



Support Command
Ministry of Defence

AQ, ISIS, Postmodern Warfare, The Pivot & The paradox of European Air power



FMW/KW

MOW

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Vz OB KW


27 November 2014



Argument in brief: the bright side

- **Due to technological & doctrinal developments air power has become the defining and normative feature of the western way of war in the postmodern era**
- **Its tactical, operational level and strategic utility for the joint commander & political leadership has greatly increased, including in irregular warfare & stabilization contexts**
- **It has had great advantages for western land forces**
 - **Reduces footprint**
 - **Decreases risk**
 - **Dominates/shapes opponent maneuver**

The air power decades...



Where we came from: Technological Evolution – Precision Strike

1943



1500 B-17 sorties
9000 bombs (250#)
3300 ft CEP
One 60' x 100' target
W.W.II

1970



30 F-4 sorties
176 bombs (500#)
400 ft CEP
One Target
Vietnam

1991





1 F-117 sortie
2 bombs (2000#)
10 ft CEP
Two Targets per Sortie
Desert Storm

1999



1 B-2 sortie
16 bombs (2000#)
20 ft CEP
16 Targets per Pass
All Weather




“Air power from all services – intelligence, surveillance, mobility aircraft, Close Air Support and space systems – have given ground forces the ability to operate in smaller units and respond quicker with more accurate weaponry than at any other point in history”


US Army Lt.Gen. David W. Barno



The granularity of targets



**VAST REAL TIME ISR
SENSORS – MAINLY
IMAGERY**




Effects of targeted killings

(Byman, 2006; Price 2012; Johnson, 2012; Carvin, 2012)



- Focuses deliberately on specific individuals
- Deprive groups of their charismatic spiritual or political leader, hard to replace
- Eliminates members with highly specialized skills that are hard to replace
- Damages capacity to execute strikes
- Disrupts the organization
- Reduces trust & cohesion
- Degrades quality of bombs: decreased lethality

- Need to change location
- Need for secrecy,
 - Drives towards dispersed structure
 - makes information flow difficult, while
 - Driving up need for coordination
- Much time spent on personal and group survival
- Loss of face, fear in community for association
- More effective/less risky than other forms of counterterrorism
- Less damage & collateral damage too than artillery, occupation with ground forces
- Deterrent effect in the long run






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- Its tactical, operational level and strategic utility for the joint commander & political leadership has greatly increased, including in irregular warfare & stabilization contexts
- It has had great advantages for western land forces
- **Europe's security concerns put an emphasis on expeditionary and power projection capabilities, which are precisely some of the key attributes of air power**
- **It suits & feeds the western sensibility concerning risk for own troops, collateral damage & civcas**



- Vast distances
- Large areas to cover
- High risk for ground troops
- Political impatience
- Ambiguous aims
- High standards req'd
- Low tolerance for risk
- Intell heavy
- Prolonged presence
- Emergent small tgts
- Proxy wars
- Hybrid opponents

- Strategic interventions
- Humanitarian aid
- statebuilding
- peacekeeping
- Coercion/embargo's
- Presence/deterrence



- Minder dominante positie van het Westen
- Inbreuk op de soevereiniteit van de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba
- Groeiende migratiedruk op – de grenzen van – de EU
- Gordel van instabiliteit
- Groeiende druk op 'openbare ruimten' van de wereld
- Groeiend strategisch belang voor Europa van de Indische Oceaan en de Noordelijke IJzee

the New Western Way of War as cultural expression

Western societies are trying to humanize war...it is the great project for the 21st Century
To be just, wars have to be humane..not only for our own soldiers who fight it
but for our enemies as well....it is a western phenomenon (Coker, 2002)

Post-heroic warfare
(Mueller)

Humane Warfare
(Coker)

Information age warfare

Precision Age Warfare

Post Modern war
(Gray/Betts)

Risk Transfer Warfare
(Shaw)

Network Centric Warfare
(Cebrowski)

Virtual war
(Ignatieff)

Spectator sport warfare
(McInnes)

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**“We had first of all to avoid if possible any
of our own casualties and fatalities, we
were told to avoid collateral damage, and
bring it to a quick end”**

**Humane Warfare
(Coker)**

Precision Age Warfare

Gen Klaus Naumann in Ward Thomas *The
Ethics of Destruction*

Risk Transfer Warfare
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


Argument in brief: the paradoxical side


- Those joint warfare advances have however been predominantly due to US innovation
- Those insights are consistently ignored/underappreciated in European militaries, for a variety of reasons
- NATO's capability gap is largely an air power gap
- All capability initiatives expressly refer to specific air power capability shortages
- Kosovo, Libya, Syria, the Ukraine & the US pivot would suggest Europe would embrace real innovation and make haste with filling those gaps
- Track record of dynamic stagnation is not entirely promising
- Europe likely unable to conduct SJO-AH without US
- Military overdependency is military & political liability



