

Poul Martin Linnet

# Afghanistan Index

A collection of quantitative and  
qualitative data on Afghanistan

Dansk Institut  
for Militære Studier



February 2008

*Afghanistan Index* Dansk Institut for Militære Studier February 2008

# Abstract

The Afghanistan index is a compilation of quantitative and qualitative data on the reconstruction and security effort in Afghanistan. The index aims at providing data for benchmarking of the international performance and thus provides the reader with a quick possibility to retrieve valid information on progress or lack of progress in the reconstruction of the post Taliban Afghanistan.

The index is mainly based on information collected on the internet in order to provide quick access to the original source.

The index is under development and thus new information will be added on a continuous basis.

The data are divided into different indicators such as security, polls, drug, social, economic, refugees etc. This represents a practical division and does not indicate that a picture as to for instance security can be obtained by solely looking at the data under security. In order to obtain a more valid picture on security this must incorporate an integrated look on all data meaning that for instance the economic data provides an element as to the whole picture of security.

Dansk Institut for Militære Studier er en uafhængig forskningsinstitution, hvis formål er at kortlægge, analysere og debattere de valg, som dansk forsvar står overfor i en globaliseret verden.

Denne rapport er baseret på forfatterens egen forskning, og dens konklusioner er således udelukkende udtryk for forfatterens egne holdninger.

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
Rapporten kan hentes på [www.difms.dk](http://www.difms.dk)

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# 01 Security indicators

## Foreign Troop strength



**Troop Contributing Nations (TCN):** The ISAF mission consists of the following 39 Nations. (The troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time)  
**NB:** Georgian troops not yet deployed


	Albania	138		Finland	86		Lithuania	196		Spain	763
	Australia	892		France	1292		Luxembourg	9		Sweden	350
	Austria	3		Georgia	-		Netherlands	1512		Switzerland	2
	Azerbaijan	22		Germany	3155		New Zealand	74		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	125
	Belgium	369		Greece	143		Norway	508		Turkey	1219
	Bulgaria	401		Hungary	219		Poland	1141		United Kingdom	7753
	Canada	1730		Iceland	10		Portugal	163		United States	15038
	Croatia	211		Ireland	7		Romania	537		ISAF +NSE	41741
	Czech Republic	240		Italy	2358		Slovakia	70		National Support Elements	6495
	Denmark	628		Jordan	90		Slovenia	66			
	Estonia	125		Latvia	96						

\* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

Current as of 5 December 2007


Source: [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf)

### Foreign troop fatalities since 2001



Note: Casualties as a result of both hostile and non-hostile incidents are included in the figures.

### Fatalities by country since 2001



Source: <http://www.icasualties.org/oef/default.aspx>

## Afghan National Security Forces

### Afghan National Army



Note: The actual number of troops present in the ANA seems to be somewhat uncertain. In a Canadian report released in January 2008 the number of troops present in ANA in December 2007 was 47000. This number was based on information from CSTC-A and the Afghan Ministry of Defense. In a status at the JCBM seventh meeting in Tokyo in February 2008 the Afghan Ministry of Defense lists the number 56672 as the actual figure.

The training of the ANA is lead by the US through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). CSTC-A is part of operation Enduring Freedom and under command of US central Command. The basic training period for a recruit is 16 weeks. Monthly pay is 100\$.

Of the approximately 46,000 troops registered 22,000 are constantly available for combat duty. However in accordance with the latest status from the Afghan Ministry of Defense of 49 planned combat battalions 36 were established by February 2008. Of the 36 established only 13 have the ability to conduct operations with the support of coalition forces. This would suggest that the actual combat ready forces of the afghan army at present are around 7000 as each battalion consists of approximately 600 troops.

Based on information from the homepage of CSTC-A the increase in manpower of the ANA to 80.000 has been approved.

Source: [http://www.mod.gov.af/#Current\\_status](http://www.mod.gov.af/#Current_status)  
<http://www.cstc-a.com/News/o8Jan-EnduringLedger.pdf>  
[http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/pdf/scond\\_e.pdf](http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/pdf/scond_e.pdf)  
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/No7/502/15/PDF/No750215.pdf?OpenElement>  
[http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/pdf/Afghan\\_Report\\_web\\_e.pdf](http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/pdf/Afghan_Report_web_e.pdf)  
<http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/src/Meeting%20and%20Documents/seventh%20JCBM/files/III.%20Reports%20and%20Supporting%20Documents/Quality.%20Quantity%20&%20Financial%20Sustainability%20of%20ANA%20-%20English.pdf>

## Current Status

The problems of desertion and difficult recruitment are recurring problems. In February 2008 the Afghan Ministry of Defense listed projected losses as follows:

Educational losses 20%, renewal of contract (private) 20%, renewal of contract (Sergeant) 55%, losses in ANA personnel 12%, killed, injured, deserted etc.

