic–Baltic space escapes easy definition. It becomes more tangible when approached through its shared fate of being a geopolitical buffer zone, however, historically positioned between neighbouring great powers, which created the constitutive external pressure during the Cold War with the United States and the USSR.² This common destiny of ‘thrownness’ between larger powers and their interests should be understood through the Nordic–Baltic states’ ‘geopolitical situatedness in a space delineated more by the great powers outside it than by any endogenous effort’.³ This has led to heterogeneous institutional configurations and affiliations. Sweden and Finland were non-aligned during the Cold War and still remain outside of NATO but contribute fully inside the EU to its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Iceland and Norway are members of NATO but not the EU, although Norway cooperates under the EU CSDP. Denmark is a member of both NATO and EU, but has an opt-out of any CSDP defence matters. In contrast, the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were quick to embrace both NATO and the EU after regaining post-Cold War independence from the Soviet Union.

Key to understanding the Nordic–Baltic space is therefore the duality of extra-regional security pressures and intra-regional political cooperation: The Nordic–Baltic space is negatively shaped by external power relations (hence a buffer zone), which in turn opens up for the internal formation of a political region based on a shared geopolitical fate.⁴ After the Baltic states joined NATO and the EU in 2004, a renewed regional self-awareness was evoked by the 2008 Russo–Georgian war, especially reminding the Baltic states of their ethnic Russian populations and geopolitical location vis-à-vis Russia.⁵ This resulted in the Baltic states pressuring NATO to develop contingency plans to defend them from overt Russian aggression, a planning task that the Alliance had hitherto not undertaken.⁶ Given that the Nordic–Baltic space is a geopolitical buffer zone, the countries of the region have traditionally been looking outside the region – not least to the US – for security guarantees. Over time, internal Nordic–Baltic defence and security cooperation has thus been a secondary aim. Nonetheless, such cooperation has a value of its own, the evolution since 2009 demonstrating this to be the case.

As regards the five Nordic countries, the 2009 Stoltenberg Report advised to enhance and focus Nordic defence cooperation efforts, which resulted in the creation of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). Addressing the Nordic–Baltic Eight (NB8) institution, the Birkavs–Gade 2010 NB8 Wise Men Report likewise argued for intensifying such cooperation, but this time region-wide, fully inclusive of the Nordic–Baltic space. The 2014 Russian aggression against Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea has only exacerbated this regional self-awareness, as all of the forums for Nordic–Baltic cooperation have been utilized to reinforce and expand on commitments. The most notable of these is NATO’s 2014 Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the subsequent Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), functioning as a trip wire for Russian intrusion into the Baltic states.

The internal formation of political regionalization is thus gradually taking place in the defence and security realm while external pressures are shaping the Nordic–Baltic buffer zone through increasing Russian assertiveness to the east and US President Trump’s questioning of NATO’s security guarantee to the west – in combination with an EU in existential crisis. These extra-regional pressures and the growing internal political regionalization give cause to take stock of the status quo and to examine future possibilities and options for Nordic–Baltic defence and security cooperation. Figure 1 shows the extant patchwork of more and less formalized cooperation that has been systematized based on national participation. This report presents a prioritization focusing on the most relevant cooperation taking place. The next section surveys this in the discussion of six institutions: NATO, EU, NORDEFCO, the Nordic–Baltic Eight (NB8), Northern Group and e-PINE.

Figure 1: Defence and security institutions in the Nordic–Baltic region.

	NATO	NATO PfP	EU	NORDEFCE	NB8	Northern Group	e-PINE
Norway	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
Denmark	✓		✓*	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sweden		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Finland		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Iceland	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Estonia	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
Latvia	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
Lithuania	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
Poland	✓		✓		✓	✓	
Germany	✓		✓			✓	
United Kingdom	✓		✓**			✓	
United States	✓						✓

* Denmark has an EU opt-out from all defence-related CSDP efforts.

** The UK is planning to withdraw from the EU in 2019.

3. Current defence and security cooperation in the Nordic–Baltic region

Security and defence cooperation in the Nordic–Baltic region has developed along multiple lines and through many institutional settings over the past decades. These settings include the formal multilateral institutions of NATO and the EU, the less formal multilateral ‘working structures’ of NORDEFECO, the Nordic–Baltic 8, the multilateral political frameworks of the Northern Group and e-PINE, and a plethora of formal and informal multilateral and bilateral relationships focused on specific areas of common interest and cooperation.⁷ A brief description of each institution in relation to various dimensions will be provided in the following. These are, first, whether an internal or external logic is driving the cooperation. Defence and security cooperation in NATO is of vital importance to the Nordic–Baltic region, but it is driven by actors and motivations that go beyond purely regional agendas, while the NB8 is driven by an internal regional logic of cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states. The description proceeds to examine the degree to which the institution facilitates political consultation, force generation, force employment and security and resilience cooperation (these are also the dimensions within which we identify options for further defence and security cooperation). Within these descriptions, attention is given to the purpose of said dimensional cooperation, where for example NORDEFECO is found to be primarily aimed at efficiency in force generation while NATO also has a defence capability focus. It is important to emphasize that the descriptions of the institutions are meant to illustrate the various dimensions and functions of defence and security cooperation in the region rather than to be an exhaustive portrayal of each of these forums.

3.1 NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – as a mutual defence pact – is the primary institutional mechanism for political consultation, force generation, force employment and security and resilience on defence and security matters for states in the Nordic–Baltic region. This is arguably also true, albeit indirectly, for non-members Sweden and Finland. NATO builds on an external logic, as it is driven by motivations and actors of which the Nordic–Baltic region is a mere subset. The core tasks of post-Cold War NATO have evolved in the direction of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.⁸ In order to facilitate these tasks, NATO has developed a vast institutional structure for cooperation, including defence planning and force development⁹ with centralized processes such as the NATO De-

fence Planning Process,¹⁰ the adoption of standards for interoperability,¹¹ and the NATO permanent, integrated military command structure headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).¹²

Of special interest to the Nordic–Baltic region is the Framework Nations concept adopted at the 2014 Wales Summit, which enables ‘flexible participation and structured cooperation’ between a subset of member states.¹³ The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), consisting of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, falls under this concept. Figures 2 and 3 in the appendix indicate a number of cooperative programs that have been undertaken in the Nordic–Baltic region under the auspices of NATO, including cooperation with Sweden and Finland.

3.2 NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)

Sweden and Finland joined the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) at its inception in 1994 and are now so-called Enhanced Opportunity Partners. Although the PfP was not intended as a transition process for states to enter NATO as full members, it has served as such for each wave of enlargement. While both Sweden and Finland have yet to make the final commitment to join,¹⁴ they have entered into an Individual Partnership Cooperation Program with NATO, they participate in the PfP Planning and Review Process, the Operational Capabilities Concept, and they have participated in many (if not most) NATO-led operations (SFOR, KFOR, ISAF and OUP (Sweden)).

In the Nordic–Baltic region, NATO cooperation with Sweden and Finland has intensified and now includes expanded coordination on hybrid warfare threats, situational awareness and talks on including both countries in the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF) on top of regular consultations on Baltic Sea security.¹⁵ Sweden and Finland have also signed and ratified the Host Nation Support memoranda of understanding (MOU), which addresses issues of permitting NATO forces on their territory in peace or wartime.¹⁶ Swedish and Finnish officers are also stationed at various headquarters within the NATO command structure that are of relevance for the Baltic Sea region.¹⁷

3.3 NORDEFECO

NORDEFECO was created in 2009 and based on an internal regional logic as the five Nordic countries consolidated numerous defence cooperation initiatives. Political consultation runs at the level of Ministers of Defence and is managed by the Policy Steering Committee (PSC)

with national departmental officers, and efficiency-focused force generation takes place through the Military Coordination Committee (MCC), with a subordinate Coordination Staff to run individual programs. NORDEFECO has an established ‘working structure for regional cooperation’,¹⁸ which is organized into five areas of cooperation (COPAs) dealing with: (1) capabilities, (2) armaments, (3) human resources and education, (4) training and exercises and (5) operations.¹⁹ NORDEFECO force deployment has also taken place. Building on the example of the European Participating Air Forces (EPAF) deployment of C-130 transport aircraft and F-16 combat aircraft to Kyrgyzstan in 2003–04, the NORDEFECO nations decided to deploy a C-130 transport aircraft to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on a rotational basis until the end of 2018.²⁰ Other cooperative endeavours within each of these functional areas are included in Figure 4 in the appendix.

