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# Diversity in the Danish Armed Forces

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## **Abstract**

The Danish Armed Forces face the functional imperative of becoming a smaller, professional expeditionary force and the societal imperative of including women and ethnic minorities. It currently lags behind its NATO partners in gender and ethnic diversity. Lessons to be learned from NATO members with more diverse militaries, such as the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, include recognition of diversity as a societal imperative to sustain the legitimacy of the armed forces, the necessity of systematically collecting and reporting personnel data to guide policy, the necessity of patience and realistic goals, systematically developing recruitment, development, and retention policies, and the superiority of an all-volunteer force over conscription in fulfilling this societal imperative.

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## Introduction

In April 2011, the Danish Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a policy on diversity for its 27,500 employees, 61 percent of whom are members of the Danish Armed Forces (DAF). The policy is the latest in a series that began in 1962 when women were allowed to join the armed forces. It was issued to encompass the many initiatives underway and to guide future efforts. One of those efforts is this report, which has been commissioned by the MoD from the University of Copenhagen as a part of the contract between the Centre for Military Studies and the MoD.

Diversity encompasses many dimensions of the people who constitute society. The MoD, however, limits its diversity concerns to women and ethnic minorities: “at the heart of the problem is the low number of women in uniformed positions and the number of ethnic minorities in both civilian and military posts.”<sup>[1]</sup> Therefore, gender and ethnicity are the focus of this analysis.

The armed forces are the institution that utilizes organized violence to achieve the objectives of the state. To do so legitimately, this functional imperative is tempered by a societal imperative to reflect the values of society. Changes in the international situation and technology have encouraged NATO members to construct smaller, professional expeditionary armed forces, while changes in the social ethos of gender relations and immigration have broadened the population expected to be included to legitimize the military as an institution of a democratic state. Denmark has been affected by these trends.

The DAF normally compare their policies with those of other Nordic countries. In this case, there are few lessons to be learned from such comparisons. The Nordic countries have faced the same functional and societal imperatives, followed the same policies, and had similar degrees of success. Despite societal norms of gender equality and proportionately small populations of ethnic minorities, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have made limited gains in terms of increasing the percentage of these groups in their armed forces. In 2000, Denmark ranked 11<sup>th</sup> among NATO countries in the percentage of its force that were women – behind countries such as France, Belgium, Hungary, Portugal, and Spain.<sup>[2]</sup> Norway ranked 14<sup>th</sup>. Valuable lessons can be learned, however, from the experience of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, which ranked 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 4<sup>th</sup>, respectively, among NATO countries with regard to the percentage of women in their military.<sup>[3]</sup> The armed forces of these Allies have had longer to adapt to the functional and societal imperatives now challenging Denmark –

and therefore have more to offer, as the Defence Command has recognized with regard to expeditionary operations.<sup>[4]</sup>

We therefore synthesize the lessons of these “diversity leaders” into five that are relevant for Denmark. First, increasing the diversity of the armed forces is a necessary policy for NATO countries. Second, the systematic collection and reporting of relevant personnel data is necessary for the successful implementation of a diversity policy. Third, setting realistic goals for increasing the representation of members of designated groups contributes to success. Fourth, policies that develop a large pool of potential recruits among designated minority populations, target them specifically for recruitment, and develop their human capital so as to increase their performance and likelihood of promotion and retention are the bases for success. Finally, countries that procure personnel for their armed forces through an entirely voluntary system have more diverse forces than countries utilizing some form of conscription. These lessons provide a broad basis for progress as the MoD and DAF attempt to balance the societal imperative of reflecting the values of society with the functional imperative of maintaining an effective armed force.

## **Manning the Force: Functional and Societal Imperatives**

The purpose of military manpower policies is to staff the armed forces with an adequate number of persons possessing appropriate levels of capability and skill to perform the functions required by the political authorities.<sup>[5]</sup> This functional imperative is complemented by – and at times in tension with – a societal imperative to reflect the values of society. From the time of the French Revolution until recently, these imperatives were complimentary for Western states. Mass armies conscripted from the populace provided an effective means of static territorial defense and an opportunity to indoctrinate the people in the civic culture of the nation.

Recent changes in the international environment and increases in technology have reduced the utility of such military force structures relative to smaller, better-trained expeditionary forces. Concomitant changes in societal values and demographics – gender equality, greater participation of women in the workforce, immigration, and ideas regarding the representation and inclusion of members of these groups in all aspects of civic life – have increased the number of persons considered eligible for military service. This increase in supply and decrease in demand has created tension between the functional and societal imperatives of manning the armed forces.

Denmark has been adapting to these functional and societal imperatives. In the 1980s, the DAF shaped itself into a smaller, more professional force, better capable of deploying for contingency operations abroad.<sup>[6]</sup> Danish policy with regard to distributing the remaining burden of service in the armed forces fairly across the population has focused primarily on women and ethnic minorities, the latter being defined as “immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries.”<sup>[7]</sup> Danish diversity policy has followed a general trajectory of increasing equal opportunities to serve in the armed forces by removing barriers to participation, mitigating factors that reduce retention, increasing recruitment outreach, and, most recently, increasing the prospects for promotion and career success. These policies originally focused on gender but have been extended and adapted to deal with ethnic minorities.

Prior to 1962, women were barred from military service and relegated to a separate auxiliary corps. Despite the lack of a legal barrier, few, if any, women served in the ranks. In 1972, the DAF began hiring women on contract to serve as noncommissioned officers and officer



trainees. Women were admitted to military academies in 1974. These changes gradually increased the positions available to women, except those where there was a risk of combat. After a decade of study, women were permitted to fill combat positions in 1988, except piloting fighter aircraft, although this restriction was lifted in 1992. Since then, there have been no formal barriers to the inclusion of women in the DAF.

Removing these barriers to participation opened up a second wave of policy initiatives, including an action plan for diversity issued in 1993. Efforts to increase female retention included regulations against sexual harassment, determining which women were motivated to be further developed professionally, and the reasons why some chose to separate. An office to assist the victims of sexual harassment was established in 2005.

The 2004 Defence Agreement established “Armed Forces Day” to systematically inform, assess, and induct young Danes into the armed forces. Young females were invited into the recruitment process and special materials were prepared to facilitate this. In 2006, 955 women participated and in 2010 the number grew to 1537 – of which 567 enlisted.<sup>[8]</sup> Ten percent of the recruits reporting for the four months of basic training in 2011 were women, a figure which is expected to rise to 20–25 percent in 2012.<sup>[9]</sup>

These efforts dovetailed with policies designed to enhance the career prospects of women in the armed forces. Danish desires to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 provided an opportunity to address gender diversity within the armed forces and make changes important for female career advancement – even though the resolution is focused on gender issues amongst populations suffering from armed conflict.<sup>[10]</sup> To assist the careers of women in uniform, the MoD pledged to increase their numbers in Danish peacekeeping contingents. Furthermore, the Defence Command adopted a charter in 2009 to promote the advancement of women within the ranks to management positions and leadership roles. The 2010 Defence Agreement directed the MoD to develop further initiatives “to ensure a higher percentage of female employees.”<sup>[11]</sup> The result has been that the percentage of women in the regular armed forces increased from 5 percent in 2007 to 6.4 percent in 2011.<sup>[12]</sup> Moreover, nearly 7 percent of Danish troops deployed in expeditionary operations in 2010 were women.<sup>[13]</sup>

Ethnicity and other characteristics<sup>[14]</sup> entered into the policy discourse in 1998, grafted onto the equal opportunity framework devised to promote gender diversity. A subcommittee on the equal treatment of personnel in Defence jobs (ULIB) was established in 1998. In 2001, a


policy putting “qualified women and ethnic minorities” in visible positions was enunciated and followed up with a booklet entitled Diversity in the Recruitment Process.<sup>[15]</sup> In 2003, guidance to accommodate ethnic minority members with regard to holidays, diet, prayer, death, and burial was published. In 2004, the armed forces admissions exam was scrutinized for bias against minority candidates and found to be fair. In 2007, the MoD began the FOCUS program to develop and foster competence in all employees, including those in uniform, regardless of gender, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation. Outreach to municipalities intended to better understand their minority communities (“MIX”) was undertaken in 2007–2008, and a program to foster citizenship and role models in Denmark (“Taking the Lead”) was implemented in the period 2009–2011.

Finally, in 2011, the MoD developed a Defence Action Plan for Equality containing 14 measures to enhance equality for women and ethnic minorities in a systematic and comprehensive manner.<sup>[16]</sup> These incorporate earlier and ongoing efforts at outreach, retention, and public affairs. These efforts resulted in the MoD winning the “Diversity in the Workplace” (MIA) Award in 2011.<sup>[17]</sup>

A new factor to consider is that the MoD can no longer pursue its diversity agenda autonomously. It is obligated to embed its effort in that of the government, which set a target of 4 percent of the employees in the public sector being ethnic minorities from non-Western countries.<sup>[18]</sup> Furthermore, the Act on Equality between Women and Men of 2007 requires ministries to prepare a report on their policies and progress with regard to gender equality.<sup>[19]</sup>

These policies have had an effect on the composition of the DAF. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of women has increased across the ranks since 2007.<sup>[20]</sup> The one percent increase in females across all ranks corresponds with the implementation of increased efforts to recruit women during Armed Forces Day as well as the implementation of policies associated with UNSCR 1325.

Figure 1: Percentage of Women in the Danish Armed Forces




Notwithstanding this success, the DAF has few high-ranking female officers. As of March 2011, none of the 38 generals or admirals were female,<sup>[21]</sup> 3.1 percent of the colonels and navy captains were women, as were 0.7 percent of the lieutenant colonels and navy commanders.<sup>[22]</sup> As the MoD's diversity policy states:

[D]espite the positive developments with more women serving in the uniformed organizations under the Ministry of Defence, the numbers show that significant challenges in recruiting, retention and the ability to make a career remain. This requires focus and action.<sup>[23]</sup>


Significant challenges also remain with respect to ethnic minorities. Overall, their share of the Danish population has increased from about 3 percent in 1990 to a little over 12 percent in 2010 – as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Percentage of Persons of Danish Origin and Immigrants and Descendants of Non-Danish Origin, 1990–2010<sup>[24]</sup>



The MoD reports that in 2010, only 1.1 percent of their employees, civilian and military, (“Forsvarsministeriet”) had an ethnic minority background, as compared to 7.2 percent of the Danish civilian workforce (“Arbejdsstyrken”). This is shown in Figure 3.<sup>[25]</sup> Data for ethnic minorities in the DAF were not available. This possibly indicates that ethnic diversity is not a priority for the DAF or that ethnicity is so sensitive as to be taboo. Given the available figures, it seems as though an effective framework for increasing the number of non-Western ethnic minorities in the DAF has yet to be developed.

Figure 3: Percentage of Ethnic Minorities in the MoD and Workforce in 2010<sup>[26]</sup>



As this review of Danish efforts aimed at promoting diversity since 1962 makes clear, the focus has been on gender rather than ethnicity. All formal barriers to including women in the DAF have been eliminated. Policies enhancing the capacity of the DAF to retain women have been implemented. Efforts to recruit and retain more women across all ranks have been undertaken. In contrast, efforts to increase ethnic diversity have been limited. Although there are no formal barriers to recruitment – indeed, Danish citizenship is not a requirement for enlisting<sup>[27]</sup> – attempts to reach out and reduce the impediments to retention have not received equal attention. The MoD has not reported the percentage of ethnic minorities in the DAF. Whatever the reason, greater efforts should be undertaken if increasing ethnic representation in the DAF is regarded as a societal imperative. Overall, the emphasis on equal opportunity for women and ethnic minorities has produced limited results.

