



Strengthening and Renewing UN Peace Operations

Political and Practical Challenges Towards a
Stronger UN

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Denne rapport er en del af Center for Militære Studiers forskningsbaserede myndighedsbetjening for Forsvarsministeriet. Formålet med rapporten er dels at belyse, hvilke muligheder og udfordringer de aktuelle bestræbelser på at reformere FN's fredsoperationer indebærer, samt, på baggrund af dette, at fremkomme med anbefalinger til, hvordan Danmark kan bidrage til dette reformarbejde og dermed til fredsoperationernes anvendelighed i dansk sikkerhedspolitik.

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This report is a part of Centre for Military Studies' policy research services for the Ministry of Defence. The purpose of the report is to shed light on the possibilities and challenges related to the current efforts at reforming UN peace operations and to arrive at a set of recommendations for how Denmark can contribute to the reform process, thereby enhancing the relevance of UN peace operations for Danish security policy.

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Abstract

Throughout 2015–16, the UN system has undergone an introspective process regarding its peace operations. This has resulted in emerging reform efforts, which António Guterres is expected to intensify when taking office as Secretary-General in 2017. Because the UN is a significant instrument in Danish security policy, it is crucial that the organization retains its relevance for solving security challenges. It is therefore important for Denmark that the Secretary-General, along with as many UN member states as possible, will succeed in implementing reforms in a manner that will strengthen the UN. The present report provides an overview of the suggested reforms and the analytical reports that underpin them. The reforms aim to strengthen the military side and revitalize the diplomatic aspects of peace operations. In short, the UN peace operations are facing a number of political and practical challenges. The political challenges stem from the opposing views among member states concerning the UN's role in international politics. These views are outlined in a chapter on the political context for reforms and, in subsequent chapters on military and diplomatic means, we then illustrate how these differences unfold in concrete terms. As for the military means, the challenges are well-known, and the report sums up the issues such as the lack of troops, logistics, equipment, and training—and the solutions that the UN is considering in order to solve these challenges. As for the diplomatic means, the UN system itself, member states, and independent experts believe that the UN should put prevention, people, partnerships, and politics first. The report provides an analysis of these four themes for reform and the synergies between them. Contrary to other analyses of peace operation reforms, however, the report also points out the risk of contradiction between them. The report will shed light on the fact that unintended consequences will occasionally result when the UN attempts to put several themes first at the same time. Finally, the report sets out a number of recommendations for how Denmark might possibly contribute to strengthening the UN as a useful instrument for Danish security policy. The recommendations build on opportunities presented by the synergies in the reform process and on ways to diminish the risk of unintended consequences and contradictions.

Resumé

FN-systemet har i 2015-16 foretaget en række omfattende analyser af sine fredsoperationer. Dette arbejde har givet anledning til begyndende reformer, som man forventer, at António Guterres intensiverer i 2017, når han tiltræder som ny generalsekretær. Da FN udgør et væsentligt instrument i dansk sikkerhedspolitik, har det betydning for Danmark, om FN bevarer sin relevans med hensyn til at håndtere sikkerhedspolitiske udfordringer. Derfor bliver det vigtigt for Danmark, at den kommende generalsekretær, i samarbejde med flest mulige af FN's medlemsstater, formår at implementere de igangværende reformer på en måde, der resulterer i et styrket FN. Denne rapport giver et overblik over de foreslåede reformer og det analysearbejde, der ligger til grund. Reformerne sigter mod at forbedre den militære indsats samt at forny den diplomatiske indsats. Kort sagt er der en række politiske og praktiske udfordringer med både den militære og den diplomatiske del af FN's fredsoperationer. De politiske udfordringer bunder i medlemsstaternes forskellige syn på, hvad FN's rolle i international politik skal være. Rapporten ridser uenighederne op i et kapitel om reformernes politiske kontekst, og i kapitlerne om henholdsvis brugen af militære midler og brugen af diplomatiske midler kommer vi nærmere ind på, hvordan disse uenigheder kommer til udtryk. Hvad angår militære midler, er de praktiske udfordringer velkendte. Rapporten opsummerer emner såsom mangel på tropper, logistik, udrustning og uddannelse—og viser, hvilke løsninger FN afprøver for at håndtere disse udfordringer. Hvad angår de diplomatiske midler, siger FN-systemet selv såvel som medlemsstaterne og uafhængige eksperter, at FN i højere grad skal sætte forebyggelse, individer, partnerskaber og politik i centrum. Rapporten analyserer disse fire retninger for reformprocessen og synergieffekterne mellem dem. Men rapporten påpeger også, i modsætning til andre analyser, at der er risiko for modstrid mellem de fire retninger. Når FN forsøger at sætte flere hensyn i centrum på samme tid, kan det have utilsigtede konsekvenser, som rapporten belyser. Endelig kommer rapporten med en række anbefalinger til, hvordan Danmark kan bidrage til at styrke FN som et anvendeligt instrument i dansk sikkerhedspolitik. Anbefalingerne beskriver en række muligheder for, hvordan reformprocessens synergi kan udnyttes bedst muligt, samtidig med at risikoen for utilsigtede konsekvenser og modsatte effekter minimeres.

