CENTRE FOR MILITARY STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN

# An Analysis of Conditions for Danish Defence Policy – Strategic Choices 2012

*This analysis is part of the research-based services for public authorities carried out at the Centre for Military Studies for the parties to the Danish Defence Agreement. Its purpose is to analyse the conditions for Danish security policy in order to provide an objective background for a concrete discussion of current security and defence policy problems and for the long-term development of security and defence policy.*

*The Centre for Military Studies is a research centre at the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. At the centre research is done in the fields of security and defence policy and military strategy, and the research done at the centre forms the foundation for research-based services for public authorities for the Danish Ministry of Defence and the parties to the Danish Defence Agreement.*

*This analysis is based on research-related method and its conclusions can therefore not be interpreted as an expression of the attitude of the Danish Government, of the Danish Armed Forces or of any other authorities.*

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*References to the literature and other material used in the analysis can be found at http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/.*

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# Introduction

The security capacity of the Danish state is the aggregated ability of state authorities and of civil society to contribute to coordinated analysis, prevention and action in relation to the threats and risks that Danish citizens and Danish society are faced with in an open, complex international system that is constantly undergoing change. The ability of this security capacity to be a well-functioning political instrument for creating security for Danish citizens and the Danish society depends on the state's ability to use various instruments in a cohesive manner so that the limited resources available can be combined in the best possible way to create the best possible effect. This requires an integration of instruments within a number of ministerial areas as well as an integration of public and private resources, but first and foremost, it requires an overall vision, a strategy and operational planning with regard to the application of these resources.

This analysis deals with the contribution of the Danish Armed Forces to Danish security capacity which, since 2001, has been characterised by participation in military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. These actions will have been phased out by the end of 2014. This means that the resources that have been committed to support for major land-based military contributions in Asia and to civil reconstruction measures for the societies in question will no longer be committed to missions of this type. This will create new liberty of action for defence policy and thereby an opportunity to re-evaluate the prioritisation and organisation of the Danish Armed Forces. At the same time, the former and existing Danish Governments have announced savings in the defence budget. This must be seen against the background of a general development in which military equipment is becoming steadily more sophisticated and expensive, in addition to the fact that operations are more costly. These cost increases come at a time when there is greater demand for the capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces while defence budgets are being cut back in Denmark as well as among our allies. In such a situation, fundamentally new thinking and firm prioritisation of the resources of the Danish Defence will be required if increasing costs combined with steadily decreasing budgets are not to gradually reduce the capacity to provide security.

It is necessary to discuss what the Danish Armed Forces is capable of and what its capacity should be used for. But such a discussion requires an advance understanding of what the Danish Armed Forces can do today on the whole. We can no longer discuss security and defence policy on the basis of the differences between our present circumstances and those of the Cold War in the past – these differences cannot help us to understand the world we live in today. Nor can we any longer discuss security and defence policy on the basis of isolated events such as the acts of terrorism on 11 September 2001 – this perspective prevents us from seeing the broad lines. In other words, we need to understand where we are going, rather than to listen to stories about the events of the past or present.

In 2011, the Woodrow Wilson Centre published an analysis of US security policy, apparently written by Mr Y. George Kennan wrote an article in Foreign Affairs in 1946 under the name of Mr X, which not only set the agenda for US policy during the Cold War, but also explained why this policy was right for the United States. By using the pseudonym Mr Y, Captain Wayne Porter and Colonel Mark Mykleby wished to emulate Kennan's method by stating how the US could find security in a 'complex, open, constantly changing system'. The two officers' analysis was an attempt to say where the world is heading and how the US should pursue its interests in it. In a similar manner, we have a certain need for a new narrative about security and defence policy in Denmark.

In recent years, the contribution of the Danish Armed Forces to the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other countries, have been discussed in the context of 'coordinated thinking' about the contributions of the Danish Armed Forces and civilian players (government as well as non-government) to the missions. In this analysis, we have attempted to move from regarding coordinated thinking as an independent area in which measures should be carried out, to looking at the connections between the civil and military aspects of Danish security capacity. Many of the problems that have been included in the discussion about coordinated thinking have thus been incorporated into the analysis in several contexts. And, not least, the relationship between civil and military measures and the need to find a connection between them have been discussed in the context of defence planning.

The Danish Armed Forces is faced with the need to make a series of procurement decisions, among which

are investments in new armoured personnel carriers, the armament of frigates (including a possible NATO missile defence capacity), equipment for special operations forces and, not least, investments in replacement combat aircraft. This analysis does not pronounce an opinion on whether or how these investments should be made, but attempts instead to provide a basis for choosing between them as it takes its point of departure in ends rather than means. The question as to which equipment Denmark should buy must begin with an analysis of which military capabilities Denmark needs to safeguard its interests. Not only must questions regarding equipment be answered on the basis of an overall analysis of the contribution of the Danish Armed Forces to security capacity, the acquisition of the equipment in itself is also a question of security policy. Which country we buy equipment from is decisive for Denmark's alliance policy, and in the context of smart defence, which country we finally decide to buy equipment from and operate in collaboration with is equally decisive.

The immaterial requirements imposed by the performance of tasks by the Danish Armed Forces are no less important than the material requirements. Danish Defence personnel are possibly the organisation's most important resource, and the ability of military personnel to perform their tasks in various mission environments in collaboration with other players – Danish as well as foreign – is decisive for how effective a contribution they can make to Danish security capacity. Thus, an isolated problem is how the Danish Armed Forces can develop the military profession in such a way that it is defined by special skills and a special ethos, at the same time as ensuring that it has the competence to lead military forces in complex operational environments and in an administrative context. This makes great demands on the ability to oversee complex systems and cooperate with the rest of the national security capacity. The development of the human resources of the Danish Armed Forces should also be seen in a democratic perspective. The general principles and priorities that can optimise the organisation in relation to strategic aims are very much a question of regarding human resources as being of strategic importance and making room for a flexible and mission-oriented organisation. Considerations regarding Danish Defence personnel must therefore be seen as an integral part of the rest of the analysis.

An important aspect of the personnel issue is related to recruitment, including conscription. The future of conscription is the object of an analysis under the Ministry of Defence – an analysis that the Centre for Military Studies is contributing to. Conscription will therefore not be discussed separately in this analysis.

A strategy-based approach is also necessary in order to use the limited Danish resources in the most cost-effective manner in a situation where the demand for security services is almost unlimited. Looking at strategic capacity overall makes it possible to identify and invest in interdisciplinary capacities that make other capacities more of a piece. Intelligence and transport resources are examples of this.

The analysis takes its point of departure, as do Porter and Mykleby, in the assumption that the international system is open, complex and constantly undergoing change. Chapter two thus sets out the framework within which the Danish Armed Forces must function by describing a world characterised by globalisation and the shift in global power. Chapter two also poses the question as to how Denmark should pursue its interests in such a world and, in this connection, differentiates between safeguarding these interests in a positive and a negative sense. But what if the global tendencies fail to materialise in practice? Chapter three looks at the strategic surprises that could change the conditions for the analysis. We therefore take a look at an important aspect of every security policy narrative at a time of unrest, namely the risk that lies in making decisions when there is uncertainty about what the future will bring. Chapter four goes from the global conditions for Danish security and defence policy to the alliance-related conditions for this. Like those of the rest of the world, Danish alliances are characterised by new patterns of co-operation – NATO is increasingly becoming a network in which Denmark must pursue its interests in bilateral and multilateral coalitions within the alliance. New demands are being made on defence planning in a world of global contexts and alliance networks. This comes to expression in the professionalisation and formalisation of defence planning on the part of our allies. Chapter five describes how these tendencies could be translated into a Danish context. Defence planning and thereby the organisation of civil-military relations is a decisive element in the democratic control of the armed forces, so how should

defence planning be realised in practice? This is the subject of chapter six, where we present a number of military models in order to demonstrate that the Danish Armed Forces could be structured in different ways and thereby contribute to Denmark's security capacity in different ways. The analysis ends with a summary conclusion. First, however, we will describe our method. The chapters all end with a number of questions that can function as drafts for the continuation of the debate.

## METHOD

Our purpose is to analyse the security policy conditions for Danish defence policy in order to create an unbiased background for a concrete discussion of current security and defence policy issues and of long-term security and defence policy developments. The analysis was carried out in the knowledge that a concrete discussion such as this must be an expression of a difficulty in ordering priorities at a time of limited economic resources.

The Centre for Military Studies was asked to perform this analysis by the political parties to the Danish Defence Agreement 2010-15 at a meeting at Christiansborg on 12 January 2012. The analysis was to be presented at a conference in April 2012 and as such form part of the preparatory discussions on prioritisations in the Danish Armed Forces. The Centre for Military Studies set up a project group to perform the analysis and assist the Ministry of Defence in arranging the conference. The analysis was thus written with the aim of creating a foundation for further discussion.

A research-based method was used to perform a concrete analysis of Danish security and defence policy with the intention of illustrating the central problem complexes in order to facilitate political decision-making. The work on the analysis was characterised by a brief project programme and a tight deadline.

The project group took its point of departure in an expert seminar held on 1 March 2012, where a number of experts, stakeholders and centrally-placed individuals from the Danish Armed Forces discussed their experiences and the opportunities for the organisation based on talks given by senior lecturer Peter Viggo Jakobsen and professor Martin Marcusen. Beginning with the subjects identified during the workshop, a number of the centre's staff members wrote working papers that formed the background for the work of the project group in performing an analysis proper. These working papers drew on the knowledge and insight built up at the centre on strategy, security policy, defence policy, NATO and the Danish Armed Forces. It can be mentioned in this connection that some of the central discussions in the project group dealt with the implementation of strategy, and these discussions benefited from the research on strategy and the implementation of policies that are carried out at the centre. The project group also drew on the various professional competences represented at the centre, including those of the military officers and civilian staff from the Ministry of Defence who are employed at the centre. Furthermore, the work drew on a workshop carried out with the Ministry of Defence, which was held at the centre in 2011, on the future capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces.

The work carried out by the project group was followed by a colleague who functioned as the red team. Based on his experience with similar projects for NATO, his task was to draw attention to the subjects that the project group had overlooked in their haste and also to quality assure the product.

Source references can be found on the centre's website.

# Globalisation and the Global Power Shift

At the beginning of the 21st century, the international system is open, complex and constantly changing. Globalisation and the global power shift form the background for this new organisation of global risks and opportunities.

Globalisation is a political, economic and social process which – due to a steady reduction in global transaction costs – enables more interaction between social systems at global and national level. Globalisation means an opening up of the systems that previously confined national communities or were dominated by transnational companies. The open systems are the framework around a social interaction that is far more complex than formerly, precisely because the political, economic and social processes are no longer limited and controllable within given systems, but are constantly undergoing change. Globalisation redefines governmental power and opportunities just as the open, complex systems offer individuals and groups new power and new opportunities. This creates many opportunities for changes, and it is these changes that define political, economic and social developments at the beginning of the 21st century.

This chapter first describes the global power shift. The fact that globalisation opens up systems increases Asia's capacity and reduces Europe's share of global production. We then take a look at the regional consequences of the global power shift. The chapter takes its point of departure in the Danish analysis of the geostrategic conditions for Danish security and defence policy so far. The analysis makes it clear that the Danish focus on security is so broad that priority must be given to those potential missions that are important for Denmark. This requires decisions to be made as to what Danish interests are – which is the third subject of this chapter.

**The Global Power Shift**

Globalisation is the framework around a global power shift at two levels. Firstly, the new, open and complex systems offer individuals, organisations and companies the opportunity to act in political, economic and social systems in ways that were not possible before. This does not mean that states and governments are less powerful than formerly (in some cases, the opposite is true), but it redefines the conditions under which they exercise their power and achieve influence. If the sovereignty of states can be understood as a way of defining a closed political system within which governments have a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, then globalisation is a challenge to the sovereignty of states. This is not

only because it opens up national, social, economic and political systems to their surroundings, but also because the performance of government tasks has become more complex as it must include other countries, their social realities and the social, political and economic facts that transcend national borders. This is in evidence at the other level of the power shift where the world's economic centre is beginning to move towards Asia.

To a great extent, globalisation has created an opportunity for Asia – with India and China in the lead – to regain that share of the global economy the region had before the Industrial Revolution brought an economic growth to the North Atlantic region that the rest of the world could not match. However, there is little to suggest that China and India will achieve what was almost 50 per cent of the world economy that they stood for at the beginning of the 19th century. The implication is that the future will see a more equal distribution of world economic activity. But at the beginning of the 21st century, we appear to have definitively left the period during which Europe stood for a disproportionate share of world economic activity. It is thus the major European powers, and thereby the EU, that are the real 'losers' with regard to the relative distribution of prosperity. This will probably manifest itself clearly in relation to those economies that are capable of pulling the world out of the financial crisis.

Even though economic power cannot on the face of things be expressed in terms of military power, the high economic growth rates in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) give these countries an opportunity to invest in military technology without it being necessary to divert the additional expenditure on defence budgets from other social investments. This offers them opportunities that the Western countries lack, and is of decisive importance for the balance of power in the long term. Today, the investments that the Western countries, with the United States in the lead, have already made in military capabilities give the West clear military superiority. However, military technology has developed in recent years with computer technology, drones and similar innovations creating radically new capabilities for warfare. A continuation of Western superiority will depend on the possibility of continued investment in new military capabilities in spite of the other demands made on state budgets, but the new growth economies have an economic surplus that can be invested in new military technologies. An assessment from the International Institute for Strategic Studies predicts that, in 2012, the absolute value of military

**The Historical Distribution of Global Gross Domestic Product** Figure 1




Source: China's Economy: Hello America, *The Economist*. 2012.