An ‘Easy Access’ NORDEFECO MOU was signed in 2016, prompted by Russian incursions into the sovereign airspace and/or territorial waters of the Nordic states combined with generally increasing tensions between Russia and the countries of the region. The MOU facilitates easier force deployment access for the NORDEFECO states to one another’s territory in peacetime²¹ and builds on the Alternate Landing Base agreement between Denmark, Sweden and Norway, which allows unarmed military aircraft to land at each other’s bases. In 2017, Finland and Iceland will consider joining, and an extension of the agreement to armed military aircraft is on the table.²² Secure communications links between Nordic Ministries of Defence and Defence Commands have been established,²³ and work continues on enabling the NORDEFECO countries to share radar data.²⁴

3.4 European Union

The EU saw Denmark join in 1973, Finland and Sweden in 1995 and the Baltic states in 2004, currently leaving Iceland and Norway as non-members. The EU’s primary purpose of political consultation has seen decades-long functional expansion into security and defence matters with a focus on force deployment and security and resilience under the heading ‘crisis management’. This has meant utilizing civilian and military capabilities for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peacemaking defined in the Western European Unions’s (WEU) 1992 Petersberg Tasks. When the Treaty of Lisbon became effective in 2009, this expanded to include a mutual defence clause²⁵ and a solidarity clause.²⁶ Neither of the principles apply to Denmark, which has an opt-out from the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),²⁷ while non-NATO EU members Sweden and Finland have attached significance to these pledges and incorporated expectations for providing and receiving such aid in

their defence plans and force structures. Norway and Iceland have also developed close cooperative relations with the EU despite their non-membership.²⁸ For instance, Norway signed an Administrative Arrangement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2006 and has participated in a number of EDA projects.²⁹

As regards Nordic–Baltic cooperation, the CSDP’s rotational EU Battlegroup structure for rapid response crisis management includes the Swedish-led Nordic Battlegroup (on alert in 2008, 2011 and 2015) with participation from Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Ireland. Again, Denmark’s opt-out means no contribution, while non-EU-member Norway has utilized an opt-in framework agreement to participate.³⁰

It is also worth noting that the more resilience-focused 2009 EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBRS) aims to integrate the Baltic State road and rail networks, energy markets and systems with those of EU members to the west and north; protect the maritime environment; and increase the region’s economic prosperity.³¹ Furthermore, the regional states (except Denmark) participate in the European Defence Agency’s Maritime Surveillance (MAR-SUR) to facilitate and improve maritime situational awareness and interoperability between EU military and civilian maritime authorities and other international maritime actors.³² These initiatives are intended to increase regional resilience against hybrid threats to social, political and economic stability.³³

3.5 Nordic–Baltic Eight (NB8)

Since 1992, driven by an internal regional logic, the cooperation format known as the Nordic–Baltic Eight (NB8) has facilitated political consultation on all levels at more than 50 annual meetings³⁴ and is unique in terms of how it includes all of the Nordic–Baltic states. The Nordic states were responsible for the Foreign Ministry-level NB8 coordination until 2008, when the Baltic states became engaged on an equal footing³⁵ – a development driven by the accession of the Baltic states into NATO and the EU, which opened up for new areas of cooperation that now include security and resilience-focused collaboration on defence, domestic security and justice, finance, energy and transportation infrastructure, as well as measures aimed at strengthening democracy and civil society.³⁶ These areas were mirrored in the 2016 Latvian chairmanship’s priorities of ‘Strengthening Security in the Region (Energy Security, Strategic Communication, Cybersecurity and Fight against Hybrid Threats) and Support for the EU Eastern Partnership’.³⁷ The NB8 provides a political platform for governments to issue joint communiqués and coordinate statements on issues of concern.³⁸ It also functions as

a forum for coordination related to other international organizations, such as the UN and EU.³⁹

A functional expansion and deepening of the NB8 cooperation has been followed up on since the 2010 ‘NB8 Wise Men Report’ by former Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs and former Danish Defense Minister Søren Gade,⁴⁰ where 38 practical initiatives were advocated, including creation of an NB8 pool of civilian resources, the creation of cyber response teams, complete NB8 participation in the EU Nordic Battlegroup and enhanced cooperation with NATO and the EU.

3.6 Northern Group

The Northern Group is an informal forum for political consultation founded in 2010 as a British initiative based on external logic and an acknowledgement of the UK as a northern European country wanting to deepen cooperation with its Nordic and Baltic neighbours, including Germany and Poland. Counting 11 countries in total, the Northern Group is the largest of the institutions mentioned here. A driver for the UK was to have a forum including non-NATO members Sweden and Finland and to cooperate on security and resilience efforts concerning cyber and energy security.⁴¹

The informal nature of the Northern Group combined with the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will likely see the UK push for further agreement on purpose and ambitions, particularly on efficient force generation such as procurement cooperation, defence–industrial partnering and service-level cooperation.⁴²

3.7 e-PINE

The American-initiated 2003 Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE) follows an external logic and serves as a framework for regular political consultation between the US and the NB8 countries. e-PINE replaced the American 1997 Northern Europe Initiative (NEI), which focused resources on the integration of the Baltic states into NATO and the EU.⁴³ As this succeeded, the US launched e-PINE to focus on security and resilience through cooperative security, healthy societies and vibrant economies⁴⁴ and ‘exporting success’ to the neighbouring areas by supporting democratization and civil society outside of NATO and the EU.⁴⁵ The political consultation takes place at the Political Director’s level and continues to provide a basis for US-NB8 coordination talks between civil servants on issues such as cyber

security, terrorism and human trafficking.⁴⁶ Running in parallel to e-PINE is the e-PINE Annual Academic Meeting, which brings think tanks together from the participating countries.⁴⁷

3.8 Towards future Nordic–Baltic defence and security cooperation

As outlined above, the geopolitical buffer zone of the Nordic–Baltic region can pride itself of a high degree of institutionalization in defence and security matters. At the same time, however, it suffers from fragmentation in the various ‘membership layouts’. The internal vision for accelerated regional defence and security cooperation was most vocally initiated by the 2009 Stoltenberg report and 2010 Birkavs–Gade report, and it gained substantial impetus from the external developments of the 2014 Ukraine crisis. There is, thus, a longstanding and outspoken regional demand for addressing these issues in concert.

While the brief institutional review above has provided insights concerning the status of Nordic–Baltic defence and security cooperation, the primary motivation for the CMS workshop was to point towards the future. This ambition is taken up in the next section, which explores a range of possible future roads to be taken to provide a range of options for further regional cooperative initiatives.

4. Options for furthering Nordic–Baltic security and defence cooperation

The options and ideas presented in this report all have an exploratory aim and seek to inspire further idea development. The initiatives have thus been described in varying degrees of detail and address the central how, why and who. Ultimately, they should be approached as plastic ideas, ready to interact with the levers available to the reader's imagination. The reader is therefore encouraged to visualize the potentials and consequences of shifting the level, scope, motivation and organization of the suggestions.

One way of developing the ideas further would be to ask questions such as:

- What if the initiative was raised from the practical to the political level?
- What if the initiative was to be reduced in scope in order to focus on a particular topic of interest?
- What if the aim of the initiative is desirable but the motivation for following through requires modification?
- What if the organizational set-up of the initiative could be improved by engaging other existing structures or creating new ones?

The Nordic–Baltic region warrants the power of ideas, and the specific suggestions here aim to stimulate dialogue and debate to induce concerted defence and security efforts to enhance the overall effort in the region and facilitate political visions becoming concrete.

For ease of reading, the options identified and developed are presented in four dimensions of defence and security cooperation. It is possible to identify other such dimensions, but these are both intuitive to understand and represent together a broad way of conceiving of defence and security policy and its practical components. As suggested above, it is possible to shift the institutionalization of some of the options at different levels (e.g. from the working military level to political level or vice versa), and the four dimensions should therefore not be taken to be mutually exclusive categories. For two of the categories, the NORDEFSCO distinction between force generation and force employment has been retained. This distinction should be familiar to most practitioners in the Nordic–Baltic Countries.