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1. Introduction: The UN reforms its peace operations

When it comes to the peace and security agenda, the work carried out by the UN contributes to a more stable world and solves a number of problems that Denmark alone would never be able to solve, which renders the UN an important instrument in Danish security policy. According to a study of Danish foreign and security policy from May 2016, the UN constitutes “the primary global forum for international peace and security.”¹ The UN is hard-pressed, however, and improving and renewing its peace operations is necessary if it is to be able to maintain its relevance. In other words, “reforms and the rationalization of the UN’s peace operations with special emphasis on the importance of preventive conflict resolution efforts” are required.²

The UN system has arrived at the same conclusion. In the course of 2015–16, the UN has conducted a number of analyses and tabled proposed reforms of its peace operations. These reform proposals are discussed within the UN itself and among its member states, and their implementation will be high on the agenda when Guterres is appointed as the new Secretary-General in 2017. This reform work follows two tracks, the one primarily being about improving military measures, the other primarily addressing the renewal of diplomatic efforts.

Generally speaking, the context for the UN’s peace operations has changed. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has become accustomed to dealing with an increasing number of diverse crises, including both intra-state conflicts and transnational threats. At the same time, the aftermath of the intervention in Libya, the Russian annexation of Crimea and paralysis in connection with the war in Syria all reflect how the great powers have resumed their rivalry.³ For a small country such as Denmark, which is entirely unable to isolate itself from the global security situation, it is important to ensure that UN peace operations continue to contribute to global security—and thereby also the security of Denmark.

The UN peace operations cover both military and diplomatic missions. The peacekeeping operations have a military component, best known for their blue helmets, and the vast majority of operations also have a number of civilian components and a police component. The political missions are generally smaller, primarily consisting of civilian experts and possibly police and military advisers.

The background for the reforms focused on improving the military dimension is that the UN peacekeeping operations are challenged on two fronts. Firstly, the demand for UN peace-

keepers is increasing with the creation of a number of new, major missions in countries such as Mali, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. At the same time, existing missions are not being ended at the same rate, which is straining the UN's limited resources. Secondly, the peacekeepers are under pressure because the UN missions are being established in increasingly difficult situations in which the UN soldiers run risks such as being attacked. Moreover, a number of missions have been criticized for not living up to their mandate to protect civilians or even for committing abuses themselves. In other words, the UN is experiencing a number of challenges with respect to protecting both civilians and their own peacekeepers.

With the current reforms, the UN member states are focusing on improving the military element in the UN's peace operations, partly by pledging new troops and equipment. For example, the US and UK have held summits in New York (2015) and London (2016) specifically to attract renewed support in the form of UN member state contributions. At the same time, the Secretary-General and his staff in the UN system are attempting to strengthen the military element by improving the management of peacekeeping operations.