Total manpower is at around 47,000 personnel and 3,000 new personnel are being recruited each month. The ANA has the capability of training 3,000 personnel each month. Facilities and capacity planning efforts are rapidly adjusting to significant increases in national recruiting efforts to meet manpower needs. By February 47,000 of the planned army of 80,000 ANA soldiers has been achieved.

There is a lack of military equipment. Currently the supply level of weapons is 69%, trucks, cars, tactical vehicles etc., 53% and communication equipment 41%. In 2008 it is planned that the equipment level will reach 80-100%.

The basic unit in the Afghan National Army is the Battalion or Kandak, consisting of 600 troops. Although the vast majority is infantry, at least one mechanized and one tank Battalion have been formed; more may be planned. An elite Special Forces unit modeled on the U.S Army Rangers is also being formed. Plans are for it to include 3,900 men in six battalions under French and U.S tutelage. Every ANA Corps will be assigned a commando battalion with the sixth designated as a special national unit under the Afghan defense ministry's purview.

As of February 2008 36 of the 49 planned Afghan National Army Combat Battalions were established, of these 13 were ready for combat operations. 16 Battalions are under evaluation, 7 battalions which has recently been established do not have the ability to conduct military operations. This would suggest that the actual combat ready forces of the afghan army at present are around 7000 as each battalion consists of approximately 600 troops.


28 combat support battalions are planned. 20 have been established. Of these 10 with the support of coalition forces have the ability to support operational segments. 9 battalions are under evaluation and one has recently been established.

Nine garrisons each supporting a brigade have been completed: Poli Charkhi, Darul Aman, Gardez, Khowst, Qalat, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Heart, Mazr-e-Sharif... Following garrisons are planned completed in 2008: Khair Kot (August 2008), Gombori (December 2008), Kunduz (December 2008), Farah (December 2008). A total of 13 of 14 planned garrisons that will primarily be regionally oriented are thus planned completed in 2008.

Five Corps exist, serving as regional commands for the ANA: the 201st Corps based in Kabul, the 203rd Corps based in Gardez, the 205th Corps based in Kandahar, the 207th Corps in Herat, and the 209th Corps in Mazar-e-Sharif. Each of the four outlying Corps will be assigned one brigade with the majority of the manpower of the army based in Kabul's 201st Corps.



**Brigade Formation + Garrison Construction Priorities  
(as of 14 Mar 07)**



Note: The map illustrates the envisioned structure of the ANA.

Source:

<http://www.and.s.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/src/Meeting%20and%20Documents/seventh%20JCMB/files/III.%20Reports%20and%20Supporting%20Documents/Quality,%20Quantity%20&%20Financial%20Sustainability%20of%20ANA%20-%20English.pdf>


CSTC-A

**Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT)/Embedded Training Teams (ETT)**

One of the key elements in training and educating the ANA are the OMLT/ETT. OMLT is the NATO designation and ETT the American.

These teams are embedded in ANA Battalions, Brigades, garrisons and Corps headquarters. OMLT/ETT provide training and mentoring to support ANA units' operational deployments and a liaison capability between ANA and ISAF forces, co-ordinating the planning of operations and ensure that the ANA units receive enabling support. At Brigade and Battalion level the OMLT/ETT deploy throughout Afghanistan with their ANA partner unit.


Source: <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/omlt.html>  
<http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/ARSIC.html>



Source: [http://images.derstandard.at/20071106/ANSO\\_Report\\_Q207.pdf](http://images.derstandard.at/20071106/ANSO_Report_Q207.pdf)



## Afghan National Police



Note: In 2007 more than 1,000 ANP were killed and over 1,400 wounded in action.

Until mid 2005 Germany was the lead nation for training the ANP. From mid 2005 CSTC-A took over the lead. An overarching coordination body the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) with the purpose of coordinating the efforts of all countries contributing to the reformation of the Ministry of Interior and the ANP was developed in 2006 and implemented in early 2007. The IPCB has a standing secretariat with participation of personnel from EUPOL, CSTC-A and others. In June 2007 the EU took over as key partner and the EUPOL is meant to draw under one umbrella nearly all non-U.S. actors including sixteen EU member states and seven others. At present the EU has not been able to deploy all of the envisaged 195 personnel. The deployment of EU personnel should be completed in spring 2008.