**The Quality of Military Equipment** Figure 2




Source: Steven Browns and Scott Gebicke, 'From R&D Investment to Fighting Power, 25 Years Later', *McKinsey on Government*, 5 (2010), 70-75.

expenditure in Asia will exceed defence expenditure in the European countries for the first time in recent history. Europe, however, will still have higher per capita expenditure. This illustrates the qualitative lead that the West has in relation to the military capacity that these countries devote their defence budgets to. What is known as the Military Equipment Quality index shows precisely how big the investment in research and development is in a country's investments in military equipment. And it clearly indicates the decisive advantage that the United States gains from its huge defence budget and how the shortfall in Russian investments has reduced the country to the status of a regional power. But it first and foremost shows what major investments China has made in its military. In its Efterretningsmæssig risikovurdering 2011 (intelligence-related risk assessment 2011), the Danish Defence Intelligence Service states that 'the modernisation of China's defence … [will] to an increasing extent make it possible for China to act as a global military power and make it the world's second-biggest military power after the United States'.

The global changes in economic activity are therefore central to the distribution of military capabilities in the world: but what significance will these changes have for the ability of the global community to act? The US National Intelligence Council concludes that in 2025, the international system will no longer be an 'international society' with common values based on national states. Globalisation means a redefinition of the sovereignty of the state, and China will represent values and a social model that can compete with those of the West. Like the rest of the Western world, Denmark is in competition with the new social and economic models in Asia, primarily China. In this connection, India will be able to gain a new, interesting position as an independent strategic player between the Western states and China and may, as the world's biggest democracy, choose a Western approach to values. In its Efterretningsmæssig risikovurdering 2011, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service concludes that: 'the global dominance of the United States will be weakened in the long term, but it will still be the strongest power. Changes in the global balance of power will lead to insecurity and a heightened risk of conflict'.

'The global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which all elements of US national power must be applied', it is emphasised in the strategy the United States published in January 2012. This was a revision of The National Military Strategy of the United States of

America published in February 2011 which defined elements of US power as 'an adaptive blend of diplomacy, development, and defense'. The United States has a very well-developed conceptual apparatus in relation to the definition of security and defence policy priorities which includes the government and Congress. In January 2012, the purpose of the strategy was to indicate a general direction in accordance with which cutbacks could be made in the defence budget. The strategy paper was thus used to order priorities. Obama's government is acutely aware that Asia and the Pacific region are the United States' geostrategic priority. Cooperation with Europe is described in relation to safeguarding the United States' global interests, and even though the strategy thus emphasises the fact that there are unresolved conflicts in Europe and that the US has a lasting interest in maintaining peace and stability in Europe, it will withdraw troops from Europe and to a greater extent rely on Europeans to perform their own tasks – through such means as task sharing in connection with defence policy. This strategy clearly shows that the United States is a global power and that its defence policy priorities are changing in step with the global power shift.

Precisely because the United States is a global power, European security policy issues form only part of the US agenda, and if Europeans can only contribute to the European element of this agenda, European security policy will appear less relevant and less in keeping with the times in a US perspective. There will be no less a need for a European contribution if the United States should carry out a geographical prioritisation of its strategy as this strategy will not clearly prioritise the tasks that US forces must perform in general. The US military is therefore confronted with an onerous task – a task that it could find increasingly difficult to perform in the long term. For this reason, there is concern in the United States about European defence spending cuts. The question being asked in Washington is what Europeans will be capable of contributing. It will be decisive for the United States' European partners – individually and collectively – to find a clear answer to what they can contribute to the maintenance of global security and stability in collaboration with the United States.

In a situation in which the international system is undergoing change with regard to the way it functions, with regard to the increased influence of non-government players and with regard to the balance of power between the major powers, it is decisive for a small country that the global infrastructure remains open to everybody. Navigable seaways, free markets and a well-functioning, uncensored Internet are just some of the areas that must function if globalisation is to remain an advantage for Denmark.

The changes in the conditions for international relations, and in power-political conditions, will set the agenda far into the 21st century. This is the background against which changes in all other security and defence policy circumstances must be understood.

**Regional Consequences of Globalisation**

The open, complex international system creates a new framework for regional security. Today, it is possible to import and export the security problems that once primarily had regional dynamism. The consequence of this in Denmark has been that the country's security can no longer simply be seen against the background of security policy dynamism in Northern Europe, but on the contrary, as the reaction to the statement that this: 'favourable situation with regard to security geography' (Danish Defence Commission 98) was a series of indirect threats from the rest of Europe. On the basis of this, the Danish Defence Commission of 1998 found that Denmark would be obliged to help to combat European security problems, also with military means, as was done in Croatia and Bosnia, and again in Kosovo in 1999. After the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York in 2001, the conclusion was that Denmark should not only have a regional security policy focus, but must also view its security in a global perspective. Threats against Denmark were not only indirect, but could also be direct in the form of a terrorist attack, for instance. It was thus stated in what is known as the Bruun Report from 2003: 'Direct threats thus include the no longer current conventional military threat against Denmark and new, asymmetrical threats of varying extent, including terrorism.' The Bruun Report continues: 'Danish security no longer primarily depends on a threat scenario in the Baltic Sea region or in Europe, but also on the broader global situation and developments.' This global view of Danish security and defence policy was also emphasised by the Danish Defence Commission of 2008 as the report from the Commission states that globalisation has

'resulted in a far more diffuse, complex and unpredictable environment in which Denmark's security is challenged in other ways by a number of global threats, risks and tendencies'. This expansion of Danish security policy awareness took its point of departure chiefly in the fact that Denmark's neighbouring area was secure. Thereby, Denmark has had a view of its security policy surroundings and its military scope that differed decisively from the view taken in Norway, Sweden and Finland.

Developments in the Arctic have in many ways placed Denmark's territory on the Danish security and defence policy agenda once again. Denmark has concrete national interests to safeguard in the Arctic. Safeguarding our interests in the Arctic is characterised to a considerable extent by the complex, open nature of the international system. Developments in the Arctic are influenced by climate change, the consequences of which are extremely complex and highly unpredictable. This is because the tendencies in the climatic developments in the area, which the policies of most countries are based on, could change in relation to what we anticipate today. At the same time, the political responses to climate change are conditioned by the new economic and social opportunities and challenges that it could lead to. Furthermore, the subject is complicated by the question of the future status of Greenland within the Danish realm. Globalisation will also influence conditions in the Arctic. Non-government players, especially transnational companies, will play a far more prominent role than formerly. Most major powers are concentrating on problems in their immediate surroundings; only the United States is a power to be reckoned with in all corners of the globe. To the extent that this power comes under challenge from China, for instance, it could influence the level of conflict in the Arctic. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service concludes in its Efterretningsmæssig risikovurdering 2011 with regard to the Arctic that: 'It is possible to a certain extent that minor, military conflicts could arise towards 2020... But even then, it is not probable that they would turn into military conflicts.' The most likely scenario for the Arctic is a cooperative order. This implies that states will handle their coastguard tasks with the aim of meeting the challenges that the increased accessibility of the Arctic could bring about, but also with the aim of demonstrating and emphasising the common norms for the satisfactory performance of tasks that will develop on the basis of the international agreement. Good governance involves demonstrating that the Arctic states will not solely pursue narrow national interests, but will also safeguard the general interest on behalf of global society by securing shipping routes and the environment. The Arctic states will therefore be expected in this scenario to provide robust coastguard services in order to legitimise their compliance with international conventions (UNCLOS) regarding the distribution of territory and resources between them in the Arctic.

The complex and changeable nature of international systems makes it difficult to say precisely when and in which area a threat could arise. The war in Georgia in 2008 showed how abruptly a conflict capable of bringing NATO close to a conflict with Russia can arise. There is a possibility of serious internal conflicts arising in the Caucasus, Ukraine and Belarus which could spread to the surrounding countries or in some other way involve the rest of Europe. Furthermore, these conflicts could cause confrontations between close Danish allies in the Baltic States, for instance, and between NATO and Russia. Even though the Danish Defence Intelligence Service characterises Russian foreign policy as 'pragmatic', Russia's geostrategic priorities do not appear to have been firmly established. The country apparently operates to a considerable extent from situation to situation without any long-term strategy proper. On the other hand, Russia has skilfully exploited its overall security capacity as a resource in its foreign policy. Russia's reduced military power has thus been supplemented by the influence it wields as a major oil producer, at the same time as Russian diplomacy has adroitly succeeded in forming 'anti-Western' coalitions. The assessment of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service is that Russia sees 'the current shift in the centre of gravity of global power from the United States and Europe towards new power centres, especially in Asia… as an opportunity to promote a world order that is no longer dominated by the United States. In this connection, Russia will attempt to consolidate its role as a major power in interaction with the growing major powers, China and India.'

There will also be considerable potential for conflict in the Middle East during the next ten to twenty years. The 'Arab Spring' has created a new departure in the region, but it has also revealed a number of social conditions

that make it difficult for many countries in the region to become integrated into the global economy, etc. The assessment of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service is that 'the situation in the Middle East and North Africa is characterised by great insecurity and instability, and the consequences of the Arab Spring go far beyond the countries affected. The outcome of the unrest will differ from country to country, and it is very doubtful that the risings will lead to democratic forms of government in a Western sense'. The region will still be of decisive geostrategic importance, even though this importance must be expected to decline in the long term as oil is gradually replaced by other sources of energy. The Middle East raises a number of decisive questions for Denmark's engagement in international operations. Both Syria and Iran are potential areas of conflict where it could be imagined that Denmark would take part in the international community's military operations.

From the status of a continent in which Denmark was primarily engaged in development aid, Africa has become a region of security policy interest for Denmark with the focus on weak states. The Danish Navy, for example, is engaged in operations off the Horn of Africa, and Denmark is also engaged in capacity build-up in East Africa. This interest stems from the fact that, with its huge human and natural resources, Africa will be one of the 21st century's central theatres. African Futures 2050, from the Pan-African Institute for Security Studies, differentiates between the possibility of an 'African Renaissance' and various scenarios for a stagnating or deteriorating development. The decisive parameters in this study are identified as favourable international conditions and good governance.

There is no incompatibility between an open, complex world and focusing on regional patterns of conflict. Conflicts occur in a given place. But the importance of place and the possible engagement of its surroundings in that place are defined by the open, complex social systems formed by globalisation. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Denmark has focused on problems that occur at increasingly long distances from the neighbouring area that our security policy focus was concentrated on during the Cold War. This focus will continue to be relevant and will probably be broadened to include Africa. However, Denmark's own territory will also take on new significance as far as the Arctic is concerned. This means that Denmark will not only be focusing on security policy developments from Afghanistan to Af-

**Number of Conflicts and their Geographical Distribution** Figure 3




Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 2011*, 64.

rica, but also from Thule to Cape Town. This will involve far more problems than Denmark can help to solve. The precondition for a cohesive security and defence policy in which the goals are commensurate with the available resources is therefore to identify where in the world Denmark would be interested in participating. The next chapter therefore deals with how Danish interests can be identified. Before looking at the definition of Danish interests, however, it is worthwhile to look at how legal regulation and legal arguments increasingly form the framework for the conflicts Denmark takes part in.

**The Legal Regulation of Complex Conflicts**

The contents of the international laws of war – jus in bello – were chiefly developed in the 20th century, and the legal foundation is therefore in the nature of the case also worded with the point of departure in the types of conflict that were familiar in the previous century. This means in practice that the body of rules is based to a great extent on a number of fundamental distinctions, not all of which are of relevance to present-day conflicts. The central rules can be found in the four Geneva Conventions from 1949. Among other things, the conventions are based on the assumption that wars are mainly fought between two or more states and that there are no great problems involved in identifying the date that conflicts began or the date that they ceased. It also assumed in the conventions that it is relatively easy to distinguish between the people who take part in the conflict – the combatants – and those who do not – the civilians – and it is easiest to apply the conventions when the parties to the conflict are solely attempting to neutralise each other's military capacity with the help of conventional means and appear inwardly and outwardly to be organised units, at least to a certain extent.

However, the new types of conflict encountered by the Western forces, including those from Denmark, in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq were of a completely different and diffuse character. We are no longer fighting against national armies only, but to a steadily increasing extent against various non-government players who are attempting to combat a foreign presence in their area with the help of asymmetrical tactics and who, broadly speaking, have the sole common feature that they attempt to hide among the civilian population. The Geneva Conventions from 1949 were supplemented with two additional protocols in 1977 which, among other things, have the purpose of regulating new types of conflict. However, this does not alter the fact that the nature of war has changed without the laws of war following suit. Finally, there can hardly be any doubt that general social developments, including the increase in globalisation and the emergence of mass terrorism after 11 September 2001, have meant that it is increasingly difficult to maintain what were otherwise the traditionally clear legal distinctions and borders between war and peace and internal and external security.

