Lars Bangert Struwe

For a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol

A Strategic Analysis of the Somali Pirate Challenge

**Dansk Institut
for Militære Studier**

March 2009

Abstract

Incidents of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have more than doubled to 111 attacks in 2008. Somali pirates thus constitute a grave threat to navigation through the Suez Canal and thereby one of the most vital maritime routes in the world. The Somali authorities are unable to solve the problem of piracy unaided and so far, while the international community has reacted, it has failed to take concerted action to combat the problem. An increasing number of naval vessels has been sent to the area, but no long-term solution has been found.

Pirates are criminals who should be pursued by the local police authority. As such an authority does not exist in Somalia, and as it appears there are no states prepared to intervene to stop the 20-year-old civil war, only the symptoms of piracy have hitherto been treated by combating it at sea. Some progress has been made, but it is necessary to take steps towards a far more permanent, regionally-based solution.

The solution suggested in this report is to establish a regionally-based maritime unit: a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol, to carry out surveillance in the area to secure free navigation and take on tasks such as fishery inspection and environmental monitoring. A Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol would comprise elements from the coastal states – from Egypt in the north to Tanzania in the south. The unit would be established with the support of the states that already have a naval presence in the area.

Recommendations

Pirates are international criminals who should be opposed locally in the places they have their bases. As there is no Somali authority capable of doing this now or in the foreseeable future, the recommendation in this report is to:

- Establish a new maritime unit – a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol.

The capacity and resources devoted by the individual states, alliances and organisations to combating piracy could be used more efficiently by establishing a regional unit: a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol (GHASP). GHASP could be built up on a regional basis founded on the states in and around the Horn of Africa. The international community must provide help with this as the pirates chiefly attack ships without considering their nationality. GHASP could be entrusted with such tasks as:

- Carrying out surveillance and securing free navigation
- Establishing security by combating illegal acts at sea
- Protecting natural resources – including fishery inspection and environmental monitoring
- Establishing a maritime life-saving service.

This means that Kenya, Tanzania, Eritrea, Djibouti, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Somalia would jointly establish GHASP. GHASP would be responsible for providing radar installations and aerial surveillance, training personnel and equipping maritime vessels. It would also be necessary to attach courts and punitive measures to GHASP. The establishment and operation of GHASP could be funded to advantage by the states that are presently providing capacity and resources for operations around the Horn of Africa.

Recommendations regarding measures on the part of Denmark:

- To participate at regional level in establishing and strengthening regional capacity – particularly in the form of a regional unit, GHASP
- To strengthen the boarding and landing capacity of the Danish Navy with the aim of continuing to take part in international operations.

There is experience of building up military and civil capacity in Denmark that must be used actively in establishing GHASP. As this will take time, a Danish maritime-military presence should be maintained off the coast of Somalia. Experience from the Absalon and Thetis missions shows that the use of helicopters combined with boarding and landing elements from the Danish Navy Frogman Corps are effective in combating attacks by pirates. Irrespective of whether there is a decision to act or react, the boarding and landing elements in particular should be strengthened. This would also strengthen participation in future international operations, such as controlling ships, for instance.

A final recommendation is to:

- Initiate research into the generic characteristics of piracy.

This report also shows that we know too little about the pirates as such. Therefore, crews of ships that have been attacked by pirates should be interviewed, and information on *best practices* in anti-piracy operations should be gathered and combined with historical information. This would make it possible to identify the generic characteristics of piracy and develop model solutions in relation to piracy that are independent of geography.

Index

01 Introduction: What is Piracy?

If measures against pirates are to be effective, they must be carried out on land. Pirates are criminals who can best be thwarted by eliminating their bases and networks. At sea, it is only possible to treat the symptoms of piracy and catch the small fish. This report focuses on the pirates off the coast of Somalia as this is where the problem has spread dramatically, and as Denmark has been extensively involved in combating piracy in the area around the Horn of Africa.

Strategies with three time horizons can be developed for combating pirates: short-term, medium-term, long-term. To date, a large number of states has become involved in combating piracy at a rapid pace, and the steps they have taken have therefore been characterised by a short-term time horizon. The aim of this report is to present recommendations that can function in the medium term. This means that temporary measures such as convoying or stationing soldiers on board merchant ships have not been taken into consideration. It is not realistic to maintain such operations for a longer period of time. Nor is there any attempt in the report to find a solution to the civil war in Somalia – something that would otherwise help to solve the problem of piracy in the long term. Somalia has neither the prospect of establishing a state capable of enforcing police authority on land and at sea, nor of an international intervention that would bring law and order to the country. This is why it is only the symptoms of the current piracy off the coast of Somalia that can be treated. However, this could be done far more efficiently than hitherto in the form of a medium-term strategy. The report provides a number of recommendations for improving efficiency in this connection.

Delimitation and method

The report focuses on Somalia and the piracy operated from there in the area around the Horn of Africa. It does not review the situation in Somalia – which would require a separate report. The report simply notes that there is no government in Somalia capable of establishing the necessary policing to control and remove pirates from the country. There is therefore no discussion in the report regarding

whether the clans or the Islamic Courts could establish the necessary power to do so.[1]

The central aspects of the report are the military and political dimensions of combating piracy. The opportunity of the individual states to prosecute the pirates has played a prominent role in the national and international debate on piracy off the coast of Somalia. This discussion has been ignored in the report which is restricted to providing recommendations that must be carried out on an international basis. It would therefore be meaningless to debate national legislation. In applying the recommendations, the individual states should naturally consider the necessary political and legal aspects of their correct forensic implementation, but this issue lies outside the scope of this report.

The source material of the report can be divided into three groups: interviews with players, such as Danish naval personnel and shipowners, material from printed and electronic media and, finally, research literature on pirates, particularly in a broad historical perspective. This report, and all other reports on the subject, has a significant shortcoming – contact with the pirates themselves. It is considered unsafe to go to Somalia and attempt to interview the pirates, which a number of journalists have attempted, some of whom have been kidnapped. Therefore, the relatively few interviews that have been published in the media have been used in this report. This involves several problems of method as it can be extremely difficult to validate the statements made. However, the interviews do show a relatively uniform approach to piracy on the part of the pirates. The interviews in the articles have therefore primarily been used as a general description of the pirates and their self-promotion.

Definition

Piracy is a criminal act that takes the form of attacking a ship. Most people can agree on this definition so far. At international level, however, there are very many definitions of piracy.[2] The one most frequently used, but also one of the narrowest, is the UN definition, as is evident from article 101 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea:

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

> (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

> (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

It is central to the definition that piracy is carried out for private ends and takes the form of one ship attacking another.[3] That is, in

pursuance of the UN's Convention on the Law of the Sea, at least two ships must be involved for piracy to take place: an attacking ship and an attacked ship. If the attackers are already on board the attacked ship, this is legally speaking a question of hijacking. In the following, the definition of piracy in the UN Convention has been used. Legally, there is a differentiation between armed robbery at sea and piracy. Somewhat simplified, armed robbery at sea is a general term, whereas piracy is defined as an act that occurs in international waters.[4] In this report, the terms piracy and pirates are used to refer to armed robbery at sea and pirates.

Status

Today, piracy attracts a very great deal of attention from the Danish and foreign press alike. The impression could therefore be gained that piracy has undergone an explosive development in recent years, but is this really the case? The number of piracy attacks internationally is illustrated in Figure 1. The number of attacks by pirates during the period from 2003 to 2008 alternated between 445 in 2003 and 239 in 2006. In 2008, the number of attacks increased to 293 and then continued the rise that occurred in 2007.

Total number of piracy attacks

Figure 1 shows the total number of piracy attacks. See the appendix for the accompanying table.

A closer look at the reports of piracy from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau provides a partial explanation of the alarming reports in the press. The reports show that there has been a marked fall in the number of piracy attacks in Southeast Asia, including the Malacca Strait and the Singapore Straits. This can be seen in Figure 2. The number of piracy attacks in this area was better than halved from 170 in 2003 to 54 in 2008. This dramatic fall is very much due to a transnational effort. On the other hand, the number of piracy attacks rose in East and West Africa. This involves increases off the coast of Somalia and Nigeria and in the Gulf of Aden, which can be clearly seen in Figure 3.

Piracy attacks by area

Figure 2 shows a major decline in the number of piracy attacks in Southeast Asia, while the number increased dramatically in East and West Africa. See the appendix for the accompanying table.

Piracy attacks, East Africa

Figure 3 shows an increase in the total number of piracy attacks off the coast of East Africa. The Somali pirates moved their area of operations from Somali waters to the Gulf of Aden. The fall in 2006 was due to the fact that the Islamic Courts were in power for a period of time. See the appendix for the accompanying table.

The dramatic aspect of the figures above is that while piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia fell in 2008, the attacks moved into international waters to the Gulf of Aden, as can be seen in Figure 3. The problem with the Somali pirates hereby became international as they were responsible for the attacks registered in the Gulf of Aden.[5]

The statistical material includes everything that could be considered piracy attacks and armed robbery at sea, and there is no differentiation between the various types of criminality. An instance that can be mentioned is that ships sailing under the Danish flag or operated by Danish shipowners were subject to 21 attacks in 2008 that ranged from possible attempts at robbery to hijacking.[6] The tables include both accomplished and interrupted acts of piracy. The figures are relatively reliable, but it must be expected that there is doubt about some of them. This is due to the fact that minor episodes were not necessarily reported because this takes time. That more serious attacks may also go unreported is far worse. Shipowners may possibly have a certain interest in failing to report incidents with regard to insurance and hiring crews.