The basic training for an ANP recruit is 8 weeks. Monthly pay is 70\$.

The above end goal of 82,000 includes 18,000 Afghan Border Police, 4,995 Afghanistan Civil order Police and 11,271 Afghan National Auxiliary Police.

Source: <http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/UN-Docs/repots-SG/2007/07march15-report.pdf>

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/No7/502/15/PDF/No750215.pdf?OpenElement>

<http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/AfghanistanPoliceFacts.html>

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south\\_asia/138\\_reforming\\_afghanistan\\_s\\_police.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/138_reforming_afghanistan_s_police.pdf)

<http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/src/Meeting%20and%20Documents/seventh%20JCMB/files/III.%20Reports%20and%20Supporting%20Documents/Review%20of%20Quality,%20Structure%20and%20Accountability%20of%20ANP%20-%20English.pdf>

Currently the entire program with regards to the ANP is being revised due to problems with rampant corruption, absence and loyalty.

In February 2008 at the JCMB seventh meeting in Tokyo a status and recommendations for action with regards to ANP was presented. The recommendations include among others the following:

- A unified, integrated vision of the Afghan police, addressing the requirements of both law enforcement and national security, should be agreed by stakeholders under the auspices of the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). This vision should be elaborated in a basic 'Policing Plan' that articulates policing objectives across the country; gives strategic and operational guidance to police activity; and introduces clear accountability. It must be compatible with broader national security planning and take account of coordination with other security agencies.
- The improvements that need to take place are not limited to technical solutions, involving the expenditure of additional resources. Many of the measures that will improve the quality and structures of the police require political will and leadership. A permanent body should be established by the MOI and the international community both to oversee vetting of police candidates and to review key leader performance. In addition, an external oversight mechanism, which includes civil society, should be established to receive complaints, evaluate standards of service and sustain public dialogue.
- Future mentoring plans should take more account of the need for mentors at the provincial and district levels. The increase in the number of mentors needs to be speeded up, and the use of trained Afghan mentors should be considered. (At present only 93 of a required number of 434 mentors are fielded.)

The size of the ANP and the present security problems have led to the creation of Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) which might be as large as 20,000 personnel. At present the force may consist of up to 11,279 persons who are to be recruited locally and given 10 days of training.

In mid 2007 the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board decided to temporarily increase the allowed personnel strength of the ANP to 82,000. This number will be reviewed every 6 months.

Source: Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board October 2007 and February 2008, available at


<http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/src/Meeting%20and%20Documents/Sixth%20%20JCMB/pdfs/Eng/03-Annex%202%20-%20Follow-Up%20to%20Previous%20JCMB%20ADs-English-02%20Oct.pdf>

<http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/src/Meeting%20and%20Documents/seventh%20JCMB/files/III.%20Reports%20and%20Supporting%20Documents/Review%20of%20Quality,%20Structure%20and%20Accountability%20of%20ANP%20-%20English.pdf>


Andrew Wilder July 2007, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, available at:

[http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=33](http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=33)

and




Source: Afghanistan Human Development report 2007. Available at [http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article\\_id=2683&Category\\_Id=REP\\_NHDR](http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article_id=2683&Category_Id=REP_NHDR)



Source: [http://images.derstandard.at/20071106/ANSO\\_Report\\_Q207.pdf](http://images.derstandard.at/20071106/ANSO_Report_Q207.pdf)

## Security incidents




The difference between 2007 and previous years is probably higher as methodologies in 2007 more accurately separate out real security incidents from basic domestic crime, non-security related incidents etc.

Source:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/No7/502/15/PDF/No750215.pdf?OpenElement>

[http://media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2007/10/01/16/UNAMA\\_2007\\_Afghanistan\\_source.prod\\_affiliate.01.pdf](http://media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2007/10/01/16/UNAMA_2007_Afghanistan_source.prod_affiliate.01.pdf)




Note: Non Governmental organisations are not present in the southern part of Afghanistan due to the security situation.

Source:


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<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistano706/afghanistano706web.pdf>



Source:

<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistano706/afghanistano706web.pdf>



Note: The data covering 2007 has been taken from the report of the UN Secretary General 21. September 2007. In this report the number mentioned is over 100 suicide attacks.