The difficulty in maintaining clear legal distinctions between war and peace and internal and external security, respectively, is clearly in evidence in the concept Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This concept has provided the international community with something resembling a tool that makes it possible to invoke an R2P situation and take action in the form of intervening in a sovereign state. In the global community where a great deal of effort is devoted to the attempt to arrive at regulation and a legal framework, R2P, as long as it has not been embodied in a convention, will be a political tool that can be used and abused. The risk of embodying it in a convention is that it could be used to legitimise an intervention that is purely a question of power politics and not consideration for the safety of the population. Danish values and Danish foreign policy measures to date have closely approached the principles of R2P in the refusal to tolerate genocide, for instance. The risk that others will abuse the concept, however, means that its practical application should be carefully considered where Denmark is concerned.

The heightened significance and complexity of legal standards make a number of very special – and partly new – demands on those states which, like Denmark, are involved in wars such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq and, most recently, Libya. One consequence of this is that the law must be operationalised – this is known as 'legal preparation of the battlespace'. It is important in this connection to emphasise the significance of the fact that legal processes are organised in such a way as to minimise the risk of violating legal standards. This is because while the public understands in general that war is quite different to other social circumstances, and that occasional breaches of legal standards can be difficult to avoid, the same understanding can rarely be found if

the processes that made these breaches possible are not changed when they prove to have unfortunate results. In this connection, it must be acknowledged that the new focus on complying with legal standards – and the subsequent need for confirming that legal standards are still respected – may sometimes tempt warring states to manipulate the facts about actual conditions or to conceal possible breaches of these standards. It is self-evident that the more detrimental breaches of legal standards are to legitimacy, the greater will be the incentive to attempt to conceal such breaches. However, it is important to remember that the opportunity of civil society and civil politicians to exercise effective control over the military apparatus depends on openness and the truthful reporting of wars and the course they may take.

The increasing 'legalistic' nature of discussions about wars is connected with a danger that the necessary political discussions about them will be supplanted by discussions about their legality. Discussions about legality are naturally important, but the democratic debate about wars should not be confined to advancing arguments about their legality, and the sharper focus on law and its details therefore also make demands on the ability of political decision-makers to view and relate to wars by other means than through a legal optic. The widespread debate about legal standards must not induce us to believe that law can provide answers to all of the questions that arise during wars. In the final analysis, Denmark must choose which missions it will take part in and how it will perform these missions. In order to make this choice, however, the first thing that is necessary is to define politically what Denmark's interests are. In the next section, we look at two ways of defining Danish interests in a complex world.

**Danish Interests in a Complex World**

Since 1945, Danish foreign policy and security policy have been defined by a Nordic dimension, a UN dimension (including development policy), a European dimension and an Atlantic dimension. After the Cold War ended, alternate governments prioritised the Atlantic dimension based, among other things, on the view that the power of the United States was a constant factor in ensuring order and security in world politics, and that Denmark could therefore best pursue its values and interests by supporting the US agenda. The Atlantic dimension gained precedence during the 1990s when the UN proved to be much weaker than had been thought and hoped immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, US power can no longer be taken for granted, and the international system is no longer a closed system defined by a permanent distribution of power and certain economic resources. The international system is open, complex and constantly undergoing change. This means on the one hand that the dimensions of Danish foreign policy and security policy cannot be defined as they could formerly and, on the other, that US power and influence must be redefined. The consequence of this is that even though relations with the United States will continue to be a central element of Danish security and defence policy, these relations must now be seen rather as a means than as an end.

This again means that Denmark must to an increasing extent define its policies on the basis of its own interests as a small country with a major commitment to an open, free international system for the benefit, among other things, of the Danish business community. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that, in a world of open, complex systems, international institutions are increasingly becoming arenas that form the framework around high political negotiations about which coalitions should perform which tasks. This also applies to the UN, NATO and the EU. Membership of these institutions thus primarily offers the opportunity to take part in negotiations, but does not in itself provide a guarantee of influence on or protection from them. Striving to create strong institutions can therefore not be a goal in itself. Denmark must have a clear strategy for what it wishes to achieve in international forums and be prepared to enter into various coalitions in order to achieve these goals. At the same time, Denmark must choose its battles and its measures with care.

How can Denmark define its interests in an open, complex world that is constantly undergoing change? There is a negative and a positive definition of national interests. A negative definition emphasises an interest in avoiding the occurrence of certain things. From this viewpoint, Denmark has an interest in securing its sovereignty and thus avoiding an attack. This could be a question of conventional military threats and unconventional threats such as cyber attacks or terrorism. Another negative interest could be to secure control of the areas

in the Arctic that Denmark lays claim to. Safeguarding negative interests need not lead to a passive policy. The argument for sending Danish soldiers to Afghanistan to combat terrorist networks and thereby prevent a terrorist attack on Danish soil was an argument based on a negative view of the country's interests.

Based on a positive definition, interests involve ensuring a given development in the belief that it would enable Denmark to exploit new opportunities and achieve new gains. Seen from a positive viewpoint, Denmark should invest in change rather than seek a stability that is no longer to be found in a globalised world and invest in the ability to control risks rather than seek definitive security which cannot be found in a world that is constantly undergoing change. A positive definition of national interests emphasises that Denmark must give in order to receive. Danish policy should therefore be a long-term investment in an international order that ensures an international legal system which develops in step with the new global systems and challenges. An international order where the global infrastructure that ensures globalisation, and thereby contributes to Danish prosperity, is secure and can be used by all countries. Over and above this, Denmark should promote the introduction of international standards for conflict and development that lead to a politically, socially, economically and organically sustainable future.

Whether Danish interests should be defined in positive or negative terms is really a political choice. Both choices involve risks, and both choices offer opportunities to create the capacity to ensure the country's security. Both approaches are activist in the sense that this concept has been applied to Danish foreign policy because they assume that Denmark is part of a global reality and that Denmark should and must play a part in that reality – also where the area of security and defence policy is concerned. Activism, however, is no longer an adequate term to describe a political direction for Denmark, not least because it is no longer enough for Denmark to simply play an active role in safeguarding its interests. This was an effective strategy at the end of the Cold War. But as shown below, Denmark today is part of a network (also within the EU and NATO) that requires it to be an active player in its own right. Being active is no longer sufficient; we must know why we are active and what we want to achieve.

There are many questions that require political decisions in an open, complex and international system before the correct security and defence policy can be implemented. These questions include:

- How can Denmark best maintain relations with the United States in a situation where US power is declining and Denmark must define its own interests?
- To what extent should Denmark coordinate its analyses of the conditions for security and defence policy with its Nordic neighbours for the purpose of establishing coordinated measures? And would this mean anything in a globalised world?
- What position should Denmark take in relation to security issues in its neighbouring area, and how should this position be balanced in relation to the need to take part in international operations and the need for its presence in the Arctic?
- Should Denmark define its interests in negative or positive terms?

Irrespective of whether Denmark's interests are defined in positive or negative terms, the focus on safeguarding them means that the government must define these interests in a national security strategy and make sure that this strategy is used to prioritise the consumption of resources in the Danish Armed Forces with the help of systematic defence planning. A strategy and defence planning are preconditions for us to enter into the task sharing that is increasingly coming to define cooperation in NATO. But interests are only one aspect of the security policy equation. The other aspect is which alliances Denmark is willing to enter into to secure its interests, which is the subject of chapter five. First, however, we will take a look at how the changes described in this chapter could take a different course and which potentially serious consequences such strategic surprises could have.

# Strategic Surprises

The fact that security and defence policy is defined by open, complex social systems that are undergoing change means that the conditions for the policy pursued could suddenly become fundamentally challenged. Such events are referred to as 'black swans', and it is difficult to solve problems arising from events of this type because they are unexpected ('white swans' were what was expected), and there is therefore no available capacity to solve them. After 11 September 2001, most Western strategic concepts included unpredictable threats and described various methods of anticipating them. The high speed of operations after the end of the Cold War, and not least since 11 September 2001, strengthened the feeling that it is impossible to predict, not to mention prepare for, the next security policy challenge. However, it is worthwhile considering the fact that at the moment future challenges become part of present-day deliberations about security policy, these challenges will no longer be something that could happen, but something that has already become part of security policy reality. Faced with the fear of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to act today to prevent countries developing them. From this point of view, future threats are not unpredictable; the mere prediction of a threat creates a basis for many security policy measures. There is extremely sharp focus on the contemporary tendencies that could constitute the threats of the future. The great challenge with regard to pursuing strategy in a world that is undergoing change is thus not unpredictability in itself, but the fact that changes oblige all players to make choices under circumstances in which the outcome of their choices and the conditions for them cannot always be predicted. There is therefore a risk of making the wrong choice, and this risk becomes a factor in the choice.

Therefore, an important aspect of a discussion about security and defence policy is to attempt to identify the circumstances that could change the existing threat pattern and the factors that could change the tendencies that the policy is based on at present. Where defence planning and national decision-making systems are concerned, the challenge is to obtain the analytical capacity to constantly revise the threat pattern and existing plans and to convert the analytical work into capabilities that can be broadly applied to the scenarios described in the analyses. This is because the test does not deal with the extent to which it is possible to predict an event – this is impossible in principle. The test proper is the degree to which it is possible to tackle an acute security policy challenge in a given situation. This involves defence planning, decision-making systems and capabilities. In this connection, an open, informed democratic debate is an important element of security and defence policy. Such a debate not only ensures that a population could be informed of a threat, so that sudden changes in defence policy choices do not appear to be unmotivated and therefore receive little support – a democratic debate also helps to ensure that all opinions, also unwelcome opinions, can be heard. The strength of a democratic debate lies precisely in the fact that it reveals additional information and thereby provides a better basis for making decisions.

In the following, we describe events that could present a challenge to the tendencies described in this analysis and which, as such, would be 'black swans' in Danish defence policy. In the nature of the case, these scenarios are speculative and based on the worst thinkable reading of motives and possibilities. The point of them is that they can 'derail' the tendencies described above and thus become a challenge to the security and defence policy choices described in this analysis.

The global power shift towards Asia, and China in particular, could be dramatically derailed if the Chinese economy collapsed. A collapse of this kind would not only lead to internal unrest, perhaps civil war, in China – it would also be an event that could easily have consequences for the rest of Asia. As the world economy is increasingly dependent on trade with China, a collapse there would also have serious consequences for global growth and prosperity. In terms of power politics, a dramatic break with the gradual growth of China's role in the world could lead to a confrontation between the Chinese regime and its surroundings. An economic collapse could mean that China would no longer be able

to gradually gain a more central international position, and the regime might decide to use its military power to forcefully obtain what it could no longer buy. An unstable, aggressive China could end up in a conflict with India. Both states are benefiting from globalisation at present with spectacular economic activity as a result. But the two states are competing for the same markets and have unclarified territorial claims that led to war in 1962. A classic power analysis would therefore point out the possible tensions and the risk of war between these two states – however improbable this might appear today.

A collapse in Pakistan, with China and India each taking sides in a civil war, which subsequently came to involve the United States and its allies is another scenario for how an Asian conflict could endanger peaceful global development.

Denmark has security policy interests in two regions: Northern Europe/Northeast Europe and the Arctic. At present, a conflict in the Arctic is the least likely scenario, but it cannot be discounted that a global confrontation of the great powers (as described above) could lead to conflicts in the Arctic. Furthermore, the discovery of new resources could attract new players to the area who could establish their own autonomous areas around mines or similar industries and in the long term create independent areas in conflict with the legitimate government. This would weaken the individual government's sovereignty over the given area and undermine the peaceful cooperation among the Arctic states. In such a situation, minor confrontations could rapidly escalate in a conflict that could also involve neighbouring powers.

Even though Europe is now in a historically peaceful situation, a collapse of the regime in Belarus with a subsequent situation resembling civil war would not only unleash a humanitarian catastrophe in Denmark's neighbourhood, it could also potentially provoke a confrontation between NATO and Russia. In a similar manner, it is possible to imagine a scenario where unrest and internal conflict in Ukraine or the Caucasus could lead to a confrontation between NATO and Russia.

Today, Denmark is not part of the EU's defence dimension. Where pooling/sharing and smart defence are concerned, Denmark only takes part within the framework of NATO or in international cooperation. However, should Denmark decide to take part fully and wholly in the EU's defence dimension, it could have consequences for which task-sharing projects and which operations Denmark could take part in.

This analysis is based on the assumption that the Kingdom of Denmark will continue to function in its existing form. But it could be imagined that Greenland or the Faeroes might decide to become independent nations. A development along these lines would influence the prioritisation of Danish military capabilities, especially those of the navy.

The use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in an international conflict would be very likely to have a major effect on how the West and Denmark view a missile defence system and could also influence attitudes regarding how and when to tackle governments that developed or threatened to use nuclear weapons. If a target in the West were to be bombed with a nuclear weapon – either by a hostile state or by a terrorist organisation – an even more vigorous reaction could be expected that would also dramatically increase the need for intelligence and security measures.

Military technology has undergone an evolutionary development during this decade that has resulted in the increased use of robots and drones as well as more network-integrated systems. The global military balance is based on existing technologies and the future acquisition of familiar platforms (e.g. fifth generation combat aircraft). But a revolution in military technology, with the introduction of completely new types of weapons and systems, would immediately reduce the value of existing technology and thereby decisively shift the military balance to the advantage of those who developed the technology. This could constitute a fundamental challenge, particularly for smaller countries with limited defence budgets.