The Suez Canal and the threat to international trade

The attacks by Somali pirates in international waters are a threat to one of the most vital maritime routes in the world. In total, approximately 7 per cent of the world's maritime transport passes through the Suez Canal. In actual figures, this means that between 1,700 and 2,000 ships pass through the Suez Canal every month, which corresponds to 60 ships every 24 hours. The Suez Canal enables shipowners to avoid their ships travelling what would otherwise be very long distances. Depending on the rest of the voyage, it is possible to reduce distances by between 23% and 86% by sailing through the canal.[7] Sailing around the southern tip of Africa would therefore mean:

- Longer transport time

- Increased pressure on the environment

- Possibly also increased (freight) prices for consumers.

The Suez Canal is very important for shipowners and global trade, but it is also – and not least – of decisive importance for Egypt, both in the form of direct and derived income. In this connection, the Suez Canal is an independent item in the state's finances. In concrete figures, Egypt earned USD 469.6 million solely in September 2008 on ships passing through the Suez Canal. During the period from 1 January to 30 September 2008, Egypt earned USD 4.1 billion from the Suez Canal.[8] If shipowners decided to reroute around southern Africa out of fear of piracy, it would have serious consequences for the Egyptian economy. Earnings from the Suez Canal constitute 4% of national income and 10% of total currency earnings.[9] This makes it even more surprising that Egypt has not acted more forcefully in connection with piracy, but has left the task to other states.

The Gulf of Aden itself is not only important for the Suez Canal, but

also for trade with East Africa, among other countries, so giving up navigation in this area would be a serious problem.

There would be serious consequences for shipowners if an area such as the Gulf of Aden were to be declared a war zone because insurance companies would demand much higher insurance premiums. When the Malacca Strait was declared a war zone, shipowners were obliged to pay between 0.1% and 1% of the value of their ships in insurance premiums when they passed through them. This could easily amount to USD 500,000 as compared to what would normally be a few thousand dollars,[10] at least a tenfold increase in insurance premiums.[11] It is difficult to make an overall calculation of the losses or additional prices for consumers if the Suez Canal were to be wholly or partly closed for fear of piracy. One of the most ominous calculations shows that the price of oil doubled in 1956 in connection with the Suez Crisis.[12] Bearing this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the international community views the Somali piracy with great concern.

The international community and its efforts against the pirates off the coast of Somalia

The international community has also reacted to the pirates to a certain extent. A large number of naval vessels has been in operation off the coast of Somalia since 2008, and today there are between 10 and 20 of these vessels in the area around the Horn of Africa. The presence of foreign powers' warships coincides with, and can almost only be explained by, the fact that the pirates' operations have become international after they moved them away from the coast of Somalia into international waters on the important route through the Gulf of Aden to Suez.

The warships come from the EU, NATO, Russia, India and China, among other countries. In 2008 there were four different operations in the area: 1) a UN operation to protect supplies from the World Food Programme (WFP aid) to Somalia, 2) Combined Task Force 150, part of the war against terrorism and part of the Coalition of the Willing, 3) a NATO force which, under the title Operation Allied Provider, escorts the WFP, among other organisations, 4) the EU Operation Atalanta, which was designed to combat pirates, but in fact primarily protects the WFP and shipping. Finally, a fifth operation is under way in the form of the US-led Task Force 151. The individual units operate under highly varying authorisations and have very different targets, and not least, differing rules of engagement. This has led to a certain amount of frustration, not only in their home countries, but also in Somalia.[13]

The UN has sharpened the focus on Somalia since 2007 because of the WFP. After attacks on three WFP supply ships by pirates, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1772 on 20 August 2007. The resolution expressed concern about the consequences of piracy and authorised the member states of the African Union (AU) to establish the necessary security measures in order to be able to provide humanitarian aid. The AU itself had reported that it was ready to continue its peace-keeping mission, AMISOM, in Somalia. Parallel

with this, all UN member states that had a military presence off the coast of Somalia were encouraged to protect shipping.[14] The means for and strengthening of AMISOM sought in the resolution, however, appears never to have been obtained to a degree sufficient for AMISOM to be able to ensure stability in Somalia.

France responded to the need to protect WFP transports and began to escort its ships from the autumn of 2007 on a purely national basis. The Danish measure, with the protection vessel Thetis, which ran from January to April 2008, was taken at the encouragement of France, also on a national basis.

Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller's, motion for a parliamentary resolution (motion for a parliamentary resolution no. B 33 introduced on 15 January 2008) presents the tasks of Combined Task Force 150 as follows:

Task Force 150 operates in international waters in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the northern part of the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Oman and the coastal waters of Somalia. The overall objective of Task Force 150 is to help improve the general level of security and stability in the area of operations. Among other things, Task Force 150 must combat piracy and terrorism and strengthen the ability of the regional coast states to maintain maritime security in the area by building up local capacity. The naval force receives its orders from the Combined Force Maritime Component Command in Bahrain, which is a maritime arm of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom.[15]

Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) operates on the authority of the Security Council's resolution 1814 and not least 1816, which permit armed forces in the area to operate in Somali territorial waters. These were reinforced with resolutions 1838 and 1851 from 2008 in which the tone was sharpened, and all states with military capacity in the area were encouraged to combat the pirates. At the same time, the authority to pursue pirates on Somali soil was extended.[16] CTF 150 is not a permanent force, but for the past six years has comprised units from the following states, among others: Denmark, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Pakistan, Spain, Great Britain, Turkey, Germany, the USA and Austria. The units have always been subject to national regulations and rules of engagement. Some states primarily took an interest in terrorism, others in human smuggling, while Denmark, for instance, chiefly focused on pirates. However, all units were under the command of the head of the US Fifth Fleet. This has led to a certain amount of frustration as a great deal of work is involved in allocating the national units to the operations the individual units are authorised to perform. In continuation of this, the USA established a new task force, Combined Task Force 151, which will have a clear mandate and uniform goals solely in the struggle against the pirates.[17]

The Danish contribution to CTF 150 has primarily comprised a ship of the Absalon class with a crew of 114 men, including a helicopter, an element from the Royal Danish Navy Frogman Corps (Frømandskorpset)[18] for boarding purposes, as well as military police, who also form part of the boarding team. At times, the head of Danish Task Group (Søværnets Taktiske Stab), with a staff comprising about 40 people, has also been stationed in the area, and functioned as Commander Task Force 150. It was made quite explicit

in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' presentation of the operation to the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) that their job was to combat piracy.[19] The task of the Danish contribution to Combined Task Force 150 appears perfectly clear: to establish maritime security through such means as *"combating piracy"*. It is relatively clear today that it was believed the pirates could be opposed at sea. Very few people could have imagined that the problem of piracy would grow and that the presence of naval vessels would not stop the pirates. However, CTF 150 has made an important contribution to regional security by providing assistance to shipping on an everyday basis with everything from medical help to warding off piracy attacks.

NATO stated that the organisation would send a task force from the NATO Standing Maritime Group 2 to the waters off the coast of Somalia in the autumn of 2008. Operation Allied Provider was implemented there, and was referred to by NATO as an anti-piracy operation. But NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said the force would not be used to combat pirates.[20] Its primary task would be to escort WFP ships, but it was also able to thwart piracy attacks. The force performed these tasks from October to December 2008.[21] When Operation Allied Provider came to an end, the task of protecting WFP ships was left to the EU Operation Atalanta, among others. The operation was only authorised to take steps against pirates as a secondary task,[22] and it took its point of departure partly in the coordination cell EU NAVCO, which was set up by the French Presidency in September 2008. In addition, The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) was established by the EU under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to assist merchant traffic in the area around the Horn of Africa. The task of MSCHOA will be to coordinate and establish an overview of navigation in collaboration with military and civilian elements in the area with the aim of providing the best possible support for merchant shipping.

A large number of states have sent units to the area around the Horn of Africa in addition to the established forces. The military superpowers Russia, China and India have all sent units to the area. There could be many explanations for this. In general, it appears to involve two circumstances: on the one hand, flag-waving as a superpower, and on the other, deep, sincere concern about the situation, which is a threat to the trade and economy of all three nations. Also, they all have a considerable number of seamen who they are naturally interested in protecting. India, for instance, is very active and, due to the presence of many Indian seamen in the area, the Indian government is under pressure to take action and is now considering sending a fleet of four ships to relieve the single Indian vessel that is there at present.[23] In accordance with their status as superpowers, it is also important for the three states to take part in operations far removed from their home waters – and thereby demonstrate their blue water capacity.

The lack of an Arab presence in the struggle against the pirates around the Horn of Africa is a surprising fact. Egypt has otherwise such great interests at stake that an Egyptian presence could have been expected. There have also been a few attempts to coordinate an Arab effort. Diplomats from Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan,

Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and the Arab League met in Cairo on 20 November 2008. However, no joint effort has been made over and above a declaration of intent on the establishment of a coordinating unit in Yemen.[24] A number of Arab states actually possesses military experience in connection with obstructing part of the passage through the Suez Straits during the war in 1973, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia have held joint naval operations in the Red Sea for several years. While Egypt has not completely refused to take part in a UN-led anti-piracy operation, representatives have expressed great concern about the use of unilateral forces in combating piracy.[25] Yemen is similarly concerned about the presence of foreign navies in the Gulf of Aden.[26]

There is broad acceptance in the international community that navigation must be allowed to function unhindered. There was a suggestion from Russia, among other countries, for a coalition against piracy.[27] This initiative on a joint operation was immediately rejected by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as he felt that it was the responsibility of the African states to combat piracy. In other words, there have been proposals to establish an alliance against the pirates that will not only protect shipping against piracy, but actually combat the pirates, proposals that were not supported by NATO, however.