## The Scandinavian Model

Danish policy makers are comfortable comparing their initiatives to those of other Scandinavian countries. Norway and Sweden, in particular, are quite similar in terms of size, position in the international system, defense spending, economic development, and cultural homogeneity.<sup>[28]</sup> It is hardly surprising that they have faced similar functional and societal imperatives. Indeed, Denmark and Norway have retained conscription (Sweden began the transition to an all-volunteer force in 2010) and allow women to volunteer for military service.<sup>[29]</sup> They have also adopted diversity policies similar to those of Denmark, leading some to refer to a “Scandinavian Model.”<sup>[30]</sup>

Norway and Sweden have focused on gender integration through policies of equal opportunity and their policies have been moderately successful. Women were given the opportunity to serve in the Norwegian armed forces in 1977, but only in non-combat functions.<sup>[31]</sup> This was changed in 1985. Although the Norwegians set an ambitious goal to have 15 percent of the armed forces be women by 2005, it has stabilized at 7–8 percent.<sup>[32]</sup> Sweden’s policy trajectory has been similar. It allowed women to serve in the armed forces in 1980 and they were allowed in combat functions in 1994.<sup>[33]</sup> Since then, few women have volunteered and Sweden has repeatedly considered conscripting women so as to increase their numbers.<sup>[34]</sup> It has not adopted such measures – indeed, it is moving toward an all-volunteer system, which has had a positive effect on female enlistment.<sup>[35]</sup> In 2008 and 2011, 4.9 percent of the Swedish officers were women, 9.2 percent of enlisted personnel, and 2.1 percent of reserve officers.<sup>[36]</sup>

Ethnicity has presented a greater challenge. The percentage of foreign-born Swedes has increased from about 4.5 percent in 1960 to 8.5 percent in 2011.<sup>[37]</sup> Sweden has not adopted a systematic policy for increasing ethnic minorities in their armed forces.<sup>[38]</sup> At best, they have articulated a broad nondiscrimination policy.<sup>[39]</sup> Likewise, immigrants and their descendants now constitute 13.1 percent of Norway’s population.<sup>[40]</sup> In the 1990s, Norway adopted the declared ambition for 4 percent of the national Defense Forces to be staffed by ethnic minorities by 2001; this goal had not been reached as of 2010.<sup>[41]</sup>

Overall, the Scandinavian Model might promote gender equality but has not succeeded in facilitating female military participation. Among NATO members, Denmark and Norway ranked 11<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup>, respectively, in the percentage of their active duty military that is female.<sup>[42]</sup> The ethnic and cultural homogeneity upon which the model is based has hindered

the promotion of ethnic diversity. The percentage of ethnic minorities in the armed forces of these Scandinavian countries has failed to keep pace with the immigration into their societies and the rate of expansion of their descendants. This suggests that experiences from the world outside of Scandinavia might have something to offer. In the next sections, we examine some of these experiences.

## **A-B-C—Easy as 1-2-3?**

Some Western states have faced the functional imperative of developing expeditionary forces and the societal imperative of integrating women and minorities longer and more fully than Denmark. The governments of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have long used the military as a homogenizing force for their heterogeneous societies, composed of citizens of different linguistic, racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds.<sup>[43]</sup> Their strategic orientation toward expeditionary operations encouraged smaller, more technologically advanced forces.<sup>[44]</sup> The victory of classical liberal conceptions of citizen obligations over those of civic republicanism in the years after the Second World War reduced societal obligations toward compulsory military service.<sup>[45]</sup> This, in turn, reduced their ability to apply conscription uniformly across their populations and encouraged them to man their forces entirely with volunteers. Such forces could be better trained, equipped, and utilized in expeditionary operations with fewer political costs.<sup>[46]</sup>

Surprisingly, volunteer forces have better integrated women and other minorities than conscript forces. How could this be? Members of disadvantaged groups see the military as an opportunity to improve their economic and social status. Volunteer-based policies entice different rates of enlistment among the subpopulations of these countries.<sup>[47]</sup> Generally, it was presumed that members of disadvantaged populations would enlist in the lower ranks at higher rates than members of advantaged populations and that the opposite would be true for the officer corps.<sup>[48]</sup> This has proven true and yet has greatly improved minority inclusion. To correct the stratification of a volunteer manning policy, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada undertook efforts to increase recruitment amongst disadvantaged populations, increase their rate of retention, and subsequently their inclusion across all aspects of the force—by rank and by occupational specialty. The results have been positive: as of 2000, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom ranked 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 4<sup>th</sup>, respectively, among NATO countries with regard to the percentage of women in their forces<sup>[49]</sup> and boast more minorities than any other.

Even more interesting, gender has not had pride of place as in the “Scandinavian Model.” In the United States, a system designed to integrate Blacks has been extended to women and Hispanics. In Great Britain, a system designed to utilize colonial forces has been adapted to integrate women and racial minorities. In Canada, a system designed to integrate Francophones has been extended to include women, indigenous people, and “visible minorities.” In each case, the challenges have proven extensive and the means used to



overcome them have demonstrated meaningful patterns. These patterns highlight paths to success and their associated costs.

## **The United States**

The United States has faced profoundly different challenges integrating Blacks, Hispanics, and women into its armed forces. These derive from the different historical contexts of these three groups and their respective positions in American society. Parallel efforts to integrate Blacks and women were developed in the 1970s and expanded to include Hispanics in the 1990s.

Until the Second World War, the United States maintained a small military establishment in peacetime and filled out its ranks via conscription in times of war. Blacks and women were either excluded from military service or, with few exceptions during times of war, segregated into separate corps. The decision to man a large standing military in 1947 rendered the utilization of all available persons a functional imperative.<sup>[50]</sup> The military was formally integrated in 1948, although implementation lagged until after the Korean War.<sup>[51]</sup> Women were also permitted to serve in uniform in 1948 but were limited to 2 percent of enlisted personnel, 10 percent of officers, and could reach no higher rank than colonel or navy captain.<sup>[52]</sup> These limits were repealed in 1967 during the Vietnam War.

In 1973, American involvement in Vietnam ended and societal imperatives impelled the shift to an all-volunteer force.<sup>[53]</sup> At the time, less than 1 percent of personnel were women and 14 percent of enlisted and 2.4 percent of officers were Black.<sup>[54]</sup> Fears that “a volunteer force during wartime would be mercenary, composed mostly of the poor, black, and uneducated”<sup>[55]</sup> were well-founded: the percentage of Blacks in the military rose to 26 percent in 1979, including 37 percent in the Army.<sup>[56]</sup> Proportions normalized over the next two decades, although Blacks remain over-represented in the enlisted forces by 6 to 10 percent and have been equally represented in the officer corps since 1997.<sup>[57]</sup> The percentage of women increased from less than 1 percent in 1973 to 8 percent in 1980, 12 percent in 1990, 19.5 percent in 2000, and 21 percent in 2010.<sup>[58]</sup> Among NATO countries, the American military has proportionally more women than any other.

These vast increases in Black and female participation have been achieved through a combination of approaches that attempted to provide for equality of opportunity as well as equality of outcomes. Racial integration was based on maintaining standards, increasing human capital, and preference at the margins. Throughout the 1970s until 2000, the U.S.

military followed a policy of setting goals for the admission and promotion of racial and ethnic minorities and adopted mechanisms of “affirmative action” to achieve those goals.<sup>[59]</sup> Regarding these objectives, “promotion boards [we]re to select minority members equivalent to the percentage in the promotion pool,” rather than in proportion to the rank, service, military, or civilian population.<sup>[60]</sup> To achieve these goals, the top and bottom portions of the distribution were identified without regard to race or ethnicity and treated appropriately. In the middle of the “rack and stack” among “micromillimeter differences” in service records is where demographic considerations came into play and deviations from the pool’s proportions required justification.<sup>[61]</sup> Thus, as one Army officer explained, “Only fully qualified people are promoted, but not necessarily the best-qualified” among this mid-range.<sup>[62]</sup>

Such a scheme depends on a large pool of qualified minority candidates. The services adopted initiatives to develop the capabilities of all service members. “The Army has successfully introduced programs to bring young people up to enlistment standards, to raise enlisted soldiers up to noncommissioned officer standards, to bring black undergraduates up to officer commissioning standards and to raise high school graduates up to West Point admission standards.”<sup>[63]</sup> These include Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) detachments in high schools,<sup>[64]</sup> Functional Academic Skills Training (FAST) to increase the reading and math skills of enlisted personnel, and military service academy preparatory schools.<sup>[65]</sup> If racial and ethnic minorities were more likely to be urged to take advantage of these development programs and did so at a rate greater than their share of the force, that was quite acceptable. The result was a gradual increase in the percentage of racial and ethnic minorities throughout all ranks and most occupational specialties.<sup>[66]</sup>

There was some resistance to this system of preferences, including successful lawsuits brought by white male officers passed over for promotion.<sup>[67]</sup> Yet policy had borne sufficient fruit: in 2002, a federal judge found that the instructions given to promotion boards were unconstitutional because “Army hiring reports from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s showed that racial discrimination in officer proportion had largely disappeared over time.”<sup>[68]</sup>

On the other hand, a less thorough policy of equal opportunity mixed with equality of outcomes has greatly increased the percentage of women, but their participation has plateaued short of proportional representation. In part, this is because the United States military has adopted different standards for men and women in the armed forces, has not directly invested in increasing female human capital, and has given preferential treatment.<sup>[69]</sup>

These practices were most evident in two areas: physical fitness standards were lowered, separate standards for men and women were adopted,<sup>[70]</sup> and women were excluded from the combat arms career fields that are most correlated with career progression.<sup>[71]</sup> The result has been an interconnecting series of negative outcomes within the success of increased numbers.

First, the exclusion of women from combat contributed to perceptions that women are not true members of the armed forces.<sup>[72]</sup> This perception is reinforced by differential fitness standards. Furthermore, exclusion from combat has prevented women from pursuing career paths that would lead to command and leadership positions. In 2006, for instance, 80 percent of general officers in the U.S. Army came from the combat units.<sup>[73]</sup> The lack of female commanders further fuels perceptions of women as inferior members of the armed forces. It also contributes to a third problem, that of sexual harassment and assault in the ranks.<sup>[74]</sup> The overall result of these policies has been that gender integration across ranks and occupational specialties in the U.S. military has reached a plateau with occasional steps to increase positions open to women.<sup>[75]</sup>

Perhaps more importantly, American policy has been most comprehensive in providing decision makers with the data necessary to establish goals, assess progress, and alter policy as needed. In particular, the Department of Defense reports demographic information in accession programs by type, commissioning source, and program; the composition of the active duty and reserve forces; promotions; admission to professional military education programs; separations – in particular involuntary separations; career assignment; discrimination and harassment complaints; and disciplinary actions under the UCMJ.<sup>[76]</sup> The Department of Defense makes much of this information available to the public so that various stakeholders can utilize it to assess its policies.<sup>[77]</sup>

Likewise, the Department of Defense has undertaken longitudinal studies of attitudes among youth to military service – both in their prospective motivations to join or their retrospective rationales for joining.<sup>[78]</sup> This research has shown that the propensity to serve varies over time, differs among subgroups, and has captured different motivations for service. Utilizing such data to understand the larger mosaic can permit the construction of detailed recruitment and professional development programs that can best meet potential recruits' career desires, thereby maximizing their likelihood to volunteer, remain, and be satisfied with their choice in the military.

Overall, the United States military has pursued policies of equal opportunity as well as

policies that pursued equal outcomes to overcome substantial historical and cultural barriers to achieve the most diverse armed forces personnel in the world. It moved from policies of exclusion to segregated inclusion in times of war, when the functional imperative dominated the societal. It then integrated these groups – Blacks and women – into the armed forces. The end of conscription led to substantial increases in the participation of members of these groups. Their retention was assisted by policies that made it more likely that they would be successful, from education and training to favor in promotions to overcome the disadvantages of previous discrimination. By 2012, the United States military had a higher percentage of women and racial minorities than any other NATO country.<sup>[79]</sup> And it achieved this end through a manpower acquisition system designed to maximize its functional imperative: a professional, all-volunteer force.