Security policy priorities can also depend on non-human factors such as epidemics or natural catastrophes. A natural catastrophe could have an effect on Denmark or its allies in the form of the destruction of infrastructure or large numbers of refugees. But it could also influence the thoughts of individuals or states and create fear or withdrawal which, in consequence, would lead to an involuntary change of priorities. If the ice at the North Pole began to melt more rapidly than anticipated or a new ice age should suddenly set in, it would have a local and global influence with changes in patterns of settlement and possibly a huge influx of refugees.

# The Alliance Context

Danish society is closely connected with and deeply integrated in an open, complex international system. International cooperation and alliances have therefore been the cornerstones of Danish foreign and security policy for more than 60 years. NATO's security guarantee and the opportunity to pursue foreign policy that a well-functioning global infrastructure and international institutions have provided Denmark with are decisive for Danish security capacity. Above all, in the area of defence, our allies are a precondition for Denmark's ability to conduct a committed security and defence policy. Only through cooperation can Denmark pursue its national interests and contribute to international peace and security – only through cooperation can Denmark provide and receive security.

The conditions for Denmark's alliances are changing. One reason for this is the financial crisis that has prompted Denmark's primary strategic partners over the past ten years (the United States and Great Britain) to re-evaluate their defence policy priorities and reorganise their armed forces. In order to minimise the consequences of the crisis, NATO has attempted to rethink international defence and security policy cooperation within the alliance with the concept smart defence. The financial crisis has been a contributory factor in giving new life to European defence cooperation – in the EU, in NATO and between the European countries. This could mean that Denmark's defence reservation will make it more difficult to operate within the European defence policy network. Concurrently with these external changes, the crisis has also affected the Danish defence budget, thereby creating a new situation for Danish alliance policy and for the way in which the Danish Armed Forces views its capabilities and its cooperative relations. Tendencies in defence policy among Denmark's allies create decisive, new challenges and new opportunities for Danish alliance policy and for the way in which the Danish Armed Forces and Danish defence planning can support this policy.

This chapter has described developments in the conditions for Danish alliance policy. It now focuses sharply on the defence policy consequences of the financial crisis in the perspective of alliances. But we will first present the idea of alliance policy as a market.

**The Market for Danish Alliance Policy**

Alliance policy is one means of achieving a security capacity that is greater than the individual country's own resources can provide. Especially for small countries, alliance policy is a decisive parameter in security and defence policy. This means that there is a market for defence and security policy cooperation. Viewed on the basis of the market metaphor, Danish alliance policy is a function of what is in demand in Denmark, what Denmark is willing to supply and how much demand there is. Therefore, two decisive elements are how Denmark positions itself on the market, on the one hand, and what the market situation is on the other. The increasing importance of the Arctic for Denmark, for instance, will change its market position, just as the developments in the Middle East after the 'Arab Spring' have changed the market situation. The combination of the market situation and Denmark's position on the market establish the conditions for Danish alliance policy.

By focusing on a defence force deployment, Denmark has deliberately specialised its defence policy with the aim of offering military services that there is a demand for on the part of NATO in general and on the part of our US ally in particular – and in all probability, this will continue to be the case. By thus making the Danish Armed Forces a 'subcontractor' for British and US missions, Denmark has chosen to help to solve common Western security policy problems. On the other hand, a weighty argument for the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan was that they would strengthen both Danish security and the opportunity for Denmark to join up with and have influence on important alliance partners – not least the United States. This alliance strategy has created a well-defined connection between supply and demand and a connection between operative and political considerations. It has created a firm position on a stable market. This market position has made it possible to adapt the dimensions of the Danish Armed Forces in accordance with its participation in international missions. Through these means, Denmark's position on the alliance market has created a control tool for military transformation in Denmark.

But the market situation is changing. There is a change in demand and supply and thereby also a change in the conditions for Danish alliance policy. The financial crisis in the West, the US orientation towards Asia and NATO's withdrawal from Afghanistan coincide with changes in the conditions for Danish defence and security policy. The market for defence policy cooperation is changing, and in the following, we will investigate these changing conditions and their consequences.

**The Consequences of the Financial Crisis for Alliance and Defence Policy**

Over the next ten years, the US armed forces must make cutbacks to the tune of USD 489 billion. In a similar manner, the British armed forces must reduce defence spending by GBP 7 billion and dismiss up to 30,000 personnel. In Europe, there were defence budget reductions of 7.4 per cent from 2008 to 2010 according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies – with the prospect of further reductions. This will result in reduced military capabilities as such major reductions cannot be made solely by improving efficiency, but must also take the form of dismissals. One of the challenges in this connection will be whether it will still be feasible to consider the need for new capabilities and possibly to develop them.

These cutbacks and their potential consequences, however, could lead to new views of cooperation and a new rationale in defence and alliance policy. First and foremost, this will heighten the military and political significance of cooperation. Even the bigger European countries now find themselves in a situation where more extensive cooperation – in the form of the acquisition and operation of common capabilities, for instance – is a condition for planning military power. This is a new situation and therefore a question of a qualitatively new integration of defence policy that will change traditional ideas of sovereignty. Political agreement about threats, risks, means and ends will become a condition for the ability to take action. Furthermore, the experiences from Libya emphasise the possibility that it will be realistic in the future to conjecture that military operations will be performed by ad hoc coalitions of willing states. A situation in which the individual capabilities of states are being reduced heightens the importance of common capabilities. This is the reason why Great Britain and France have established a collective defence system. Therefore, the choice of collaborative partners made by individual states will be decisive for the actions that will be possible in the future.

It will no longer be sufficient for Denmark to simply consider what is in demand on the part of NATO on the security alliance market. Demand will be driven by the supply of security capabilities that can be procured in bilateral or multilateral cooperation within the alliance. While Denmark decided to live up to a number of specific NATO objectives for the development of member states' armed forces in the Defence Agreement 2005-2010, it will be necessary in the future for Denmark to plan on the basis of how other countries decide to live up to these objectives and how Danish capabilities can be combined with those of these countries. In other words, we must not only consider the organisation of our own defence, but also the organisation of the defence systems of our close allies and how Danish capabilities fit in with them. A common strategic culture and a common strategic vision will be decisive for the choice of collaborative partners.

When mapping out the consequences of the new conditions for cooperation between Denmark's allies, there are two central concurrent and opposing tendencies: a tendency towards nationalisation and a tendency towards increased international cooperation – bilateral and multilateral – which together will play a decisive role in determining how Danish alliance policy and defence planning can support a unified Danish security capacity.

Given the reduction in resources, there will be a tendency in many countries to consolidate investments at national level and to focus on the traditional core tasks of their armed forces. With this as the point of departure, the need to be capable of independently providing and using military force to prevent violations of sovereignty will be decisive for defence planning. In this respect, the Danish Armed Forces could be seen as a kind of insurance policy where, during economically hard-pressed times, the greatest possible coverage must be bought at the lowest price. The price of this is an inflexible defence system, and this is a tendency that can be seen in the German defence reforms, for instance. Another example is the prioritisation of an independent nuclear weapons capacity in the British defence reforms. The tendency towards nationalisation often coincides with the desire to maintain a defence industry base. Jobs – in the armed forces and in industry – and consideration for the economic sustainability of local communities, especially in financially pressed conditions, could be important for the way in which the Danish Armed Forces is proportioned. Cutbacks in connection with joint international projects can be politically 'easier' than closing down barracks. Taken together, traditional considerations regarding sovereignty, industry and the economy create a tendency towards heightened nationalisation, which prompts the individual countries to reduce their capabilities without taking account of the common consequences of these reductions.

At the same time, the financial situation is pressing countries in the direction of heightened nationalisation. There have been attempts in Europe since the 1990s to establish international defence cooperation in various ways in order to increase or maintain military capacity. The European Defence Agency (which Denmark is not a participant in due to the Danish defence reservation) came into being in order to promote this cooperation, with limited success, however. Only 22 per cent of European defence equipment acquisitions were made in cooperation with other European countries according to the European Defence Agency (2010 figures). One of the reasons for this inability to realise defence cooperation in practice is the major industrial interests connected with the acquisition of defence equipment. But it does mean that there is a good deal of experience to draw on, and the attempts to strengthen international defence cooperation are intensifying – bilaterally as well as in a multilateral framework.

Smart defence sets two different, but overlapping, agendas. From the point of view of alliances, smart defence involves a method of procuring greater and more useful military capabilities by encouraging countries to work together. From a national point of view, smart defence involves buying and setting up fewer military capabilities while obtaining the same military effect by sharing tasks with other countries. If these two factors are not coordinated, there is a real risk that the individual countries will make reductions in the expectation that the alliance as a whole will compensate for the loss of capacity. But if everybody makes cutbacks, smart defence will mean less defence. International and multinational agreements and programmes will therefore be decisive if this situation is to be avoided.

In the long term, defence policies based on task sharing would appear to be the only way to procure relevant, deployable military capabilities in Europe; however, in the short term there would be many reasons why task sharing would be impossible to carry through as a general principle. The fact that Europe might not go in for the smart defence option, however, does not in itself mean that Denmark and other small countries could not take up task sharing to advantage. While the big European countries have greater capabilities at their disposal and national defence industries to consider, the small countries are far closer to the lower limit for the applicability of their capabilities. Furthermore, a number of smaller countries have no defence industries of any great importance that could dictate national policy on their own. Denmark could therefore decide to share its capabilities in collaboration with a bigger country, to take part in specialised pools with other smaller countries or to join forces with a number of smaller countries in collaboration with one or more big countries to create a strategy with the aim of utilising its limited resources in the best possible way.

Task sharing could take many forms and focus on operations as well as acquisitions. Irrespective of which forms this cooperation might assume and irrespective of how successful the task sharing agenda in NATO would be, the debate emphasises Denmark's need for capabilities that are interoperable with those of bigger collaborative partners. Danish capabilities must also be based on plug and play in the future. This also shows how the strategic effect of small capabilities can be multiplied through cooperation. But a precondition for this cooperation is finding countries to cooperate with. The new conditions for cooperation in NATO are the subject of the next section.

**From Concentric Circles to Alliance Network**

When Denmark was obliged to reassess its security policy in the new Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it made sense to see the framework of security and defence policy collaboration as a series of concentric circles – each of which often had its own security policy organisation. These circles can be seen as a kind of foreign policy target where a commitment in a position near the centre of the target gave most influence. If we are to sum up Danish foreign and security policy during this period, it involved moving as far towards the centre of the circle of European cooperation as possible. Contributions to military operations were chiefly seen as a means of strengthening European integration. This made security policy a question of choosing a position between the centre and the periphery.

This situation no longer exists. There is no longer a centre in relation to which an orientation can be gained. There is no European security policy core, and – relatively speaking – the United States represents gradually weakening leadership. This changes the importance of institutional frameworks such as NATO and the EU, and the same applies to the type and importance of the choices that must be made.

**Concentric Circles in European Defence Policy** Figure 4




Source: Centre for Military Studies

The absence of a centre means that the decisive choice is not whether to integrate, this is given in a complex, open international system. The decisive factors will be how, with regard to what, with whom and how long Denmark will cooperate. At the same time, the choices involved must be made more frequently and in relation to several potential partners, not least in a situation in which lower defence budgets and the increasing cost of missions and equipment make specialisation a necessity. The result will be a complex, diversified market for cooperation comprising many players and characterised by flexible relations – with regard to investments, equipment and operations, policies and the performance of military operations. These relations will be changeable, and their mutual character will be politically sensitive at all times as decisive security policy consequences will follow the choices and decisions made by the players.

The consequence of this will be that Denmark might be unable to provide and receive security in a fixed partnership or from a firmly anchored market position. The contemporary alliance network has a radically different logic than that of the concentric circles of the 90s. New analyses and new strategies are therefore required with regard to how Denmark can tackle the new situation and act internationally in relation to strengthening its security capacity.

The complex, flexible alliance network that Denmark must operate in brings new challenges, but also new opportunities. However, it is necessary to think in a more flexible manner in relation to the choice of partners in order to realise these opportunities. Instead of seeking a fixed position in relation to a centre, the objective must be to establish a position as a node in an alliance network that is in contact with as many countries as possible. This

will create a point of departure for the ability to offer security and cooperation to many countries and thereby obtain the best conditions for handling its own security policy demand. For several reasons, Denmark is in an advantageous position in relation to establishing a central position in the network of alliance relations. At the same time, the alliance network requires states to be capable of making rapid strategic choices, which was not the case during the Cold War, for instance. Today, it is necessary to find collaborative partners for a given policy that it may not be possible to incorporate naturally into the existing alliance structures, but with familiar alliance partners.