The USA has been officially attempting to build up a new task force – Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) since January 2009. It will operate in the same area as CTF 150, but with the sole task of combating piracy. With CTF 151, the Americans are seeking to gather a number of states for a joint effort against the pirates.[28] In spite of a certain amount of attention from the media, among them several interviews with CNN, very little is known about CTF 151.[29] Who is taking part? What is its legal foundation? Which rules of engagement will it be operating under? And, not least – has an agreement that applies to all members of CTF 151 been reached with Kenya on handing over pirates with the aim of prosecuting them? If the USA succeeds in reaching a permanent agreement between CTF 151 and Kenya, some states might be tempted to join the task force, which would make it possible to combat and prosecute the pirates. Denmark has transferred Absalon from CTF 150 to CTF 151 as its focus is on combating pirates.

The above listed operations are or were temporary and lead by foreign powers without regional affiliation. Capacity build up have been a part of all the listed operations, but it have been in a national non-coordinated way. The lack of coordination of capacity build up and the temporality of the operations are weaknesses. Leading to a lack local and regional engagement.

O2 Who are the Pirates and are They Merely Pirates?

Who are the pirates in reality?

In order to combat them it is necessary to know who they are. Pirates are not only a problem for the individual seaman or shipowner. They are a problem at state level because they challenge the monopoly of states to exercise legitimate violence. And not alone that – pirates and terrorists are often linked – at least in newspaper headlines.[30] Pirates therefore appear to be not only criminals seeking financial gain – they are in the media also linked with one of the gravest threats to the international community, namely terrorism. That such a link cannot be documented by facts will be shown in the following.

From a purely theoretical viewpoint, both terrorists and pirates are non-governmental armed players who could join forces on a common interest in unstable times, or act under cover of each other. Terrorists and pirates will in principle find it difficult to cooperate as their goals differ greatly, but it is conceivable that terrorists could make use of piracy to finance their terrorist activities. A parallel to this is opium growing in Afghanistan where the Taleban took violent action against opium growers, but have earned enormous sums of money themselves from this in recent years. In a similar manner, pirates could possibly use terrorism as a cloak for their activities. However, it has not been possible to find examples in the available literature of episodes in which terrorists and pirates have collaborated.

In spite of some superficial similarities, terrorists and revolutionary movements differ considerably from pirates and other organised criminals. Terrorists and revolutionary movements fight for a "higher cause", while pirates and organised criminals take part in activities for the sake of gain. These different approaches clearly influence the attitude of the groups to the loss of life, for instance. There is a great deal to suggest that those who take part in activities for gain are not quite so prepared to die as those who are serving a "higher cause". In other words, pirates and organised criminals run an occupational risk, but are not prepared to sacrifice themselves for a cause as are suicide bombers. Pirates themselves have described the risk of dying and how they flee when they meet naval vessels.[31]

Statistics from the American National Counter Terrorism Centre show that there were 49,572 episodes of terrorism during the period from January 2004 to June 2008 on an international basis, and only 54 of these episodes could be related to ships. Of the total number of

fatalities of 73,075 only 236 people were killed in maritime attacks. In other words, maritime terrorism accounts for only 0.1% of all episodes and for 0.3% of the fatalities in these statistics.

The report, *Unholy high seas alliance*, made it plausible that there is a connection between Islamic revolutionary groups and pirates.[32] But there does not appear to be similar, reliable documentation regarding a link between terrorists and pirates. There will naturally always be a risk that terrorists turn into pirates because the individual terrorist or revolutionary could be tempted to use his/her weapon for gain. But there is very little probability that terrorists and pirates will join forces.[33]

It is far more likely that politicians and the media might create a link between pirates, terrorists and revolutionaries. It is tempting to classify the various types of non-national armed players under a single heading so they can be pursued under the same legislation – or lack of the same.[34] States, for instance, could legitimise the hunt for either terrorists or pirates by accusing them of being the opposite. From a western point of view, for instance, it might be easier to intervene and combat terrorism than piracy, while certain Muslim states might use the term pirates about Muslim terrorists. Legitimation would be the key word.

In the 1990s, al-Qaeda failed to establish itself in Somalia.[35] There was therefore nothing at the time to suggest there was any terrorist connection between pirates and al-Qaeda. It is not known whether al-Qaeda is established in the area today, or whether other terrorist organisations have established contact. Everything suggests that Somalia is not an area where jihadis are welcome.[36] There are very few, unreliable reports on this area. One possibility is that various clans or parties involved in the Somali civil war are in contact with terrorists, but this also appears to be speculation – under any circumstances there is a lack of evidence for this in open sources.

The statistical material – with all its unreliability – quite clearly indicates that piracy is not connected with terrorism. This does not make piracy any less of a disturbing activity in relation to world trade, however.

03 The Somali Pirates

Instead of the terrorism angle, attention should be directed elsewhere in order to understand – and thereby combat – pirates. Based on historical experience, there is support for setting out four conditions that help to make the existence of pirates possible.[37]

1) A weak or non-existent state

   a) Weak law enforcement

   b) Disordered security policy

2) Particular geographical circumstances

   a) Sea routes close by

   b) A long coastline

3) Unclear jurisdiction

   a) National and international disagreement

4) High returns.

All four conditions need not necessarily be fulfilled for piracy to arise, but they can be used to predict the risk of piracy arising in a given area so it would be possible to intervene before the problem became acute. It is noteworthy that all four conditions are fulfilled in Somalia.

Very little is actually known about the individual Somali pirates, but analyses, statistics, and a few interviews do help to provide a rough sketch of them and the attacks they are responsible for. In 2008, 200 piracy attacks were registered, of which 112 occurred while the ships in question were tied up or at anchor, while 87 occurred while the ships were sailing. Of this latter part, Somali pirates accounted for 44 of the attacks, but they did not attack ships that were tied up or at anchor.[38] This is very likely due to the fact that most ships keep well away from Somalia's coast in accordance with international recommendations.[39] However, the Somali pirates appear to be undergoing a course of development that gives cause for concern. They have extended their operational range to international waters far out at sea. The attack on the Saudi Arabian tanker Sirius Star, for instance, occurred 450 nautical miles southeast of the Kenyan port of Mombassa.[40]

Typical Somali piracy attacks take the form of pirates manning one

or more small boats, or *skiffs*, equipped with powerful outboard engines and attacking a ship. These skiffs are unable to overtake ships sailing at more than about 14 knots, and they have a fairly short range, so they make use of parent ships as bases for their operations. These parent ships are usually trawlers or smaller fishing boats, and the pirates often hide among the fishing boats around fishing grounds and suddenly pursue passing ships. The pirates are armed with everything from knives to firearms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). They board ships with the help of boarding ladders to enable them to climb up from the low-lying skiffs. Boarding is carried out by pirates who specialise in this discipline. In 2008, Somali pirates carried out 111 attacks and hijacked 42 ships. In total, 815 crew members have been taken hostage and as of 31 December 2008, Somali pirates had 13 hijacked ships and 242 crew members under their control.[41]

The hijacked ships are taken to a Somali port where guards are put on board and negotiations are entered into with the shipowner and its insurance company. This is a highly specialised business, with pirates negotiating with representatives from insurance companies. Media reports state that very high ransom sums are involved,[42] but insurance companies are extremely guarded about releasing information on these sums. A typical ransom sum, however, appears to be between USD 500,000 and 2 million per ship. This amounts to a total income in Somalia from piracy of somewhere between USD 22 and 88 million a year. Ransom sums have apparently risen over the past few years, and they grew dramatically in 2008. The pirates involved in the Sirius Star hijacking said that they had received USD 3 million – their original demand being USD 100 million.[43] These huge ransom sums constitute a unique opportunity for the individual Somali, who often lives in abject poverty and hunger in a country marked by 15 to 20 years' civil war. Estimates put the number of Somalis in need of humanitarian aid at 3.25 million.[44] The recruitment base for piracy is therefore very extensive.

The amount of information that comes from Somalia is limited, but some journalists have written reports which indicate that pirates lead comfortable lives and earn a good deal. If the picture of Somalia in these reports is correct, and there is a lot to suggest it is, Somali society is undergoing a change that gives cause for concern, with piracy becoming a tentatively accepted career. And certainly a career that leads to wealth and fame.

How much money pirates make has been much discussed. The individual rank and file pirate may perhaps be paid USD 30,000 if he takes part in an attack on a ship, and USD 20,000 if he helps to guard a ship once it has come into port or under the shelter of the coast. Some pirates have claimed that they earned USD 250,000 for a single attack, and a drowned pirate was found to have USD 150,000 on him as his share of the haul in connection with the Sirius Star hijacking.[45] It is necessary here to make a clear differentiation between the specialised pirates who board ships and the guards who take over once the ship is lying off the coast of Somalia after it has been hijacked. Some guards earn fairly small sums in the region of USD 1,000 and it is highly probable that the money is spent on the

narcotic leaves, *khat*.[46] Pirates' earnings disappear into thin air – a point of similarity with other criminals. They may have spent USD 2,000 during an evening with gin, women and khat.[47] Khat abuse is a problem in itself, both for the pirates and Somalia, but that is not discussed in this report.

Irrespective of how it is calculated, some people earn very large amounts of money on the pirates. They include owners of marine stores who supply the guards on the hijacked ships, prostitutes, pimps, bar owners, drug sellers and, not least, the unidentified men behind them. These backers are possibly connected with the Somali diaspora (refugees) in North America and Europe. This is the supposition among Somalia experts and shipowners.[48] The backers outside Somalia should be an obvious target for the international community as it will often be possible to take proceedings against them and convict them on the basis of local legislation in the individual countries.