Land capabilities



Air capabilities



US contribution: from Kosovo to Libya

60 % SORTIES

80 % WEAPONS

80 % CRUISE MSL

70% SUPPORT MISSIONS

90 % EW/SEAD

ALL STEALTH


75 % CSAR

AIR C2

From 63 to 77% of mil spending

Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP - US & NATO

Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1999-2000; and The Military Balance 2010





The European air power gap & evolving NATO ambitions

<u>fighters</u>	1990	2000	2010	2020
Belgium	144	90	60	
Denmark	98	69	48	
France	603	498	289	225
Germany	537	503	301	
Italy	336	201	119	
Netherlands	207	170	108	37
Norway	63	58	38	57
Spain	254	175	98	
UK	525	484	237	130 ?
Total	2767	2248	1298	< 1000

The air power gap




DCI 1999

- Deployability and mobility: getting forces to the crisis quickly;
- Effective engagement: improving forces' cutting edge capacity;
- Consultation, command and control: giving forces maximum awareness and control;
- Survivability: protecting forces;
- Sustainability and logistics: supporting forces in the field.

PCC 2002

- intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition;
- air-to-ground surveillance;
- deployable and secure command, control and communications;
- combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences;
- strategic air and sea lift;
- air-to-air refueling;
- deployable combat support and combat service support units.





The Dynamic Stagnation of European defence cooperation



Transformation involves force restructuring & re-orientation

From territorial focus

From blue water

From tactical air power focus

From heavy mechanised large armies

To expeditionary rapid response orientation

To littoral *and* blue water

To full spectrum

To light, mobile and reconfigurable

•Agile, light and swift

•Interoperable and networked

•Reduced logistic footprint

•Joint use of air power for offensive action and surveillance

•Emphasis on joint C4ISTR and transport

•Reduced size, improved quality, increased usability

•Premium on professional forces

Increase PGM 30% by 2005

Increase SEAD 50% by 2005

Increase Strat lift/AAR by 2004

Increase deployable logistics 25% by 2005

All deployable units >30 day readiness + NBC protection

AGS design/developments phase 2004

C3 equipment for mobile HQ's



Smart defence is about (Rasmussen, Foreign Affairs, Aug/July 2011)

- Building security for less money by working together and being more flexible
- Encouraging multinational cooperation
- Small clusters of nations combining resources
- Building capacities that benefit Alliance
- Pooling & sharing military goods and best practices
- The need to identify a common set of security priorities
- Doing more with less
- “pool it or loose it”

In spite of the fact that NATO spending through 2005 is likely to be relatively stable thereafter the prospects look grim. All NATO nations will come under increasing pressure to fund the retirement and social security/health costs of baby boomers
....at worst defence budgets could fall to 1% of GDP from 2005-2020
...when the need to replace major assets will become paramount

Paul Hazel, *Jane's*, Dec 1999

The real problem



1. 180 Bn EURO, shrinking, 3 countries achieve 2%, other national priorities
2. Defence Priorities: Territorial orientation, 10000 TANKS
3. Personnel, 54-70% of budgets in Europe (33% in US):
 1. 1.1 Mn army versus 260.000 Navy + 360.000 air force
 2. Only 10% of 1.5 mln deployable
 3. Cannot sustain more than 50.000
4. High operational tempo, S&R drain on budget
5. fragmented, disconnected defence spending (NATO Parliament, 2008, p.3)
6. Lack of cohesion, unity, shared strategic culture
7. DCI, PCC, Transformation, CPG, Helsinki Headline Goals require drastic force restructuring/budget re-allocation

*European NATO nations spend 60% of what the US spends
.....luxury of having 50% more personnel
spend 1/3 in R&D..without coordination
.....are surprised to produce not more than 10-15 % of
US power projection capability, Gen Klaus Naumann (rtd)*



Europe's Diverging strategic interests & perspectives

Noetzel & Schreer, 'Does a multi-tier NATO matter?', *International Affairs*, 85: 2 (2009), p.223

Issue	Reversal	Status quo	reformer
Raison d'être	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic States	Germany, France, Italy, Spain	United states, UK
Threat perception	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic States	Germany, France, Italy, Spain	United states, UK, Canada
Europeanization		France, Germany	United states, UK, Poland
Art 5	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic States	Germany, France, Italy, Spain	United states, UK, Canada
Enlargement	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic States	Germany, France, Italy, Spain	United states, UK
Global NATO	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic States	Germany, France, Italy, Spain	United states, UK, Canada
Afghanistan	Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic States	Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey	United states, UK, Netherlands
capabilities	Poland, Czech Republic	Germany, France	United states, UK

The real problem



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5. fragmented
6. Lack of
7. DCI, P
rest

**A fat military pygmye with
short stubby arms and legs
(after Lord Robertson)**