The four dimensions are therefore, respectively, **the political level** (the world of ministries and ministers, but also of e.g. political directors or political public engagement), **the level of force generation** (‘upstream’ activities related to e.g. planning, capability development, military education, defence industry relations), **the level of force employment** (‘downstream’ activities related to the use of the military instrument, including situational awareness, crisis management, training and operations), and finally **the level of security and resilience** (including disaster response, civil defence, engagement and cooperation with the private sector outside of the defence industry as well as with the broader public).

4.1 Political level options

4.1.1 A Nordic–Baltic summit at the level of heads of state and government

The summit would serve as a venue for ‘highest level’ discussions on topics important to the region and allow for subsequent occasional ‘one region – one voice’ political declarations to be issued.⁴⁸ The summit would be a major political event with a strong external-signalling capacity to partners and other external actors alike. The summit could be held on a bi-annual basis with a rotating host and chairman. It could function as a ‘Christmas tree’, anchoring the political focus in the regional cooperation initiatives. Possible topics for discussion include, but are not limited to: energy security, hybrid threats, diplomatic initiatives to be taken, disaster preparedness, security of supply and political dialogue with Russia.

- Other than the heads of state and government, participation could include the line ministries and others in charge of topics to be discussed, such as foreign and defence ministers, defence political directors as well as chiefs of defence.
- In addition to discussing region-relevant issues (including defence and security), the summit could also serve to streamline and more efficiently utilize the interaction which already takes place between various Nordic–Baltic forums, such as the meetings between the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Baltic Council of Ministers.
- Finally, the summit could be a vehicle for parallel, second-tier efforts of civil society engagement, including NGOs, opinion-makers and think tanks.

4.1.2 NB8 as the principal venue for defence and security dialogue

In 2010, the Birkavs–Gade report suggested giving NB8 an enhanced defence and security dimension – a dimension that is still lacking today. However, heightened tension and increasing Russian aggression call for unity of effort amongst the countries of the region.

NB8 is the only forum for all Nordic–Baltic states. Given the external security conditions, it could therefore potentially serve as the principal venue for dialogue on defence and security for this group of countries. This necessitates adapting NB8 to this new key task by expanding its security and defence dimension and raising matters of defence and security to also include the level of heads of state – while still including ministers of foreign affairs and defence as well as the chiefs of defence. The Nordic–Baltic region is institutionally fragmented, which weakens its ability to cooperate and act in concert. Simultaneously, it exposes the individual countries in the region to external pressures. In combination with the initiative on expanding NORDEFECO to include the Baltic countries suggested elsewhere, a political agreement on this adaption of NB8 would send a strong message of unity in Nordic–Baltic defence and security.

The adapted NB8 would function as the common Baltic–Nordic defence and security network node for establishing vertical and horizontal connections to other organizations, such as NATO, NORDEFECO, the EU, E-PINE as well as to the various Nordic–Baltic centres of excellence. By convening the appropriate levels of NB8 ministers and by working out joint approaches – including the issuing of joint statements on critical issues of defence and security – a new NB8 (Birkavs–Gade 2.0) could represent such unity of effort in the Nordic–Baltic region and simultaneously facilitate a new attempt to work towards a Nordic–Baltic defence and security identity. As such, the focus of the adapted NB8 should be dialogue furthering the overall integration of the defence and security spheres in the region, whereas the cost efficiency dimension in procurement and acquisition (or ‘smart defence’ in NATO-speak) could still be handled through NORDEFECO.

4.1.3 Baltic NORDEFECO membership

Through NORDEFECO’s areas for cooperation (COPAs), the Nordic countries have made advances in efficiency within the defence and security spheres. Such advances could be made available to the entire Nordic–Baltic region and could therefore also include the three Baltic countries. A region-wide utilization of NORDEFECO’s evolving structures for cooperation would improve cost efficiency on all levels; from minimizing procurement costs to more efficient training and exercises and, ultimately, also to a positive impact on operations. In combination with the initiative on adapting NB8 suggested elsewhere, a political agreement on expanding NORDEFECO to include the Baltic countries would send a strong message of unity in Nordic–Baltic defence and security.

Of particular interest to region-wide cooperation is NORDEFECO's NORTAT (Nordic cooperation on air transport assets), focusing on optimizing the use of air transport assets, the Mine Counter Measures (MCM) effort being of special concern in the Baltic sea area, and finally the NORDEFECO Cyber Defence cooperation – an area within which the Baltic states have unique experiences (e.g. the 2007 attack on Estonia) – and an area where region-wide cooperation could contribute to the aim of a concerted Nordic–Baltic immediate-threat warning system.

4.1.4 MOD-level pledge on Nordic–Baltic procurement cooperation

All of the Nordic–Baltic Ministers of Defence could sign a pledge to explore regional cooperation on procurement projects prior to initiating new capability development projects. The idea is that the political level commitment will ensure that the default position for armament and procurement agencies, when embarking on new capability development projects, is to always examine first the potential for international procurement cooperation at the Nordic–Baltic level before turning to a purely national solution. In order to document that this formal requirement has been upheld, it will also be a defining feature of the relationship between the political level and the armament and procurement agencies.⁴⁹ The structures for such cooperation are available to some degree through the NORDEFECO COPA ARMA initiative, which consists of a number of working groups based on the perceived needs of the participating nations.⁵⁰ But this currently only solidly includes the NORDEFECO countries. The pledge could include an aim to harmonize Nordic–Baltic standards, and the responsibility for following through could be placed at the political level.

4.1.5 Cluster meetings: Streamline Nordic–Baltic defence and security coordination

The increase in defence and security cooperation has also meant an increase in international meeting activity in various forums. This option points to the opportunity to cluster meetings together at the same physical events, saving time especially for the smaller nations. Desk officers with responsibility for one specific area can then save time by meeting in the different formats on the same day. The rationalization of meetings and efforts in the Nordic–Baltic region could be achieved through coordinated planning measures aimed at avoiding the current situation of having the same desk officers meet in different fora at different times. Cluster meetings would be of special benefit to the fractured membership lists of NORDEFECO, NB8, Northern Group and e-PINE while allowing for high-level political meetings to take place before and after, ensuring political attention and commitment to common efforts. This

meeting format would also generate synergy with extra-regional actors, who would find a more focused Nordic–Baltic entry point for defence and security matters.

4.1.6 Biannual Nordic–Baltic defence and security conference

The Nordic–Baltic region requires regular high-level attention from heads of state, ministers, parliamentarians, scientists, international organizations, business and media. To accomplish this, lessons could be taken from the achievements of the Munich Security Conference and translated into the Nordic–Baltic context through a biannual Nordic–Baltic defence and security conference. A number of more or less high-level conferences already exist with a more or less clearly defined regional focus. This idea should therefore ideally build on one or more of these while also elevating the conference to a higher formal level, such as by having the aforementioned Nordic–Baltic summit as part of the conference.

- The conference could be run in concert between think tanks and COEs, drawing on their specialist knowledge to determine topics of interest and facilitate information sharing on lessons learned and recent research. To ensure the impact of such lessons learned and research on decision makers, participation could include government officials and parliamentarians involved in defence and security. The venue could rotate between think tanks and centres of excellence in the Nordic Baltic countries to maximize national anchoring.

4.2 Force generation options

4.2.1 A Nordic–Baltic strategic space: Integrate situational awareness systems

The integration of various existing Nordic–Baltic situational awareness systems – or better utilizing and sharing what data they produce to create a common overall picture – can assist in establishing regionally shared and up-to-date perceptions of developments within the region. This would increase the common regional understanding of potential challenges, it would make communication within the region easier, and it would finally enable quicker national decision-making in crisis situations.

The Nordic–Baltic region has a number of information gathering and sharing systems and agreements. These include the NORDEFSCO shared radar picture system NORECAS, which serves the Nordic countries, the joint air surveillance network BALNET operated by the three Baltic states, the multinational open-source maritime situational awareness network for the Baltic Sea region (SUCBAS),⁵¹ and the Swedish–Finnish bilateral maritime surveillance cooperation in SUCFIS⁵² as well as an array of other national military and civilian systems.