The Danish Armed Forces is dependent on capable partners in order to support Danish security capacity, so Denmark must work to create increased internationalisation. Furthermore, defence policy integration is in the interests of a small country. With an institutional base, the network of alliance relations unites the European great powers, prevents them from taking a solitary approach and enhances the opportunities for influence on the part of small states. At the same time, Denmark has a very limited domestic market where the defence industry is concerned and therefore few national industrial considerations to take into account. On the contrary, increased internationalisation could mean more openness and competition in the defence industry field, which could open up new markets for the Danish defence industry. This openness and competition, however, will not come about of its own accord. Smart defence could simply turn into an industrial collaboration, and this would probably not be in the best interests of small countries. Finally, task sharing requires a smart alliance policy. The crisis and the new conditions for European defence policy mean that creativity – in thought and deed – will help to strengthen the position of the countries in the network. In brief, there will be a demand for new ideas. Thanks to its flexible defence, Denmark is favourably placed in relation to exploiting this demand. Finally, an increase in task sharing in the alliance could be realised in earnest if it enabled the people who work in the national and international organisations to cooperate in earnest. This requires competence development and the exchange of employees. One means to this end would be a process in which military training could be accredited so that officers could be trained throughout the alliance and create networks.

These are some of the questions that should be considered in Denmark where the alliance context for our defence planning is concerned. The following questions must therefore be among the key considerations in Danish defence planning:

- Should the Danish Armed Forces be regarded as a 'subcontractor' for one or more major European powers and only contribute to the security policy 'market' in Europe together with them? Or should Denmark on the contrary concentrate on entering into collaborations with a number of smaller countries (e.g. in NORDEFCO) in order to contribute to the alliance in this way?
- Can Denmark identify niche capabilities that would make it an interesting partner for many different countries in connection with various missions, so that the 'market value' of Denmark's contribution increased?
- How can the need for national operations, services for the public authorities and tasks in the Arctic be balanced in relation to task sharing in a NATO context?

In a situation in which the ability and the will to contribute with equipment and capabilities become decisive for a country's position in a network of alliance relations, defence planning is ascribed a major role in alliance policy. It is defence planning that in the final analysis ensures the presence of the military capabilities that support the alliance policy. Defence planning thereby functions as the engine room that ensures an optimum network position, which means that both the form and the contents of defence planning are politically significant. Defence planning should therefore be integrated into deliberations about strategic, defence and security policy to a greater extent than formerly. This would strengthen conformity between means and ends and thereby optimise the military's contribution to the overall Danish security capacity.

# Defence Planning

In an open, complex international system that is constantly undergoing change, the first challenge for a government is to establish a security capacity to tackle complex elements of uncertainty in a series of social systems. As these elements of uncertainty and the international environment as such are constantly changing, a precondition for a comprehensive security capacity is to invest in the long-term planning and prioritisation of resources in order to make it possible to analyse, prevent and take action in connection with the threats and risks that Danish citizens and Danish society are faced with. A holistically-oriented security policy of this kind involves risk management. Risk management becomes even more necessary in a situation in which the means of combating risks must be found in cooperating and sharing tasks with other countries. Systematic and future-oriented defence planning is a precondition for the ability to create the necessary security capacity in an open, complex international system.

Defence planning involves the processes that either separately or as part of an integrated unity have the purpose of creating the technical decision-making foundation for progressive decisions about defence policy, including structures, equipment, personnel and processes. Defence planning is thereby carried out with regard to all of the general aspects of defence policy. The way in which defence planning is organised is therefore a central issue for all of the policy's agents – from staff officers to civil servants to politicians. The organisation of defence planning with regard to the processes, analyses and tools it comprises and how they are related to each other is therefore an essential subject for the craft of defence policy.

In this chapter, we look first at international tendencies in defence planning. Tendencies regarding how other comparable countries develop their defence planning will always be interesting as a source of inspiration for how Denmark can organise its own defence planning. But Denmark must pay particular attention to these tendencies in a situation where defence cooperation comes to an increasing extent to take the form of bilateral and multilateral cooperation within NATO. In order to gain the most from this cooperation, Denmark must be familiar with and be able to plug and play in others' defence planning processes as well as in connection with joint missions. We next look specifically at Danish defence planning and at the demands made on it by a complex, open international system that is constantly undergoing change.

**International Tendencies**

Defence planning can best be thought of as an environment in which the individual elements form part of a cycle that creates an organic unity. From an overall viewpoint, defence planning includes both formal and informal processes which together constitute the foundation for major future-oriented decisions. The defence policy cycle should therefore be thought of collectively – from establishing a political framework in connection with compromises and the adoption of defence budgets to analytical development work. This section provides an account of three general tendencies in international defence planning. Together, they point to a general trend towards the professionalisation and formalisation of defence planning – not least as a response to the complex challenges that changes in the conditions for security policy have meant for defence policy. The three tendencies all point to an enlargement of the object of defence planning, which is illustrated in figure 5.

Firstly, international defence planning is characterised by a functional expansion – from a narrow focus on rigorous military missions to also include the broader security administration based on a more holistic view that includes preventing conflicts, crisis management and the stabilisation of areas after conflicts. Secondly, it is characterised by a control-related elevation. From being a technical and often purely military practice founded on national agencies for equipment management, the issues related to defence planning are lifted higher up and anchored at a strategic, military and political-administrative level. Thirdly, it is characterised by a time-related expansion: from being practice-oriented towards making

**Three International Tendencies in Defence Planning** Figure 5




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decisions about the acquisition of equipment, with little or no integration into overall political directions of a future-oriented nature, to a practice with the increasing inclusion of political directions, including quality control and the testing of assumptions. If we look at the three tendencies collectively, international defence planning points towards increased formalisation, understood as an explication of processes in relation to connecting the individual processes internally, connecting them with each other and connecting them to a political level. These formal processes require a professionalisation of the area – a professionalisation comprising more formalised institutional processes, including quality control and regular evaluations of the processes themselves.

The international tendencies in defence planning constitute a challenge for similar Danish processes. Developments in control paradigms in a small state such as Denmark typically originate in other countries. There are also grounds to compare the Danish system with international experience in this area. Precisely because the area involves the state's most pressing considerations – the nation's survival and protection in an international context where the conditions in other states are directly comparable with those in Denmark – there are also weighty grounds to pay attention to developments with regard to contents and to systematically compare Danish experiences and processes with international experiences and processes.

In an international perspective, Danish administrative traditions are characterised by a lower degree of formalisation, less intuitive faith in formal descriptions of administrative processes and in explicit documentation. In this connection, it is important to consider the international tendencies in defence planning in their control-related context – as part of the increasingly widespread goal and framework-oriented control in the public sector. The international tendencies pose concrete questions about

Danish defence planning:

- Is there a need to strengthen the political or strategic control of Danish defence planning, including an elevation of the control-related anchoring of processes?
- How and to what extent do Danish processes address the new risks and the organisational challenges presented by task sharing in NATO, for instance?
- To what extent does Danish defence planning integrate future-oriented risk management and the capability concept which require an opening for production and the evaluation of alternatives?

Collectively, these questions lead to three concrete challenges for Danish defence planning which all reforms must address in one way or another.

- The integration of NATO's existing defence planning
- The integration of processes for military guidance within the Danish Armed Forces
- The integration of the political-strategic level.

It is possible to create an adequate cycle by addressing all three levels. The question where NATO is concerned is how Denmark can best integrate and apply NATO's existing defence planning, including long-term planning, into its own processes. If it is integrated in a systematic manner, it will be possible to use central, existing analytical resources which can at minimum be used as a benchmark for a discussion of Danish capacity prioritisation.

Where the integration of military defence planning in concerned, there are already several processes – sometimes supplementary, sometimes competing – in use at the Ministry of Defence, with the Chief of Defence Denmark and with NATO staff. But there is no general, ongoing overview of the strategic prioritisations and alternatives that constitute the Defence Chief's military guidance of the government.

Finally, and in relation to the integration of the political-strategic level of Danish defence planning, two areas come into play – the one is administrative, the other political. The administrative area involves the department of the Ministry of Defence's function in relation to the formal processes of defence planning. If the ministry is not the place where the threads of Danish defence planning are gathered up, it will have negative consequences. A minimum version would comprise a central role in relation to evaluating the outcomes of the regular process, including the form and effectiveness of the process, for the ministry. But it would be natural for the ministry to be the anchor for Danish defence planning with the aim of creating internal control and to show politicians and the public the principles involved in an overall Danish defence planning process.

**Danish Defence Planning**

The first challenge for a government in an open, complex international system that is constantly undergoing change is to establish a security capacity to tackle a series of complex elements of uncertainty in a number of social systems. As these elements of uncertainty and the international environment as such are constantly changing, a precondition for a comprehensive security capacity is to invest in the long-term planning and prioritisation of resources in order to make it possible to analyse, prevent and take action in connection with the threats and risks that Danish citizens and Danish society are faced with. A holistically-oriented security policy of this kind involves risk management.

A national security strategy is a precondition for risk management. A strategy of this kind functions as a compass that gives bearings for security policy in a complex world that is undergoing change and makes it possible to order priorities and make plans in relation to a wide range of challenges. A national security strategy is also a contract between a number of players. Within the state apparatus, a national security strategy is a contract between the government that lays down the government's desire to have a given capacity at its disposal and the underlying authorities that must procure this capacity so that the necessary resources, etc., for the realisation of the strategy become available. A national security strategy is also a contract between the government and the public that details the security policy challenges Denmark is faced with, the opportunities it has and the political decisions that must be made on this basis.

A national security strategy can also be described as a contract with our allies. In an open, complex world, it is impossible for any single country to achieve security unaided and on its own premises. A national security strategy for Denmark must define our interest in and capacities for cooperation. It is decisive to maintain and strengthen the view among our allies that Denmark is creative, trustworthy and reliable with regard to its security policy. Ensuring that our policy lives up to these values so that our allies can count on us is more impor-

tant than always providing the same type of contribution to operations with our allies. Such a contract becomes even more important when Denmark must share tasks with its alliance partners.

A capability-based approach that not only includes the capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces, but the entire strategic capacity of the Danish state, is necessary if the Danish state is to be capable of protecting Danish citizens and Danish society in relation to the threats and risks that Danish citizens and Danish society are faced with in an open, complex international system that is constantly undergoing change.

NATO has had a capability-based approach to defence planning since 1999, and the Danish Armed Forces has pursued a similar approach in earnest since 2005. Thinking of the capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces in terms of part of total strategic capacity makes it possible to plan acquisitions and the organisation and application of the resources of the Danish Armed Forces in the context of the Danish state's overall needs and economic ability. It is important in this connection to regard its capabilities as part of what Denmark can provide in multinational coalitions. However, the experience gained during the past ten years shows the need to coordinate the capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces with the capacities of the civil defence forces and capacities in other ministerial areas. In order to be effective, the capability-based approach must therefore be applied in relation to all bodies that contribute to security capacity. When considering this focus on capabilities and capacities, it is surprising that there is no – publicly accessible – list of the capacities and capabilities that Denmark has at its disposal for various operations at any given moment. The National Auditors have recommended that the Danish Armed Forces should provide an account of the capabilities that are available for international operations.

How the Danish Armed Forces can be adapted with the help of defence planning in the long term is not a new question. In connection with the defence reforms at the beginning of the 1970s, defence planning was an independent subject because, among other things, it was necessary in order to be able to tackle the long-term consequences of the cessation of military aid. Danish defence planning was closely connected with NATO's strength and defence planning. Since then, NATO's defence planning has come to play a less direct role in Danish defence planning, and in the present situation, there might be a need to take another look at a national planning process in order to reintroduce the long-term perspective into Danish defence planning after Afghanistan.

A national security strategy could create the necessary basis for controlling and coordinating security capacities across ministerial areas and across the dividing line between public and private. A national security strategy must also deal with procuring the processes and resources that can ensure innovation and learning in connection with the interdisciplinary application of security capacities.

However, a national security strategy and the priorities it includes will have no effect if it is not integrated into overall Danish defence planning. In the following, we offer an idea as to how these challenges can be met at one and the same time, i.e., can increase the internal integration of defence planning, improve the connection with the political sphere and incorporate the defence planning of the NATO alliance into Danish defence planning. The idea is described as an integrated process based on two general status documents and a number of underlying dynamic processes that include control documents.

The overall aim is to create a more formalised process that:

- constitutes a transparent, closed cycle
- runs from the establishment of frameworks and ambitions at the political level to their administrative implementation
- runs from the development of a military and strategic foundation for guidance back to the political level
- systematically works with alternatives
- respects and builds on the various areas and professional skills at the military and political levels
- includes its own quality control to create greater strategic and political transparency
- in the final analysis creates a firmer basis for strategic and political decision-making.

The process is described in figure 6 which should be read as follows: The top line contains the parliamentary chain of command from the Minister of Defence and the parties to the Danish Defence Agreement to the underlying military authorities. All processes on the horizontal plane that lie under one or more of these levels belong formally to those levels.

**A proposal for new Danish Defence Planning** Figure 6




Source: Centre for Military Studies

The left-hand column contains descriptions of three functions of defence planning. The two general control documents, which are changed regularly, but not often, are at the top. Both are expansions of existing strategic texts in Danish defence policy – namely Sections 1 and 2 of the Danish Defence Act and descriptions of the mission and vision of the Danish Armed Forces. The two control documents establish the political framework for defence policy and the implementation of the framework by the Danish Armed Forces in order to strengthen the downward implementation. These documents are described in more detail below. Although defence planning itself does not include defence policy in its entirety, every reorganisation of defence planning will at the same time be a reform of the relationship between the civil level and the military organisation in Denmark. Thereby the subject touches on matters of principle such as the democratic control of the military organisation and the fact that political decision-makers can receive guidance from the special field constituted by the armed forces. At the same time, there is the important consideration that decision-making and the provision of guidance be institutionalised in a cycle so that the relevant institutions are included in an ongoing, systematised decision-making process. It is a cycle of this kind that runs from the top down and from the bottom up, where the areas of responsibility are clear with regard to the political level proper, the departmental level and the military levels shown in the figure.