Fishery off the coast of Somalia formerly flourished, but it is declining dramatically today. There is a clear connection between the increase in the number of piracy attacks and the tsunami in 2004, when there were only two attacks, while there were 35 the year after. In spite of the fact that the epicentre was more than 6,000 kilometres away, the tsunami had a devastating effect on the coast of East Africa as, among other things, it destroyed many fishing boats.[49] The tsunami was thus one of many factors that led to piracy around Somalia.[50]

Fishermen from all over the world fish – often illegally – just outside Somali territorial waters, but often in Somalia's exclusive economic zone (the 200 nautical mile limit). A number of the ships that have been hijacked are fishing boats, and some people in Somalia regard preventing "foreign" fishing in Somali waters as legitimate.[51] A recurring story from the few available interviews with Somali pirates is the account of the ruined fishing and the struggle for the fish.[52] A number of the Somali pirates also use names that are normally associated with law enforcement, such as Central Regional Coast Guard,[53] Somali Coast Guard (also known as the Somali Marines) or National Volunteer Coast Guard. The names suggest that some pirates see themselves as being involved in a more legal occupation than piracy. To the extent it has been possible to interview the pirates, they often refer to themselves as heroes who are fighting against a far superior power.[54] An interpretation that the Chairman of the African Union, Colonel Gaddafi, agreed with when he took up the post.[55]

Dangerous and possibly nuclear waste appears to constitute a special problem. In addition to reports of overfishing by people from third-party countries off the coast of Somalia, a number of reports on dumping nuclear waste in Somali waters has popped up during the past few years. Uganda has raised this as a problem in a UN context, and the UN environmental organisation, UNEP, documented the consequences of the tsunami in a report and confirmed the dumping of dangerous waste in Somali waters.[56]

Fishery has not died out, however, and the pirates use the fleets of fishing boats as cover while waiting for passing ships. This means that fishermen are often armed so they can defend themselves against less successful pirates.

04 Measures Against Piracy

The focus of this report so far has been either pirates or military matters. It must not be forgotten, however, that piracy attacks also harm fishermen and merchant seamen.

There are many recommendations from such bodies as the international maritime organisation, IMO, for shipowners regarding how they can avoid being attacked by pirates. Emphasis is given in general to ordinary training of personnel, which involves the incorporation of certain routines. When navigating in pirate-infested waters, it is important to sail as fast as possible, to lock up the ship, keep a sharp lookout, and sail along the recommended routes. In case of attack, fire-fighting equipment can be used to hold off the pirates, sharp manoeuvres can be made, and assistance called via radio channel 16.

Over and above this, shipowners can initiate defensive measures, from passive to much more active means. IMO offers some recommendations on this point. The organisation has suggested that shipowners install ShipLoc, a tracking system that ensures a distress signal can be sent from ships, and their position can be tracked later if they are hijacked. IMO also recommends the installation of an electric fence, Secure-Ship, which makes it far more difficult for pirates to board ships.

The US Naval Central Command has established a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) especially for the area around the Horn of Africa. The area functions as a corridor with intensive radar monitoring and maritime surveillance planes (Maritime Patrol Aircraft MPA). This has the advantage that naval vessels can rapidly provide help, but on the other hand, it means that ships sail in such a narrow corridor that it is easy for the pirates to search them out.

The threat of a ship being hijacked – or possibly losing customers by choosing the slower route south of Africa – means that shipowners must consider how much protection they can obtain, in addition to the sometimes limited help they can obtain from naval vessels. On the face of it, there are five possibilities:

- Passive means, such as the electric fence mentioned above
- Active means used by the crew, such as various lethal or non-lethal weapons

- Private security guards on board

- Establishing a private hunt for pirates

- Military personnel on board.

Several companies provide private shipowners with maritime security solutions that include a wide range of services from intelligence or alarms, to guards, rescue operations and patrolling coastal waters. It is no problem for shipowners to find a solution to the problem, specifically adapted to their needs and wishes.

However, there is a major problem in connection with defensive means, from the use of fire hoses handled by crews to the use of private security companies (PSC) or private military companies (PMC). The Somali pirates are armed, but there have been very few fatalities to date during piracy attacks and subsequent capture. This will quite probably change if ships' crews are armed, or armed guards are taken on board. This development is already under way. There are shipowners that have hired PSCs for protection,[57] but securing their own ships with guards could mark the beginning of a spiral of violence as it would make piracy far more dangerous for the pirates. They would be faced with a choice of continuing their deeds or quitting piracy. As it is possible to earn a great deal of money from piracy, and as there is very little probability that conditions in Somalia will improve in the foreseeable future, pirates can be expected to hold on to their "jobs". If they do, they will be confronted with armed guards and an escalation of violence would appear to be unavoidable. Furthermore, there is a risk that armed guards could come to shoot at civilians, something there are already examples of.[58] The Danish Shipowners' Association has energetically refused to recommend that Danish shipowners should use private security companies to protect their ships.[59] Nor should it be forgotten that over the course of time a number of private pirate hunters became pirates themselves when pirate hunting took a turn for the worse. The central issue is trust – whether shipowners dare have armed guards on board their ships. The risk being that they could take the opportunity to hijack the ship themselves or raise the price of "protection".

In other words, shipowners are obliged to make a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. They can either decide to sail south around Africa, which is more expensive and, when the bill has to be paid and not everybody sails south, they risk a loss of turnover. If they decide against the southern route, they risk their ships being taken by pirates, or being caught in the middle of a fire fight between pirates and security guards. Neither of these solutions is very attractive.

It is important to point out that pirates have a rather different attitude to a national military presence, which has a clearly deterrent effect. It is possible that escorts could be established for merchant shipping combined with the deployment of marines on board the ships. This would have a different effect than PMCs as it would be seen as a projection of an overwhelming national military power.

South around Africa – possibly a considerable saving

Shipowners could decide to reroute their vessels away from the problem of piracy, which means south of Africa. This was the decision made by the Maersk-owned shipowner Svitzer as one of the first.[60] The question is how much effect this change would have on consumers. In the autumn and winter of 2008, the press claimed it would lead to price rises, and a statement from Maersk, for instance, noted that it would increase transport prices on voyages from the Middle East to the USA by 20%.[61] The longest journey made by a product is usually accounted for by sea transport, but this represents only 1% of the value of the product. Therefore, there can be a relatively high rise in the cost of sea transport without consumers noticing dramatic price rises. Where the individual shipowner is concerned, however, it means very considerable expense. It was estimated in 2008 that the additional cost for Maersk would be between DKK 200 and 300 million and that transport time for oil tankers that sailed around the south of Africa on route from the Persian Gulf to Rotterdam would be increased by 20 days.[62] However, the latest information shows that shipowners could possibly save money by sailing around the south of Africa. Some container ships could save USD 330,000 in canal fees per voyage and the additional fuel consumption could be reduced by reducing speed, which would benefit the environment. Finally, the saving on insurance premiums must also be included.[63]

Military solution to piracy

Shipowners want a military solution to piracy and, among other things, have praised the crew of Absalon. This is possibly because they know that a military solution was effective in the Malacca Strait. In 2003, ASEAN began a collaboration targeting piracy.[64] For several years, a number of states in the area attempted to establish regional cooperation that did not involve the USA, China or Japan. In September 2005, four states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, decided to combat pirates in the Malacca Strait between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and the Malaccan peninsula, which is shared by Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. The measure focused on four elements:

- Joint sea patrols in the form of the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol, which monitors the waters and reports to a joint Monitoring and Action Agency

- Operation Eyes-in-the-Sky, in which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore carry out joint aerial surveillance

- MSP Intelligence Exchange Group which shares intelligence with the help of the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol's information system 65

- Operations with military aircraft in the air space of other states.

This type of cooperation has a disadvantage as, on the one hand, it challenges states' sovereignty because cooperation involves sharing the monopoly on legitimate violence and entitles states to operate on

foreign territory. On the other hand, it is necessary for the states to maintain their claim of sovereignty as they would otherwise lose control of a given area. Indonesia, for instance, is struggling to maintain control of the Malacca Strait which has resulted in the country taking very forceful action against the pirates. Among other things, Indonesia has given other states the opportunity to take part in combating piracy by supplying radar equipment and training, while patrolling must be left to the coastal states themselves.[66] The concern for the involvement of other states in national matters can also be found in Malaysia.[67] International cooperation has been established in the area where, with the point of departure in Singapore, countries including Cambodia, Japan, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar (Burma), South Korea, Vietnam, India and Sri Lanka are involved in combating piracy. The participating states share information on the pirates through a central unit established to collect and process intelligence material on them. Finally, there has been no hesitation in using all available forcible means, which have clearly had the character of military operations. The operations have been outreaching and one of the major accomplishments over the years has been liberating vessels hijacked by pirates. This happened in 2001, for instance, when Malaysian and Indonesian forces stormed a hijacked Shell tanker.[68]

In the Malacca Strait, the focus is on:

- Knowledge sharing

- Obtaining intelligence

- Aerial surveillance

- Constant patrolling

- Waiving territorial limitations, i.e. enabling cross-border hunting of pirates

- International cooperation

- Rigorous measures against pirates.

Danish experience from Combined Task Force 150[69]

Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) has been a success. Steps have been taken against pirates, and a large number of arrests and seizures have been made. During the period from September 2008 to January 2009 there were confrontations with 177 pirates, of whom 63 were handed over to the authorities in and outside Somalia, 107 were acquitted, two were killed and finally, five were detained on board Absalon. In this connection, 97 rifles, 17 RPGs, ten other weapons, and 16 boarding ladders were seized, eleven skiffs were destroyed or seized, and three parent ships seized. The parent ships proved to be either hijacked or stolen. There appeared to be no repeated offenders among the pirates.[70] The number of successful piracy attacks has fallen dramatically since December 2008. Pirates continue to attack ships, but a combination of sharper attention on the part of crews of merchant ships and a prominent military presence and intervention have reduced the number of successful hijackings dramatically.