Bringing the outputs of these air and maritime surveillance systems closer together and establishing agreements facilitating information sharing at an earlier stage would enhance Nordic–Baltic Situational Awareness and create a more seamless Nordic–Baltic strategic space.

One key obstacle to establishing a common situational awareness platform such as the one proposed here for the Nordic–Baltic region is a reluctance to share privileged and classified information. Here, the countries in the region could take the lessons of the NATO ISAF mission to heart. If it was possible for the Alliance to share operationally sensitive information with a wide range of partners in Afghanistan, it could likewise be possible to share sensitive Nordic–Baltic information to build a more regionally integrated situational awareness.

Furthermore, full and complete integration need not be the goal; in any case, first steps are likely to be handled best in a piecemeal and incremental manner. For instance, NORDEFSCO could expand its NORECAS membership to include the Baltic States, SUCBAS and SUCFIS could develop a parallel framework for sharing classified situational awareness information with others, and NATO could support this by establishing a Nordic–Baltic regional ‘easy situational awareness access for partners’ procedure, thereby effectively integrating parts of Swedish and Finnish situational awareness into NATO’s own – and vice versa.

4.2.2 Nordic–Baltic crisis management table-top exercises

Regular and high-level Nordic–Baltic table-top crisis-management exercises can function as a means to several political and security-related ends. Through the use of different types of scenarios, the key issues to be explored in the exercises would be the various interconnections and interdependencies the decision-makers and countries in the region will have to deal with in a crisis. The wide range of potential scenarios that could be utilized during such exercises could include region-specific political conflicts and crises, more malicious type events instigated by outside actors, such as a hybrid warfare incursions, but also actual kinetic military conflicts. All scenarios are likely to include trans-border crises or crises in which trans-border cooperation is optimal.

Apart from the inherent value in planning and conducting exercises in this multinational setting, these exercises would highlight regional dependencies and clarify roles and responsibilities – nationally as well as internationally, provide a testbed for existing regional cooperative mechanisms, identify shortfalls, gaps, unforeseen consequences and point to future improvements and solutions. In fact, such exercises could be used to test the value of many of the

initiatives suggested in this report. One such test could be the consequences of a more tightly integrated system for sharing information and situational awareness, as mentioned above.

4.2.3 A network for Nordic–Baltic centres of excellence

A number of NATO-affiliated and other centres of excellence (COEs) have been set up in the wider Nordic–Baltic region in recent years. Their focus areas largely reflect various dimensions of modern ‘grey zone’ conflicts. The centres include the *NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence* in Tallinn, the *NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence* in Riga, the *NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence* in Vilnius, the *NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence* in Bydgoszcz, the *NATO Counter Intelligence Centre of Excellence* in Krakow and the *Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters* in Kiel. Most recently, the *European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats* in Helsinki has been established.

The Nordic–Baltic COEs, each with its own distinct profile, specialization and core competences, mainly focus on various aspects of what can be referred to as grey zone challenges that fall between the traditional duality of war and peace.⁵³ This communality could be used as an opportunity to foster closer cooperation between the COEs. All of the centres engage with security issues of concern for the countries of the region, and the nations of the region coming together to support a community between them holds the potential to make their combined effect more than the sum of the parts of the individual centres.

One way to support this is to jointly pledge support to the Nordic–Baltic COEs in terms of funding and through the posting of national academic, bureaucratic and military staff.

Supporting the centres ensures regionally based attention to, expertise in and impact from fields that require specialization which can be difficult to sustain nationally. Consequently, a vibrant regional community of COEs can offer an important source of support for regional training, development of national and regional exercises, certifications and standardizations, as well as in the support of contingency planning and last but not least work to put regional security concerns and solutions on the international security agenda.

4.2.4 Best practice initiative for multinational procurement, planning and operations

The Nordic–Baltic space is heterogeneous in terms of military planning traditions, bilateral cooperation, institutional affiliation, procurement decisions and threat perception. This heterogeneous and complex landscape can be seen as an impediment to enhanced cooperation.

Conversely, the multitude of differences means that a wide number of different forms of cooperative practices have developed. The recent Host Nation Support Agreements signed between NATO and Sweden and Finland are instances of a cooperative initiative overcoming obstacles to cooperation.

Individual desk-officers and caseworkers within the Nordic–Baltic defence structures often possess critical knowledge on how a particular obstacle to cooperation was surmounted in a particular instance. Bringing this knowledge forward and ‘multilateralizing’ it might provide further inspiration for regional cooperation and function as best-practice cases. One way to do so is to create a Nordic–Baltic Ministry of Defense-level taskforce to look for examples and cases overcoming obstacles to further cooperation – multilateral as well as bilateral. The establishment of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States is but one example where NATO’s need to deploy quickly must have led to new cooperative schemes that can function to inspire in other situations. In relation to both operations and procurement, there are similar experiences and lessons that would be valuable to multilaterilize.

4.2.5 A Nordic–Baltic defence and security research portal

Focused and easy access to central documents, reports and research on Nordic–Baltic defence and security would strengthen the multinational research efforts while enhancing impact as research becomes readily available. The portal could be run by the regional (community of) COEs, helping to establish and facilitate a research network encompassing universities, defence colleges, think tanks and government institutions in the Nordic–Baltic region. There is a growing demand for research on Nordic–Baltic security and defence issues, and therefore also an increased need for knowledge sharing on Nordic–Baltic issues. This initiative could also tie into an effort to support the COEs and raise awareness about their existence.

In addition to the establishment of a research portal, a very practical way of knowledge sharing is suggested: The use of a common Nordic–Baltic defence and security hashtag #NorBalDef. The hashtag could also be used retrospectively, so that relevant but already published research is reactivated through #NorBalDef.

4.3 Force employment options

4.3.1 A ‘Schengen for defence’ in the Nordic–Baltic region

The ‘Schengen for defence’ idea is already being embraced in EU and NATO circles alike, acknowledging the various challenges to rapid force employment of both organizations in

case of crisis. The particular concept of a ‘Schengen for defence’ or ‘military Schengen’ is supported by key European actors, including Germany, France⁵⁴ and Italy,⁵⁵ while the commander of U.S. Army Europe, Ben Hodges, has called for the same concept in NATO.⁵⁶ This concern is not least motivated by the rapid, large-scale snap exercises conducted by Russia and the inability of NATO to keep up with the speed with which Russia can deploy large forces to Eastern Europe.⁵⁷

The Nordic–Baltic region could set an example for how to turn these thoughts into reality. The purpose of a Nordic–Baltic Schengen for defence would be to include all of the Nordic–Baltic states in a coordinated political and administrative effort to identify and remove obstacles to the rapid deployment of troops and materiel across Nordic–Baltic borders via air, sea and land. In addition to ensuring the necessary political and legal framework, this initiative could also include streamlining national infrastructure.

In 2016, the NORDEFECO countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Easy Access in peacetime,⁵⁸ and Estonia has taken steps to remove obstacles in national legislation, reducing the time needed to clear allied troops arriving on Estonian territory to only a matter of hours.⁵⁹ In that sense, work is already being done – nationally as well as in multilateral settings – within the Nordic–Baltic region.

Further and concerted multinational efforts to advance this agenda would serve as inspiration to NATO and the EU. Conversely, they would convey a strong regional deterrent message from a more united Nordic–Baltic region. At the same time, a Nordic–Baltic ‘military Schengen’ would provide a significantly higher degree of flexibility in, for example, hot pursuit across borders and significantly speed-up and ease support in regional crisis response.

This Nordic–Baltic ‘Schengen for defence’ could be an initiative pushed through NB8 to secure institutional anchoring.

4.3.2 Baltic inclusion in NORDEFECO secure communications

The NORDEFECO countries have recently agreed on – and are in the process of implementing – a system that allows secure communications between the NORDEFECO countries. During times of heightened tension, such a system can prove paramount in preventing crises spinning out of control. As NORDEFECO represents a mix of NATO and non-NATO countries, there should be no principal obstacles preventing the three Baltic countries from becoming part of the system, thus expanding the system to include all of the Nordic–Baltic space.