In addition, there is broad recognition and agreement in the UN system and among the member states that even though more troops are needed, troops are not enough. It has been repeated on numerous occasions that military solutions don't solve conflicts.⁴ According to the UN itself, UN military forces alone cannot ensure lasting solutions to current conflicts nor prevent new ones. The most central report in the reform process points out that "recent and ongoing militarized responses have provided only short-term, and, in some cases, fleeting or illusory success, while further exacerbating some of the grievances underlying the conflict."⁵ This view is put forward in the UN's own reports and independent reviews, and it is supported by experts in the member states, military and civilian alike, who emphasize that even though the use of force can be necessary to protect UN soldiers and civilians, military power alone is insufficient to solve a conflict.⁶

As far as the UN's diplomatic work is concerned, the support from member states to renew UN efforts can be seen from their commitment to political and financial support, for example at the donor conference for the UN Peacebuilding Fund, which took place in September 2016. In other words, in addition to the efforts to improve the military element in the UN peace operations, there is broad agreement concerning the importance of renewing the UN prevention and conflict resolution work. According to numerous UN analyses, conflict prevention is

the best medicine for the overburdened UN.⁷ Prevention is also a priority among the UN member states that do not want to look on passively as violent conflict is brewing. The second best cure is lasting solutions to conflicts so that they do not break out again and to avoid it becoming necessary to maintain a massive presence of peacekeepers. For the UN to become better at prevention and conflict-resolution, both the UN's own analyses and independent analyses indicate that, as part of the ongoing reform process, it is necessary to prioritize the diplomatic element in peace operations. Overall, it has been proposed that politics, prevention, people, and partnerships should be placed first.

Even though the general direction of both of these paths of reform has already been set, many important decisions are still left to the new Secretary-General Guterres. While Ban Ki-moon spent 2016 harvesting the low-hanging fruit among the reform proposals in the reports—such as providing an overview of how the UN's prevention and mediation work will be financed and taking a number of administrative decisions on mobility in connection with missions and increased cooperation with the African Union (AU)⁸—he has not dealt with a number of major questions, including some concerning the structure of the UN secretariat.⁹

If Denmark wants to support the ongoing reform processes—as the Taksøe report recommends¹⁰—it is important to contribute to the political momentum surrounding the ongoing reform process, as described in the report. It is also important to be aware of the less conspicuous political disagreements taking place in connection with this reform work as well as a number of practical challenges relating to both tracks. When it comes to political differences, it is possible to identify a split between the member states that want a generally proactive UN and those that want a predominantly reactive UN. While there is agreement that it is better to prevent conflict than to watch on as violence increases, there is disagreement as to where the limit goes between prevention and undue meddling in a state's internal affairs. How proactive should the UN be with respect to preventing a violent conflict from breaking out? When are such preventive measures at odds with a member state's sovereignty? How strong must the evidence be before the UN can respond when a violent conflict is presumed to be brewing? There is a lack of consensus on this type of politically sensitive questions. Similarly, it is possible to trace underlying disagreement concerning questions about the UN's use of military force as regards the protection of civilian populations and in relation to anti-terror activity and counterinsurgency. While numerous member states believe that the classical ideals regarding peacekeeping—impartiality, consent, and a minimum use of force—have become obsolete,¹¹ a number of the large troop-contributing countries have fought to maintain these

principles and thus a more reactive UN.¹² In other words, disagreement on how proactive or reactive the UN ought to be is not merely about the UN's preventive measures but also about politically sensitive questions about which groups the international community regards to be legitimate authorities.

A number of the challenges regarding the UN's use of military force have already been described, as this aspect of UN peacekeeping has attracted considerable attention, such as the missions in Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but also much earlier, as in connection with the UN's peace enforcement missions in the 1990s. Chapter 3 of this report provides an overview of some of these challenges ranging from inadequately trained/equipped soldiers to a mismatch between mandates and expectations regarding the mission. As these challenges have already been described elsewhere, this report gives priority to a more detailed description and analysis of the challenges involved in prioritizing the UN's diplomatic work. This prioritization does not reflect any neglect of the importance of the military dimension of the UN's peace operations; it is to be understood as indicating that there is a lot of work required to cast light on the challenges related to the reforms aimed at prioritizing the UN's diplomatic work. The predominant focus has been on the synergy between the proposed reforms,¹³ but we show that tension can just as well develop between them.