The process for developing new capabilities lies at the next level. The frameworks for this process are established at the level above, but here the process runs the other way – from the Danish Armed Forces up to the political level. Here too, at least two general documents are included – partly at the political level in the form of an annually-updated plan for capability development, including alternatives that have been envisaged or investigated, and partly at the military level in the form of a similar, but more comprehensive document that gathers the strategic plans and, not least, the alternative options (AO) generated by the underlying defence planning. Both of these documents are updated annually.

The processes and products in the context of NATO can be found at the lowest level. The Danish process and the Danish documents should relate systematically to and integrate the NATO line in a transparent manner.

The claim in this chapter is not that many of these processes are not carried out today; the claim is rather that the increased speed of operations and their complexity make great demands on a broad perspective and systematic processes. This is not least because the operations that Denmark has taken part in over the past ten years, and in all probability will take part in during the years to come, require political decisions to be made on an ongoing basis. It will only be possible for politicians to take this responsibility if there are systematic processes that prompt them to do so. There are several concrete questions to discuss on the basis of this:

- Is there a need to strengthen the political or strategic control of Danish defence planning, including an elevation of the control-related anchoring of processes?
- How and to what extent do Danish processes address the new risks and the organisational challenges presented by task sharing in NATO, for instance?
- To what extent does Danish defence planning integrate the future-oriented risk management and the capability concept which require an opening for production and the evaluation of alternatives?
- Does Denmark need a national security strategy?
- How can the Danish Armed Forces best comply with the recommendation from the National Auditors to provide an account of the capabilities that are available for international operations?

A systematic defence planning process is a precondition for Denmark's ability to prioritise its security and defence policy resources and take part in a network of task sharing and cooperation in a NATO framework, for instance. Sound plans, however, do not make sound policies. In the final analysis, it is the people who realise security and defence policy in practice, including those who risk their lives for this policy, who are decisive for whether or not the policy is successful. This is not least the case in an open, complex security policy reality. A central aspect of defence planning is therefore to train military and civilian personnel to provide them with the competence to see the connections between operative, administrative and political problem complexes. In this connection, the ability to see the Danish Armed Forces as part of Denmark's total security capacity is vital.

In this chapter, we have looked at defence planning in general. In the next chapter, we describe how various plans can result in various models for how the Danish Armed Forces could be structured.

# Mission Types

Hitherto, the Danish Armed Forces has prioritised flexible and deployable forces that can conduct operations in three dimensions (land, sea and air) in missions of various types. The price for the ability to deploy these forces has been fewer capabilities. There has been a political rejection of some capabilities such as submarines, artillery and a land-based air defence system. In an international context, the existing capabilities have primarily been deployed in specific, limited missions. The posting of a combat battalion to Helmand, major naval detachments sent to the Gulf of Aden to hunt down pirates and F-16 combat aircraft in UN actions over Libya are concrete examples of this. The Danish Armed Forces has also retained the ability to contribute to a regional NATO defence force and to defend and protect Denmark, as well as the capacity for tasks relating to the public authorities and sovereignty.

The reorganisation from a collective mobilisation defence force in the neighbouring area to a force on international standby with sterling capabilities has been broadly speaking brought to an end today. Although it might be possible to make some further cuts in the defence budget by improving efficiency, there is no longer a 'Cold War structure' to make cuts in. The cutbacks that were announced by the former Danish government and confirmed by the present government have thus brought politicians into a situation in which they must choose between capabilities, all of which are potentially relevant in international operations in various contexts, and where every choice made will involve a greater or lesser risk that it will no longer be possible to be a relevant contributor to certain scenarios. This does not mean, however, that all spending cutbacks must necessarily be found by cutting capabilities. A concrete economic analysis must clear up the extent to which the need for cuts can be compensated for by improving efficiency, but this will also have consequences for the performance of tasks by the Danish Armed Forces, and as such, cutbacks will result in narrowing the economic framework for the tasks that the Danish Armed Forces can perform. This economic framework will therefore also in itself be an expression of choices and prioritisations.

At the same time, our allies are also going through comprehensive spending cuts. This means that Danish forces can no longer expect that our allies will have 'surplus capacity' that we can count on being able to make use of in areas such as logistics and transport to the same extent as before. For example, the deployment of Danish combat aircraft in Libya depended on a US aerial refuelling capacity established at the beginning of the 1960s. Denmark must therefore choose between capabilities, each of which is relevant for international operations. These capabilities must be all-of-a- piece to a greater extent than previously in the sense that, as a point of departure, they must be able to provide their own transport and logistics. Denmark must therefore not only choose between international capabilities; these capabilities have also become more expensive. It is self-evident that fewer capabilities can be maintained on a reduced budget.

In order to ensure the optimum use of limited economic resources, operations and capabilities must be commensurate to the greatest possible extent. In a complex, open international system where there are various risks, operations and capabilities will never reflect each other completely. If they did, it could justifiably be argued that Denmark would have prepared in relation to the last war, not in relation to the next. However, Denmark could also choose to specialise further in the types of operation that we wish to take part in. This would give Denmark an opportunity to optimise its defence organisation so that it could perform specific operations that bigger countries with the ambition and resources to take part in scenarios and operations of all types do not have. In such a case, Denmark would on the one hand be obliged to comply with the methods used by bigger organisations and countries to perform operations, but, on the other, would be free to choose its own military niche in these operations. This would mean that Denmark could choose between relevant capabilities in accordance with how compatible they were with the military niche chosen. But it would also mean that Denmark – unlike countries with bigger defence budgets – could end up with a military capacity that was fundamentally limited and therefore would not be a desirable, relevant contribution in all future contexts.

Specialisation, however, is nothing new for the Danish Armed Forces. It has often been necessary for Denmark to adapt its operational ambitions to the economic framework for the Danish Armed Forces. Throughout the Cold War, the Danish Armed Forces specialised in the ability to receive reinforcements, a military model

that has been called a 'bridgehead defence'. The Danish Armed Forces focused on the limited resources of the types of military capabilities that were most difficult for the bigger allied nations to transport to Denmark and specialised these capabilities in relation to the defensive effort to buy the time for reinforcements to arrive. These capabilities were selected and optimised on the basis of a given 'defence concept'.

In this chapter, we will consider a number of potential military models that Denmark could choose in order to optimise the structure of the Danish Armed Forces in relation to that of the present-day situation. A military model is an ideal type of the way in which the Danish Armed Forces contributes to Denmark's security capacity – a model that describes the task and generic operation concept of the Danish Armed Forces with the point of departure in a strategic consideration. In reality, the tasks and organisation, etc., of the Danish Armed Forces will usually be a combination of several different considerations, not all of which will be strategic. The purpose of the model is thus not to describe how the Danish Armed Forces isstructured or could be structured, but rather to describe the opportunities for prioritising resources and the various contributions that the Danish Armed Forces can make to overall security capacity.

Denmark can choose between several different military models as a point of departure for optimising its military capabilities, depending on where it is considered desirable to sharpen its security policy focus. In this chapter, we will therefore first outline the parameters within which security policy choices are made. We then list a series of ideal-typical opportunities for defence organised in such a way as to tackle some of these missions. The purpose of the chapter is thus to illustrate options, not to define which choices Denmark should make.

**Defence Policy Choices**

Which military model could form the basis for an optimisation of the armed forces? The answer comprises two elements. The first concerns the emphasis placed on international operations, on the Danish Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea region, and on the performance of national tasks related to upholding sovereignty and in support of society as a whole (hereafter "national operations"). The answer given to this question in the most recent Danish Defence Agreement and by the Danish Defence Commissions has been that the Danish Armed Forces must be optimised in relation to its contributions to international operations. The ability to defend Denmark within the framework of NATO has increasingly been seen as an implicit function of international capacity. This is an expression of the fact that Denmark's situation with regard to geographical security changed after NATO's border was moved to the east due to the accession of a number of Eastern European countries to the alliance. Even if a confrontation with Russia should once again set the security policy agenda, it will not initially be necessary for the Danish Armed Forces to defend Danish territory, but to help defend the Baltic Sea region – by reinforcing the defence of the Baltic States or Poland. Denmark's role as a front line state during the Cold War has changed significantly because of NATO's expansion. Even in a regional context in NATO's collective defence, Denmark has gone from the status of an importer to the status of an exporter of security. It would be a break with existing Danish defence policy if Denmark should decide to go its own way in this connection and to make national plans based on a defensive approach with a narrow orientation in favour of its own territory.

A pressing question, over and above the prioritisation of national and international operations, concerns the Arctic. As described above, developments in the Arctic mean that Denmark has new geopolitical interests to defend. Even though this is in principle a question of national operations, the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic is subject to completely different requirements regarding equipment and appropriate regional logistics than is the case with the Danish Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea region. From this point of view, the Arctic has become an independent area of defence policy priority. This does not necessarily mean that the Arctic must be given high priority or that the Danish Armed Forces must take responsibility for all new tasks in the Arctic, but it does mean that Denmark has concrete geopolitical interests in the area that must be prioritised in relation to other tasks. The optimum would naturally be to use capabilities that were not exclusively designed for use in this connection, but – after a concrete political prioritisation in the individual case – would also be relevant as a contribution in international contexts.

The next question regarding prioritisation involves the framework that deployment should take place in.

Should the Danish Armed Forces be deployed under the auspices of NATO, in coalitions, under the auspices of the UN, in a Nordic context – or under the auspices of the EU if the Danish defence reservation were to be withdrawn? The question is which alliance-related profile we wish the use of the Danish armed forces to have. The primary framework for and anchoring of cooperation helps to a considerable extent to define which types of mission it would be relevant for Denmark to specialise in. The framework for cooperation is also interesting in relation to the economic framework as task sharing and joint acquisitions, etc., are more feasible in a multinational context. Nordic cooperation, the EU and NATO provide an opportunity for this. However, the Danish defence reservation must be taken into consideration in an EU context. The EU and the defence reservation constitute an independent problem complex, not least if the financial crisis forces the major European countries to find joint security policy solutions within the framework of the EU that Denmark, for the present, will not be able to participate in. The potential inexpediencies connected with this where Denmark is concerned are to a considerable extent mitigated by the fact that NATO approaches and NATO standards have hitherto constituted the foundation for EU initiatives whereby Denmark, by virtue of what is still a high profile and a major commitment in

**Prioritisation Axes in Danish Defence Policy** Figure 7




Source: Centre for Military Studies

the context of NATO, indirectly can maintain the preconditions for continued relevance in the context of the EU in the long term.

The next element of the answer regarding the composition of the Danish Armed Forces takes its point of departure in the duration of the missions that the armed forces are expected to perform. Experience since 2001 has shown that it is rarely possible to choose how long a mission will last. On the other hand, the question of the duration of missions is a decisive factor for the economy of the Danish Armed Forces and its ability to maintain the long-term level of capacity aimed at politically.

In order to illustrate the options Denmark has for choosing how to set up its defence, we describe four military models below. In this connection, we have decided to take a look at joint forces' functions and also to consider logistics and combat support capacity under the heading of joint forces, irrespective of the fact that these are organisationally the province of the individual forces today. With regard to the matter below, we are therefore not recommending a certain type of organisational attachment where these functions are concerned, but are looking at uniform, and at times overlapping, capabilities in the Danish Armed Forces (or as the supplementary acquisition of civil capacities) collectively.

**Military Models**

The following is a description of how the Danish Armed Forces can focus on various approaches to the performance of its tasks. These models should be regarded as ideal types. In practice, the tasks of the Danish Defence will rarely be defined in accordance with a unique model; the armed forces' equipment and location, etc., will often be determined by several factors that are expressions of a number of other social considerations rather than purely military considerations. The models listed below should therefore be regarded as ideal types that illustrate the options for choices rather than descriptions of how the Danish Armed Forces will actually be structured. The ideal types listed are:

- a long-term stabilisation force
- an international assistance force
- a humanitarian deployment force
- a defensive force.

In the following, each ideal type will be briefly described with the point of departure in the tasks the Danish Armed Forces could have in each type of operation and in accordance with which generic operational concept operations would be performed. This is followed by an outline of how a defence of this type could be structured.

**A Long-Term Stabilisation Force**

The tasks of the Danish Armed Forces as a long-term stabilisation force would be to deploy forces capable of stabilising areas of conflict or failed states that have become bases for terrorist activities or threatened to destabilise neighbouring countries or regions in the absence of intervention. This model reflects an attempt to strengthen Denmark's foreign policy profile with the help of ongoing military activism. Operations of this kind must be based on extremely solid mandates, and given this background, it must be expected that they will often be performed by coalitions of the willing. Denmark will thus typically perform operations in collaboration with the United States, Great Britain and France.