### **The United Kingdom**

The United Kingdom has addressed numerous challenges in its attempts to diversify its armed forces along gender, ethnic, and racial lines. Britain's transition from an imperial power to a member of the European Union has affected the manner in which it deals with these issues. After addressing issues of class critical to establishing its all-volunteer force, it pursued parallel efforts toward women and racial and ethnic minorities, that have continued to the present. These policies emphasized equal opportunity and resisted some pressures to use other means to achieve equal outcomes.

British efforts to diversify its armed forces began with the re-adoption of an all-volunteer force in 1962. Its focus was on socio-economic class, as the distinctions between officers and enlisted men reified the class structure of British society and constituted a significant barrier to recruitment.<sup>[80]</sup> Officer recruitment in particular proved challenging and “strenuous efforts [were] made ... to attract commissions from as wide a social base as possible,” including from state-sector schools, middle-class backgrounds, families whose fathers had not been officers, and from the enlisted ranks.<sup>[81]</sup> Improvements were obtained “partly by making the conditions of entry into the office corps as varied and flexible as possible ... through the creation of various types of commissions which ha[d] different standards and modes of entry.”<sup>[82]</sup> But the biggest barrier was one of identity. “The increasing number of applicants who lack[ed] the characteristics customarily associated with the British officer corps present[ed] difficulties for those concerned with the selection and training of officers” that required a “reappraisal of selection and training methods.”<sup>[83]</sup> This reappraisal emphasized the meritocratic and professional nature of the officer corps at the expense of its presumed

social status. Yet these efforts at providing equal opportunity had, at best, a temporary effect. Forty years later, the House of Commons found that over half of the cadets selected to attend Sandhurst had graduated from independent schools, whereas 58 percent of Army officers, 70 percent of Navy officers, and 75 percent of Air Force officers selected to attend the Advanced Command and Staff Course had attended state schools.<sup>[84]</sup> It concluded that “the Department collects and monitors information on many aspects of diversity, but does not do so for social and educational background and cannot therefore be sure whether the Armed Forces are truly representative of the society they defend.”<sup>[85]</sup>

This earlier effort set the conditions for the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities in the British armed forces. These efforts have been philosophically bifurcated. The inclusion of women has been framed as securing equality of opportunity, and the inclusion of ethnic minorities has been framed as obtaining equality of outcomes even as the same sorts of policies have been pursued for each.

Women have long served in the British Armed forces, albeit in a segregated women’s corps. The first move to provide equal opportunity for women to serve was the integration of their separate corps into the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1949 and the Army in 1980. Still, within the services, women were relegated to certain career fields and barred from others. These barriers were incrementally addressed – and continue to be removed today. Women were permitted to pilot aircraft in 1980 and deployed to a combat theater for the first time in 1990.<sup>[86]</sup> The percentage of posts available to women continued to increase thereafter: 96 percent of RAF posts, 71 percent of posts in the Royal Navy, 73 percent in the Royal Marines, and 67 percent of posts in the Army as of 2006.<sup>[87]</sup>

Because the problem of gender diversity has been framed as one of equal opportunity, women have not been specifically targeted for recruitment. It is accepted that men and women have different propensities to serve in the military. Given this, the MoD has not set specific targets for women in the forces. The percentage of women joining the armed forces has declined over the past decade, from 11.3 percent joining in 2000/01 to 8.8 percent in 2010/11.<sup>[88]</sup> Still, the overall numbers of women in the forces continued to rise, as seen in Table 1.

**Table 1: Percentage of Women in the Active Duty Armed Forces<sup>[89]</sup>**

	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>Officers</b>	8.9	10.9	11.3	11.6	11.9	12.1	12.2	12.3
<b>Enlisted</b>	7.8	8.7	8.7	8.8	8.9	8.9	9.0	9.0
<b>Total</b>	8.0	9.0	9.1	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.6	9.6

This increase can be credited to increased retention of female personnel, despite gender differences contributing to shorter lengths of service.<sup>[90]</sup> Until 1990, women were required to leave the armed forces upon becoming pregnant.<sup>[91]</sup> Maternity leave and anti-harassment policies undertaken under the 1998 Defence White Paper have been reinforced over time and have contributed to greater retention rates. Indeed, the increase in the percentage of females in the regular armed forces suggests that the rate of attrition is less than that of accession. This is borne out, as can be seen in Table 2: the outflow of females declined by 1–2 percent over the course to the 2000s.

**Table 2: Percentage of Women Leaving the UK Armed Forces<sup>[92]</sup>**

	2000/01	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11
<b>Officers</b>	11.1	10.7	11.0	12.4	12.7	11.5	12.2
<b>Enlisted</b>	9.6	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.3	7.5	8.4
<b>Total</b>	9.7	8.5	8.6	8.9	8.8	7.9	8.8

Diversifying the British armed forces along racial and ethnic lines<sup>93</sup> has also been based on equal opportunity, although diversity is often assessed as though it was based upon achieving equality of outcomes. Britain’s history as a colonial power has provided vast experience with utilizing non-white, Anglo-Saxon males in its volunteer armed forces. Given its penchant for a small land force, the British provided officers to command indigenous forces to police and defend their colonial holdings. As such, these forces were separate from the core of the British military, properly conceived. Functionally, this separation worked well but has had an effect on the British armed forces as it has diversified over the past fifteen years. As Dandeker and Mason argue:

The recent forebears of many of Britain's citizens who are not white were either enemies or colonial subjects. In these circumstances, it may be difficult to view their descendants as co-nationals – whatever their formal citizenship – because they lack both the common origins and the ethnic homogeneity which the British national myth ... requires.<sup>[94]</sup>

Yet their presence is increasing. From 2001 to 2009, members of these non-White groups increased from 8.82 to 12.0<sup>[95]</sup> percent of the British population.<sup>[96]</sup>

As when addressing social class and gender, British authorities framed the participation of ethnic minorities in terms of equal opportunity. The Race Relations Act of 1976 made discrimination illegal but did not require positive steps be taken to overcome past discrimination. These policies and the metrics of nondiscrimination in recruitment and promotion policies continued through the 1990s. During this period, however, policies based upon equal opportunity came to be judged in terms of outcomes measured in terms of proportional representation.<sup>[97]</sup> Such an approach justifies “positive discrimination” to rectify previous imbalances.<sup>[98]</sup> Against this trend, the 1998 Strategic Defence Review retained an equal opportunity approach to racial and ethnic diversity even as it accepted that the British armed forces “should better reflect the ethnic composition of the British population.”<sup>[99]</sup> It set a goal of 2 percent of the recruits being of ethnic minority stock.<sup>[100]</sup> It also decided to increase that goal by 1 percent each year until “eventually, the composition of our Armed Forces reflects that of the population as a whole.”<sup>[101]</sup> To further this goal, the MoD sought to accommodate religious and cultural differences when possible to deepen the conception of equal opportunity rather than adopting a program of “positive discrimination” to achieve equal outcomes more quickly.

The 2001 Race Relations Amendment Act formally shifted the frame from equal opportunity to equality of outcomes. It required the British military “to take positive steps not only to eliminate discrimination but also to promote racial equality.”<sup>[102]</sup> In response, the MoD re-emphasized equal opportunity. Its Race Equality Scheme for 2002–2005 set out to “achieve an environment free from harassment, intimidation and unlawful discrimination, in which all have equal opportunity and encouragement to realise their full potential” and “increase[e] the number of ethnic minorities at all ranks in the Armed Forces.”<sup>[103]</sup> It set a goal of 2.8 percent of the active force to be ethnic minorities by 2006 while reducing the ambition of annually increasing ethnic minority recruitment to a more reasonable 0.5 percent.<sup>[104]</sup> As seen in Table

3, the British increased their recruitment of Blacks and ethnic minorities and reached their objectives for 2006.

**Table 3: Percentage of Black and Ethnic Minorities Recruited 1998–2011**<sup>[105]</sup>

	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2005	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11
<b>Officers</b>	1.9	1.3	2.1	—	—	2.6	2.1	—	—	—	2.3	2.5
<b>Enlisted</b>	1.8	1.8	2.9	—	6.9	5.8	6.4	—	—	9.6	7.2	6.3
<b>Total</b>	1.8	1.7	2.9	—	—	5.5	6.0	—	—	—	6.9	5.9

In 2006, the MoD set “a target to increase the proportion of black and ethnic minority personnel in the Armed Forces to 8% of all personnel by 2013.”<sup>[106]</sup> The 2008 Equality and Diversity Scheme subsumed the Race Equality Scheme and included other minority groups, including women.<sup>[107]</sup> It set no objectives for either recruitment or overall representation levels for ethnic minorities – perhaps because the MoD had already set its own objectives and was on its way to achieving it, primarily through the swelling of the enlisted ranks, as seen in Table 4. Although there has been a steady increase, the rate of 0.2–0.3 percent per year indicates that the current policy mix will not allow the British military to reach its goal of 8 percent ethnic minorities in the regular forces by 2013.

**Table 4: Percentage of Black and Ethnic Minorities in the Active Duty Armed Forces**<sup>[108]</sup>

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>Officers</b>	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.4
<b>Enlisted</b>	5.8	6.1	6.5	6.7	7.3	7.4	7.6
<b>Total</b>	4.9	5.2	5.5	5.7	6.1	6.3	6.6

Overall, the British military has overcome substantial historical and cultural barriers to become one of the most diverse armed forces in the world. It relied upon policies of segregated inclusion in times of war, when the functional imperative dominated the societal imperatives, and then slowly integrated these groups – ethnic minorities and women – into the peacetime armed forces through the recruitment mechanisms of an all-volunteer force. The services retained substantial autonomy over their manpower policies, which allowed significant differences in attitudes toward minority groups to drive policy. An emphasis on equal opportunity rather than equal outcomes, fairly realistic recruiting goals for ethnic minorities, and increased retention of women have increased the representation of both



groups. By 2012, the British armed forces ranked third in the percentage of women and third in the percentage of racial minorities amongst NATO countries.

## **Canada**

Canada has been a heterogeneous country with an all-volunteer force since its founding. It has faced numerous challenges integrating Francophones into the Canadian Forces (CF) and has built upon these efforts in recent decades to include women, “visible minorities,” and Aboriginal peoples. After its long-standing policy of assimilation became problematic, the CF’s policies emphasized equal outcomes for Francophones and then shifted toward equal opportunity for other groups.

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the CF had been accommodating its Francophone minority within the force. Canada has long endured the legacy of its origins as a federation of French and Anglo settlements and used the military to foster unity and loyalty to the Canadian state as an Anglo entity. Francophones were compelled to use English until the Canadian government decided to make its institutions bilingual and the first Francophone, Jean Victor Allard, was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff in July 1966. The CF established bilingual infrastructures so that CF units could communicate in both languages.<sup>[109]</sup> As of 1969, the CF pursued two policies to integrate Francophones: targeted recruitment and promotion and bilingualism. It was decided in 1971 that proportionality of Francophones would be achieved across all ranks and occupational specialties within 15 years,<sup>[110]</sup> and the CF developed a long-term plan requiring all officers, warrant officers, and sergeants be functionally bilingual by 1980.<sup>[111]</sup> These plans were based upon equality of outcome rather than equal opportunity.

In terms of recruitment, the CF determined that recruiters would have to target Francophones out of proportion to their numbers in the Canadian population to quickly swell the ranks and build their number across specialties and ranks.<sup>[112]</sup> Their focus was primarily on officers. Indeed, “the question of recruiting privates was not considered, since the suggested quotas were filled fairly easily.”<sup>[113]</sup> Thus it was decided that “for the 1970–71 fiscal year, 50 percent of officer cadets in the Direct Officer Entry Plan (DOEP) would be Francophones.”<sup>[114]</sup> The 50 percent quota continued until 1979, when it was lowered to 35 percent for career fields in which Francophones were severely under-represented.<sup>[115]</sup>

Yet Francophone recruitment was only the first hurdle. “It was once they were in the Forces that things went wrong for the Francophones.”<sup>[116]</sup> Problems arose for Francophones because

they were required to operate in a professional environment in which English was the working language. They were generally a year behind their Anglophone peers given the need for language training and, even then, their language skills proved detrimental to their career progression. Moreover, Francophones were traditionally drawn to the infantry and not to most other career fields, leading to significant efforts to redirect Francophones into fields beyond their initial interest.