The use of units of the frigate class – such as Absalon – has proved to be a success. Frigates can operate independently, maintain their presence for a relatively long time, and can carry sufficient manpower and equipment. Most noteworthy from a Danish point of view has been that the more important elements in the operations have been those carried out with helicopters and by the Danish Navy Maritime Task Force. The helicopters have taken part in two different types of mission – reconnaissance and protecting merchant ships – and have provided an overview of certain areas and made tactical observations that would take much longer to cover by sea. It has been possible to send helicopters in advance in acute situations, which has had a clearly deterrent effect on the pirates as they risked being fired on from the helicopters, which also carried special operations forces such as the Royal Danish Navy Frogman Corps. Having helicopters on board ships has provided flexibility that would have been difficult to achieve if they had to be called in from land or from other ships. But the helicopters in question can only carry smaller units, so it is either necessary to have two helicopters on board, which is possible on ships of the Absalon class, or to invest in other types of helicopter. In general, it is regrettable that only one helicopter is carried.

Since the 1990s, the Danish Navy has rediscovered the art of boarding as an operation. This has been one of the most important elements in Absalon's mission. A number of ships have been boarded at sea to determine whether everything on board was as it should be and to search for pirates. Boarding is included in Military Interdiction Operations, and Danish Navy Maritime Task Force has been developed in Denmark in this connection. A team of this kind comprises 12 people: four frogmen, four Navy MPs, two EODs (explosives specialists) and two people to man the vessel used in the operation. Danish Navy Maritime Task Forces have functioned successfully, but consideration should be given to whether there is a need to provide them with more fighting power. This could be done in one of two ways: the MP element of the Maritime Task Forces has shown its value by securing evidence and setting up prison camps, etc., and their fighting power could be enhanced either by further training the MPs so that they could function more as a fighting force, or by increasing the number of frogmen. It has proved to be the case that circumstances in connection with boarding can rapidly deteriorate and end in fighting. In such a case, there is a need for the individual Maritime Task Force to have more fighting power. Furthermore, it is necessary to bear in mind that boarding as a general element is included in everything from fishery inspection to combating pirates. Therefore, there is a need for different types of knowledge for different boarding teams, and they must be set up to suit the occasion.

An operation such as CTF 150 can rapidly take a turn for the worse, whether at strategic, tactical or operational level. In such a case, there will be an urgent need for additional fighting power in the form of special operations forces, for instance. It would take up to a week in the existing area of operations to deploy frogmen and their weapons, etc., from Denmark to the area and sail Absalon into port. Consideration should be given to developing Danish transport

capacity so that frogmen and their equipment could be flown to the area of operations and dropped there. This would save vital time if it were necessary to relieve a Danish ship that had fallen into the hands of pirates. In general, the transport element must be taken into consideration. This applies to the use of helicopters, the opportunity to carry vehicles so that pirates could be pursued on land, as well as transport capacity from Denmark to the area of operations. Today, a land pursuit could be carried out by helicopter or on foot, so vehicles would be a good supplement if it were necessary to free Danish hostages held in Somalia, for instance.

A successful anti-pirate strategy

Pirates can best be combated before they become organised, so they must be opposed as soon as they put in an appearance, and their bases must be destroyed if this is to be done efficiently. In popular terms, the eggs must be smashed in their nests. This could expand a relatively narrowly-defined maritime operation to include operations on land with the risk of escalating the military commitment. In areas where pirates' activities influence conditions on land and the opportunity of private players to rebuild the area, action must be taken, or piracy will develop – not only in the form of piracy attacks, but also in the form of a development towards the formation of a state. It is conceivable that pirates and/or warlords could establish a kleptocracy in the areas close to the coast, which could possibly result in formalised extortion with regard to shipowners and people in the local area. Smaller units composed of special operations forces could be sent on goal-oriented missions against the bases of pirates or warlords in order to weaken them. Special operations forces could obtain support from ships and aircraft to carry out rapid actions in this connection. This would have to be supplemented with police investigations targeting not only the individual pirates, but also their backers.

To sum up briefly, a successful strategy to combat pirates should, as is evident from the chapters above, be based on the following parameters if the local coastal state is unable to solve the problem unaided:

- Constant patrolling

- Local anchoring

- State-organised and well-founded law enforcement

- International cooperation against the pirates

- Sharing knowledge and intelligence

- Waving territorial/sovereignty limitations

- Combating pirates before they become organised

- Destroying pirates' bases.

One of the major problems is states' maintenance and assertion of their maritime sovereignty. It has been realised in connection with the Malacca Strait that it is necessary to modify this a little; otherwise pirates can enter the territory of other states when being

pursued and thereby find refuge. This makes states' partial waiving of sovereignty a key concept in a successful strategy for combating pirates. Cooperation in the Malacca Strait, where states maintain their sovereignty while giving other states limited access to their territorial waters to pursue pirates in the form of joint patrols, appears to be a suitable solution to the problem of sovereignty.

05 The Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol: A Regional Solution

Destroying pirates' bases is a common denominator in successfully combating piracy.[71] In general, pirates constituted and constitute an important part of a local community's economy. They bring their easily-earned money into the community and spend it very rapidly. In present-day Somalia, young women are very willing to marry high-profile, rich pirates.[72] At the same time, a certain amount of money can be earned in the local community by building houses for, and selling cars and supplies, etc., to the pirates. This easily turns into a desire for piracy to continue, as long as the pirates do not attack the local inhabitants.

Broadly speaking, the international community has the following options in taking action against the pirates based in Somalia:

1. To establish peace and a police authority in Somalia

2. To privatise protection against pirates and the pursuit of pirates

3. To sail around the south of Africa

4. To maintain a large military presence from the international community

5. To establish a permanent regional force that can at least limit piracy.

In all probability, item 1 cannot be done either in the short or medium term. Nobody appears to be prepared to intervene in Somalia, nor does it appear that Somalis themselves can establish the necessary peace. Item 2 has been attempted to some extent previously, but privatising the coast guard in Somalia has not been successful, and there is nothing to suggest that shipowners are prepared to send in private security companies on a large scale. Item 3 has almost certainly been considered by a large number of ship-owners, and this has already been set in motion in part. It has advantages and disadvantages, as previously outlined, but piracy attacks will continue, and it can be feared that pirates will simply expand their area of activities. Item 4 is only a temporary solution: the international community can and will maintain a naval presence in the area for a certain period of time, but it is hardly feasible that this

can be continued in the medium term, not to mention the long term, because it would lead to problems at home and in Africa. Finally, there is item 5: establishing a permanent regional force. This appears to be the ideal solution as it could function in the short, medium and long term.

A permanent regional force could also be established with the support of the states that are already present in the area as they would all have an interest in being able to utilise their resources in a different way.

The capacity and resources devoted by the individual states, alliances and organisations to combating the pirates today, could be used more efficiently by establishing a regional unit – a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol (GHASP). However, it is important that such a unit is not only used to combat pirates. At present, it could constitute such an important part of the local Somali economy that focusing solely on piracy could limit the possibility of success. The locals – Somalis – must gain more from the establishment of the unit, i.e. the unit should be built up in such a way as to resemble a classic coast guard to a certain extent with the following tasks:

- Monitoring and securing free navigation

- Establishing security by combating illegal acts at sea

- Protecting natural resources – including fishery inspection and environmental monitoring

- A maritime life-saving service.

The last two items in particular would be important for the local Somali fishermen who have seen their livelihood ruined. It would be an advantage to employ local Somalis in some areas of the unit. This would create jobs and attract jobs, so GHASP would promote positive economic development in the area.

The Somali authorities have been attempting to establish a coast guard for the past eight to ten years by outsourcing the task. However, none of the companies that have tried to handle it have been capable of doing so successfully. They were either not professional enough, were not paid to do the job, or were hit by the weapon embargo against Somalia. An example that can be mentioned is SOMCAN – the Somali Canadian Coastguard, which was headed by a Canadian-Somali former taxi driver. SOMCAN's contract was terminated after a piracy attack on a Thai fishing boat carried out by members of SOMCAN.[73]

There must be constant patrolling at sea and in the air so that pirates are always at risk of being detected. At the same time, there must be local anchoring, which means that, as far as possible, Somalis must be employed by the unit. This would bring about a sense of local responsibility, the opportunity to obtain intelligence and, not least, establish alternative sources of income to piracy.

There should be local anchoring not only in Somalia, but throughout the region, defined as the "Greater Horn of Africa". Hereby GHASP will be connected not only to Africa or the Arabian World, but to both sides oft the Gulf of Aden. In this case, it would mean that Kenya,

Tanzania, Eritrea, Djibouti, Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia would have to establish GHASP jointly. These states have a large number of different and, at times, conflicting interests, but they all have an obvious interest in ensuring that the shipping routes around the Horn of Africa are not obstructed by pirates. They all have vital economic and security-related interests in preventing piracy. As far as possible, Somalia – or Somali provinces – must become involved in establishing and operating GHASP. It is also important to obtain the participation of bigger states in particular, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as they are the only states that have frigates.

It is also extremely important that the tasks entrusted to GHASP are not performed by private security companies, but that the states in the region commit themselves to the task and supply capacity from their own police forces, coast guards or military. Experience from the Malacca Strait indicates that the best results can be obtained through a relatively high degree of integration of the forces of the participating states in the joint patrols. In addition, GHASP will only become really efficient when sovereignty in the form of territorial claims is waived to a certain extent.

GHASP could be established and operated to advantage with the support of the states that are presently providing capacity and resources for operations around the Horn of Africa. The tasks that GHASP must perform are not new or unfamiliar. In one way or another, they are elements of the power structure of most states. It should therefore be possible for GHASP to obtain international assistance in training personnel, equipping vessels, bases and headquarters, and providing radar installations, aerial surveillance, and command structures. Patrols must be organised at sea and in the air to monitor and possibly intervene in illegal acts at sea around the Horn of Africa. Over and above this, surveillance and operations centres must be established to coordinate and direct operations and also coordinate the collection and sharing of intelligence. As a corollary to this, an information system, that civilians and military personnel can report to, must be established. The coordination measures carried out at this centre should also target pirates and other criminals with the help of Interpol, for instance, with the aim of hitting out at the backers of piracy. Finally, courts and punitive measures should also be attached to GHASP.