The analysis in the reports is based on publicly available information from governments, think tanks and the UN (e.g. reports, resolutions, minutes from meetings). This has been supplemented with information gathered through a number of meetings and interviews in Copenhagen, New York, Bamako, and Bujumbura. We have spoken with government representatives, UN employees, researchers, and individuals who are currently on UN missions or have been recently. As part of the study, we conducted fieldwork in Bujumbura, Burundi, in July 2016. We have chosen to anonymize all of the interviews out of consideration to the informants. They have been used as background information and are referred to as "the author's interviews," without further specification. We have also reviewed the research literature on the UN's peace operations. This literature review forms the context and is included in our analysis of the reform proposals that have been presented. The report uses Burundi as a case in order to highlight empirically some of the points, particularly regarding the development in the UN diplomatic peace operations. The specific stories from Burundi are available in the text and in boxes. We also use Mali as a case in connection with the discussion of the military dimension of peace operations, as the mission in Mali is the most vulnerable and

exemplifies a number of efforts in the work to improve the UN's ability to protect civilians and its own troops. The report has undergone internal and external review processes. We are indebted to everyone we have interviewed for sharing their time and insight. Thanks also to colleagues at Centre for Military Studies and the sparring partners who have contributed along the way, and not least to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable input.

In order to highlight the political disagreements and practical challenges that must be overcome in order to strengthen the UN's role as a relevant security policy actor, the report is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe the global political context within which the discussions on the reform of the UN's peace operations take place. We also briefly describe the UN's current operations and the background for the ongoing reforms. Chapter 3 describes the political disagreement and a number of practical challenges associated with the reform track that are generally about improving the UN's exercise of military force to better ensure the safety of their own soldiers as well as the civilian population. Chapter 4 describes the political disagreements and practical challenges that are important to keep in mind in connection with the reform addressing the UN's diplomatic work. More specifically, we describe the direction for this reform in relation to four themes, which we believe capture the essence of the current discussions and the underlying analyses. The four themes are that the UN should place four considerations first: 1) prevention, 2) partnerships, 3) politics, and 4) people. In the same chapter, we shed light on a number of relationships and the risk of contradictions between these four themes. Chapter 5 summarizes the general conclusions made in the report and zooms in on the question as to what the reform process described here means for the future involvement of Denmark in UN peace operations. Finally, we derive a number of recommendations for the two reform tracks based on the analysis in the previous chapters in the report.

As additional background information, the report includes two appendices. The first appendix provides an overview of the parts of the UN that are relevant for peace operations. The individual organizations, both the inter-state organizations and the UN bureaucracy, are briefly introduced. The second appendix contains a brief and selective review of the crisis in Burundi in 2015–16 with a focus on the UN's involvement.

2. The global political context

2.1 Old disputes flare up

The UN member states disagree on how much power they are willing to entrust to the multi-lateral level in the UN. While some member states feel that the sovereignty principle always trumps other concerns, other member states are more willing to waive the sovereignty principle for the sake of joint solutions. With their veto in the Security Council, Russia and China are the leading forces in the former group. They are often joined by countries from the Global South, organized in G77 and/or the Non-Aligned Movement.¹⁴ However, there are significant differences in how China and Russia play their cards. Despite their relatively waning economic and political power, Russia is adamant about its principles and confronts its opponents directly. The most recent example was in October 2016, when Russia was the only country to veto a French–Spanish resolution on Syria. Russia insists on being considered one of the world’s great powers, which is not to say that Russia does not regard the UN as an important global security actor.¹⁵ On its part, while China played its cards very carefully for many years, it has become more active and self-assured since 2000.¹⁶ Nevertheless, China often works together with Russia and appears comfortable to let others fight the high-profile diplomatic battles. The other group consists of the three Western countries with permanent seats on the Security Council: the USA, UK, and France (aka. P3). As far as the question about the sovereignty principle and the willingness to disregard it in order to allow for UN solutions to violent conflicts, the P3 countries are often supported by other Western European member states, including the Nordics, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan.¹⁷ The USA has historically been the driving force behind many UN initiatives with respect to peace and security. Britain and France have recently worked hard to maintain their status as permanent Security Council members, however, meaning that they have assumed responsibility for many military and diplomatic tasks.¹⁸