Source:

<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/afghanistano407/afghanistano407webwcover.pdf>

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/No7/502/15/PDF/No750215.pdf?OpenElement>





Figure 2: Changes in Accessibility from May 2006 to May 2007

Security map (as at 10 December 2007) Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2008: Expected opium poppy cultivation trends (by province)



Source security map: UNODC  
 Source: M/CN-UNODC Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2008 ([http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop\\_monitoring.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html))  
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Map 9: Expected cultivation trend vs. security situation (as reported by UNODC)

Note: the above two maps show the security assessment as viewed by United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan. Be aware that the colouring of the areas low risk and medium risk has changed. On the top amp the area low risk is green and medium risk is light yellow. On the bottom map low risk is light yellow and medium risk is light green. Furthermore the high risk area changes from orange to pink. The colouring of extreme risk areas are the same namely red.





Figure 3 : HARA Map<sup>10</sup> - August 2007

United Nations Department of Safety and Security, half year review August 2007.


Source:

[http://media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2007/10/01/16/UNAMA\\_2007\\_Afghanistan\\_source.prod.affiliate.91.pdf](http://media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2007/10/01/16/UNAMA_2007_Afghanistan_source.prod.affiliate.91.pdf)




Source: Afghanistan Human Development report 2007. Available at

[http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article\\_id=2683&Category\\_Id=REP\\_NHDR](http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article_id=2683&Category_Id=REP_NHDR)



Source: Anthony H. Cordesman (2007), "Winning in Afghanistan" [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/o7o215\\_afghanbrief.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/o7o215_afghanbrief.pdf)

### Civilian Casualties



Note: Much debate has and still is taking place as to the number of civilian casualties connected with the conflict.

The above numbers are taken from the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) quarterly data report, Q2-07. ANSO assesses that there will be little change in the volume of civilian casualties so long as the dynamics of the conflict remain the same with AOG attacking from within civilian populations and IMF responding with air forces.

The UN is also following the number of civilian casualties. In the Secretary General's last report about the situation in Afghanistan from September 2007 it is noted that the UN from January to 31 August 2007 recorded over 1,000 civilian deaths. In many instances, however, security conditions limiting the Mission's access to combat areas and the political sensitivity of the issue make it difficult to gather sufficient information to provide a comprehensive incident report.

Source: [http://images.derstandard.at/20071106/ANSO\\_Report\\_Q207.pdf](http://images.derstandard.at/20071106/ANSO_Report_Q207.pdf)  
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/No7/502/15/PDF/No750215.pdf?OpenElement>





# 02 Polls


## ABC News/BBC World Service Poll and ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Strife Erodes Afghan Optimism Five Years After The Taliban's Fall December 2006, 1036 Afghan adults interviewed.


Afghanistan - Where things stand, December 2007, 1377 Afghan adults interviewed.




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







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
December 2007









December 2006




December 2006



December 2006



December 2006



Source: [http://abcnews.go.com/images/politics/afghanistan\\_poll\\_061205.pdf](http://abcnews.go.com/images/politics/afghanistan_poll_061205.pdf)  
<http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1049a1Afghanistan-WhereThingsStand.pdf>


## World Public Opinion

Afghan Public Opinion Amidst Rising Violence December 2006.

2089 Afghan adults interviewed. Interviews were conducted in 32 of 34 provinces.


### 1. Country's Direction, Afghan Government and Foreign Military Presence

Majorities of Afghans see their country as going in the right direction and are positive toward the central government, President Karzai, NATO forces, and the United States. But all of these majorities are declining.




### 2. Dissatisfaction with Reconstruction

A majority of Afghans are critical of the progress made in reconstructing roads, schools, hospitals and water supplies and they put a higher priority on economic over military assistance. The more frustrated Afghans feel about the pace of reconstruction, the more likely they are to feel that their country is headed in the wrong direction and to express unfavorable opinions about the foreign military presence and the United States. Perceptions of corruption are also related to lower support for the central government. International aid agencies, however, get good marks for their work.



## Economic vs. Military Aid

Please think about the amount of economic help for reconstruction and the amount of military help for security that other countries are currently giving to Afghanistan. If you could increase only one of these, do you think it would be better to have more economic help or more military help?



WPO 11/06

### 3. The Taliban

The vast majority of Afghans—now nine in ten—view the Taliban negatively. They also think that overthrowing the Taliban was good for their country. Both the central government and local leaders are much more widely seen as having power and respect than the Taliban. While opinions are mixed on whether the Taliban has recently gained or lost ground, four out of five Afghans think it unlikely that the Taliban will actually return to power. Despite increased Taliban activity, most Afghans continue to express fairly positive views of security in their area. This may be due to the confidence that Taliban forces will not prevail. Afghans may also have a high tolerance for insecurity given the instability that they have faced in recent decades.

## Overthrowing the Taliban

Overall, do you think that overthrowing the Taliban government was a good thing or a bad thing for Afghanistan?