4.3.3 Increase Nordic–Baltic training area cooperation

Nordic and Baltic states have existing structures for and a long history of sharing national training facilities, but they are split between, respectively, NORDEFECO for the Nordic countries and BALTTTRAIN for the Baltic countries. Establishing a formal basis for sustained Nordic–Baltic dialogue and coordination between NORDEFECO’s five-year Combined Joint Nordic Exercise Plan (CJNEP) and BALTTTRAIN would increase interoperability, military integration, cross-national lessons learned and improve the output quality of exercises while simultaneously presenting potential savings from sharing training facilities.

4.3.4 Small-scale experimental Nordic–Baltic combined joint exercises – potentially to develop a common Nordic–Baltic planning and operations capacity

Iterative small-scale combined joint exercises planned and run by Nordic–Baltic states – perhaps run through NORDEFECO – would enhance regional integration on many levels within national defence bureaucracies and simultaneously act as drivers of change. First and foremost, the multinational planning and running of regionally anchored combined joint exercises would be a valuable tool in stimulating regional planning and increase the competences of national military staffs of the small Nordic and Baltic countries not accustomed to contemplating larger, regional and complex military scenarios. Furthermore, these exercises would produce valuable knowledge that can be used to strengthen and focus regional defence efforts in an integrated manner. Finally, this initiative would also provide means that can be used to inform political and military decision-makers in Brussels and Washington on the particular conditions of the Baltic Sea Region shaping larger military operations.

4.3.5 Annual Nordic–Baltic chiefs of operations ‘Contingency Plans and Capabilities’ information sharing meeting

How do the Nordic–Baltic countries do contingency planning, what contingences are planned for, and what do the plans look like? Sharing information on national contingency plans amongst the Nordic–Baltic countries and their chiefs of operations (to the extent possible) would serve the long-term aim of harmonizing such plans into more region-wide coherent plans, or at least function to share knowledge on national planning. These meetings would also keep the chiefs of operations updated on the military capabilities present and (potentially) available throughout the region, and in the process help build a network of people central to any regional or national contingency. As much as classification is an issue, NATO partner countries (SWE/FIN) could participate in the margins of the meetings and information could be shared with partner countries as far as classifications would allow. Alternatively – a bit

bolder – this problem could be addressed through the establishment of a ‘Nordic–Baltic Mission Secret system’.

4.4 Security and resilience options

4.4.1 Nordic–Baltic disaster management mechanism through NB8

National civil defence systems had been heavily reduced in the decades immediately prior to the intensification of grey zone challenges following the 2014 crises in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Both the 2009 Stoltenberg report and the 2010 Birkavs–Gade report called for increasing joint Nordic capabilities on societal resilience and disaster management. In 2017, this call could be answered through regional Nordic–Baltic cooperation in the institutional setting of NB8 to ensure appropriate political attention.

Nordic–Baltic disaster preparedness could employ a whole-of-government approach to counter diverse challenges, such as large-scale cyber-attacks that can blackout critical IT-infrastructure (e.g. civilian airspace management or banking or tele- and data-communication), the deliberate shutdown of energy supplies, natural or environmental disasters, flows of internally displaced persons following hybrid incursions or worse. Countering these challenges requires region-wide, whole-of-government efforts. Being able to respond to a disaster or a civil emergency rapidly requires that the mechanism for responding is predetermined through clear standard operating procedures. These could include the scope of the mechanism, agreements on what constitutes a disaster or an emergency, criteria for activating the mechanism, the levels and entities being part of the mechanism as well as the various roles and responsibilities in the mechanism, such as the coordination of internal and external Nordic–Baltic lines of communication (who talks to e.g. NATO, EU, US and Russia). The political anchoring in NB8 would allow for high-level exchanges of information on an operational level on, for example, health infrastructure and the expansion of existing mechanisms, like the example of cooperation on NORDEFECO MEDEVAC helicopters.

4.4.2 Nordic–Baltic civil emergency table-top exercises

Regular and high-level Nordic–Baltic table-top civil emergency exercises can function as a means to ends related to increased civil and societal security in the Nordic–Baltic region. Utilizing a range of different scenarios, the key issues to be explored in these exercises would be the various interconnections and interdependencies the decision-makers and countries in the region will have to deal with in case of a larger civil emergency. The wide range of potential scenarios that could be played include regional flooding, large-scale infrastructure break-

down, man-made environmental disaster and national or regional health emergencies. Many such scenarios are likely to include trans-border crises or crises where trans-border cooperation is necessary.

Apart from the inherent value in planning and conducting exercises in this multinational setting, these exercises would highlight regional dependencies and clarify roles and responsibilities – nationally as well as internationally, provide a testbed for existing regional cooperative mechanisms, identify shortfalls, gaps, unforeseen consequences and point to future improvements and solutions. In fact, such exercises could be used to test the value of many of the initiatives suggested in this report. One such test could be the consequences of a more tightly integrated system for sharing information and situational awareness, as mentioned above.

4.4.3 Nordic–Baltic government–business network for defence and security (‘Inter-Force’)

Strong government and military ties to civil society are important for continued support to and the development of defence and security efforts. In Denmark, this aim is supported through the so-called InterForce initiative established in 1999.⁶⁰ InterForce currently consists of more than 1800 public and private Danish businesses who have pledged flexibility and support toward their employed military reservists. This pledge guarantees that Danish reserve personnel can participate in training, education and exercises while simultaneously pursuing civilian careers. The arrangement helps keep qualified personnel close to the military organizations and facilitates smooth transitions between military and civilian jobs while simultaneously establishing a government-to-business network for defence and security.

Similar or somewhat comparable structures or initiatives aiming at integrating government and civil society in national defence or emergency management efforts exist in many other Nordic–Baltic countries. One such initiative is the Estonian Cyber Defense League. Building on these various networks, we propose, first, that a mapping of government-to-business relations in the region should be made. This could function to share best practices, support the reorganisation of existing initiatives or inspire new ones in the countries in the region. Secondly, and building on the mapping effort, regional initiatives such as a Nordic–Baltic Government-Business Network for Defense and Security could be established. Such a network could focus on how to develop national government to civil society relations and/or become a framework for firms operating regionally – perhaps especially for private actors owning or operating key infrastructure or providing essential services across the region.

Regional government–business integration will strengthen regional civil–military relations and form the basis for the integration of the private sector in a more coherent response to various societal challenges, such as terrorism, natural or environmental disasters or military crises.

5. Final remarks

The Nordic–Baltic security environment has undergone significant change. Internal regional developments and external pressures are putting a premium on further regional cooperation on security and defense issues. To inspire and facilitate that process – and to point to issues of further potential for cooperation – this report outlines a number of regional cooperative options along four dimensions of defense and security cooperation: the political level, force generation, force employment and security and resilience.

By drawing on the discussions and the many great ideas generated during the expert workshop held in Copenhagen in March 2017, the final aim of this report is not only to present a range of cooperative options, but additionally and more importantly to stimulate and inspire what needs to be an ongoing, common and creative effort in identifying innovative and effective ideas for regional cooperation.

More than a finalized product, therefore, the options presented here should be seen as an opening and a source of inspiration on how to think regional cooperation. Many of the options and the ideas driving them can be recycled in other venues or on other cooperative issues than the ones mentioned here; they can inspire new national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for practical cooperation, they can be ballooned from a military to a political level and/or from one issue-area to encompass wider areas of cooperation, or alternatively be reduced to foster concrete, small-scale military cooperation on a particular issue.

Furthermore, a number of the options presented are in themselves focused on creating venues and avenues for further creative thinking on how to strengthen regional cooperation. The final lessons to be drawn from this report are perhaps, therefore, that the first step to change is to imagine change, and efforts to strengthen regional security are not only a matter of investment in capabilities but that investments in ideas are equally important.