This report is being published at a time when the perception of the UN as global security actor is changing. Old disputes between the permanent members of the Security Council, which had lost relevance since the end of the Cold War, again have influence on the UN’s opportunities. The NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011 to protect civilians resulted in Gaddafi’s death and a new regime. According to Russia and China, this was never the plan. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and their ongoing support to Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria have further exacerbated tensions with the P3 countries. At the same time, a new Secretary-

General was appointed in October 2016, a process that surprised most observers in terms of being fast, gathering broad support, and—despite heated discussions on Ukraine and Syria—the daily work of the Security Council continues undeterred.¹⁹

2.2 Reactive or proactive peace operations?

The dividing line between the member states that stick to the sovereignty principle and those that are more often willing to sacrifice it becomes apparent both in the form of various positions on when and how the UN should intervene in specific crises and the different views on how the UN's deployed forces should operate. As regards where and when, the conflicting opinions among the permanent Security Council members mean that where and when the UN intervenes in order to maintain or enforce peace and security is not automatic; it is only possible to establish and maintain a UN intervention if all of the permanent council members agree, meaning that it is not possible to predict when the UN chooses to intervene.²⁰ The UN has therefore also been criticized for being a so-called selective security system.²¹

The lack of consensus on the weighting of sovereignty also means that it has historically been very difficult to reach agreement on preventive measures, particularly regarding military means. China and Russia, together with the countries listed above that have supported them, considered early intervention highly problematic. The norm has therefore been that the UN has been unable to deal with conflicts that are brewing, its efforts limited to conflicts that have actually broken out.²²

Similarly, there are different approaches to how the UN can operate once decision is made for the UN to intervene in a conflict. To what extent are UN representatives allowed to get involved? Are the Secretary-General and/or his envoys allowed to push governments and others to find solutions? Are they able to independently—without each time having to obtain member state approval—take the initiative to offer or withdraw support? And should UN peacekeeping soldiers intervene to stop human rights violations? What if the local government is committing the violations? The UN system lacks clear answers to these kinds of questions, but they are an important part of a political battle over a definition of the role of the UN now and in the future. In chapters 3 and 4 of the report, we elaborate on what these political disagreements mean for the UN's military and diplomatic peace operations.

2.3 Political will and momentum for reforms

Despite the deep disagreement in the international community over the status of the UN, there is renewed international support for strengthening the UN's capabilities in connection with peace operations. This support is based on a belief that a functional UN is in the states' own interest. So there is genuine disagreement about exactly what the UN should be able to do—but at the same time agreement on the UN having to be able to carry out peacekeeping operations properly. As such, there is broad support among the UN member states and within the UN organization alike to undertake reforms.

2.3.1 International support displays political will for reform

Trends in Denmark and abroad point in the direction of renewed attention concerning the importance of the UN's role as a global security actor and renewed support to UN peace operations. The global context is important for understanding whether the reform of the UN system that is currently being discussed—and which is the pivotal point of the report in hand—can be said to be part of a more general political movement in which the role of the UN in connection with international security is prioritized. Obviously there are also a number of unknown factors, not least as to whether or not the American support for the UN's peace operations will continue. The UN system is under strong American influence, not least due to the USA's large share of the budget and their veto in the Security Council.