WPO 11/06



## Most Powerful Local Authority

Thinking about the area where you live, which of the following is the most powerful authority?

Central government



Local leaders



Taliban



WPO 11/06

## Likelihood of Taliban Return to Power

How likely do you think it is that the Taliban will return and take over governing Afghanistan?

Very/Somewhat likely



Not at all likely


Not very likely



WPO 11/06


#### 4. Role of Pakistan

A large and growing majority views Pakistan negatively and thinks Pakistan's government is permitting Taliban operations on its soil.



#### 5. Efforts to Control Opium Production

A majority of Afghans approve of international forces' efforts to control opium poppy production. However, this majority is declining. In some regions, half now disapprove of such efforts.



Source:

[http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/deco6/Afghanistan\\_Deco6\\_rpt.pdf](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/deco6/Afghanistan_Deco6_rpt.pdf)

# 03 Opium Poppy

## Afghanistan Winter Rapid assessment Survey Trends 2008

### Opium poppy cultivation trends

Following a record level of 193,000 hectares (ha) of opium poppy cultivation in 2007, the Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey forecasts the following cultivation trends in 2008:

- A sharp increase in cultivation in Nimroz province (western region), with a significant level of cultivation in that province;
- An increase in cultivation in six provinces, mainly in the southern (Kandahar and Uruzgan) and western (Farah, Badghis and Ghor) regions, with a significant level of cultivation in those provinces;
- Cultivation trends are expected to remain stable in five provinces, namely Hilmand, Day Kundi and Zabul in the south and Sari Pul and Takhar in the north. The southern region accounted for 69 per cent of total opium poppy cultivation in 2007; little change is expected in 2008.
- Twelve provinces are likely to remain poppy-free, mainly in the central and northern regions. The number of poppy-free provinces may increase to 14 or 15 if spring cultivation is controlled through effective prevention campaigns and eradication efforts.

Overall, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is likely to decrease slightly in 2008. However, early eradication efforts and an effective awareness campaign to control spring cultivation may reinforce this trend and bring about a further decrease in cultivation.

**Table 1: Opium poppy cultivation trends in 2008**

Cultivation trend in 2008	No. of provinces	Provinces
Poppy-free	12	Balkh, Bamyan, Ghazni, Khost, Kunduz, Logar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktya, Panjshir, Parwan, Wardak
Decrease	7	Badakhshan, Baghlan, Hirat, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman
Sharp decrease	3	Faryab, Jawzjan, Nangarhar
Increase	6	Badghis, Farah, Ghor, Kandahar, Samangan, Uruzgan
Sharp increase	1	Nimroz.
Stable	5	Day Kundi, Hilmand, Sari Pul, Takhar, Zabul

### Key highlights of ORAS

The 2008 ORAS highlights the following key cultivation trends as compared to 2007:

- A sharp increase in cultivation in Nimroz province, mainly in the Khash Rod district;
- A sharp decrease in Nangarhar province;
- An increase in the Farah, Badghis, Kandahar and Uruzgan provinces;
- Little change is expected in Hilmand province, which accounted for 53 per cent of total opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2007;
- At least 12 provinces continue to be poppy-free. Samangan province may remain poppy-free if the Government's public awareness campaign to prevent poppy cultivation is implemented more intensively. Kabul province may become poppy-free if poppy cultivation is eliminated in the Surobhi district.

Table 3: Proportion of opium poppy-growing villages by region

Region	Non-poppy growing	Poppy growing
Central	99%	1%
East	92%	8%
North-east	76%	24%
North	87%	13%
South	15%	85%
West	63%	37%
<b>Total</b>	<b>68%</b>	<b>32%</b>

In the southern region, 85 per cent of the villages visited reported poppy cultivation in 2008. In Helmand province, all villages (30) reported poppy cultivation in 2008. Ninety-two per cent of villages visited in Uruzgan province, 83 per cent of those in Kandahar province and 77 per cent of those in Farah province reported likewise. However, no poppy cultivation was reported in the villages visited in Nangarhar (25) and Balkh (18) provinces, while 28 per cent of villages visited in Badakhshan reported low levels of poppy cultivation in 2008.

#### 1.4. FAMILIES INVOLVED IN OPIUM CULTIVATION

The percentage of families involved in opium cultivation in the villages visited is strikingly high in the southern provinces, closely followed by that for the western provinces. A high proportion of families are reported to be involved in opium cultivation in the following provinces: Hilmand (93 per cent), Uruzgan (66 per cent), Zabul (46 per cent), Nimroz (35 per cent), Day Kundi (26 per cent), Farah (24 per cent) and Kandahar (22 per cent).