In order to accomplish proportionality throughout the ranks, several schemes were considered.<sup>[117]</sup> The CF chose to utilize selective deviations from merit-based promotions to ensure sufficient Francophones were gradually promoted through the ranks, with increasing annual targets set for each rank and specialty. Unlike U.S. practice, however, Anglophones who were specifically passed over for promotion in favor of a Francophone “would automatically be placed at the top of the next promotion list and promoted at the first opportunity.”<sup>[118]</sup> Although such “deviations” constituted between 2.5 and 3 percent of promotions each year,<sup>[119]</sup> the practice had the unfortunate effect of undermining the credibility of the promotion system and reducing morale as “hundreds of persons continued to believe they had been passed over in favor of a less qualified Francophone ... [and s]everal Francophones ... were told outright ... that they had been promoted because they were Francophones.”<sup>[120]</sup>

This formula was used from 1972 until 1987, when it was challenged and amended to broaden the basis of deviations from language to “skill and knowledge” appropriate for the position.<sup>[121]</sup> As shown in Table 5, focused recruitment, quotas, and preferential promotions did steadily increase the proportion of Francophones throughout the ranks of the CF.

**Table 5: Percentage of Francophones in the CF<sup>[122]</sup>**

	1966	1970	1974	1978	1982	1987	1992	1997	2002	2007	2010
<b>Officers</b>	9.4	10.7	16.5	19.3	21.6	22.3	24.0	25.0	25.0	24.2	22.8
<b>Enlisted</b>	17.0	19.0	22.8	25.4	28.2	28.3	29.0	28.5	28.0	28.6	27.8
<b>Total</b>	15.8	17.6	21.6	24.3	26.9	27.1	27.5	27.5	27.0	27.0	26.6

When discontinued in November 1987, Francophones constituted 27.09 percent of the CF *en toto* (28.32 percent of enlisted and 22.32 percent of officers), compared to 24.91 percent of the Canadian population as a whole.<sup>[123]</sup> By the 2000s, Francophones remained represented

almost in proportion with their percentage in the Canadian civilian population, which was 28.1 percent in the 2006 census.<sup>[124]</sup>

The Canadian Forces also pursued a policy of bilingual training in order to facilitate integration and to reduce inequities in promotion and retention decisions. In 1988, the CF adopted a universal approach to bilingualism for all personnel. The CF pursued this policy successfully for two decades to great success. As seen in Table 6, the percentage of bilingual Francophone officers and enlisted members, as well as Anglophone officers, has increased substantially since 1991, while the percentage of bilingual Anglophone enlisted members has not.

**Table 6. Bilingual CF Members<sup>[125]</sup>**

	1991	1996	2001	2006	2010
<b>% Bilingual Francophone Officers</b>	27.0	80.0	91.0	91.0	87.0
<b>% Bilingual Anglophone Officers</b>	20.0	46.0	62.0	68.0	63.0
<b>% Bilingual Francophone Enlisted</b>	19.5	50.0	65.0	61.0	56.0
<b>% Bilingual Anglophone Enlisted</b>	3.0	7.0	9.5	9.5	8.0

The CF viewed its success as “over-compliance” with the Act.<sup>[126]</sup> In April 2007, it altered its policy to ensure only that “National Defence personnel are led, trained, administered and supported in their official language of choice.”<sup>[127]</sup> In essence, it aimed to move bilingualism from the individual level to the unit level, effectively alleviating the CF of the requirement to train all of its members in their nonofficial language within the first few years of their career.

The societal imperative of inclusion has been extended to gender, “visible minorities,” and Aboriginal peoples. Women were permitted to serve in the CF beginning in 1951, albeit with a 1.5 percent limit on their numbers and restrictions on their career fields.<sup>[128]</sup> The 1978 Human Rights Act prohibited such discrimination and “by 1985, women were allowed in 75% of military occupations.”<sup>[129]</sup> “In 1989, the CF was directed by a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal to remove gender-based employment barriers and to achieve the complete integration of women into all occupational and employment areas within ten years.”<sup>[130]</sup> This opened all positions in the military to women, including combat-related positions.<sup>[131]</sup> Indeed, “Canada was the first NATO country to open all occupations to women, although other countries such as Norway, Denmark and Belgium have since followed.”<sup>[132]</sup>

Nonetheless, from 1989 to 1998 there was less than a one percent increase in women in the regular force, with half of a percent increase in the NCO corps and a 2.5 percent increase among officers.<sup>[133]</sup> In 1999, the CF established a goal of recruiting 28 percent for women by 2019. Efforts to increase recruitment through targeted campaigns throughout the 2000s improved female representation,<sup>[134]</sup> as seen in Table 7.

**Table 7: Percentage of Female CF Members<sup>[135]</sup>**

	1991	1996	2001	2006	2010
<b>Officers</b>	10.0	11.0	13.0	15.0	17.0
<b>Enlisted</b>	11.0	11.0	11.5	12.0	12.5
<b>Total</b>	11.0	11.0	12.0	12.5	13.0

These results were achieved without quotas, such as those used to rapidly increase the representation of Francophones, as quotas were prohibited by the Employment Equity Act of 1996. The focus was on recruiting “the best candidate – whether man or woman.”<sup>[136]</sup>

Canadian emphasis on increasing the proportion of females in the force through equal opportunities in recruitment and promotion has slowed the rate at which the ranks of the officer and NCO corps can be populated by females, as seen in Tables 8 and 9.

**Table 8: Percentage of Female Officers by Rank, 2006–2010<sup>[137]</sup>**

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>General Officer</b>	3.9	4.9	3.8	2.4	2.2
<b>Colonel</b>	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.6
<b>Lieutenant Colonel</b>	6.4	7.0	7.2	7.6	8.1
<b>Major</b>	10.3	11.1	12.2	13.2	13.8
<b>Captain</b>	15.7	16.5	16.2	16.8	17.3
<b>Lieutenant</b>	22.4	24.8	27.5	23.8	23.5
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant</b>	19.2	16.7	15.5	17.9	14.9
<b>Cadet</b>	21.8	21.4	22.2	21.6	22.9
<b>Total</b>	15.0	15.5	15.9	16.3	16.5

**Table 9: Percentage of Female Enlisted by Rank, 2006–2010<sup>[138]</sup>**

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Chief Warrant Officer</b>	4.1	4.1	4.2	5.4	4.9
<b>Master Warrant Officer</b>	6.0	6.3	6.1	6.4	7.0
<b>Warrant Officer</b>	7.8	8.6	8.9	8.6	9.1
<b>Sergeant</b>	11.4	11.8	12.3	13.0	13.8
<b>Master Corporal</b>	12.9	14.1	14.5	14.9	14.7
<b>Corporal</b>	13.5	13.5	13.6	13.6	13.5
<b>Private</b>	14.0	13.6	13.6	13.6	12.9
<b>Total</b>	12.4	12.6	12.8	13.0	12.9

The Employment Equity Act of 1996 also applied to Aboriginal peoples<sup>[139]</sup> and “visible minorities.”<sup>[140]</sup> Policies of equal opportunity were applied to each.

“Visible minorities” faced explicit discrimination in the CF. The Navy and Air Force prohibited them from service until 1943.<sup>[141]</sup> Little was done beyond allowing them to serve until 1997, when, in response to the Employment Equity Act of 1996, the CF set a goal to recruit 9 percent “visible minorities” by 2019.<sup>[142]</sup> In part due to focused recruitment efforts, the percentage of “visible minorities” in the CF increased six-fold from 1991–2010, as indicated in Table 10.

**Table 10: Percentage of “Visible Minority” CF Members<sup>[143]</sup>**

	1991	1996	2001	2006	2010
<b>Officers</b>	0.7	1.1	2.0	2.7	5.6
<b>Enlisted</b>	0.5	1.0	1.3	2.1	3.1
<b>Total</b>	0.6	1.0	1.4	2.0	3.5

Finally, Aboriginal people pose particular challenges. The settlement of the “New World” by European immigrants destroyed Aboriginal peoples and their cultures over the course of centuries. “Politically, Aboriginal people were marginalized and forced from their home territories, put on reserves, and excluded from the economic mainstream ... Accordingly, Aboriginal nations descended into poverty and became dependent on the Canadian

government for subsistence.”<sup>[144]</sup> The Canadian government has adopted specific policies designed to increase the educational level of Aboriginal peoples, among other policies, so as to help redress this damage.<sup>[145]</sup> In 1999, the CF set a goal for Aboriginal peoples to constitute 3 percent of all recruits by 2019,<sup>[146]</sup> which was roughly their share of the population in the 2000 census.<sup>[147]</sup> The percentage of Aboriginal peoples in the CF from 1991–2010 is indicated in Table 12. Given the trajectory of these figures, it would appear as though the CF will not achieve its objective without greater efforts.

**Table 11: Percentage of Aboriginal CF Members**<sup>[148]</sup>

	1991	1996	2001	2006	2010
<b>Officers</b>	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.5
<b>Enlisted</b>	1.0	1.3	2.1	2.1	2.3
<b>Total</b>	0.9	1.2	1.9	2	2.1

Overall, the Canadian military has overcome substantial historical and cultural barriers to achieve the second-most diverse armed forces population in NATO. It moved from policies of forcible assimilation and the marginalization of Francophones, albeit within a volunteer military, toward promoting bilingualism and policies favoring Francophones until they were proportionally represented. Policies designed to achieve rapid equality of outcomes were problematic, however, and emphasis shifted to equal opportunity to address women, “visible minorities,” and Aboriginals. The Canadian Forces took the lead in integrating women. This process was accelerated through legislative and judicial edicts requiring the adoption of equal opportunity policies. Societal imperatives also drove efforts to integrate “visible minorities” and Aboriginal peoples into the CF. The proportions of all three of these legislatively “Designated Groups” have been increased through focused recruitment efforts. By 2012, the Canadian Forces were among the most diverse among the NATO nations, which was achieved through a manpower acquisition system designed to maximize its functional imperative: a professional, all-volunteer force.

### **Mechanisms for Sharing**

These three countries have extensive experience with integrating ethnic, racial, and linguistic minorities into their armed forces. These experiences informed their efforts of gender integration, with all three countries outpacing the Nordic countries of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. Remarkably, their policies have developed independently, with only informal

reference made to one another's experiences. For instance, the U.S. Diversity Leadership Commission's Report of 2011 contains no reference to the experiences of Canada or Great Britain.<sup>[149]</sup> The report of the U.S. Congressional Research Service on issues pertaining to women in combat only references a press account of a Canadian study on the topic.<sup>[150]</sup> Comparisons are equally weak among the Nordic countries. The only reference found to the experiences of other Nordic countries was a Norwegian survey of private sector diversity practices in Denmark.<sup>[151]</sup>

Opportunities for cross-national learning do exist, however. NATO has several mechanisms at its disposal allowing alliance members to collect data, provide and share information regarding national programs, policies, and procedures on gender-related issues, including the implementation of UNSCRs 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010). These include task forces, working groups, and committees of experts.<sup>[152]</sup>

The mechanisms are thus in place for sharing lessons and improving the integration of women and ethnic minorities into the armed forces of NATO countries. Denmark participates in these forums to achieve its objectives of "greater, active participation of women in peace building at international and local levels," as well as objectives outlined in its National Action Plan for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.<sup>[153]</sup> Its advocacy of such objectives should be tempered by the recognition that other Allies are more successful at integrating women—and ethnic minorities—into their armed forces.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The Danish Armed Forces are undergoing a transformation as they respond to the functional imperatives of becoming a smaller, more professional expeditionary force that can better contribute to NATO missions. They are also being transformed by a commitment to reflect the composition of Danish society. Danish diversity policy has focused on issues of gender equality, a Scandinavian strength, and has only recently begun to address the changing ethnic make-up of Danish society. As such, it has made some strides with regard to gender diversity, opening all positions to women and ranking 11<sup>th</sup> among NATO countries in terms of the percentage of the force composed by women. It has yet to achieve comparable success with ethnic minorities.