6. Appendix

Figure 2: Selected NATO initiatives in the Nordic–Baltic region

NATO	
Area	Initiative
Political dialogue	Partner participation in NATO summit
Capabilities	5000-strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)
Manning	Increase in personnel of NATO Response Force from 13,000 to 40,000
Planning	Readiness Action Plan (RAP), which introduces a series of ‘assurance measures’ and ‘adaptation measures’ specifically aimed at the Nordic–Baltic region
	NATO Forward Integration Teams to NATO’s ‘eastern flank’
	Contingency planning
	Host nation agreements with Sweden and Finland
Training & exercises	Steadfast Series exercises, Baltic Countries (Juncture 2012, Jazz 2013, Javelin 2014)
	Exercise Noble Jump, Poland (2015)
	Exercise Cold Response, Norway (bi-annual – Norwegian-led)
Operations	Baltic Air Policing
	NATO Force Integration Units in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland
	Enhanced Forward Presence: Battalion-sized units in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland
	Enhanced Readiness: Multinational Corps Northeast, Poland
	NATO AWACS surveillance flights
	Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1

Figure 3: NATO cooperation with Finland and Sweden

NATO, Sweden and Finland	
Area	Initiative
Political dialogue	Participation in NATO Summit
	Regular discussions at ChoD and Ministerial level
	Host Nation Support MOUs
Capabilities	Potential inclusion in NATO Response Force
	Strategic Airlift Interim Solution
Planning	Civil emergency planning
	Information exchanges on Baltic Sea region
Training & exercises	Iceland Air Meet (2014)
	Steadfast Jazz (2013)
	Almnäs PfP Training Centre
Operations	SFOR (Bosnia)
	KFOR (Kosovo)
	ISAF & Resolute Support
	Operation Unified Protector (Sweden)

Figure 4: NORDEF CO

NORDEF CO		
Area	Initiative	
Political dialogue	Annual meetings (ChoDs, Ministers of Defence & Foreign Affairs)	
	New secure communications system for discussions	
	Coordination on regional security issues	
National Defence	Enhanced cooperation on air surveillance – RADAR data sharing	
Capabilities	Air Transport Assets (NORTAT)	
	Battalion Task Force 2020	
	Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED)	
	Base camp material	
	Cyber defence	
	Land mobility engineering	
	Mine counter measures	
Armaments	Simulators and trainers	Soldier protection equipment
	Base camp management	Situational awareness systems
	Diving systems	Dismounted arms and ammunition
	Environment & hazardous materials	Unitized group rations
	Geospatial support	Nordic common uniform
	Long-range air surveillance sensors	Small arms indoor training simulators
	NATO codification	CBRN protective masks
	Pharmaceutical products	Tactical data link
	SAP software systems	
Human Resources	Individual training and courses	
	Veterans issues	
	Peace support operations education and training	
Training & Exercises	'Easy access' MOU	
	Develop Northern Flag from Arctic Challenge (if US supports)	
Operations	MEDEVAC helicopters	
	Rotational C-130 to MINUSMA	
	Support for Easter Africa Standby Force	

Figure 5: EU initiatives in the Nordic–Baltic Region

European Union	
Area	Initiative
Political	Lisbon Treaty Solidarity Assistance Clauses (2007–present)
Capabilities	Nordic Battlegroup (2007–present)
Economic	Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (2009–present)

7. Notes

¹ The Centre for Military Studies is very grateful to the workshop participants for their enthusiasm, expertise and ideas that they brought to the table. It is important to note, however, that while the authors of this report have drawn upon the views and suggestions of the workshop participants, the report does not – and indeed cannot – represent a consensus view of the participants. The views expressed herein are those of the authors alone.

² Henrik Breitenbauch, “Det store nordiske rum: Trump, Putin og geopolitikkens uafvendelighed,” *Internasjonal Politikk*, 75, 1 (2017): 45-51.

³ Henrik Breitenbauch, “Geopolitical *Geworfenheit*: Northern Europe after the Post-Cold War,” *Journal of Regional Security* 10, 2 (2015):114.

⁴ Breitenbauch, “Geopolitical *Geworfenheit*: Northern Europe after the Post-Cold War,” 14.

⁵ President of the Republic of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves et al., *Joint Declaration of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Presidents on the situation in Georgia (9 August 2008)*: <https://web.archive.org/web/20080814032314/http://www.president.lt/en/news.full/9475>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

⁶ Ulrike Demmer and Ralf Neukirch, “NATO Developed Secret Contingency Plans for Baltic States,” *Der Spiegel*, (7 December 2010): <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/fear-of-russia-nato-developed-secret-contingency-plans-for-baltic-states-a-733361.html>, accessed March 26, 2017; Scott Shane, “NATO Balanced Baltic and Russian Anxieties,” *The New York Times*, (6 December 2010): <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/europe/07wikileaks-nato.html?>, accessed March 27, 2017.

⁷ Both formal and informal institutions are comprised in Samuel P. Huntington’s definition of institutions as ‘stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour’, in Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12.

⁸ NATO, *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010), 2–3.

⁹ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *Background on Agency Reform - Media Backgrounder* (undated): http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_06/20110609_backgrounder-agency_reform.pdf, accessed March 26, 2017.

¹⁰ NATO, *NATO Defence Planning Process*, (updated 30 January 2017): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49202.htm, accessed 26 March, 2017.

¹¹ NATO, *Standardization*, (updated 23 January 2017): http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69269.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 26 March, 2017.

¹² NATO, *Allied Command Operations (ACO)*, (updated 11 November 2014): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52091.htm, accessed 26 March, 2017.

¹³ Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "The Framework Nations' Concept and NATO," *NATO Defence College Research Paper no. 132* (July 2016), 2. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=965_, accessed 17 May, 2017.

¹⁴ Juha Pyykonen, *Nordic Partners of NATO: How Similar are Finland and Sweden within NATO Cooperation? FIIA Report 48* (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016): http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/616/nordic_partners_of_nato, accessed 17 May, 2017; Robert Egnell, "The Swedish Experience: Overcoming the Non-NATO-Member Conundrum," in *Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War*, ed. Karl Mueller (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015); Daniel J. Pedrotty, *Prospects for Finland and Sweden to Pursue Closer Defense Cooperation with NATO* (Monterey: United States Naval Postgraduate School, 2016) <http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/50465>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

¹⁵ NATO, *Relations with Sweden*, (updated 28 November 2016): http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52535.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 26 March, 2017.

¹⁶ NATO, *Relations with Sweden*.

¹⁷ Pyykonen, *Nordic Partners of NATO*, 100.

¹⁸ Embassy of Finland in Washington, *Nordic Defense Cooperation and Smart Defense: 'To Do More with Less'*, (22 October 2012): <http://www.finland.org/Public/default.aspx?contentid=260665&nodeid=35833&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>, accessed 21 March, 2017.

¹⁹ NORDEFECO, *The Cooperation Areas*, (undated): <http://www.nordefco.org/The-Cooperation-Areas>, accessed 26 March, 2017.

²⁰ NORDEFECO, *MINUSMA - Signature of Letter of Intent*, (undated): <http://www.nordefco.org/MINUSMA-Signature-of-Letter-of-Intent>, accessed 26 March, 2017.

²¹ NORDEFECO, *Joint Statement from the Nordic Ministers of Defence, Copenhagen, 9 November 2016*: <http://www.nordefco.org/files/Backgrounds/Joint-Statement-from-the-Nordic-Ministers-of-Defence-2016.pdf>, accessed 26 March 2017.

²² NORDEFECO, *NORDEFECO Annual Report 2016* (Copenhagen: Ministry of Defence, 2017), 10.

²³ NORDEFECO, *NORDEFECO Annual Report 2016*, 10.

²⁴ NORDEFECO, *NORDEFECO Annual Report 2016*, 3.

²⁵ The Mutual defence clause contains an 'obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power' in case a member state is the victim of armed aggression on their territory (although pointing to NATO for collective defence for NATO EU members). Further, the Lisbon Treaty obligates members to 'act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster'. Treaty of Lisbon: Mutual defence clause (Article 42.7 TEU): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf, accessed 17 May, 2017.

²⁶ European External Action Service, *Shaping a Common Security and Defence Policy*, (updated 8 July 2016): https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters-homepage/5388/shaping-commin-security-and-defence-policy_en, accessed 3 April, 2017.