#### 1.6. FIELD SECURITY


The security situation, as reported by respondents of the survey, was good in most provinces during the Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey. However, security was a general concern in most areas of Hilmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Zabul, Kunar, Badghis, Nimroz and Farah. Since eradication had not begun in any part of Afghanistan by the time this survey was completed, it was not possible to assess the level of resistance among farmers to the eradication campaign.

The survey indicates that approximately 70 per cent of villages with poor security and 63 per cent of those with very poor security are involved in poppy cultivation, as compared to only 26 per cent of villages with good security. There is a strong link between security conditions and opium poppy cultivation in the southern and western provinces, where 100 per cent of villages with poor security have cultivated opium poppy. This percentage is also significantly high (44 per cent) for the eastern region.

Table 6: Security situation vis-à-vis opium poppy cultivation

Security situation	No. of villages		% villages cultivating opium poppy
	No opium poppy cultivation	Opium poppy cultivation	
Very poor	16	27	63%
Poor	21	48	70%
Good	181	62	26%
Very good	102	11	10%

Figure 1: Monthly farm-gate prices for dry opium, Sept. 2004 to Dec. 2007 (US\$/kg)



Source: UNODC Monthly Opium Price Report for Afghanistan, December 2007

## 2007 Annual Opium Poppy Survey in Afghanistan

### Fact Sheet

	2006	Difference on 2006	2007
Net opium poppy cultivation	165,000 ha	+17%	193,000 ha
In per cent of agricultural land	3.65%		4.27%
In per cent of global cultivation	82%		82%
Number of provinces affected	28		21
Number of poppy free provinces	6		13
Eradication	15,300 ha	+24%	19,047 ha
Weighted average opium yield	37.0 kg/ha	+15%	42.5 kg/ha
Potential production of opium	6,100 mt	+34%	8,200 mt
In percent of global production	92%		93%
Number of households involved in opium cultivation	448,000	+14%	509,000
Number of persons involved in opium cultivation	2.9 million	+14%	3.3 million
In per cent of total population (23 million)	12.6%		14.3%
Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) of fresh opium at harvest time	US\$ 94/kg	-9%	US\$ 86/kg
Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) of dry opium at harvest time	US\$ 125/kg	-2%	US\$ 122/kg
Afghanistan GDP <sup>1</sup>	US\$ 6.7 billion	+12%	US\$ 7.5 billion
Total farm-gate value of opium production	US\$ 0.76 billion	+32%	US\$ 1 billion
Total farm-gate value of opium in per cent of GDP	11%		13%
Household average yearly gross income from opium of opium poppy growing families	US\$ 1,700	+16%	US\$ 1,965
Per capita gross income of opium poppy growing farmers	US\$ 260	+17%	US\$ 303
Afghanistan GDP per capita	US\$ 290	+7%	US\$ 310
Indicative gross income from opium per ha	US\$ 4,600	+13%	US\$ 5,200
Indicative gross income from wheat per ha	US\$ 530	+3%	US\$ 546

<sup>1</sup> Source: Afghan Government, Central Statistical Office, preliminary estimate.

Figure 1: Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan (ha), 1994-2007




Figure 2: Global opium poppy cultivation (ha), 1990-2007




Table 1: Regional distribution of opium poppy cultivation, 2006-2007

Region	2006 (ha)	2007 (ha)	Change 2006-2007	2006 as % of total	2007 as % of total
Southern Region	101,900	133,546	+31%	62%	69%
Northern Region	22,574	4,882	-78%	14%	3%
Western Region	16,615	28,619	+72%	10%	15%
North-East Region	15,234	4,853	-68%	9%	3%
Eastern Region	8,312	20,581	+148%	5%	11%
Central Region	337	500	+48%	0%	0%
<b>Rounded Total</b>	<b>165,000</b>	<b>193,000</b>	<b>+17%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 2: Main opium poppy cultivation provinces in Afghanistan (ha), 2007**

Province	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Change 2006-2007	% Total in 2007	Cumulative %
Hilmand	15,371	29,353	26,500	69,324	102,770	+48%	53%	53%
Nangarhar	18,904	28,213	1,093	4,872	18,739	+285%	10%	63%
Kandahar	3,055	4,959	12,989	12,619	16,615	+32%	9%	72%
Farah	1,700	2,288	10,240	7,694	14,865	+93%	8%	79%
Uruzgan	4,698	N/A	2,024	9,773	9,204	-6%	5%	84%
Nimroz	26	115	1,690	1,955	6,507	+233%	3%	87%
Rest of the country	36,246	66,072	49,464	58,763	24,281	-59%	13%	100%
<b>Rounded Total</b>	<b>80,000</b>	<b>131,000</b>	<b>104,000</b>	<b>165,000</b>	<b>193,000</b>	<b>17%</b>		