What conclusions can be drawn from this survey of Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, American, British, and Canadian policies? Five conclusions are clear:

1. Diversity is a societal imperative
2. Systematic data reporting is imperative to success
3. Lofty goals can be counterproductive
4. Focused development, recruitment, promotion, and retention policies are key
5. Volunteer forces are more diverse than conscript forces

**Diversity is a societal imperative.** Changing societal norms regarding gender relations and the increased presence of ethnic minorities have made diversity in all public agencies a metric of legitimacy. All must bear responsibility for the functioning of the state and society.

Virtually every NATO member has moved to include more women and ethnic minorities in their armed forces. The context differs across countries, with different groups posing the primary challenge to be overcome. In the United States, Blacks were the primary group whose process of integration formed the basis for integrating women and other ethnic minorities. In Canada, Francophones were the most challenging group to integrate, with women, “visible minorities,” and Aboriginal peoples included afterwards. In Great Britain, policies to include ethnic minorities and women followed efforts to broaden the socio-economic basis of the officer corps that have only recently begun to merge. Although these three countries have not given women pride of place in their diversity efforts, they nevertheless have the greatest proportion of women in their armed forces amongst the NATO countries.



**Systematic data reporting is imperative to success.** It is difficult, if not impossible, to set goals, monitor progress, and adjust policies without access to appropriate data. Personnel data are amongst the easiest to collect, collate, and analyze. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada produce annual (and in the British case, quarterly) reports describing the status of their armed forces: total manpower, accessions, and separations, broken down by service, component, rank, and relevant demographic variables such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, primary language, and marital status. These studies also compare these descriptive statistics to those of the civilian population, both *en toto* and in comparison to the civilian work force. These reports are made public so that relevant stakeholders and interested parties can use reliable data as they monitor compliance by their governments. As the British put it, “The Armed Forces ensure public access to information and services which they provide by making these accessible to everyone.”<sup>[154]</sup> Regular institutionalized reporting of data to all stake holders, including the legislature and civil society, should be undertaken by the Danish MoD.

These compendiums can be complemented by analyses of promotion rates, command selection, and assignment patterns so that progress of groups of interest can be tracked and systemic deviations from the norm can be investigated.<sup>[155]</sup> As the British Ministry of Defence states, “We gather, analyse and evaluate information to determine any patterns of inequality. This analysis is carried out across the whole spectrum of employment in the Armed Forces, from joining up to leaving service.”<sup>[156]</sup> In addition, these governments survey the attitudes of service members to evaluate the cultural context within which policy initiatives are taking place, identify potential issues and challenges, and provide a basis for overcoming them.<sup>[157]</sup> The Danish MoD should follow suit.

**Lofty goals can be counterproductive.** The British and Canadian armed forces set goals for increasing the percentage of designated minority groups recruited and in the force as a whole when adopting their respective diversity and integration initiatives. These objectives garnered plaudits when announced. They later had to scale back their ambitions and paid a price when doing so.<sup>[158]</sup> The Canadians learned a valuable lesson from these failures to meet their objectives. Canada has repeatedly adjusted its recruiting targets to take into account propensity to serve. This has allowed it to avoid setting unrealistic expectations, such as recruiting sufficient numbers of women to make the CF 50 percent female in any reasonable timeframe. The Danish MoD should use similar analyses to set achievable goals for recruiting, retaining, and promoting women and ethnic minorities in the DAF.

**Focused development, recruitment, promotion, and retention policies are key.** Great Britain and Canada have had success in recruiting minorities when they are targeted, be they women or members of ethnic or linguistic minority groups. The United States has also targeted minority groups for recruitment, but it has also developed programs to augment the qualifications of minority group members so as to increase the pool of qualified applicants. This approach has been most successful.

The Danish MoD should do more than “examine in collaboration with civil sports country high schools to offer a sports course that prepares women and men for a future military career.”<sup>[159]</sup> Programs for developing the human capital of potential recruitment pools should include education and vocational programs so as to increase the quality of personnel in the force and offer inducements to join.

The United States and Canada have also carried out numerous studies of the propensity of youth to enlist in the armed forces. Such studies control for numerous factors beyond gross demographics, such as family socio-economic status and occupational preferences, to determine the probability of youths from different groups electing to serve in the armed forces, their occupational preferences, and expected length of service. The Danish MoD should undertake such studies to improve its capacity to set and then achieve realistic goals.

The American experience suggests that members of different groups join the armed forces for different reasons: to serve the nation, learn a trade, further their education, demonstrate their patriotism, and so forth. Recognizing these differentiated career expectations may offer a means by which to increase the propensity to join and remain in the armed forces. Women and ethnic minorities must see the armed forces as an attractive career option. The MoD should study “options for further differentiated career tracks to ... visualize different job types and career paths. Both men and women should be able to see attractive career paths in the military,”<sup>[160]</sup> regardless of their ethnicity.

Yet recruitment changes the composition of the armed forces slowly, and only at the lower levels given the lack of lateral entry. Increasing diversity through recruitment and retention therefore requires patience. Indeed, recruitment rates must be greater than the attrition of members of targeted groups if growth in their proportion of the force is to occur.

Retention therefore requires significant attention. Many diversity policies first establish a harassment-free work environment. This is necessary to enhance retention rates. Other

problems may exist, however, which exploration through systematically applied exit interviews may uncover. For instance, “Interview surveys with female soldiers who stop their military training, among others, indicate the main reason for female dropout is the physical challenges.”<sup>[161]</sup> Such interviews should be conducted for all personnel, regardless of time in service or rank.

The experience of the United States and Canada suggests that training and education programs that develop the skills and knowledge of personnel are crucial to retaining a pool of capable minorities able to advance through a meritocratic system and avoiding premature attrition. Such programs may ostensibly be open to all but be designed to benefit members of groups that are more likely to lack certain qualifications. It would appear as though the FOCUS program begun in 2007 could provide the basis for developing the DAF’s human capital.

Along these lines, the experience of the United States and Canada suggests that the most effective means of increasing the proportion of designated minority group members across ranks and career fields is to provide them with advantages in promotions. In each case, goals or quotas for members of these groups were established for cohorts appearing before a promotion board. Members of these groups were given a preference, either directly or indirectly, so that diversity objectives could be reached. In both cases, the integrity of the promotion system was compromised, resentment for members of the designated minority groups was fostered, and ultimately targeted preferences were deemed illegal. These practices were therefore either discontinued or significantly modified to account for skills, knowledge, or experiences that may be unevenly distributed across demographic groups. In 2004, the Danish government set formal targets of 4 percent for ethnic minorities in all government departments. Such goals may encourage policies that expedite the recruitment and retention of ethnic minorities but may come at substantial cost. Utilizing a system of preferences in promotion decisions is contrary to other fundamental values – indeed, would be prohibited by EU Directives 2006/54/EC, 2000/48/EC, and 2000/78/EC – and should be avoided.

**Volunteer forces are more diverse than conscript forces.** It is generally argued that the functional and societal imperatives of the military are in tension and that increasing the former reduces the latter.<sup>[162]</sup> The professionalization of the military, beginning with the officer corps, through non-commissioned officers, and today reaching even the enlisted ranks,<sup>[163]</sup> subordinated the societal imperative of representation to the functional imperative

of effectiveness. Voluntary and merit-based entry, retention, and promotion structures provide for long-term careers and continued professional development while conscripted forces provide short-term service that ideally rotates a majority of citizens through the military. A conscript force is not professional and its personnel cannot be trained and educated beyond a rudimentary level. In essence, a professional force is selective in its personnel policies and effective in its performance, whereas a conscripted force is inclusive but less effective.

Interestingly, the evidence suggests that a selective volunteer force is also more representative than a conscripted one.

The case for moving from conscription to an all-volunteer force is generally based upon a philosophical emphasis upon freedom of choice for citizens, macro-economic efficiency, and developing a professional force of career-oriented personnel whose time in service will permit the acquisition of the depth and breadth of knowledge and expertise necessary to be effective in the current international environment.<sup>[164]</sup> It is presumed that females and ethnic minorities will be less likely than males of the dominant racial/ethnic/linguistic group to enlist. Although studies of enlistment propensity bear this out,<sup>[165]</sup> NATO militaries with all-volunteer forces tend to have the greatest proportion of females – far outpacing nations that acquire manpower through conscription (and allow women to volunteer).<sup>[166]</sup> Indeed, the data suggests that shifting to an all-volunteer force is accompanied by an increase in female and ethnic and racial minority participation.<sup>[167]</sup> Indeed, in Sweden's first year of transitioning to an AVF, 13.9 percent of the applicants were female and 9 percent were not of Swedish origin.<sup>[168]</sup> Perhaps this is because a mix of compulsory male conscription and voluntary female enlistment emphasizes the perception that the military constitutes “man's work” and that the environment may not be accommodating.

On the other hand, moving toward an all-volunteer force might not increase ethnic diversity in advanced welfare states such as Denmark. In countries where racial and ethnic status are tied to economic and social disadvantage, the opportunity to acquire useful skills, become socialized into the civic culture of the nation, and pass these traits on to children has proven to be a powerful inducement to join the armed forces – so much so that racial inequality in the American military has been overcome for both enlisted and officers.<sup>[169]</sup> But in societies where such benefits are not coupled to public service, such as Denmark, these incentives will be less effective. Alternatively, motives such as inclusion, patriotism, and humanitarianism

might be more powerful than in societies oriented toward individualism. Clearly, the motivation of persons to serve in the armed forces should be explored further.

The respective experiences of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada suggest that moving from conscription to an all-volunteer force, focused policies to develop, recruit, retain, and promote members of targeted groups, setting realistic goals, and monitoring, analyzing, and reporting personnel statistics on a regular basis are the most effective policy steps that can be taken to adjust to the societal imperative of including all members of society in the armed services of the nation.

To conclude, Denmark has made some strides in pursuing the diversification of the personnel in its armed forces. It has utilized a policy of equal opportunity largely focused upon gender and implemented a succession of successful policies over the past 50 years. Yet more could be done. The experiences of countries that have had more time to adapt to the functional and societal imperatives of the era, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, have much to offer – particularly as the armed forces of all three are more diverse than those of Denmark.

# Notes

<sup>[1]</sup> Ministry of Defence, Diversity Policy (April 2011), page 10.

<sup>[2]</sup> Helena Carreiras, Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies (London: Routledge, 2006) page 99, Table 5.1. It was ahead of Greece, the Czech Republic, Norway, Germany, Turkey, Poland, and Italy.

<sup>[3]</sup> Carreiras, Gender and the Military, page 99, Table 5.1.

<sup>[4]</sup> Defence Command Denmark, Defence Mission and Vision, p. 13, available at:

[http://forsvaret.dk/FKO/Nyt%20og%20Presse/Publikationer/PublishingImages/forsvarsets\\_mvs.pdf](http://forsvaret.dk/FKO/Nyt%20og%20Presse/Publikationer/PublishingImages/forsvarsets_mvs.pdf)

<sup>[5]</sup> The objective of the British MoD is “to recruit, train, motivate and retain sufficient military personnel to provide the military capability necessary to meet the Government’s strategic objectives” (House of Commons Defence Committee, HC 424. Recruiting and Retaining Armed Forces Personnel. Fourteenth Report of 2007–08. Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 30 July 2008), page 11).