A large number of national and international organisations would be able to contribute to GHASP during its various stages. The success of GHASP will depend on its institutional anchoring. GHASP could be attached to NATO, either in the form of an attachment to what is known as NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, or NATO could perhaps establish a similar African Dialogue. Another possibility would be to attach GHASP to the UN, The African Union, or ESDP. GHASP's attachment to an international security organisation would very probably depend on which organisation or which states took the initiative. There is no doubt that piracy must be combated, but there is a great deal of uncertainty in the international community regarding how it should be combated. In its capacity as a member of NATO and with its strong UN profile, Denmark could act in both organisations and become a motive force in establishing GHASP.

Danish experience from NATO and the UN could be used to describe the need for integrating the forces attached to GHASP, for instance. Unfortunately, on the face of things, NATO does not appear to be a possibility as it might meet a certain amount of opposition in the region. There is really no organisation that goes beyond the limits of the Gulf of Aden which all of the states that should participate in GHASP are members of – other than the UN. Therefore, it might be necessary to choose a UN solution or enter into a regional agreement without the involvement of the existing organisations. Establishing GHASP would be a further development of the far looser collaboration that the international maritime organisation IMO is attempting to establish at present.[74]

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs could become a motive force in establishing GHASP. Danish development policy has focused on Africa for decades, and a great deal of knowledge and expertise of arranging conferences and summit meetings has been accumulated – a condition for successfully launching GHASP. The Danish police and other state and non-government organisations, such as the Danish Maritime Authority, possess great expertise in developing local capacity and could ensure support from relevant international maritime organisations in collaboration with the Danish Shipowners' Association.

Over the past 15 years, the Danish Navy has accumulated a considerable amount of knowledge of international operations in the form of control missions and operations off the coast of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and off the coast of Lebanon in 2006, as well as far more aggressive operations such as participation in CTF 150. Furthermore, the Danish Navy performs such tasks as acting as coast guards, providing marine life-saving services, fishery inspection and territorial defence, so it could provide personnel and knowledge in connection with building up and operating GHASP.

As it is not possible to establish GHASP overnight, there will be a continuing need for an international military presence around the Horn of Africa for the foreseeable future. Taking into account the size and earnings of the Danish Merchant Navy, a Danish presence in the area would seem only natural. Other tasks, including inspection and boarding, could also be mentioned – at the time of writing (February 2009), they could also include controlling weapon smuggling to Gaza. Therefore, a future Danish naval effort would include the need for boarding and landing capacity. Such knowledge and capacity would also be relevant in building up GHASP.

06 Conclusion and Perspectives

The number of piracy attacks at global level is falling. Pirates with bases in Somalia, however, have been responsible for a dramatic escalation of attacks off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as a whole. These attacks must be considered criminal acts provoked by the emergency in Somalia and by the prospect of enormous financial gains from successful attacks. At present, there is nothing to suggest a connection between terrorists and pirates.

An anti-piracy strategy should therefore not focus on terrorism, but on ordinary law enforcement on land and at sea. The area around the Horn of Africa is one of the most vital trade routes in the world, which is why the international community has committed to a number of actions that have only partly been anti-piracy operations. The operations are designed to protect merchant ships or WFP, but have hitherto only been reactive. Offensive action is necessary to combat piracy. This can best be done in the form of a coordinated effort. The recommendation in this report is that this coordinated effort should be brought about by establishing a regional unit – a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol (GHASP). GHASP would be regionally based, and it is suggested that the following states should be invited to take part: Kenya, Tanzania, Eritrea, Djibouti, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Somalia.

GHASP would be responsible for monitoring and ensuring free navigation. This would be done through such means as aerial surveillance and coordinating intelligence and police investigations. GHASP would ensure security at sea by combating pirates and liberating hijacked vessels. If the necessary capacity can be obtained, arrests could be made and bases on land destroyed. In the longer term, GHASP could perhaps help to establish better conditions for the civilian population of Somalia. This could be done by protecting Somalia's natural resources at sea. Fishery inspection and environmental monitoring would therefore be important tasks for GHASP. In a similar manner, GHASP could provide a maritime life-saving service and thereby provide the local population with a measure of security. Pirates must be prosecuted locally so that the people of Somalia have a clear understanding that piracy does not pay (after the establishment of GHASP).

Denmark could contribute knowledge on building up civilian and military capacity. As establishing GHASP would take quite some time, the Danish Navy should continue to develop its own boarding and landing capacity, capacity that could also be used in other connections, such as UN blockades.

This report also shows that there is a need for further research into piracy. Among other things, too little is known about the pirates themselves. Therefore, there should be systematic interviews with crews of ships that have been attacked by pirates. This would provide more insight into the pirates' lives and methods of operation, which is necessary for the continued development of anti-piracy strategies. Similarly, there is a need for more analyses of best practices and best knowledge in combating and isolating pirates. Most of the available research is based either on regional or historical surveys. There is a need for research into the generic characteristics of piracy if general and future-oriented anti-piracy strategies are to be developed. This would make it possible to identify, analyse and develop geographically independent model solutions in relation to piracy.

07 Appendix

Number of piracy attacks 2001-2008

Area/year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
Southeast Asia	**170**	**158**	**102**	**83**	**70**	**54**	
Indonesia	121	94	79	50	43	28	
Malacca Strait	28	38	12	11	7	2	
Malaysia	5	9	3	10	9	10	
Myanmar (Burma)	0	1	0	0	0	1	
Philippines	12	4	0	6	6	7	
Singapore Straits	2	8	7	5	3	6	
Thailand/Gulf of Thailand	2	4	1	1	2	0	
Far East	**19**	**15**	**20**	**5**	**10**	**11**	
China /HK/ Macau	1	3	4	1	0	0	
South China Sea	2	8	6	1	3	0	
Vietnam	15	4	10	3	5	11	
Other	1	0	0	0	2	0	Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Taiwan
Indian subcontinent	**87**	**32**	**36**	**53**	**30**	**23**	
Bangladesh	58	17	21	47	15	12	
India	27	15	15	5	11	10	
Sri Lanka	2	0	0	1	4	1	
Americas	**72**	**45**	**26**	**29**	**21**	**14**	
Brazil	7	7	2	7	4	1	
Columbia	10	5	2	2	0	1	
Dom. Rep.	6	2	1	0	0		
Guyana	6	2	1	1	5		
Haiti	1	6	2	0	2	2	
Jamaica	5	7	8	3	1		
Peru	7	5	6	9	6	5	
Venezuela	13	7	2	4	1	3	
Other	17	4	2	3	2	2	Argentina, Caribbean, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Martinique, Panama, Salvador, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, USA

East Africa	**29**	**15**	**53**	**29**	**66**	**130**	
Kenya	1	1	0	0	4	2	
G. Aden/Red S.	18	8	10	10	13	92	
Somalia	3	2	35	10	31	19	
Tanzania	5	2	7	9	11	14	
Other	2	2	1	0	7	3	Egypt, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Africa
West Africa	**64**	**58**	**27**	**32**	**54**	**60**	
Angola	3	0	0	4	1	2	
Cameroon	2	4	2	1	0	2	
DRC	0	0	0	3	4	1	
Ghana	3	5	3	3	1	7	
Guinea	4	5	1	4	2		
Ivory Coast	2	4	3	1	0	3	
Nigeria	39	28	16	12	42	40	
Senegal	8	5	0	0	0		
Sierra Leone	0	3	0	2	2		
Other	3	4	2	2	2	5	Benin, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Togo.
Middle East	**3**	**5**	**12**	**7**	**11**	**0**	
Arabian Sea	0	2	2	2	4		
Iran	2	0	0	2	2		
Iraq	0	1	10	2	2		
Other	1	2	0	1	3		Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE
Other	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	Belgium, Bulgaria, UK, Pacific Ocean, France, Seychelles.
Total	445	329	276	239	263	293	

Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual Report 1 January-31 December 2007 (London: ICC, 2008) and ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual Report 1 January-31 December 2008 (London: ICC, 2009).

08 Literature and Sources

"21 danske skibe overfaldet af pirater", in: *Det Maritime Danmark*, 30 January 2009, http://www.maritimedanmark.dk/?Id=3638 (30-01-2009 22:00).

Ahmad, Razali Hj: *Security challenges in the 21st century: The Malaysian perspective*, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/8arfmeet/papers/malaysiaCOLrazali_paper.pdf (12-02-2009 13:16).

Al Qaeda's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa (Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, Harmony Project, Westpoint, NY, 2007).

Albadri, Abukar & Edmund Sanders: "Somalia's pirate problem grows more rampant" in: *Los Angeles Times*, 31 October 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-pirates31-2008oct31,0,649768.story .

American Forces Press Service: *Multinational Task Force Targets Pirates*, 8 January 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52586 (23-01-2009 13:25).

Ammar, Manar: "Somali pirates can divert maritime routes away from Suez Canal", in: Daily News Egypt, 17 October 2008, http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=17172 (12-02-2009 00:01).

ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Security, 17 June 2003, http://www.aseansec.org/14837.htm (12-02-2009 13:10).

Ashine, Argaw: "Gaddafi defends Somali pirates", in: *Daily Nation* (Kenya), 5 February 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/-/1066/525348/-/13rtrgiz/-/index.html (10-02-2009 22:40).

Beder, Charlotte: "Pirater kan koste Mærsk dyrt", *epn.dk*, 21 November 2008, http://epn.dk/brancher/transport/skib/article1521614.ece (23-11-2008 20:09).

"Bevæbnede vagter på Maersk skibe", in: *Det Maritime Danmark*, 27 March 2008, http://www.maritimedanmark.dk/?Id=1578 (23-11-2008 17:53).