Opium poppy cultivation in Hilmand province increased by almost 50% and reached 102,770 ha, compared to 69,324 ha in 2006. Fifty-three per cent of total opium poppy cultivation of Afghanistan was located in Hilmand. Cultivation in Hilmand province more than tripled between 2002 and 2007, bringing the area under opium poppy cultivation in 2007 nearly equal to total cultivation in Afghanistan in 2005 (104,000 ha).

In Kandahar province, opium poppy cultivation increased by one third to 16,615 ha in 2007 compared to 2006, despite the eradication of 7,905 ha of opium poppy. The sharp increase in opium poppy cultivation had started already in 2004 when only 4,959 ha were cultivated. Since then, the area under opium poppy has more than tripled.

Opium poppy cultivation in Nimroz province tripled compared to 2006 and reached 6,507 ha in 2007. The majority of the cultivation was located in Khash Rod district. Many new agricultural areas were identified in the northern part of this district in 2006 and 2007, a vast majority of which were used for opium poppy cultivation. Only 43 ha of opium poppy were eradicated in 2007 in Nimroz. In 2004, total opium poppy cultivation in this province was only 115 ha.

The total area under opium poppy in Farah province almost doubled to 14,865 ha in 2007. Eradication was very limited (179 ha). As in Kandahar, cultivation started to increase after 2004. In 2002, the total cultivation in this province amounted to only 500 ha.

#### ***Nangarhar slips back to high level of opium poppy cultivation***

In 2007, opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar increased by 285% to 18,739 ha. In 2005, the province had become almost opium poppy free as a result of self restriction on the part of farmers, which led to a 96% decrease on 2004. In 2006, opium poppy cultivation began to increase but could only in very remote parts of the province. By 2007, opium poppy cultivation was observed even in close proximity to the provincial capital. Significantly, two important tribes in Nangarhar did not follow the Government's opium ban, and this

led to a sharp increase in cultivation in the southern part of the province. Opium poppy cultivation in the northern part of the province is still very limited.

In Laghman province, opium poppy cultivation decreased by 21% and reached only 561 ha in 2007. In Kunar province, opium poppy cultivation declined to 446 ha in 2007, a 52% reduction compared to 2006. In both provinces, opium poppy cultivation was restricted to remote areas with difficult access.

#### ***Number of opium poppy free provinces increases to 13 in 2007***

The number of opium poppy free provinces increased to 13 in 2007 compared to 6 in 2006<sup>3</sup>. These poppy free<sup>4</sup> provinces are: Balkh, Bamyán, Ghazni, Khost, Kunduz, Logar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktya, Panjshir, Parwan, Samangan and Wardak.


Unless serious action is taken in terms of external assistance to Balkh and other opium poppy free provinces, there is a high risk that they will resume opium poppy cultivation in the coming growing season.

#### ***Increased opium income for Hilmand farmers***

In 2007, the total opium income for farmers in Hilmand province amounted to US\$ 528 million compared to US\$ 347 million in 2006. This is much higher than the opium farm-gate income of the two previous years, 2005 and 2006, combined (US\$ 486 million).

The Opium Winter Assessment Survey 2007 indicated that more than 80% of farming families in this province were involved in opium poppy cultivation. According to the 2006 survey results, at least 35% of a farmer's annual cash income in Hilmand came from opium. These figures indicate the strong and growing dependence of the province's economy on opium.

Figure 3: Potential opium production in Afghanistan (metric tons), 1994-2007



**14.3% of the total population is involved in opium poppy cultivation**

In 2007, the survey estimated that 509,000 families were involved in opium poppy cultivation compared to 448,000 families in 2006 (a 14% increase). Given an average of 6-7 members per family, this represents an estimated total of about 3.3 million persons, or 14.3 % of Afghanistan's 23 million population.

The 14% increase in opium cultivating households in 2007 does not correspond directly to 'new' opium poppy growing farmers. About 46% of the opium poppy growing farmers in Afghanistan started to cultivate poppy before the year 2001, and about 54% after the year 2001. Only a small proportion of farmers started opium poppy cultivation in 2006 (3%) and in 2007 (4%). In the Southern and Eastern Regions, where opium poppy cultivation increased by 31% and 44% respectively, very few farmers had cultivated for the first time. Both in the Southern and Eastern Region, around 43% of the farmers who grew opium poppy in 2007 started opium poppy cultivation before 2001. These farmers did not necessarily cultivate every year.