2.3.2 Appetite for reform in New York

The last time the UN peace operations were thoroughly examined was in the so-called Brahimi report from 2000, so during a very different security policy context than at present. The UN celebrated its 70th anniversary in 2016, which provided occasion for reflection on how it could maintain its relevance in the future and further analysis of how it carries out peace operations. This analysis was to result in proposals for how the UN can be made “fit for purpose.” This section provides a brief overview of the process.

In October 2014, Ban Ki-moon brought together HIPPO (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations). The panel produced a report entitled *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*. It was to conduct a thorough analysis of UN peace operations, which were broadly defined so as to include more than peacekeeping operations and to recommend the reform of UN peace operations. The panel consisted of 15 experts, carefully selected to cover perspectives from different countries and different aspects of peace operations. On July 16, 2015, the HIPPO

report was published, and it has since been a pivotal point for the ongoing discussions about the future of peace operations.²³

On the basis of the HIPPO report, the Secretary-General wrote an implementation report that was released on September 2, 2015. Here, Ban Ki-moon described which of the recommendations from the report he would follow and how. It is generally accepted that most of the major decisions have been deferred to 2017 after the inauguration of a new Secretary-General.²⁴

In parallel with Ban Ki-moon's analysis, a number of member states, through the UN Peacebuilding Commission, decided on December 15, 2014, to conduct their own assessment. The Commission set up an expert group that released a report on June 29, 2015, stating that the UN ought to begin regarding peacebuilding as a continuous process and not just as a post-conflict activity, a concept they dubbed 'sustaining peace'.²⁵

Coinciding with the work being carried out by the secretariat and the Peacebuilding Commission, UN Women were asked in 2013 to assess the significance of Security Council Resolution 1325, which deals with women, peace, and security. The report, published on October 9, 2015, describes how the implementation has been lacking, not least in terms of the lack of incentives to involve women in conflict resolution around the world.²⁶ The report cites a number of examples worth following about how, in accordance with the resolution, women can play a greater role.

These various reports should partly be seen in the light of what Ban Ki-moon has called his *Human Rights Up Front* initiative. This initiative was first presented at the UN General Assembly on December 17, 2013, and more countries have since declared their support, including Denmark. The initiative includes human rights violations among the causes of intra-state conflict and calls for UN employees to focus more on human rights to help prevent such violations. The initiative is about increasing the capacity of the UN to monitor and analyze situations involving (potential) human rights violations.²⁷ Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson was given the overall responsibility for implementing the initiative, which reflects that it is a high priority for the UN.

Finally, the various reports should be seen in the light of renewed focus on conflict prevention. The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2171 in 2014 on the prevention of conflict, which states that it is necessary for the UN system to be able to give early warning signals and act early.²⁸ There has long been focus on the need for mechanisms capable of

ensuring that the Security Council is made aware of “nascent causes of tension” early enough to be able to prevent a conflict from escalating.²⁹ Various mechanisms have also been tested. One example was a British initiative in 2010, where the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was asked to hold the first so-called “horizon-scanning” briefing to inform the Security Council about potential conflicts. Horizon-scanning briefings were only a regular part of the program for three years, however, as a number of member states expressed concern over the issues being brought up and the lack of control over the issues that the DPA chose to inform about. These concerns have meant that horizon-scanning briefings are little used; the last took place in December 2013.³⁰

2.3.3 Consensus in the UN system provides new momentum to implement reforms

The UN’s evaluation work and the reports this work produced in 2015 opened up for a number of new opportunities. For despite political disagreement, there is broad consensus on a number of reform proposals made in the HIPPO report that are partly due to the panel’s composition reflecting a broad range of interests within the UN. In many ways, the recommendations made in the report are an expression of politics as the art of the possible, and the feedback on the recommendations in connection with the subsequent inter-governmental negotiations has generally been positive.

While the discussions on reforms and part of the work have already started, this merely means that a general direction has been set out within which many major decisions have yet to be made. As mentioned above, Ban Ki-moon has left a number of major decisions to the next Secretary-General.³¹ In the course of 2017–18, the newly appointed Secretary-General can therefore be expected to address some of the larger, more politically sensitive questions about the reorganization and refocusing of the UN’s peace operations.