Boertmann, Dines: *Dansk fragtskib kapret ud for Somalia*, i: DR Nyhederne, 8 November 2008, http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Udland/2008/11/08/112622.htm (10-11-2008 08:56).

"CMA CGM overvejer at undgå Suez", in: *Det Maritime Danmark*, 28 January 2009, http://www.maritimedanmark.dk/?Id=3612 (28-01-2009 12:08).

Combined Maritime Forces news release: *New Counter-Piracy Task Force Established,* 8 January 2008, http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=41687 (23-01-2009 13:40).

Costello, Miles: "Shipping insurance cost soars with piracy surge off Somalia", in: TimesOnline, 11 September 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article4727372.ece (19-11-2008 01:09).

Earle, Peter: *The Pirate Wars*, London: Methuen, 1998.

The Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center. *Economic & Social Indicators Bulletin of the Arab Republic of Egypt, November 2008*, Egypten, 2008.

Egypt State Information Service, *The Suez Canal: historical flashback*, Egypten, 2008 http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Land&people/SCanal/031300000000000002.htm (19-11-2008 11:34).

EUbusiness, *Egypt willing to participate in anti-piracy missions,* 3. december 2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1228317424.23/ (25-01-2009 00:28).

EU ESDP, *EU NAVFOR Somalia*, http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1518&lang=da (24-01-2009 23:47).

UN Security Council: *Security Council authorizes African Union Somalia mission for further six months, Unanimously adopting resolution 1772 (2007),* 20 August 2007 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9101.doc.htm (21-01-2009 07:43).

UN Security Council: *Security council authorizes states to use land-based operations in Somalia, as part of fight against piracy off coast, unanimously adopting 1851, 2008*, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9541.doc.htm.

"From The Pirates Mouth", in: *Shiptalk*, 21 January 2009, http://www.shiptalk.com/index.asp?ItemID=4227&rcid=256&pcid=148&cid=256'#anch (27-01-2009 13:36).

Gatehouse, Jonathon: "This cabbie hunts pirates. Former Toronto taxi driver is now in charge of a Somali coast guard", in: *Macleans*, 12 January 2009, http://blog.macleans.ca/2009/01/12/this-cabbie-hunts-pirates/2/ (28-01-2009 23:51).

Gettleman, Jeffrey: "Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money", in: *New York Times*, 1 October 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/africa/01pirates.html?ref=africa (02-01-2009 13:30).

"Gidsler befriet af kommandosoldater", in: *Det Maritime Danmark,* 17 September 2008, http://www.maritimedanmark.dk/?Id=2591 (16-11-2008 14:25).

Gosse, Philip: *The History of Piracy*, New York: Dopver publications, Mineola, 1932/2007.

Howden, Daniel: "Vi er ikke pirater. Det her er vores hav", in: *Information,* 17 November 2008.

Factsheet: Milestones of Malacca Strait Patrols, Ministry of Defence Singapore http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2008/mar/28mar08_nr/28mar08_fs.html (19-11-2008 00:19).

Hvilsom, Frank: "Pirateri fører til prisforhøjelser", in: *Politiken,* 19 November 2008, http://politiken.dk/erhverv/article600730.ece (21-11-2008 00:07).

Hvilsom, Frank: "Lejesoldater vil passe på danske skibe", in: *Politiken,* 21 November 2008, http://politiken.dk/erhverv/article601313.ece (23-11-2008 17:58).

ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annual Report 1 January-31 December 2007*, London: ICC, 2008.

ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual Report 1 January-31 December 2008*, London: ICC, 2009.

ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings,* http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=58 (16-11-2008 08:45).

International Maritime Organization (IMO), *Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, RESOLUTION A.922(22), Adopted on 29 November 2001 (Agenda item 9)*, http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D23528/A922%2822%29.pdf (23-11-2008 17:26).

International Maritime Organization (IMO), *High-level meeting in Djibouti to conclude regional agreement to prevent, deter and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships,* in: IMO Briefing 02, 27 January 2009, http://www.imo.org/.

Greenberg, Michael, Peter Chalk & Henry H. Willis (et. al.): *Maritime Terrorism. Risk and Liability*, RAND, USA, 2006.

Morrow, Adam & Khaled Moussa al-Omrani: "Somalia: Anti-Piracy Flotillas Rattle Arab Security", in: *allAfrica.com,* 28 November 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200811280936.html.

Murphy, Martin: *Contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism. The threat to international security. Adelphi paper 388,* Routledge, UK, 2007.

Møller, Bjørn: *The Somali conflict: The role of external actors*, Copenhagen: DIIS, 2009, (unpublished report), http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009-02_%20Piracy_maritime_terrorism_and_naval_strategy.pdf (11-02-2009 23:45).

Møller, Bjørn: *Somalia after the Ethiopian withdrawal, DIIS Brief,* Copenhagen: DIIS, January 2009.

Møller, Bjørn: *Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, DIIS Brief,* Copenhagen: DIIS, January 2009.

Møller, Bjørn: *Piracy, maritime terrorism and naval strategy. DIIS Report 2009,* Copenhagen: DIIS, 2009.

Møller, Per Stig: *Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om dansk deltagelse med sømilitært bidrag til styrkelse af den maritime sikkerhed ved Afrikas Horn.* (Motion for a parliamentary resolution no. B 33), 15 January 2008, http://www.folketinget.dk/doc.aspx?/Samling/20072/MENU/dok_FOU_B33_spm.htm.

"Nato: Pirater må bekæmpes", in: *Fyns Amts Avis*, 20 November 2008, http://www.faa.dk/article/93974:Ritzau-Udland--Nato--Pirater-maa-bekaempes .

Obura, David: "Impacts of the 26 December Tsunami in East Africa", in: *Ocean and Coastal Management*, vol. 49, no.11,2006, pp. 873-888.

Official Pirate-Fishing in the Somali Indian Ocean flourishing, Mareegforum http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=8987&tirsan=3&PHPSESSID=a7d1aaf50bb2cb3b29ae23d0bfa189b2 (12-02-2009 12:05).

Osler, David & Mike Grinter: "Owners hire armed guards to secure ships against pirates", in: *Llyods List*, 12 September 2008, http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=20017570367&src=rss (23-11-2008 17:53).

Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, ISEAS Publishing, 2006.

"Pirater kaprer kæmpe olietankskib" in: TV 2 Nyhederne, 17 November 2008, http://nyhederne.tv2.dk/article.php/id-1814343.html (18-11-2008 21:29).

Pirates captured after high-seas pursuit, in: CNN, 28 June 2001, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/06/28/indonesia.piracy/index.html (12-11-2008 13:20).

RI rejects any effort to internationalize Malacca Strait, Minister of The State Secretary Indonesia, http://www.indonesia.go.id/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7229&Itemid=701 (12-02-2009 13:15).

Rice, Xan & Abdiqani Hassan, "Death at sea: how pirates' triumph ended in disaster", in: *The Guardian*, 17 January 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/17/pirates-somalia (27-01-2009 13:53).

Richardson, Michael: *A Time Bomb for Global Trade. Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004.

"Russia proposes joint land anti-piracy operation", in: *International Herald Tribune*, 19 November 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/11/19/news/Piracy-NATO-Russia.php.

Senior, C. M.: *A Nation of Pirates. English Piracy in its Heyday*, London: David & Charles Newton Abbot, 1976.

SHAPE News, *Successful completion of NATO mission Operation Allied Provider*, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2008/12/081212a.html (23-01-2009 13:58).

"Sirius Star pirater druknede på vej hjem", in: *Det Maritime Danmark*, 10 January 2009 http://www.maritimedanmark.dk/?Id=3404 (27-01-2009 14:27).

"Somali piracy backed by international network", in: MSNBC, 10 December 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28158455/ (20-12-2008 22:54).

Stauffer, Thomas R.: "The Cost of Middle East Conflict, 1956-2002: What the U.S. has spent" in: *Middle East Policy*, Vol. X, no. 1, 2003.

Sterling, Joe: *Navy creates force devoted to fighting piracy*, in: CNN, 8 January 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/01/08/piracy.task.force/ (28-01-2009 12:31).

Thorup, Mikkel: *Pirater, terrorister og stater*, Århus: Klim, 2008.

Thomson, Janice E.: *Mercenaries, Pirates & Sovereigns. State-building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

UNEP, *After the Tsunami: Rapid Environmental Assessment*, http://www.unep.org/tsunami/reports/TSUNAMI_report_complete.pdf (27-01-2009 12:11).

"Unholy high seas alliance", in: *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, 31 October 2008, http://www8.janes.com.ez-fak.minimeta.minibib.dk/JDIC/JTIC/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jtsm/history/jtsm2008/jtsm5196.htm@current&pageSelected=&keyword=piracy&backPath=http://jtic.janes.com.ez-fak.minimeta.minibib.dk/JDIC/JTIC&Prod_Name=JTSM&activeNav=http://www8.janes.com.ez-fak.minimeta.minibib.dk/JDIC/JTIC (23-11-2008 11:32).

Viguerie, Veronique de: „Life with the pirates of Somalia" in: *The Guardian*,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/gallery/2008/nov/18/piracy-somalia-gallery?picture=339805476 (27-01-2009 13:13).

Vijayan, K.C.: "Malacca Strait is off war risk list but piracy attacks up last month", in: *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 11 August 2006, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/scholarship/ST%20-%20Reading.pdf (19-11-2008 00:38).

Wallis, Keith: "Indian navy could boost Gulf of Aden patrols", in: *Lloyds List*, 21 November 2008, http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/indian-navy-could-boost-gulf-of-aden-patrols/20017592796.htm (23-11-2008 20:35)

WFP, *Somalia,* http://beta.wfp.org/countries/somalia (12-02-2009 11:49).