**Security and opium poppy cultivation show strong correlation**

Security incidents in Afghanistan increased every year since 2003. Figure 12 shows security incidents from January 2003 to May 2007 as recorded by UNDSS. In parallel with opium poppy cultivation, the number of security incidents increased sharply after 2004, particularly in the south and south-west. The majority of opium poppy cultivated in 2007 was concentrated in Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Farah and Nimroz provinces where security is very poor. Most of the districts in this region are not accessible to the UN and NGOs. Anti-government elements as well as drug traders are very active in this region. The security map shows the difference between southern and northern provinces in terms of security.


In Nangarhar province, opium poppy cultivation increased in the southern part of the province where security conditions are precarious. Moreover, some influential tribes decided to grow opium poppy in 2007. The resistance to opium poppy eradication was very strong in the area controlled by these powerful tribes.






**Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2005-2007**




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC  
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



Source: UNODC - Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003 ([http://www.unodc.org/unodc/press\\_monitoring.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/press_monitoring.html))  
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.




Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2008: Expected opium poppy cultivation trends (by province)




Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2008 ([http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop\\_monitoring.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html))  
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2007 (at province level)




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC  
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Opium poppy cultivation change in Afghanistan (by province), 2006 - 2007



Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Security map (as at 10 December 2007) Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2008: Expected opium poppy cultivation trends (by province)




Source security map: UNODC  
Source: MCN - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2008 ([http://www.unodc.org/uno/do/0/crop\\_monitoring.html](http://www.unodc.org/uno/do/0/crop_monitoring.html))  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


Map 9: Expected cultivation trend vs. security situation (as reported by UNODC)

Source: [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFGo5%20full\\_web\\_2006.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFGo5%20full_web_2006.pdf)  
[http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFGo7\\_ExSum\\_web.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFGo7_ExSum_web.pdf)  
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghan-winter-survey-Febo8-short.pdf>


# 04 Economic indicators




Source: <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>



Source: <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>




Source: <http://www.imf.org>



Source: <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>

# 05 Social indicators



Note: The actual number of the population is somewhat unsure. The present number ranges from 24.1 millions to approximately 30 millions, depending on source used.

Source: Afghanistan Human Development report 2007. Available at [http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article\\_id=2683&Category\\_Id=REP\\_NHDR](http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article_id=2683&Category_Id=REP_NHDR)


United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural organisation UNESCO estimates the number of population to 29,8 millions in 2005. The number has now been adjusted to 27,1 millions.

[http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF\\_Language=eng&BR\\_Country=40&BR\\_Region=40535](http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=eng&BR_Country=40&BR_Region=40535)


<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/population.htm>

The last census took place in 1979. A new census is planned in 2008.

Source: Afghanistan Human Development report 2007. Available at [http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article\\_id=2683&Category\\_Id=REP\\_NHDR](http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article_id=2683&Category_Id=REP_NHDR)




Source: Afghanistan Human Development report 2007. Available at [http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article\\_id=2683&Category\\_Id=REP\\_NHDR](http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article_id=2683&Category_Id=REP_NHDR)



Source: UNDP Human Development reports 2001-2006  
<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/>






Source:

[http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=136&IFLanguage=eng&BR\\_Topic=0](http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=136&IFLanguage=eng&BR_Topic=0)


Source: Afghanistan Human Development report 2007. Available at

[http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article\\_id=2683&Category\\_Id=REP\\_NHDR](http://www.undp.dk/article.asp?Article_id=2683&Category_Id=REP_NHDR)




# 6 Refugees and Internally displaced persons

## Refugees




Source: UNHCR statistical yearbooks 2000-2006, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics.html>



Note: There seems to be some discrepancy between the actual number of refugees as listed in the UNHCR statistical yearbooks and the numbers illustrated on the map above. The major return of refugees seems to have stopped in 2004 with the number of refugees being around 2 millions since.

## Internally Displaced Persons



The actual number of IDP's is very uncertain and the number in the above graph represents only those that are either protected or assisted by UNHCR. According to the Internal Displacement monitoring centre some 80.000 to 90.000 have fled as of October 2006 due to the fighting in the South.

Source: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf>  
<http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4676a71d4.pdf>  
[http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/CD02D8752990FAF3802570B8005A6F58?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/CD02D8752990FAF3802570B8005A6F58?OpenDocument)