The generic operational concept for a long-term stabilisation force is to permanently maintain a visible show of strength in the mission area within the framework of an international coalition. The contribution of the Danish Armed Forces should be seen as part of a long-term military measure that forms part of a general effort to enable an area affected by conflict to move towards peaceful development. This requires a presence that can only be provided by land-based military forces. In a concrete mission, the early stages of a Danish military action should be seen as a limited contribution that supports the coalition's normative goals and paves the way for the effort proper at a later date where Denmark will share the risks of the mission at the same level as that of the leading coalition partners. Danish units would be among the first to enter an operational area and among the last to leave it. While the goal of the effort would be reconstruction and stabilisation, the conflict will at times become extremely intense, as has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the strength of Denmark's contribution should therefore be very robust.

The core of such operations should therefore be robust units capable of fighting in the wide range of operations that can be expected when there is combat between local communities and not between states. There will be a need for a high level of protection for personnel as the primary

weapon system will be infantry and not heavy weapons. Supporting fire and heavier weapons such as tanks, artillery and infantry fighting vehicles must therefore be seen as auxiliary arms for the primary measure, but will also be a precondition for the relevance of a Danish contribution throughout the entire range of the operation. In a long-term stabilisation force, special operations forces would be a suitable Danish contribution of strength during the initial stages of a coalition measure in an area affected by conflict or in a failed state that could serve as a base for terrorism. With the Danish military focus directed towards the land, the role of the air force would clearly be to support the deployment of a land-based military contribution. This approach would mean that the air force could be devoted to providing tactical air transport, to supporting land-based operations, to supporting special operations and to the need of the army unit for an intelligence-gathering capacity. The navy's international capacity in a long-term stabilisation force would be to supplement rather than directly support the land-based military contribution which is the focus of this model. The navy's international measure would therefore focus on capacity build-up and on larger units and their ability to support special operations.

However, there would be tasks for the navy (and to a lesser extent the air force) in the Arctic, independently of international operations. This is an expression of the fact that the focus of long-term stabilisation could only with difficulty create a synergy effect between tasks performed for the public authorities, tasks in the Arctic and national tasks, and an attempt to do this would rapidly result in mutual competition for resources, which would require ongoing political prioritisation. In this type of mission, it would be necessary for the Danish Defence Intelligence Service to provide strategic and tactical intelligence services, and the service would therefore be obliged to obtain comprehensive knowledge of the operational area.

**An International Assistance Force**

The tasks of the Danish Armed Forces as an international assistance force would be to contribute to the enforcement of sanctions and embargos, to create peaceful conditions and participate in anti-terrorist operations within the framework of an international coalition for the purpose of maintaining international law and the resolutions of the UN Security Council. This concept would involve an attempt to pursue Danish interests through active military actions designed to maintain international order. Denmark would help to ensure that Security Council resolutions were enforced in order to strengthen international order and to ensure that the international community lived up to its obligation regarding R2P. There would be broad Nordic support for at least some operations of this kind, but they would require robust measures, so it must be assumed that Great Britain, France and the United States would usually also take part in them.

The operational concept for an international assistance force is that Denmark would have to clearly assert its presence in operations that involved the international community applying pressure to states that flouted UN resolutions, threatened the global infrastructure or were bases for terrorist activities. Danish military actions would have to support the legitimacy and dynamism of the UN and the global community and would therefore have to be organised so they could be performed rapidly, as was the case, for instance, when Danish combat aircraft helped to prevent forces loyal to Gaddafi from bombarding Benghazi in March 2011. The Danish Armed Forces must therefore be optimised to take action rapidly and effectively. This makes great demands on intelligence gathering, logistics and preparedness, which impose limitations on the size of such a force. In this military model, the long-term stabilisation of areas affected by conflict and failed states would to a greater extent be a question of development policy, and an attempt would also have to be made to support a preventive build-up of security capacity in potential areas of conflict. The contribution of the Danish Armed Forces to stabilisation, etc., would be to build up the capacity of security forces where the experience gained from clear-cut actions could be put to use and would fundamentally be a precondition for the ability of the Danish armed forces to maintain their competences as a relevant element in such contexts.

In an international assistance force, the army would focus its international contribution on smaller units and special operations forces suitable for carrying out effective actions at short notice. This requires logistics and transport to and within operational areas as well as army or naval detachments that could create a framework for actions by special operations forces. The deployment of special operations forces would require units from all

three services at a high level of preparedness. Contributions from the air force and the navy would lend weight to an international assistance force. Operations of this type could have the aim of enforcing a UN resolution with the help of sanctions and embargos or of securing the global infrastructure. As such, this has already become a traditional naval task, and the navy is at present performing a task of this kind off the Horn of Africa. The air force and the navy are capable of contributing to an international assistance force, and the air force can do so at very short notice (with regard to both deployment and withdrawal). An international assistance force requires the prioritisation of a high-tech, effective air force at a high level of preparedness that can be integrated into the coalition's airborne operations from day one. Combat aircraft could thus constitute a capacity capable of providing the sort of weight it can be difficult to achieve with special operations forces alone.

Naval detachments, combat aircraft and special operations forces would thus be able to make an effective contribution in three operational environments and thereby enable Denmark to contribute to many different types of operation. Finally, naval detachments, combat aircraft and special operations forces could be used in combination for operations and create a synergy effect. There would be several overlapping competence-related areas in the performance of tasks in the Arctic and the assumption of a global assistance role, which should also create a synergy effect between the two types of task. In relation to a defence contribution within NATO's collective defence in the Baltic Sea region, deployable forces at a high level of preparedness would also be appropriate capabilities, and an international assistance force would make it possible to pursue an international NATO agenda as well as to reassure the eastern members of the alliance who still place great emphasis on a collective defence obligation.

**A Humanitarian Deployment Force**

The tasks of a humanitarian deployment force would be to contribute military capabilities that could ensure the successful performance of UN missions, including civil missions. The Danish contribution could comprise those elements of a mission that are decisive for its performance, such as logistics, intelligence gathering, training or special operations forces. These contributions could be provided to advantage in collaboration with other Nordic countries with a high UN profile. A humanitarian deployment force is probably that model which would be most suitable to pave the way for comprehensive Nordic defence cooperation.

The operational concept for a Danish contribution to missions in this model is the UN. Denmark must stand for something special in its participation in existing and future UN missions – and it is necessary in this connection for the Danish UN contribution to make a real difference to missions. While Denmark cannot place large forces at the disposal of UN missions, which countries such as Pakistan, India and some African nations do, Denmark can help to improve the performance of UN missions and make special contributions by providing the kind of quality that other nations are typically unable to. UN missions are often of longer duration, which brings focus to bear on the ability to create and maintain organisational staying power. Missions of these types could be supported in a number of ways. Denmark could contribute with logistics at the tactical and strategic levels. Transport helicopters or transport aircraft are a necessary capacity in missions that are spread across large areas of land, while sea transport (the ARK project) could be used strategically. Training is another area in which primarily land forces could train local forces and UN forces, but this also involves the assumption that Danish forces are capable of maintaining the knowledge and technical competences that are in demand. If Denmark decided to maintain a more permanent camp capacity, one possibility would be to set up and operate a camp for a UN mission or elements of one. Some of these tasks could be performed by the Home Guard or the Emergency Management Agency. In addition to setting up camps, the Home Guard could also be responsible for guarding them. Over and above direct support for a UN mission, camp capacity could also take the form of a humanitarian contribution by equipping some camps with medical facilities or establishing a field hospital.

A humanitarian deployment force would not need a combat plane capacity or heavily armed land-based military units. This means that there would be little synergy effect between international operations in a purely humanitarian UN framework and national operations, services for the public authorities and tasks in the Arctic. There would be a need for a separate capacity for tasks in the Arctic and for defending Denmark, including the

maintenance of sovereignty. A humanitarian deployment force could therefore be combined with a nationally-oriented defence force on a smaller scale, for instance.

**A Defensive Force**

The military models described above focus on how to set up various ideal types of force optimised to perform various international tasks. An alternative could be to focus on local defence. For the past ten years, NATO has taken its point of departure in the idea that the capacity for collective defence began with deployable forces, but Denmark could also decide to take its point of departure in the defence of its own territory and in the appropriate capabilities in this connection. This would constitute a marked break with Danish defence policy since the end of the Cold War, but it is nevertheless a possibility. It is in the nature of the case that a defensive force would be of less interest to Denmark's allies, and the contribution of the armed forces to foreign policy would be significantly reduced.

The tasks of a defensive force would be to defend Danish territory and integrity against direct threats. The Danish Armed Forces is thus viewed as part of Danish security capacity, but only where direct threats against Danish territory are concerned, i.e., if a concrete antagonist should materialise in the Baltic Sea region and/or in the North Atlantic area and the Arctic – at some future date.

A defensive force would be based on an operational concept that involved protection rather than weight. The Danish Armed Forces and the Home Guard would have to be capable of assisting the police force in connection with protective tasks. Even though the focus would be on territory and not on local defence, there would still be a need for an operative reserve that could reinforce the local defence. Therefore, the preconditions for a defensive force, in addition to local defence, would be a field army that could reinforce this local defence, an air defence system that could ensure the operational freedom of the local defence and the field army and an inshore naval detachment that could stop or sink an aggressor trying to gain access to Danish territory and could provide adequate warning in a crisis.

A defensive force would represent a choice to do without capabilities optimised to be deployable, which would significantly reduce requirements for logistics and mobility. In general, such capabilities could be given lower priority in connection with a force of this kind, also because it would be a question of a mobilisation capacity that would be able to make use of civil resources within the country's borders. A defensive force would presuppose a strategic warning system and thereby require attention to be paid to what was happening in the Baltic Sea region and in the Arctic. There would be a need for tactical intelligence to monitor potential aggressors, their concrete military capabilities and their ability to reach Danish territory.

Focusing on a mobilisation defence and hard-and-fast military tasks close to Danish territory would leave only limited potential for a synergy effect in connection with the performance of tasks by the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic. On the other hand, the presence of the Danish Defence in the Arctic based on this model would be the only large-scale operation that would be performed far away from the Baltic Sea region, which would provide considerably more room for an action in the Arctic in the overall prioritisations. The Arctic capabilities would be in the highest state of preparedness and most flexible, and it would only be possible to a lesser extent to merge the tasks of the individual military capabilities, such as was also the case during the Cold War.

**Other Capabilities**

Irrespective of which military model Denmark might choose for its armed forces, there are still a number of capabilities that could contribute to the country's security capacity. It is self-evident that the way in which they could be applied would depend on the model chosen, but all models would make it possible to provide an important contribution to overall security capacity. This applies to:

- the Home Guard
- the Emergency Management Agency
- cyber defence
- a missile defence system
- the intelligence service
- contributions to international staff, etc.

In discussing the various models, the Home Guard and the Emergency Management Agency could be adapted in different ways, but they are relevant in general and could be variously applied to all four ideal types.

The Home Guard is a voluntary national organisation whose primary task is to support the Danish Armed Forces. In addition, the Home Guard has an important

function where the national anchoring of the Danish Armed Forces is concerned. As the missions of the Danish Armed Forces have gradually taken on an international character, the Home Guard's support has taken the form of relieving the Danish Armed Forces of some national tasks as well as assisting in areas where missions are performed, as individuals and as units, in connection with providing guard duties, for instance. However, the civil competences of the members of the Home Guard could also be used in connection with capacity built-up where they would have the advantage of being able to use their military and civil competences concurrently.

The fact that the Home Guard supports the services is connected with the idea that air, sea and land are viewed as the domains in which combat is carried out. In postmodern wars that are fought by national populations, war has moved into the civilian domain, which should give occasion for deliberations regarding whether the Home Guard could take on the international tasks that are more related to civilians, with the aim of giving such tasks a focus that can be difficult to establish in the services' organisation, and with the aim of utilising the potential that the Home Guard has as a reserve that already possesses a number of relevant civil competences. Computer network security could be one such task.

The Emergency Management Agency possesses a large number of specialised competences that could be used nationally and internationally. It would also be necessary in connection with future international missions to be able to supply specialists and more comprehensive contributions. The Emergency Management Agency is part of Denmark's overall security capacity in two ways: (1) as the state emergency preparedness organisation that can perform large-scale, complex tasks connected with areas such as rescue operations, the environment and extensive fires, and (2) provide assistance in connection with catastrophes abroad. As part of the Ministry of Defence's sphere, it would be possible to create a heightened synergy effect between the capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces and those of the Emergency Management Agency. In a similar manner, it would be possible to use the competences of the Emergency Management Agency in military operations in the form of an emergency fire service, as was done in Lebanon in 2010. Cooperation between the Emergency Management Agency and the Danish Armed Forces should be characterised by pragmatism and focus on performing concrete tasks. For example, the Danish Defence could assist the Emergency Management Agency with transport and mobility. It could also help to provide security for the Emergency Management Agency's employees and its equipment, which would mean that relief aid could be provided in areas where there might not necessarily be security of any kind.

Computer network security is an apt illustration of how security in an open, globalised society crosses traditional lines of demarcation. It is necessary in connection with computer network security and computer network operations (CNO) to distinguish between the offensive and defensive use of CNO by military forces and society's vulnerability with regard to cyber attacks. Whereas the first is by definition a military task, it is not a matter of course that securing society's civil systems is such a task.