²⁷ Christine Nissen, "European Defence Cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty - The road is paved for increased momentum," *DIIS Report 06* (Copenhagen 2015): https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer_2015/diis_report_06_european_defence_cooperation_after_the_lisbon_treaty_web.pdf, accessed 17 May, 2017.

²⁸ Håkon Lunde Saxi, "Nordic Defence Cooperation after the Cold War," *Oslo Files on Defence and Security* (Oslo: 2011), 21: <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/99336>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

²⁹ Leif Lindbäck, "Norway's Experience with the EDA," *EDA Bulletin* 12 (2009).

³⁰ Government of Norway, *Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy*, (updated 5 August 2013): https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/european-policy/Norways-relations-with-Europe/eu_fusp/id684931/, accessed 7 April, 2017.

³¹ Government Offices of Sweden, *Three Goals for the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region*, (updated 26 November 2014): <http://www.government.se/sweden-in-the-eu/eu-strategy-for-the-baltic-sea-region/three-goals-for-the-eu-strategy-for-the-baltic-sea-region---eusbsr/>, accessed 7 April 2017; European Commission, *What is the EUSBSR - EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region*, (2017): <http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/about>, accessed 9 April, 2017.

³² European Defence Agency, *Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)*, (13 August 2012): [http://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/maritime-surveillance-\(marsur\)](http://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/maritime-surveillance-(marsur))

³³ Martin Murphy, Frank G. Hoffman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., *Hybrid Maritime Warfare and the Baltic Sea Region*, (Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies, November 2016): http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/Hybrid_Maritime_Warfare_and_the_Baltic_Sea_Region.pdf, accessed 17 May, 2017; Gary Schaub Jr., Martin Murphy, and Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Maritime Warfare: Building Baltic Resilience," *The RUSI Journal* 162, 1 (February/March 2017).

³⁴ Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8)*, (updated 04.07.2016): <http://www.vm.ee/en/nordic-baltic-cooperation-nb-8>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, *Co-operation between the Baltic and Nordic Countries*, (updated 26 January 2017): <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/baltic-sea-region/co-operation-between-the-baltic-and-nordic-countries>, accessed 8 April, 2017.

³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, *Briefly on Practical Baltic-Nordic Cooperation* (2016): http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/-relizes/nb8_sadarbiba_eng.jpg, accessed 8 April, 2017.

³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, *Co-operation between the Baltic and Nordic Countries* <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/baltic-sea-region/co-operation-between-the-baltic-and-nordic-countries>, accessed 8 April 2017.

- ³⁸ Danish Presidency of Nordic–Baltic Eight 2015, *NB8 - Nordic–Baltic Cooperation - Progress Report 2015*, (no date): http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/Final_NB8_Progress_Report_2015.pdf, accessed 8 April, 2017.
- ³⁹ Latvian Presidency of the Nordic–Baltic Eight 2016, *Nordic–Baltic Cooperation Progress Report 2016* (2016): http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/NB8/2016_12_21_NB8_Progress_Report_2016_EN.pdf, accessed 8 April, 2017.
- ⁴⁰ Valdis Birkavs and Søren Gade, *NB8 Wise Men Report* (Riga and Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, August 2010): <https://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/Skyrslur/NB8-Wise-Men-Report.pdf>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- ⁴¹ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Defence Secretary launches new forum of northern European countries* (2010): <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-launches-new-forum-of-northern-european-countries>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- ⁴² The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Enhancing Security in the Nordic and Baltic Regions* (London: January 2017)
- ⁴³ Heather Conley, *The Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE)*. Heather Conley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. *Testimony Before the House Committee on International Relations* (Washington, April 21, 2004): <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/31684.htm>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- ⁴⁴ United States Department of State, *Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE)*: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rt/epine/index.htm>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- ⁴⁵ United States Department of State, *Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (E-PINE): Mission Statement* : <https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/epine/c10621.htm>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- ⁴⁶ Estonian Presidency of Nordic–Baltic Eight 2014, *Nordic–Baltic Cooperation – Progress Report 2014*: http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/ministrija/NB8_Progress_Report_2014.pdf, accessed 8 April 2017; Conley, *The Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE)*.
- ⁴⁷ Institute of International Relations and Political Science Vilnius University: *Annual e-PINE academic meeting* <http://www.tspmi.vu.lt/en/photos/annual-e-pine-academic-meeting-125>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- ⁴⁸ The summit suggested in the report envisages a top-level regional forum where regional issues can be discussed and where regional stances and common regional solutions can be agreed upon – similar to summits held between the countries of the so-called Visegrad Group. See for instance: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- ⁴⁹ Henrik Breitenbauch et al., *Get it Together – Smart Defence Solutions to NATO’s Compound Challenge of Multinational Procurement* (Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies: 2013): http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/getittogether/Get_it_Together.pdf, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- ⁵⁰ NORDEFECO, *ARMA Working Groups & Activities* (no date): <http://www.nordefco.org/ARMA-Working-Groups>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

⁵¹ The SUCBAS cooperation commenced operations in April 2009 and consists of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the United Kingdom. The initiative is led by the natives of these countries. SUCBAS, *SUCBAS Rationale* :<http://sucbas.org>, accessed 26 March, 2017.

⁵² The lessons learned from the Swedish–Finnish SUCFIS cooperation directly inspired the multinational SUCBAS cooperation as SUCBAS notes on the SUCBAS.org website. This experience shows the need and potential of further Nordic–Baltic SITAWARE integration.

⁵³ Patricia DeGennaro, “The Gray Zone and Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space,” *Small Wars Journal* (2016): <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-gray-zone-and-intelligence-preparation-of-the-battle-space>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

⁵⁴ Andrew Rettman, “France and Germany propose EU ‘defence union,’” *EUobserver*, 12 September, 2016: <https://euobserver.com/foreign/135022>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

⁵⁵ Paolo Gentiloni “Gentiloni - EU needs ‘Schengen for defense’ (Politico)” 15 September, 2016: http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2016/09/gentiloni-eu-needs-schengen-for.html, accessed 17 May, 2017.

⁵⁶ BBC News, “US Nato general fears rapid Russian troop deployments,” 20 June, 2016: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36575180>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

⁵⁷ BBC News, “US Nato general fears rapid Russian troop deployments.” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36575180>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

⁵⁸ NORDEFECO, *Memorandum of Understanding on Easy Access signed by Nordic Defence Ministers* (9 November 2016): <http://www.nordefco.org/Memorandum-of-Understanding-on-Easy-Access-signed-by-Nordic-Defence-Ministers>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

⁵⁹ Paul Ciocoiu, “Estonia eyes a military Schengen Area,” *Balkan Defense*, 2 January, 2016: <http://www.balkandefense.com/estonia-eyes-a-military-schengen>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

⁶⁰ *InterForce website*: <http://www.interforce.dk>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

8. References

- BBC News, "US Nato general fears rapid Russian troop deployments." 20 June, 2016: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36575180>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- Birkavs, Valdis and Gade, Søren. *NB8 Wise Men Report*. Riga and Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, August 2010. <https://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/Skyrslur/NB8-Wise-Men-Report.pdf>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- Breitenbauch, Henrik. "Det store nordiske rum: Trump, Putin og geopolitikkens uafvendelighed," *Internasjonal Politikk* 75, 3 (2017): 45-51.
- Breitenbauch, Henrik. "Geopolitical *Geworfenheit*: Northern Europe After the Post-Cold War," *Journal of Regional Security* 10, 2 (2015): 113-133.
- Breitenbauch, Henrik; Schaub Jr., Gary; Pradhan-Blach, Flemming and Kristensen, Kristian Sjøby. *Get it Together – Smart Defence Solutions to NATO's Compound Challenge of Multinational Procurement*. Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies, 2013. http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/getittogether/Get_it_Together.pdf, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- Ciocoiu, Paul "Estonia eyes a military Schengen Area," *Balkan Defense*, 2 January, 2016: <http://www.balkandefense.com/estonia-eyes-a-military-schengen>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- Conley, Heather. *The Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE)*. Heather Conley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. *Testimony Before the House Committee on International Relations*, Washington, April 21, 2004: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/31684.htm>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- Danish Presidency of Nordic–Baltic Eight 2015, *NB8-Nordic–Baltic Cooperation – Progress Report 2015*: http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/Final_NB8_Progress_Report_2015.pdf, accessed 8 April, 2017.
- DeGennaro, Patricia. "The Gray Zone and Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space," *Small Wars Journal* (2016) <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-gray-zone-and-intelligence-preparation-of-the-battle-space>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- Demmer, Ulrike and Neukirch, Ralf. "NATO Developed Secret Contingency Plans for Baltic States," *Der Spiegel*. 7 December 2010. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/fear-of-russia-nato-developed-secret-contingency-plans-for-baltic-states-a-733361.html>, accessed 17 May, 2017.
- Egnell, Robert. "The Swedish Experience: Overcoming the Non-NATO-Member Conundrum," in *Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War*, ed. Karl Mueller, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015.
- Embassy of Finland in Washington. *Nordic Defense Cooperation and Smart Defense: 'To Do More with Less'*, (22 October 2012):

<http://www.finland.org/Public/default.aspx?contentid=260665&nodeid=35833&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>, accessed 21 March, 2017.

Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Nordic–Baltic Eight (NB8)*, (updated 4 July 2016): <http://www.vm.ee/en/nordic-baltic-cooperation-nb-8>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

Estonian Presidency of Nordic–Baltic Eight 2014. *Nordic–Baltic Cooperation – Progress Report 2014*: http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/ministrija/NB8_Progress_Report_2014.pdf, accessed 8 April, 2017.

European Commission. *What is the EUSBSR – EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region*, 2017. <http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/about>, accessed 9 April, 2017.

European Defence Agency. *Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)*, 13 August 2012 : [http://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/maritime-surveillance-\(marsur\)](http://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/maritime-surveillance-(marsur)), accessed 17 May, 2017.

European External Action Service. *Shaping a Common Security and Defence Policy*, (updated 8 July 2016): https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters-homepage/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en, accessed 3 April, 2017.

Gentiloni, Paolo. *Gentiloni – EU needs ‘Schengen for defense’ (Politico)*. 15 September 2016: http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2016/09/gentiloni-eu-needs-schengen-for.html, accessed 9 April, 2017.

Government of Norway. *Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy*, (updated 5 August 2013): https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/european-policy/Norways-relations-with-Europe/eu_fusp/id684931/, accessed 7 April, 2017.

Government Offices of Sweden. *Three Goals for the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region*, (updated 26 November 2014): <http://www.government.se/sweden-in-the-eu/eu-strategy-for-the-baltic-sea-region/three-goals-for-the-eu-strategy-for-the-baltic-sea-region---eusbsr/>, accessed 7 April, 2017.

Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Institute of International Relations and Political Science Vilnius University: *Annual e-PINE academic meeting*. <http://www.tspmi.vu.lt/en/photos/annual-e-pine-academic-meeting-125>, accessed 9 April, 2017.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Enhancing Security in the Nordic and Baltic Regions*. London: January, 2017.

InterForce website
<http://www.interforce.dk>

Latvian Presidency of the Nordic–Baltic Eight 2016, *Nordic–Baltic Cooperation Progress Report 2016* (2016):

http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/NB8/2016_12_21_NB8_Progress_Report_2016_EN.pdf, accessed 8 April, 2017.

Lindbäck, Leif, “Norway’s Experience with the EDA,” *EDA Bulletin* 12, (2009).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, *Briefly on Practical Baltic-Nordic Cooperation* (2016): http://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/-relizes/nb8_sadarbiba_eng.jpg, accessed 8 April, 2017.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, *Co-operation between the Baltic and Nordic Countries*, (updated 26 January 2017): <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/baltic-sea-region/co-operation-between-the-baltic-and-nordic-countries>, accessed 8 April, 2017.

Murphy, Marti; Hoffman, Frank G., and Schaub Jr., Gary, *Hybrid Maritime Warfare and the Baltic Sea Region*. Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies, November 2016.

http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/Hybrid_Maritime_Warfare_and_the_Baltic_Sea_Region.pdf, accessed 17 May, 2017.

NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *Background on Agency Reform – Media Backgrounder* (undated), available at

http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_06/20110609_backgrounder-agency_reform.pdf, accessed 26 March, 2017.

NATO, *Allied Command Operations (ACO)*:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52091.htm, accessed 26 March, 2017.

NATO, *NATO Defence Planning Process*, (updated 30 January 2017):

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49202.htm, accessed 26 March, 2017.

NATO, *Relations with Sweden*, (updated 28 November 2016):

http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52535.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 26 March, 2017.

NATO, *Standardization*, (updated 23 January 2017):

http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69269.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 26 March, 2017.

NATO, *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon*. Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010.

Nissen, Christine. “European Defence Cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty – The road is paved for increased momentum,” *DIIS Report 06* (Copenhagen 2015): 1-40.

https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer_2015/diis_report_06_european_defence_cooperation_after_the_lisbon_treaty_web.pdf, accessed 17 May, 2017.

NORDEFECO, *ARMA Working Groups & Activities* :

<http://www.nordefco.org/ARMA-Working-Groups>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

NORDEFECO, *Joint Statement from the Nordic Ministers of Defence, Copenhagen, 9 November 2016*: <http://www.nordefco.org/files/Backgrounds/Joint-Statement-from-the-Nordic-Ministers-of-Defence-2016.pdf>, accessed 26 March, 2017.

NORDEFECO, *Memorandum of Understanding on Easy Access signed by Nordic Defence Ministers* (9 November 2016):

<http://www.nordefco.org/Memorandum-of-Understanding-on-Easy-Access-signed-by-Nordic-Defence-Ministers>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

NORDEFECO, *MINUSMA – Signature of Letter of Intent*, (undated):

<http://www.nordefco.org/MINUSMA-Signature-of-Letter-of-Intent>, accessed 26 March, 2017.

NORDEFECO, *NORDEFECO Annual Report 2016*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Defence, 2017.

NORDEFECO, *The Cooperation Areas*, (undated):

<http://www.nordefco.org/The-Cooperation-Areas>, accessed 26 March, 2017.

Palmer, Diego A. Ruiz. “The Framework Nations’ Concept and NATO,” *NATO Defence College Research Paper no. 132* (July 2016): 1-20. <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=965>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

Pedrotty, Daniel J. *Prospects for Finland and Sweden to Pursue Closer Defense Cooperation with NATO*. Monterey: United States Naval Postgraduate School, 2016.

<http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/50465>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

President of the Republic of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves, President of the Republic of Latvia Valdis Zatlers, President of the Republic of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Poland Lech Kaczyński, *Joint Declaration of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Presidents on the situation in Georgia (9 August 2008)*:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20080814032314/http://www.president.lt/en/news.full/9475>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

Pyykonen, Juha. *Nordic Partners of NATO: How Similar are Finland and Sweden within NATO Cooperation? FIIA Report 48*. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 2016.

http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/616/nordic_partners_of_nato, accessed 17 May, 2017.

Rettman, “Andrew. France and Germany propose EU” *EUobserver* (12 September 2016):

<https://euobserver.com/foreign/135022>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

Saxi, Håkon Lunde. “Nordic Defence Cooperation after the Cold War,” *Oslo Files on Defence and Security* (Oslo: 2011), 21: <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/99336>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

Schaub Jr., Gary; Murphy, Martin and Hoffman, Frank G. "Hybrid Maritime Warfare: Building Baltic Resilience," *The RUSI Journal* 162, 1 (February/March 2017): 32-40.

Shane, Scott. "NATO Balanced Baltic and Russian Anxieties," *The New York Times*. (December 6, 2010): <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/europe/07wikileaks-nato.html>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

SUCBAS, *SUCBAS Rationale* :<http://sucbas.org>, accessed 26 March, 2017

Treaty of Lisbon: Mutual defence clause (Article 42.7 TEU):

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf, accessed 17 May, 2017.

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Defence Secretary launches new forum of northern European countries*. 2010: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-launches-new-forum-of-northern-european-countries>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

United States Department of State, *Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE)* (no date): <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rt/epine/index.htm>, accessed 17 May, 2017.

United States Department of State, *Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (E-PINE): Mission Statement* :<https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/epine/c10621.htm>, accessed 17 May, 2017.