The following chapters build further on the discussion in this chapter by analyzing how the described political context—where the member states are divided in some areas but nevertheless support reform—affects the work with improving the military dimension and renewing the diplomatic dimension of the UN’s peace operations.

3. The UN's use of military force

3.1 Military force: an insufficient necessity in need of improvement

UN peace operations have traditionally been based on the principle of the minimal use of force, and the soldiers on the first UN missions were actually unarmed. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the UN Security Council has provided a mandate to establish a number of missions where the use of force has come to play a more central role for UN soldiers, partly because these missions include tasks that could not have been attended to without exercising military force. Since 1999, the protection of civilians has become a standard task in connection with peacekeeping operations, particularly in situations where there is no peace agreement between the conflicting parties. Expanding the legitimate authority of a government to areas that are otherwise beyond its control is another example of a task where the exercise of military power by UN soldiers can become necessary. UN soldiers are therefore increasingly becoming the target of attacks by a party to the conflict that does not approve of the UN presence, which often relates to the fact that this party does not regard the government's authority as legitimate.³² The exercise of force can therefore become necessary to ensure the survival of UN soldiers where their security is at risk. The UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA, is an example of a mission in which all of these aspects are true: MINUSMA has a mandate to exercise power in connection with the protection of civilians, expansion of the authority of the government, and defense against hostile attack.

3.1.1 Military power as necessity but not as solution: the UN mission in Mali

For the above reasons, MINUSMA is an illustrative example of the trend towards robust mandates and greater willingness to let UN soldiers exercise military force. The Security Council decided to establish MINUSMA on April 25, 2013, when Resolution 2100 gave the mission its mandate to use all necessary means. This was highlighted most recently on June 29, 2016, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 2295, where the mission was given a "more proactive and robust" mandate. The Security Council increased the number of troops in the mission (from 11,200 to 13,289 soldiers)³³ and mandated French forces to intervene and use all means necessary to support the mission in situations where the UN was confronted by serious threats. Since the mission in Mali began in April 2013, 97 UN soldiers and 3 UN police officers have lost their lives,³⁴ which is clearly the largest number among the UN's active missions. In light of the type of challenges that the UN mission in Mali is facing, there is broad consensus among the UN member states that the use of military power can be necessary in certain circumstances. At the same time, however, there can be consensus that mili-

tary force, while possibly necessary for solving a difficult peacekeeping task, is not sufficient; the exercise of military force does not represent a viable contribution from the UN to finding sustainable solutions to the conflicts that originally triggered the need for a UN presence. The exercise of military force is thus regarded at one and the same time to be necessary and insufficient.

It is one thing to observe the development in UN peace operations, where the use of military force has become a more central element in peace operations than what has traditionally been the case, while at the same time acknowledging that this cannot lead to lasting solutions. Another matter is the question of the capacity of the UN to carry out this aspect of peace operations. The use of military force in recent years has shed light on significant challenges that we describe below and has given occasion to widespread concerns regarding the need to improve the use of military force for protective purposes.

The important challenges described above in connection with how UN soldiers exercise military force generally fall into two categories: Some are practical, while others are of a more political character. Where the former deals with troop contributions (their education and training levels, deployment readiness, and utility in connection with specific missions), the latter includes, but is not limited to, the possible mismatch between militarily focused mandates and over-ambitious expectations. In the following we describe a number of practical challenges as well as the current support for various proposed improvements aimed at addressing these challenges. This is followed by description of a number of political challenges and the division that can be seen among the UN member states regarding the question of how proactive/reactive the UN ought to be in connection with the exercise of military force.