A missile defence system constitutes a capacity that the debate in NATO places on the Danish Armed Forces policy agenda. It was decided at the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 to develop a missile defence system in accordance with the US approach. The United States emphasises the need to develop a system that can have an operational as well as a strategic purpose. Missile defence systems in their present form involve building up a network of detectors and interceptors that can be used to provide protection against a concrete missile-based threat in the field or in a given geographical area. The United States has decided to deploy four missile-carrying destroyers in Spain as part of NATO's missile defence system, and a decision was made in the Netherlands to establish a capacity on selected frigates – initially as a sensor capacity by upgrading their SMART L radar, which incidentally is the same as that on the Danish frigates. Romania, Poland and Turkey have entered into agreements that allow stationary missile defence installations to be installed in their territories. NATO is developing a joint alliance command and control capacity in connection with missile defence systems, and an initial missile defence command and control capacity was commissioned at the beginning of 2012. A picture is emerging of a system in which control and warning systems are predominantly a joint alliance measure, while the weapons themselves will be installed by the individual member countries.

Viewed from a transatlantic perspective, Denmark has already made a contribution by providing a site for the Thule radar base. The Danish choice with regard to play-

ing a part in NATO's missile defence system is primarily due to Denmark's European alliance policy. Denmark will probably be able to choose to take part in NATO's missile defence system on a rotation basis with the corresponding capabilities of other countries. Denmark could thus have an interest in demonstrating its ability to contribute to NATO's overall missile defence system in a relevant manner, but with the least possible binding of the organisation and with the greatest possible synergy effect with the performance of other tasks that there is still a desire to perform. In the final analysis, the Danish choice with regard to a missile defence system therefore involves the extent to which Denmark is prepared to equip one or two frigates with updated radar systems and a limited number of missiles and is prepared to devote a frigate to the ballistic missile defence(BMD) role for shorter or longer periods at a time. This is a suitable area for task sharing within the alliance.

Intelligence activities can be defined as the gathering and processing of information that is of significance for a government's options for taking action, particularly in the military and political areas. Intelligence activities are usually kept secret, are performed by special state institutions and are a central element in national security capacity. To a great extent, intelligence activities make it possible for a government to understand what is taking place in a complex world, and they provide a basis for taking action. Intelligence activities therefore constitute an important contribution to what could be called crisis perception. Crisis perception must be as rapid as possible so that Denmark can gain an orientation in the international system and make security policy choices on the basis of the information and intelligence supplied by the security capacities. This could potentially make it completely unnecessary to deploy military capabilities. However, consideration should also be given to whether to deploy special operations forces or naval vessels, for instance, for a short period of time in order to gain more in-depth intelligence during a crisis perception phase.

After the events of 11 September 2001 in particular, governments are not only requesting intelligence that provides information and warnings – intelligence is increasingly taking on a leading role. Intelligence can help to predict which missions will be needed, and intelligence can make it clear when the logic of a mission changes in a more peaceful or dangerous direction. But probably the most important thing is that intelligence can clarify whether a given crisis can be met with other than military means. Intelligence therefore forms the foundation for an assessment of the degree to which military force should be used in a given situation and whether there are other, more peaceable alternatives.

Intelligence can in itself be an important contribution that Denmark could make in a cooperative network. When the Danish Prime Minister visited the United States in February 2012, President Obama emphasised Danish-US intelligence cooperation. Research in the area refers to the 'globalisation of intelligence' in order to describe how cooperation and task sharing are becoming increasingly important aspects of intelligence activities.

Over and above material capabilities, Danish Defence personnel could constitute an immaterial capacity for international cooperation. Danish military contributions to international staffs, missions and organisations – together with civil servants posted abroad and Danes who are employed by international organisations – are important elements in Danish security capacity because they can safeguard Danish interests around the world on the spot. The need for Danish military personnel to become a party to allied communities of practice, on an equal footing with personnel from other countries, should prompt considerations regarding whether training courses and exchange services abroad should be incorporated to a greater extent as central factors of a future personnel and training structure. Military activism makes greater demands on military-technical skills, also because Danish military professionalism is part of the overall picture of the Danish contribution. This is therefore not only a question of whether Danish NCOs and officers are capable of acquiring the operationally relevant competences, but also of where and how they acquire these competences. If Danish officers were to take some of their training courses abroad, they could bring competences, knowledge and new ideas to the Danish Armed Forces. At the same time, training abroad could provide an opportunity to make contacts and form networks, which would be extremely valuable in the allied cooperation networks that the Danish Armed Forces is part of. A strategy for how international education and training could enhance competences and form networks in relation to the central allies should therefore be an integral part of the focus on international operations.

For the first time since 2003, it now appears that, after 2014, Denmark will no longer be engaged in such a large-scale international mission that its needs alone can be seen as definitive for the general demands on the performance of tasks by the Danish Armed Forces. This is thus an opportunity to choose which type of defence we want and thereby to define which military model the individual services should be organised in accordance with and operate under. The more unambiguous this choice is, the greater the opportunity there will be to optimise the structure of the Danish Armed Forces in harmony with the model. The need to make cutbacks in spending on the Danish Armed Forces and the cutbacks made by our allies must necessarily play a major role in these exercises in optimisation. This is because the rigid choice of any single model would at the same time potentially have such far-reaching consequences for the flexibility of Danish military options that the Danish military contribution could become irrelevant in some potential future scenarios.

In this connection, we must discuss four circumstances:

- Which factors are central for Danish security policy interests, and how can the Danish Armed Forces best be organised in order to pursue them?
- Which level of ambition are we considering for the ability to perform or contribute to specific types of mission and task?
- Which countries is it possible for Denmark to cooperate with if we choose a given military model?
- Which demands does the model chosen make on the Danish Armed Forces as an organisation and its personnel administration?

# Conclusions

The narrative of Danish security and defence policy at the beginning of the 21st century must take its point of departure in how Denmark can pursue its interests. In a globalised world of open, complex systems countries are activist by default. Thus, the concept of Activism explains the basic conditions for our policies, but activism does not describe our choices – and choose we must. Denmark cannot choose whether to prioritise, but we can choose how we will prioritise. In contrast to conditions during the Cold War, it is now possible to choose niches and scenarios. The choices that there is a desire to make from a political point of view are highly dependent on how Denmark's interests are interpreted.

A security and defence policy based on negative interests regards the Danish Armed Forces as an insurance policy. The Danish Defence is thus a long-term investment designed to secure the nation's sovereignty. Viewed from this perspective, it is most important for the Danish Armed Forces to be capable of defending national territory and asserting this sovereignty. National security capacity must first and foremost protect the nation's citizens and companies against an external attack – with the help of intelligence activities, the Emergency Management Agency, computer network security and similar. Ultimately, the Danish Armed Forces is therefore a defensive force that protects the nation and its territory. From this point of view, regional issues – the drawing of frontiers in the Arctic or Russia's role – are most prominent, while international operations are important to the extent that they can strengthen Denmark's security, either by keeping risks at a distance or by strengthening the ties with our allies. The Danish Armed Forces can function as an international assistance force in operations of this kind.

A security and defence policy based on positive interests regards the Danish Armed Forces as a tool of foreign policy on a footing with development aid, trade policies and similar. The Danish Armed Forces must therefore continually provide a political return that benefits the realisation of the government's other policies. The total security capacity must therefore be devoted to many different purposes. The nation's survival and security are naturally the ultimate goal, but there is a desire to move away from ultimate problem complexes of this kind when acting on the basis of positive interests – so such considerations do not in themselves adequately describe the drivers of policy. The focus on problems here and now could shift the focus to the immediate stabilising measure, with the Danish Armed Forces becoming a long-term stabilisation force, but it could also lead to considerations about using the capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces to assist in obtaining 'softer' security policy goals as a humanitarian deployment force. At the same time, there will be focus on securing the international legal system, which would give the Danish Armed Forces tasks as an international assistance force. Concrete problems – such as hostage taking – could give occasion to use special operations forces in independent missions.

It could be said that the future operational environment will be defined by the continued integration of open, complex social systems. Whereas military forces in the 20th century fought within a well-defined framework in a closed system, military forces in the 21st century will have to operate in open systems – and the conditions for victory and defeat change from system to system. This makes it particularly important for national security strategy to result in concrete subsidiary strategies for the operations that Danish security capabilities take part in. These strategies must define the security policy narrative for the operation as well as for more concrete goals and subsidiary goals in order to lay down the conditions for success that apply to the concrete operation.

It is precisely because security cannot be created solely by military means that considerations regarding security have increasingly become relevant in many social, economic and political systems. The distinction between

domestic and foreign in many of these systems is not the most relevant factor. Security for Danish citizens and Danish society must therefore be ensured in many systems at the same time. The measures that there is a desire to prioritise are political choices. In order to be able to contribute to a number of different missions in open, complex systems, the capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces must be regarded as modules, independent units that can be deployed in various operations and missions.

It is impossible for a Defence Establishment organised in accordance with such a 'Lego brick system' to meet all conceivable security and defence policy challenges, but the Armed Forces' resources must be prioritised to meet well-defined, relevant challenges. In practice, the armed forces will always be organised to take in many considerations, not all of which will have the character of defence policy. At the same time as this political reality is acknowledged, however, the defence policy reality that the Danish Armed Forces is most effective when it is goal-directed and that the Danish Armed Forces as an organisation functions best when it has a clear mission and vision to go on, must also be acknowledged. This analysis describes four alternative models for the way in which the Danish Armed Forces could be specialised in relation to the capacity to perform certain types of mission:

- a long-term stabilisation force
- an international assistance force
- a humanitarian deployment force
- a defensive force.

In addition to these missions, the Danish Armed Forces will have to perform national operations, services for the public authorities and tasks in the Arctic. The new conditions in the Arctic have meant that measures in this part of the Kingdom must be considered independently in relation to the overall balancing of the Danish Armed Forces. This does not mean, however, that the Danish Armed Forces must perform all of the new tasks in the Arctic, or that tasks in the Arctic must necessarily be given a high priority, but it does mean that the performance of tasks in the Arctic has taken on a new meaning and a new importance. Over and above these missions, the Home Guard and the Emergency Management Agency will contribute to security capacity, and computer network security and a missile defence system will play a role for the way in which the scope of the Danish Armed Forces is established.

Establishing the scope of the Danish Armed Forces so that it can perform effective actions – coordinated with the rest of the Danish state – in a world undergoing change characterised by open, complex systems makes new demands on defence planning. It is necessary to coordinate and establish the scope to a greater extent and more frequently. This makes special demands on how political choices and military know-how can interact in such a way as to ensure that the value of both aspects can be mutually acknowledged. Informal structures and pragmatic solutions can hinder informed democratic debate, well-considered decisions and the precise ascription of responsibility, particularly in a complex, changeable operation environment. When decisions have been made, however, it should be remembered that conflicts and the armed forces are too complex to expect that the capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces could be changed overnight. Defence policy is characterised in particular by the fact that the acquisition of equipment, the development of competence and doctrines and all of the other circumstances that shape the Danish Armed Forces as a political tool take a long time. The defence that we decide on today will not be realised tomorrow, but far into the future when conditions may have changed. Therefore, the most important element of defence policy and defence planning is to create flexible units that are prepared for reorganisation at the same time as there is a clear vision and mission that the people employed by the Danish Armed Forces can be guided by.

## LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES



# Abstract

This analysis focuses on the armed forces' ability to contribute to Danish security capacity, defined as the cohesive effort from all areas of the Danish government and civil society for coordinated analysis, prevention and action in relation to the threats and risks facing Danish citizens and Danish society in an open, complex international system that is undergoing change. In such an international system, 'activism' is a condition for Danish security and defence policy. The analysis concludes and points out the need to develop a coherent notion of the kind of interests the Danish government wishes to pursue. In defining Danish national interests, the way in which climate change is transforming the Arctic environment and Greenland's geopolitical significance have become more important parameters. While the analysis makes it clear that armed conflict is not likely in the Arctic and that the armed forces will therefore primarily be engaged in coastguard duties, the Kingdom of Denmark will need to configure its security capacity to deal with a host of new issues in the region.

The primary mission for the Danish armed forces will not be in the Arctic, however. The analysis introduces four 'military models' that present competing visions of the types of operation the Danish armed forces should be organised to engage in: a long-term stabilisation force, an international assistance force, a humanitarian deployment force and a defensive force. Depending on the type of structure Denmark chooses, there will be different possibilities for cooperating with other nations in coalitions, and these forces will differ in relevance in different institutional contexts. These contexts of cooperation are important for Danish security and defence policy, not only because Danish contributions to international operations depend on the multinational context in which they are most often deployed, but also because the way Denmark cooperates in an alliance framework is important in and of itself. It is from this perspective that the smart defence debate in NATO becomes important to Denmark. The analysis points out the possibilities of the smart defence agenda, but also warns that, unless carefully managed, this agenda might actually serve as an excuse for European countries to cut defence budgets in the belief that other nations will supply the capabilities they have cut.

The intricacies of alliance cooperation at a time dominated by network policy further increase the need for Denmark to adopt a cohesive defence planning process that carefully integrates political decision-making with military competences and guidance. The need for a cohesive defence planning process is all the greater considering that the current as well as the previous government indicated the need for cuts in the defence budget when the operations in Afghanistan come to an end. This leaves Denmark with the scope for making strategic choices.



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