<sup>[6]</sup> See Bertel Heurlin, “The New Danish Model: Limited Conscription and Deployable Professionals,” in Curtis L. Gilroy and Cindy Williams, editors, Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006) and Henning Sorensen, “Denmark: From Obligation to Option,” in Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, editors, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

<sup>[7]</sup> Ministry of Defence, Diversity Policy (April 2011), page 7. “Non-western countries [are those] outside the EU, Scandinavia, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland and Vatican City.” This is the same definition used by Statistics Denmark and the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration. It differs from the definition used in the MoD’s “Historical Timeline for Equal Treatment and Diversity Initiatives in the Defence,” (Copenhagen: Ministry of Defence, undated), which is “a minority whose cultural identity is distinct from the majority population in the country where they live.”

Available at:

<http://www2.forsvaret.dk/temaer/mangfoldighed/Documents/Historisk%20tidslinje%20for%20ligebehandling%20og%20mangfoldighedstiltag%20i%20forsvaret.pdf> (accessed 16 May 2012).

<sup>[8]</sup> Ministry of Defence, Diversity Policy (April 2011), page 10; Forsvarskommandoens handleplan for ligebehandling og mangfoldighed 2011-2012, pages 24–25.

<sup>[9]</sup> Centre for Military Studies, White Paper on Conscription (June 2012).

[http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/pdf/pub/vaernepligtsnotat.pdf/](http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/pdf/pub/vaernepligtsnotat.pdf)

<sup>[10]</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Danish National Police, Denmark’s National Action Plan for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, 2008–2013 (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008), pages 8, 5, 15.

<sup>[11]</sup> Ministry of Defence, “Historical Timeline for Equal Treatment and Diversity Initiatives in the Defence,” page 5.

<sup>[12]</sup> Forsvarskommandoens handleplan for ligebehandling og mangfoldighed 2011–2012 [Defence Command Action Plan for Equal Treatment and Diversity 2011–2012], page 23.

<sup>[13]</sup> Kilde FPT fakta [Source: Defense Personnel Service fact].

<sup>[14]</sup> Including “race, color religion, political opinion, sexual orientation, national, social and ethnic origin,” (Danish Ministry of Defence (*Forsvaret*), “Historical Timeline for Equal Treatment and Diversity Initiatives in the Defence,” (Copenhagen: Ministry of Defence, undated). Available at:

<http://www2.forsvaret.dk/temaer/mangfoldighed/Documents/Historisk%20tidslinje%20for%20ligebehandling%20og%20mangfoldighedstiltag%20i%20forsvaret.pdf> (accessed 16 May 2012). In addition, sexual orientation

has been considered explicitly, with a study conducted in 2009. See Hans Henrik Erland Hansen, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Nation Denmark: A Study of Six Men’s Homosexual Adventures and Experiences in the Danish Defense (Gothenburg: Nordiska högskolan för folkhälsovetenskap, 2009). Available at: [http://www.nhv.se/upload/dokument/forskning/MPH/MPH\\_2009-5\\_Hans%20Henrik%20Erland%20Hansen.pdf](http://www.nhv.se/upload/dokument/forskning/MPH/MPH_2009-5_Hans%20Henrik%20Erland%20Hansen.pdf)

<sup>[15]</sup> Ministry of Defence, “Historical Timeline for Equal Treatment and Diversity Initiatives in the Defence,” page 2, available in Danish at:

<http://www2.forsvaret.dk/temaer/mangfoldighed/Documents/Historisk%20tidslinje%20for%20ligebehandling%20og%20mangfoldighedstiltag%20i%20forsvaret.pdf>

[16] *Forsvarskommandoens handleplan for ligebehandling og mangfoldighed 2011–2012* [Defence Command Action Plan for Equal Treatment and Diversity 2011–2012].

[17] MIA is the Danish acronym for “diversity in the workplace” and is awarded by the European Union and the Danish Ministry of Employment.

[18] See

<http://perst.dk/Arbejdspladsen/Mangfoldighed/Rekruttering%20af%20etniske%20minoriteter/Maaltal%20for%20etniske%20minoriteter.aspx>. The targets are overseen by the Modernization Agency [*Moderniseringsstyrelsen*] within the Ministry of Finance. In 2004, 8.2 percent of the Danish population was of non-Danish origin (Source: Statistics Denmark. <http://www.dst.dk/en>).

[19] Act on Equality between Women and Men of 2007, available at:

<https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=20929>

[20] Ministry of Defence, Defence Personnel Service (*Forsvarets Personeltjeneste*), “Women in Armed Forces,” (21 May 2012) available at:

<http://forsvaret.dk/fpt/nyt%20og%20presse/tal/kvinderiforsvaret/Pages/default.aspx>

[21] *Forsvarets Personeltjeneste, Chefer i forsvaret*; <http://forsvaret.dk/FPT/cheferiforsvaret/Pages/default.aspx>

[22] Ministry of Defence, *Diversity Policy* (April 2011), page 14.

[23] Ministry of Defence, *Diversity Policy* (April 2011), page 14.

[24] Source: Statistics Denmark. <http://www.dst.dk/en>

[25] Ministry of Defence, *Diversity Policy* (April 2011), page 7. This likely refers to all MoD employees rather than only those in the DAF.

[26] This figure is taken directly from the MoD *Diversity Policy* (April 2011), page 7.

[27] Personal correspondence with Henrik Sønderskov, Special Adviser, Defence Command, Strategic Personnel Branch, Denmark (13 September 2012).

[28] Henning Sørensen, “Conscription in Scandinavia During the Last Quarter Century: Developments and Arguments,” *Armed Forces and Society* 26, 2 (Winter 2000).

[29] Karsten Friis, “The Power of the Draft: A Century of Changing Legitimacy of Norway’s Armed Forces,” in Pertti Joenniemi, editor, *The Changing Face of European Conscription* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006). Sweden began the transition from conscription to a volunteer force in 2010 (Ulf Ivarsson, “Pendeln måste slå tillbaka,” *Hemvårnet* 1 (February 2007), page 5) [“The pendulum must hit back”].

[30] Trude Langvasbråten, “A Scandinavian Model? Gender Equality Discourses on Multiculturalism,” *Social Politics* 15, 1 (2008); Gillian Pascall and Jane Lewis, “Emerging Gender Regimes and Policies for Gender Equality in a Wider Europe,” *Journal of Social Policy* 33, 3 (2004); Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[31] Frank Brundtland Steder, Nina Hellum and Kristina Skutlaberg, “*Forskning på årskull fra sesjon og framover – kjønn, ledelse og rekruttering i Forsvaret*,” (Oslo: Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI), 22 November 2009), page 4. [“Research on cohorts from the session and future—gender, management and recruitment in the military”].

[32] Frank Brundtland Steder, “*Kvinner i Forsvaret—quo vadis?*” *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift* 5 (June 2010), page 20 [“Women in the military—quo vadis”].

[33] *Forsvarsmakten*, “History and Statistics,” <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Om-Forsvarsmakten/Arbetsplatsen/Jamstalldhetsarbete/Historik-och-statistik/> (accessed 26 June 2012).

[34] Shira J. Boss, “Equality may mean Army service in Sweden,” *Christian Science Monitor* (19 April 2000); “Sweden mulls military service for women,” *China Daily* (27 June 2003); “Sweden’s military looks to women,” *Daily Times* (Pakistan) (13 May 2004); and “‘Make conscription mandatory for women’: Social Democrats,” *The Local, Swedish News in English* (28 April 2009).

[35] Emma Jonsson, “Recruitment after the Introduction of an All-Volunteer Force in Sweden—so far so good.” Paper presented at the ISA RC 01 Interim Conference in Maribor, Slovenia, 8–12 July 2012.

[36] 2008 figures for officers and reserve officers from *The Pocket Guide to the Swedish Armed Forces* (Stockholm: Swedish Armed Forces, 2009), page 51. 2011 data from Hanna Stenberg with Sofia Styrman, Madeleine Roghult, Malin Göransson, Karin Eklund, Joel Borgström, Gunilla Fallqvist, Josefin Arlesten, and Emma Johansson, *Security Council Resolution 1325: Civil Society Monitoring Report 2011: Sweden* (Stockholm: Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, 2011), available at: <http://www.gnwp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/sweden1.pdf>

- <sup>[37]</sup> “Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2011,” Statistics Sweden  
[http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart\\_26041.aspx](http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart_26041.aspx), accessed 26 June 2012.
- <sup>[38]</sup> “Swedish army to jobless immigrants: we want you,” *The Local* (30 May 2012).
- <sup>[39]</sup> Swedish Armed Force, “Core Values,” available at: <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/About-the-Armed-Forces/Our-task/Core-Values-in-the-Swedish-Armed-Forces/>, accessed 8 June 2012; Inger Furseth, “Religious Diversity in Prisons and in the Military: The Rights of Muslim Immigrants in Norwegian State Institutions,” *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 2, 1 (2000), available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001388/138885E.pdf#page=42>
- <sup>[40]</sup> Statistics Norway, “Focus on: Immigration and immigrants,” (Oslo: Statistics Norway, 1 January 2012), available at: [http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/00/10/innvandring\\_en/](http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/00/10/innvandring_en/), accessed 8 June 2012.
- <sup>[41]</sup> Hilde Solheim, “Minorities and Diversity in the Armed Forces,” *PACEM* 13, 1 (2010) pages 25–44, available at: <http://www.pacem.no/2010/1/2identitet/3solheim/>
- <sup>[42]</sup> Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*, page 99, Table 5.1
- <sup>[43]</sup> On the use of the military as a homogenizing institution for the nation, see Gary Schaub, Jr. “Civil-Military Relations,” in *The Encyclopedia of Political Science, Volume 1* (Washington: CQ Press, 2011); Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 46, 4 (January 1941); Maury D. Feld, *The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Ronald R. Krebs, “A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might,” *International Security* 28, 4 (Spring 2004); and Morris Janowitz, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies,” *Armed Forces and Society* 2, 2 (Winter 1976).
- <sup>[44]</sup> For geopolitical explanations of their propensity to project military power beyond their borders—i.e., to undertake expeditionary operations—see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); David S. McDonough, “Grand Strategy, Culture, and Strategic Choice: A Review,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 13, 4 (2011); and Damon Coletta and Sten Rynning, “NATO from Kabul to Earth Orbit: Can the Alliance Cope?” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 10, 1 (2012). For their preference for technologically advanced forces, see Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); Peter J. Dietz and J.F. Stone, “The British All-Volunteer Army,” *Armed Forces & Society* 1, 2 (February 1975); Edward N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, 3 (May/June 1995); and Hugh Smith, “What Costs Will Democracies Bear? A Review of Popular Theories of Casualty Aversion,” *Armed Forces and Society* 31, 4 (Summer 2005).
- <sup>[45]</sup> See Gary Schaub, Jr. and Adam Lowther, “Who Serves? The American All-Volunteer Force,” in Stephen J. Cimbala, editor, *Civil-Military Relations in Perspective: Strategy, Structure, and Policy* (London: Ashgate, 2012); James Burk, “The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service,” *Defense Analysis* 8, 1 (1992).
- <sup>[46]</sup> Andrew C. Bacevich, “Whose Army?” *Dædalus* 140, 3 (Summer 2011).
- <sup>[47]</sup> Bernard D. Rostker and Curtis L. Gilroy, “The Transition to an All-Volunteer Force: The U.S. Experience,” in Curtis L. Gilroy and Cindy Williams, editors, *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
- <sup>[48]</sup> Richard V. L. Cooper, “Military Manpower Procurement Policy in the 1980s,” in Brent Scowcroft, editor, *Military Service in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982), pages 163–164. See also Bernard D. Rostker and Curtis L. Gilroy, “The Transition to an All-Volunteer Force: The U.S. Experience,” in Curtis L. Gilroy and Cindy Williams, editors, *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
- <sup>[49]</sup> Helena Carreiras, *Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies* (London: Routledge, 2006), page 99, Table 5.1.
- <sup>[50]</sup> Andrew J. Bacevich, “Who Will Serve?” *The Wilson Quarterly* 22, 3 (Summer 1998).
- <sup>[51]</sup> David R. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 108–113.
- <sup>[52]</sup> Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, pages 118–121.
- <sup>[53]</sup> Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, pages 67–74; Bernard D. Rostker and Curtis L. Gilroy, “The Transition to an All-Volunteer Force: The U.S. Experience,” in Curtis L. Gilroy and Cindy Williams, editors, *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).