"Yemen concerned over foreign naval presence in Gulf of Aden", in: *Zawya,* 10 November 2008, http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidANA20081110T123729ZPMC04/Yemen%20concerned%20over%20foreign%20naval%20presence%20in%20Gulf%20of%20Aden (12-02-2009 00:27).

"Yemen wants Arab cooperation to fight piracy", in: *International Herald Tribune*, 19 November 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/11/19/news/Piracy-Arabs.php (20-11-2008 22:57).

09 Notes

Notes

[1] For an introduction to the problems in Somalia, see Bjørn Møller, *The Somali conflict: The role of external actors*, DIIS, 2009, unpublished report.

[2] Martin Murphy, *Contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism. The threat to international security. Adelphi paper 388,* Routledge, UK, 2007, p. 11. f.

[3] Bjørn Møller, *Piracy, maritime terrorism and naval strategy. DIIS Report 2009,* Copenhagen, DIIS, 2009, p. 15 ff.

[4] International Maritime Organization (IMO), *Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, RESOLUTION A.922(22), Adopted on 29 November 2001 (Agenda item 9).*

[5] ICC, IMB: *Piracy and armed robbery against ships. Annual report. 1 January-31 December 2008*, London, 2009, p. 6.

[6] "21 danske skibe overfaldet af pirater", in: *Det Maritime Danmark,* 30 January 2009.

[7] Egypt State Information Service, *The Suez Canal: historical flashback*, Egypt, 2008.

[8] The Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Centre. *Economic & Social Indicators Bulletin of the Arab Republic of Egypt, November 2008,*

[9] Manar Ammar, "Somali pirates can divert maritime routes away from Suez Canal", in: *Daily News Egypt*, 17 October 2008.

[10] K.C. Vijayan, "Malacca Strait is off war risk list but piracy attacks up last month", in: *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 11 August 2006.

[11] Miles Costello, "Shipping insurance cost soars with piracy surge off Somalia", in: *TimesOnline,* 11 September 2008.

[12] Thomas R. Stauffer, "The Cost of Middle East Conflict, 1956-2002: What the U.S. has spent", in: *Middle East Policy,* Vol. X, no. 1, 2003, p. 48.

[13] "Yemen wants Arab cooperation to fight piracy", in: *International Herald Tribune*, 19 November 2008.

[14] UN Security Council, *Security Council authorizes African Union Somalia mission for further six months, Unanimously adopting resolution 1772 (2007),* 20 August 2007.

[15] Per Stig Møller, *Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om dansk deltagelse med sømilitært bidrag til styrkelse af den maritime sikkerhed ved Afrikas Horn,* motion for a parliamentary resolution no. B 33, 15 January 2008.

[16] UN Security Council, *Security council authorizes states to use land-based operations in Somalia, as part of fight against piracy off coast, unanimously adopting 1851, 2008*.

[17] Combined Maritime Forces news release: *New Counter-Piracy Task Force Established,* 8 January 2008, and American Forces Press Service: *Multinational Task Force Targets Pirates*, 8 January 2009.

[18] Frømandskorpset is a unit like the US Navy Seals ore the British Special Boat Service.

[19] Per Stig Møller, *Forslag til folketingsbeslutning* […].

[20] "Nato: Pirater må bekæmpes", in: *Fyns Amts Avis*, 20 November 2008.

[21] SHAPE News, *Successful completion of NATO mission Operation Allied Provider*.

[22] EU ESDP, *EU NAVFOR Somalia.*

[23] Keith Wallis, "Indian navy could boost Gulf of Aden patrols", in: *Lloyds List,* 21 November 2008.

[24] Adam Morrow og Khaled Moussa al-Omrani, "Somalia: Anti-Piracy Flotillas Rattle Arab Security", in: *allAfrica.com,* 28 November 2008.

[25] EUbusiness, Egypt willing to participate in anti-piracy missions, 3 December 2008.

[26] "Yemen concerned over foreign naval presence in Gulf of Aden", in: *Zawya,* 10 November 2008, http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidANA20081110T123729ZPMC04/Yemen%20concerned%20over%20foreign%20naval%20presence%20in%20Gulf%20of%20Aden.

[27] "Russia proposes joint land anti-piracy operation", in: *International Herald Tribune.* 19 November 2008.

[28] American Forces Press Service: *Multinational Task Force Targets Pirates*, January 2009.

[29] Joe Sterling; Navy creates force devoted to fighting piracy, CNN, 8 January 2009.

[30] See, for instance, Martin N. Murphy, *Contemporary piracy...*, Michael Richardson, *A Time Bomb for Global Trade. Maritime-related Terrorism in an*

Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2004; *Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits*, ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, ISEAS Publishing, 2006; *Maritime Terrorism. Risk and Liability*, Michael Greenberg, Peter Chalk & Henry H. Willis (et al), RAND, USA, 2006.

[31] See, for instance, "From The Pirates Mouth", in: *Shiptalk*, 21 January 2009.

[32] "Unholy high seas alliance", in: *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, 31 October 2008.

[33] *Maritime Terrorism. Risk and Liability*, p. 140.

[34] Se Mikkel Thorup, *Pirater, terrorister og stater*, Århus: Klim, 2008.

[35] *Al Qaeda's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa* (Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, Harmony Project, Westpoint, NY, 2007), p. 77 ff.

[36] Bjørn Møller, *Somalia after the Ethiopian withdrawal*, *DIIS Brief,* Copenhagen: January 2009, p. 4.

[37] For more details, see the following works for a historical account of piracy: Peter Earle, *The Pirate Wars*, Methuen, London, 1998; Philip Gosse, *The History of Piracy*, New York: Dopver publications, Mineola, 1932/2007 and C. M. Senior, *A Nation of Pirates. English Piracy in its Heyday,* London: David & Charles, Newton Abbot, 1976. Pirates and the state are discussed in Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates & Sovereigns. State-building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

[38] ICC, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. 2008*, p.11.

[39] ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings*.

[40] *Pirater kaprer kæmpe olietankskib*, in: TV 2 Nyhederne, 17 November 2008.

[41] ICC, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. 2008*, p.22.

[42] "Gidsler befriet af kommandosoldater", in: *Det Maritime Danmark*, 17 September 2008.

[43] "Sirius Star pirater druknede på vej hjem", in: *Det Maritime Danmark*, 10 January 2009.

[44] WFP, *Somalia*.

[45] "From The Pirates Mouth", and Xan Rice & Abdiqani Hassan, "Death at sea: how pirates' triumph ended in disaster", in: *The Guardian*, 17 January 2009.

[46] Information on this came from interviews with shipowners whose ships had been hijacked.

[47] Abukar Albadri & Edmund Sanders, "Somalia's pirate problem grows more rampant", in: *Los Angeles Times,* 31 October 2008.

[48] See, for instance, "Somali piracy backed by international network", in: MSNBC, 10 December 2008.

[49] David Obura,, "Impacts of the 26 December Tsunami in East Africa", in: *Ocean and Coastal Management*, vol. 49, no. 11, 2006, pp. 873-888.

[50] Bjørn Møller, *Piracy off the Coast of Somalia*, *DIIS Brief*, Copenhagen, January 2009, p. 1.

[51] See, for instance, *Official Pirate-Fishing in the Somali Indian Ocean flourishing*, Mareegforum,

Jeffrey Gettleman, "Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money", in: *New York Times,* 1 October 2008, and Daniel Howden, "Vi er ikke pirater. Det her er vores hav", in: *Information,* 17 November 2008.

[52] "From The Pirates Mouth".

[53] Photographer Veronique de Viguerie had a series of photos in *The Guardian*: *Life with the pirates of Somalia* on the Somali pirates from the Central Regional Coast Guard.

[54] See, for instance, Xan Rice & Abdiqani Hassan, *We consider ourselves heroes.*

[55] Argaw Ashine: "Gaddafi defends Somali pirates", in: *Daily Nation* (Kenya), 5 February 2009.

[56] UNEP, *After the Tsunami: Rapid Environmental Assessment*.

[57] David Osler & Mike Grinter, "Owners hire armed guards to secure ships against pirates", in: *Llyods List*, 12 September 2008.

[58] "Bevæbnede vagter på Maersk skibe", in: *Det Maritime Danmark*, 27 March 2008.

[59] Frank Hvilsom, "Lejesoldater vil passe på danske skibe", in: *Politiken,* 21 November 2008.

[60] Dines Boertmann, *Dansk fragtskib kapret ud for Somalia*, in: DR Nyhederne, 8 November 2008.

[61] Frank Hvilsom, "Pirateri fører til prisforhøjelser", in: *Politiken,* 19 November 2008.

[62] Charlotte Beder, "Pirater kan koste Mærsk dyrt", *epn.dk*, 21 November 2008.

[63] "CMA CGM overvejer at undgå Suez", in: *Det Maritime Danmark*, 28 January 2009.

[64] *ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security*, 17 June 2003.

[65] *Factsheet: Milestones of Malacca Strait Patrols,* Ministry of Defence Singapore.

[66] See, for instance, *RI rejects any effort to internationalize Malacca Strait*, Minister of The State Secretary Indonesia.

[67] Razali Hj Ahmad, *Security challenges in the 21st century: The Malaysian perspective.*

[68] *Pirates captured after high-seas pursuit,* CNN, 28 June 2001.

[69] This section is based on conversations with Royal Danish Navy personnel.

[70] The information was made available by Fleet Admiral Per Bigum Christensen.

[71] See note 37.

[72] Abukar Albadri, *Somalia's pirate problem grows more rampant.*

[73] Jonathon Gatehouse, "This cabbie hunts pirates. Former Toronto taxi driver is now in charge of a Somali coast guard", in: *Macleans,* 12 January.

[74] International Maritime Organization (IMO), *High-level meeting in Djibouti to conclude regional agreement to prevent, deter and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships,* IMO Briefing 02, 27 January 2009.