<sup>[54]</sup> Population Representation in the Military Services Fiscal Year 97 (Washington: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), November 1998), Table D-17: Black Active Component Enlisted Members by Service with Civilian Comparison Group, FYs 1973–1997, available at: <http://prhome.defense.gov/RFM/MPP/ACCESSION%20POLICY/poprep97/html/d-17.html> and Table D-27: Black Active Component Officers by Service with Civilian Comparison Group, FYs 1973–1997, available at: <http://prhome.defense.gov/RFM/MPP/ACCESSION%20POLICY/poprep97/html/d-27.html>

<sup>[55]</sup> Armor and Gilroy, “Changing Minority Representation in the U.S. Military,” page 230, Figure 1; quote at page 227.

<sup>[56]</sup> Armor and Gilroy, “Changing Minority Representation in the U.S. Military,” page 229.

<sup>[57]</sup> Schaub and Lowther, “Who Serves?” Figures 7.8 and 7.10.

<sup>[58]</sup> 1980 and 1990 figures from Moskos, “Diversity in the Armed Forces of the United States,” page 21, Table 2.3. 2000 and 2010 figures from Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services FY 2000 (Washington: Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2001) and Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services FY 2010 (Washington: Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2011).

<sup>[59]</sup> See Department of the Army Affirmative Action Plan, Pamphlet 600–6–26 (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 23 May 1990) and Franklin Foer, “Quotas and Colin Powell: The Real Story of Affirmative Action in the Army,” *Slate* (14 December 1997).

<sup>[60]</sup> Charles Moskos, “Affirmative Action: The Army’s Success...,” *The Washington Post* (15 March 1995), page A19.

<sup>[61]</sup> Moskos, “Affirmative Action,” page A19; Department of the Army Affirmative Action Plan, page 5.

<sup>[62]</sup> Moskos, “Affirmative Action,” page A19.

<sup>[63]</sup> Moskos, “Affirmative Action,” page A19.

<sup>[64]</sup> Title 10, U.S. Code, § 2031.

<sup>[65]</sup> USMAPS website: <http://www.usma.edu/usmaps/>. Visited 12 March 2012. See also <http://www.usafa.af.mil/prepschool.asp> and <http://www.usna.edu/NAPS/>.

<sup>[66]</sup> There are still disparities, particularly in the higher ranks, driven in part by factors that are correlated with race and ethnicity, including choice of career field, prior knowledge of the military promotion system, the availability of mentors and role models, perceptions of opportunity, and perceived discrimination. See Jason K. Dempsey and Robert Y. Shapiro, “The Army’s Hispanic Future,” *Armed Forces & Society* 35, 3 (April 2009) and The Diversity Leadership Commission, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21<sup>st</sup>-Century Military, Final Report (Arlington: Military Leadership diversity Commission, 15 March 2011).

<sup>[67]</sup> Jin Tice, “New Guidance for Officer Boards Stops Race, Gender Preferences,” *Army Times* (6 March 2000).

<sup>[68]</sup> Neely Tucker, “Judge Halts an Army Policy on Promotion; Ruling Says Gender, Race Overly Stressed,” *The Washington Post* (5 March 2002), page A1.

<sup>[69]</sup> David F. Burrelli, Women in Combat: Issues for Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 8 November 2011); Martha E. McSally, “Defending America in Mixed Company: Gender in the U.S. Armed Forces,” *Dædalus* (Summer 2011).

<sup>[70]</sup> Nancy Kassebaum Baker, Chairwoman, Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues (Washington: The Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues, 16 December 1997); Anita K. Blair, Chairwoman, The Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, Final Report (Arlington: The Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, July 1999).

<sup>[71]</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule,” (13 January 1994).

<sup>[72]</sup> Elisabeth Bumiller, “Pentagon Allows Women Closer to Combat, but Not Close Enough for Some,” *The New York Times* (9 February 2012).

<sup>[73]</sup> The Diversity Leadership Commission, From Representation to Inclusion, page 67.

<sup>[74]</sup> Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Sexual Assault and Prevention Office, March 2010); Elisabeth Bumiller, “Sex Assault Reports Rise in Military,” *The New York Times* (16 March 2010); Jessica Turchik, “Sexual Assault in the U.S. Military: A Review of the Literature and Recommendations for the Future,” *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 15, 4 (July–August 2010); and Laura L. Miller, “Feminism and the Exclusion of Army Women from Combat,” *Gender Issues* 16, 3 (Summer 1998).

<sup>[75]</sup> Bumuller, "Pentagon Allows Women Closer to Combat"; James Dao, "Marines Moving Women Toward the Front Lines," *The New York Times* (24 April 2012).

<sup>[76]</sup> See Department of Defense Instruction 1350.3.

<sup>[77]</sup> In particular in the annual Population Representation in the Military Services reports of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, available at <http://prhome.defense.gov/RFM/MPP/ACCESSION%20POLICY/poprep.aspx>

<sup>[78]</sup> Jerald G. Bachman, David R. Segal, Peter Freedman-Doan, and Patrick M. O'Malley, "Who Chooses Military Service? Correlates of Propensity and Enlistment in the U.S. Armed Forces," *Military Psychology* 12, 1 (2000); Todd Woodruff, Ryan Kelty, and David R. Segal, "Propensity to Serve and Motivation to Enlist among American Combat Soldiers," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, 3 (April 2006); Dempsey and Shapiro, "The Army's Hispanic Future."

<sup>[79]</sup> Still, this success does not encompass all ranks across the services. See, for instance, Gary N. Leong, "Diversity Within the U.S. Air Force Senior Leadership," (Professional Studies Paper, Air War College, 17 February 2010); Irving Smith III, "Why Black Officers Still Fail," *Parameters* 40, 3 (Autumn 2010); and Pauline Jelinek, "Report: Too Many Whites, Men Leading Military," *Associated Press* (7 May 2011).

<sup>[80]</sup> "For the greater part of the nineteenth century England's army officers were 'gentlemen first, landed gentry almost always, professionals almost never. Her common soldiers were the restless, the misfits, the unhappy ... (with) ... the standing of second class citizens'," Sir John Hackett, quoted by Dietz and Stone, "The British All-Volunteer Army," pages 159; see also 164–166.

<sup>[81]</sup> Dietz and Stone, "The British All-Volunteer Army," pages 178–181.

<sup>[82]</sup> Dietz and Stone, "The British All-Volunteer Army," page 180.

<sup>[83]</sup> Dietz and Stone, "The British All-Volunteer Army," page 186.

<sup>[84]</sup> House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces: Thirty-fourth Report of Session 2006–07 (London: The Stationary Office, 18 June 2007), page 14.

<sup>[85]</sup> House of Commons, Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces, page 3. On the other hand, the individual services do record educational attainment and employment status for non-officer recruits. This data is not publicly reported (David Gee, Informed Choice? Armed Forces Recruitment Practice in the United Kingdom (London: Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, November 2007), page 15).

<sup>[86]</sup> Dandeker and Segal, "Gender Integration in the Armed Forces," page 32. The opening of positions to women was driven by European Council Directive of 9 February 1976 "on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards to access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions."

<sup>[87]</sup> 1998 figures from Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review (London: Ministry of Defence, 1998), paragraph 40; 2006 figures from Imram Khadim, UK Armed Forces. Annual Manning Report: Analysis by Rank and Age at 1 April 2011 (London: Defence Analytical Services and Advice, Ministry of Defence, 26 May 2011), page 6.

<sup>[88]</sup> Defence Analytical Services and Advice, United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2011 (London: Ministry of Defence, 28 September 2011), Table 2.17, Intake to UK Regular Forces by Service and Sex.

<sup>[89]</sup> Defence Analytical Services and Advice, United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2011, Table 2.7, Strength of UK Regular Forces by Service and Sex, at 1 April Each Year.

<sup>[90]</sup> Imram Khadim, UK Armed Forces. Annual Manning Report: Analysis by Rank and Age at 1 April 2011 (London: Defence Analytical Services and Advice, Ministry of Defence, 26 May 2011), pages 3, 6.

<sup>[91]</sup> Khadim, UK Armed Forces. Annual Manning Report, page 6. This change of policy was forced by the United Kingdom's decision to opt into the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty in 1997 and mirror EU Directives with regard to gender, race, and religion, belief, sexuality, disability, and age (Directives 2006/54/EC, 2000/48/EC, and 2000/78/EC).

<sup>[92]</sup> Defence Analytical Services and Advice, United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2011, Table 2.22, Outflow from UK Regular Forces by Service and Sex.

<sup>[93]</sup> "[I]n order to qualify for the designation as an ethnic minority, a category of people must exhibit a degree of 'difference' that is regarded as significant ... In practice, it is a combination of visibility by skin color and cultural values that marks off 'ethnic minorities' from the 'majority' population in Britain," (Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, "Diversifying the Uniform? The Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services," *Armed Forces & Society* 29, 4 (Summer 2003), page 483).

<sup>[94]</sup> Dandeker and Mason, "Diversifying the Uniform?" page 494.

- <sup>[95]</sup> The British adopted conscription in 1939 and retained it given the tensions of the Cold War.
- <sup>[96]</sup> Office for National Statistics, "Population Estimates by Ethnic Group 2002–2009," *Statistical Bulletin* (18 May 2011), page 2, Table 1, available at: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/peeg/population-estimates-by-ethnic-group--experimental-/current-estimates/index.html>
- <sup>[97]</sup> See N. Jewson and D. Mason, "The Theory and Practice of Equal Opportunities Policies: Liberal and Radical Approaches," *Sociological Review* 34, 2 (May 1986).
- <sup>[98]</sup> Dandeker and Mason, "Diversifying the Uniform?" page 487. Even so, such action is unlawful in the United Kingdom and throughout the European Union. Section 159 of the 2010 Equality Act, however, does allow a choice between two equally qualified candidates to be based on an enumerated demographic characteristic if the choice helps achieve proportional representation for an underrepresented group. Government Equalities Office, *Equality Act 2010: What Do I Need to Know? A Quick Start Guide to Using Positive Action in Recruitment and Promotion* (London: Government Equalities Office, undated), available at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/equalities/equality-act-publications/equality-act-guidance/positive-action-recruitment?view=Binary>, accessed 15 September 2012.
- <sup>[99]</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review* (London: Ministry of Defence, 1998), paragraph 41. Available at: [http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998\\_complete.pdf](http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf), accessed 27 May 2012.
- <sup>[100]</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review*, paragraph 41.
- <sup>[101]</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review*, paragraph 41.
- <sup>[102]</sup> Dandeker and Mason, "Ethnic Diversity in the British Armed Forces," page 140.
- <sup>[103]</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Race Equality Scheme 2002–2005 for the Ministry of Defence: Armed Forces, Civil Service and Ministry of Defence Police* (London: Ministry of Defence, 31 May 2002), Annex B, available at: [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.mod.uk:80/issues/racial\\_equality/annexb.htm](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.mod.uk:80/issues/racial_equality/annexb.htm), accessed 27 May 2012.
- <sup>[104]</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Race Equality Scheme 2002–2005*, Annex B, paragraph 3.
- <sup>[105]</sup> Figures from 1998–2005 from Dandeker and Mason, "Ethnic Diversity in the British Armed Forces," page 143, Table 10.1. Figures from 2005/06–2010/2011 from Defence Analytical Services and Advice, *United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2011* (London: Ministry of Defence, 28 September 2011), Table 2.16, Intake to UK Regular Forces by Service and Ethnic Origin. Omitted figures in this table were not reported by the Defence Analytical Services and Advice as "more than 40% of ethnicity data are unknown."
- <sup>[106]</sup> House of Commons, *Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces*, page 14.
- <sup>[107]</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Equality & Diversity Schemes 2008–2011: Incorporating Armed Forces, Wider Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence Police* (London: Ministry of Defence, undated), available at: <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/98E4EAB6-CE02-4F39-9EF2-17DD054C5905/0/eqdivschemes20082011.pdf>, accessed 24 May 2012. This was further supplemented by the Equality Act of 2010. See Ministry of Defence Corporate Equity Team, *MOD Strategic Equality Objectives 2012–16* (London: Ministry of Defence, undated), page 2, available at: [http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/BFBBF99D-B1B1-4A93-94D0-42C50C04E462/0/ea10\\_strategic\\_equality\\_objectives.pdf](http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/BFBBF99D-B1B1-4A93-94D0-42C50C04E462/0/ea10_strategic_equality_objectives.pdf), accessed 6 May 2012.
- <sup>[108]</sup> Defence Analytical Services and Advice, *United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2011*, Table 2.9, Strength of UK Regular Forces by Service and Ethnic Origin, at 1 April Each Year.
- <sup>[109]</sup> Pariseau and Bernier, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces*, page 226.
- <sup>[110]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II*, page 91. This objective was reaffirmed by the Minister of Defence, James Richardson, in the House of Commons on 28 April 1976. (Bernier and Pariseau, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II*, page 100).
- <sup>[111]</sup> Pariseau and Bernier, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces*, page 237.
- <sup>[112]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II*, page 104.
- <sup>[113]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II*, pages 106–107.
- <sup>[114]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II*, page 105.
- <sup>[115]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II*, page 126.

- <sup>[116]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II, page 104.
- <sup>[117]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II, pages 90–92.
- <sup>[118]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II, page 94. Also, such deviations required authorization from Directors General for Officers' and Other Ranks' Careers, no one could be promoted twice successively based on such exceptions, and no more than 10 percent of all promotions could be made by exception (page 88).
- <sup>[119]</sup> According to Lieutenant General H.A. Carswell, Assistant Deputy Minister for Personnel, in testimony on 17 November 1981 (Bernier and Pariseau, French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II, page 102).
- <sup>[120]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II, page 95.
- <sup>[121]</sup> Bernier and Pariseau, French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II, pages 87–88.
- <sup>[122]</sup> 1966–1987 from Bernier and Pariseau, French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume II, pages 116–118, Tables 4–6; 1992–2002 and 2007–2010 from Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2009/2010 (Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel Research And Analysis, Department of National Defence, November 2011), page 14, Figure 14 and page A-6, Tables A.6a and A.6b. Figures have been rounded to one decimal place.
- <sup>[123]</sup> According to the 1991 census. See "Canada's Francophone Population," *Canadian Geographic* (July/August 1994). Available at: <http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/magazine/ja94/alacarte.asp>, accessed 22 April 2012.
- <sup>[124]</sup> Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2009/2010, page iii, page 14.
- <sup>[125]</sup> Derived from Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2009/2010, , pages 15–16, Figures 15 and 16.
- <sup>[126]</sup> "National Defence Official Languages Program Transformation Model has Arrived!" *The Maple Leaf* 10, 25 (5 September 2007), available at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=3698>. Accessed 26 April 2012. The Model can be viewed at: [http://www.dnd.ca/hr/Dol/Engraph/TransModel\\_TOC\\_e.asp](http://www.dnd.ca/hr/Dol/Engraph/TransModel_TOC_e.asp)
- <sup>[127]</sup> Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2009/2010, page 15.
- <sup>[128]</sup> Lise Bourgon, "The CF as an Employer of Choice: The Key for a Successful Gender Integration," (paper prepared for the Canadian Forces College, 19 April 2007), pages 6–7.
- <sup>[129]</sup> Bourgon, "The CF as an Employer of Choice," page 7.
- <sup>[130]</sup> Chief Review Services, Evaluation—Gender Integration in the CF (Ottawa: Ministry of Defence, June 1998, Revised November 1998), synopsis.
- <sup>[131]</sup> Donna Winslow, Phyllis Browne, and Angela Febbraro, "Diversity in the Canadian Forces," in Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen, editors, Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: An International Comparison (London: Routledge, 2007), page 33.
- <sup>[132]</sup> Chief Review Services, Evaluation—Gender Integration in the CF, page ii.
- <sup>[133]</sup> Chief Review Services, Evaluation—Gender Integration in the CF, page ii.
- <sup>[134]</sup> Helena Carreiras, Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies (London: Routledge, 2006), page 104.
- <sup>[135]</sup> Derived from Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2009/2010, page 19, Figure 20. Winslow, Browne, and Febbraro, "Diversity in the Canadian Forces," page 35 reported that the CF's "Self-Identification Census" indicated that 16 percent of CF members were women, making up 23.3 percent of the officer corps and 10.7 percent of non-commissioned members in 2001, but these figures have been superseded by an actual count by the Canadian Human Resource Management System.
- <sup>[136]</sup> Chief Review Services, Evaluation—Gender Integration in the CF, page i.
- <sup>[137]</sup> Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2009/2010, page C-9 Table C.8a.
- <sup>[138]</sup> Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2009/2010, page AC-9 Table C.8b.

<sup>[139]</sup> A category consisting of Status Indians, Non-Status Indians, Métis (people of mixed French–Aboriginal ancestry in western Canada), and Inuit (the Aboriginal people of the Arctic).

<sup>[140]</sup> The Canadian Equity Employment Act defines “visible minorities” as “persons, other than Aboriginal people, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour,” (StatCan, Visible Minority Population and Population Group Reference Guide, 2006 Census, available at: [http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/ref/rp-guides/visible\\_minority-minorites\\_visibles-eng.cfm](http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/ref/rp-guides/visible_minority-minorites_visibles-eng.cfm), accessed 26 April 2012).

<sup>[141]</sup> Winslow, Browne, and Febbraro, “Diversity in the Canadian Forces,” page 36; James W. St. G. Walker, “Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force,” *Canadian Historical Review* 70, 2 (1989).

<sup>[142]</sup> Winslow, Browne, and Febbraro, “Diversity in the Canadian Forces,” page 35, note 14. These goals were based upon a study of interest and propensity of members of these groups to enlist in the CF and later reduced to 7.8 percent based upon a new estimation of interest and propensity to enlist. See Hans Jung, “Can the Canadian Forces Reflect Canadian Society?” *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2007), page 29.

<sup>[143]</sup> Derived from Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2009/2010, page 20, Figure 22. Leuprecht reports that visible minorities constituted 3.6 percent of the non-commissioned members and 4.3 percent of the officer corps in 2001, but these figure conflict with the official ones. In 2001, visible minorities constituted 13.4 percent of the Canadian population (Leuprecht, “Demographics and Diversity Issues,” page 132, Table 1).

<sup>[144]</sup> Kathleen Maclaurin, “Organizational Values and Cultural Diversity in the Canadian Forces: The Case of Aboriginal Peoples,” in Karen D. Davis, editor, Women and Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Perspectives and Experience (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), page 150.

<sup>[145]</sup> See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal\\_Commission\\_on\\_Aboriginal\\_Peoples](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Commission_on_Aboriginal_Peoples).

<sup>[146]</sup> Winslow, Browne, and Febbraro, “Diversity in the Canadian Forces,” page 35, note 14.

<sup>[147]</sup> Winslow, Browne, and Febbraro, “Diversity in the Canadian Forces,” page 35, Table 3.1.

<sup>[148]</sup> Derived from Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2009/2010, page 19, Figure 21. Based upon the CF’s “Self-Identification Census,” Leuprecht indicated that Aboriginal peoples constituted 3.3 percent of non-commissioned members and 1.5 percent of the officer corps.

<sup>[149]</sup> The Diversity Leadership Commission, From Representation to Inclusion.

<sup>[150]</sup> David F. Burrelli, “Women in Combat: Issues for Congress,” *CRS Report for Congress* 7-5700 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 5 April 2012), page 14.

<sup>[151]</sup> Tuva Schanke, Tonje Lauritzen, and Birgit Leirvik, “*Kvinner i forsvaret: Kunnskapsunderlag med fokus på tre tema; ungdoms valg av utdanning og yrke, det kjønnsdelte arbeidsliv og mangfold i organisasjoner*,” ØF-notat nr. 05/2008 (Lillehammer: Østlandsforskning, August 2008). [“Women in the Armed Forces. Knowledge Basis with a Focus on Three Themes: Youth Choice of Education and Occupation, the Gender-Divided Labor, and Diversity in Organizations”]

<sup>[152]</sup> NATO, “Women, peace and security: NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325,” (7 March 2012), available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B4207037-EF829357/natolive/topics\\_56984.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B4207037-EF829357/natolive/topics_56984.htm), accessed 8 June 2012.

<sup>[153]</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Danish National Police, Denmark’s National Action Plan for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, 2008–2013 (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008), page 9.

<sup>[154]</sup> Equality & Diversity Schemes 2008–2011, Incorporating Armed Forces, Wider Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence Police (London: Ministry of Defence, undated), page A-6, available at: <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/98E4EAB6-CE02-4F39-9EF2-17DD054C5905/0/eqdivschemes20082011.pdf>

<sup>[155]</sup> The Diversity Leadership Commission, From Representation to Inclusion, pages 129–130.

<sup>[156]</sup> Equality & Diversity Schemes 2008–2011, Incorporating Armed Forces, Wider Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence Police (London: Ministry of Defence, undated), page A-17, available at: <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/98E4EAB6-CE02-4F39-9EF2-17DD054C5905/0/eqdivschemes20082011.pdf>

<sup>[157]</sup> Jeh Charles Johnson and Carter F. Ham, Co-Chairs, Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (Washington: Department of Defense, 30 November 2010); Dao, “Marines Moving Women Toward the Front Lines”; Equality & Diversity Schemes 2008–2011, Incorporating Armed Forces, Wider Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence Police (London: Ministry of Defence, undated), page A-17.

- <sup>[158]</sup> Audrey Gillan, "Diversity in Forces Slow to Improve," *The Guardian* (13 January 2009); David Mason and Christopher Dandeker, "Evolving UK Policy on Diversity in the Armed Services: Multiculturalism and its Discontents," *Commonwealth & Comparative Studies* 47, 4 (2009).
- <sup>[159]</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Diversity Policy* (April 2011), page 22.
- <sup>[160]</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Diversity Policy* (April 2011), page 22.
- <sup>[161]</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Diversity Policy* (April 2011), page 22.
- <sup>[162]</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, page 2; Charles C. Moskos, "The Citizen-Soldier and the All-Volunteer Force," in Michel Louis Martin and Ellen Stern McCrate, editors, *The Military, Militarism, and the Polity: Essays in Honor of Morris Janowitz* (New York: The Free Press, 1984).
- <sup>[163]</sup> David R. Segal and Karin De Angelis, "Changing Conceptions of the Military as a Profession," in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, editors, *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
- <sup>[164]</sup> Schaub and Lowther, "Who Serves?" pages 115–120.
- <sup>[165]</sup> Jerald G. Bachman, David R. Segal, Peter Freedman-Doan, and Patrick M. O'Malley, "Who Chooses Military Service? Correlates of Propensity and Enlistment in the U.S. Armed Forces," *Military Psychology* 12, 1 (2000); Todd Woodruff, Ryan Kelty, and David R. Segal, "Propensity to Serve and Motivation to Enlist among American Combat Soldiers," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, 3 (April 2006).
- <sup>[166]</sup> Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*, pages 99–100, Table 5.1.
- <sup>[167]</sup> "Figure 5.10 shows that the representation of women is higher in countries that have voluntary systems of military service or consider transition from conscript to [an all-volunteer force] and face actual or potential recruitment shortfalls" (Carreiras, *Gender and the Military*, page 121).
- <sup>[168]</sup> Jonsson, "Recruitment after the Introduction of an All-Volunteer Force in Sweden," page 3.
- <sup>[169]</sup> Schaub and Lowther, "Who Serves?" page 128, Figure 7.7 and page 130, Figure 7.9; Armor and Gilroy, "Changing Minority Representation in the U.S. Military."