3.2 Challenges and suggestions for improvement

One of the challenges impeding UN peace operations is that not all of the soldiers have the necessary training and/or equipment required to perform the tasks that the mission has been ordered to perform. With respect to education and training, three particular factors have been emphasized: Firstly, that the UN soldiers have not always been sufficiently prepared to confront the type of threat met on a mission such as the one in Mali, and that they are sometimes unable to protect themselves from for example roadside bombs. Secondly, not all UN soldiers are sufficiently educated in human rights, international humanitarian law, and UN policies. Thirdly, UN missions often experience challenges concerning inter-operationality (e.g. differences in language, training, and equipment), which weakens the effectiveness of the mis-

sions. This is hardly surprising in light of how the UN consists of 193 different member states, most of which contribute in different ways with personnel and equipment.³⁵

Regarding equipment, there are basically three types of such shortages: a) traditional military capabilities, such as helicopters, armored vehicles, and logistics, b) special capabilities, such as special operations forces, intelligence units, and special technologies (e.g. drones),³⁶ and c) a more practical, but not insignificant, logistical challenge. As regards logistics, not all forces are able to fend for themselves, which in the worst case means that their participation becomes a burden for the mission. And while some contributions can prove to be a burden for a mission, others are not fully utilized.³⁷ When considering the utility of drones, like other technology and equipment, it is important to consider where and how they are to be used in specific missions. In Mali, it has been pointed out that drones are not necessarily of much value if they cannot be used in northern Mali, where the need is greatest.³⁸ This example reflects a more general point: the value of potentially decisive contributions is significantly reduced if they cannot be used where the need is greatest. While this might seem obvious, there are numerous examples of how competing concerns, such as risk minimization, result in equipment that is requested from European countries not having the optimal effect on missions because their use is limited (e.g. to Bamako and Gao even though the need is greater in northern Mali).

An important point that the examples from the mission in Mali can help highlight is that these challenges cannot always be reduced to being about logistics alone. A number of contextual factors have crucial significance for whether the available equipment can be used optimally. As regards the military intelligence unit (ASIFU) to which Denmark has contributed (see the section below), the lack of information-sharing practices with non-European states exemplifies how such a contextual factor has limited the usefulness of the unit. The need for improved information sharing is not unique to the UN mission in Mali and has been highlighted as a more general cause for concern.³⁹ The Mali example also illustrates a more general point concerning the importance of remembering the need to make possible adjustments in connection with the contribution of equipment with respect to optimizing the utility of these contributions in the context of a specific UN mission.

It is also important to emphasize that these equipment-related challenges are closely linked to troop contributions. There are examples of soldiers who are deployed without the necessary equipment. In some cases, they are ultimately unable to help the mission implement its man-

date. In other words, it is not enough to send more troops; rather, troops must be considered together with the challenges regarding the acquisition of equipment. Another challenge that affects both troops and equipment is deployment readiness.⁴⁰ The following section describes how there is currently considerable attention among the UN member states regarding the need to increase troop deployment readiness and with respect to many of the challenges mentioned in the above.

3.2.1 Support for improvement: summit, new force register, and rotation schemes

There is a strong focus on and support for the reform work taking place with respect to improving the military aspect of UN peace operations. This is partly seen in the massive support among UN member states for a) the Obama summit (2015) and the minister conference in London (2016), b) creation of a new force register, and c) the development of new rotation schemes.

a) Summit: new commitments regarding troops and equipment

In September 2015, US President Obama called for a summit on the UN's peace operations. Over 50 countries participated, even though the requirement was clear: speaking time at the meeting required commitments to new military contributions to UN missions. Obama made clear that he had initiated the meeting because a strong and reformed UN that could take part in efforts to maintain peace and security worldwide is in the American interest. His message was that our common security requires a strong UN and that the UN member states must therefore stand together to reform and strengthen the UN peace operations. Obama pointed out that we do not do this for others but because our collective security depends on it.

The summit resulted in pledges of support amounting to more than 40,000 troops. The declared objective had been 10,000, leading the participating countries to conclude that the meeting was a success. While troops were at the top of the list, police, helicopters, field hospitals, and other support capabilities were also needed and to some extent promised. Most of the new contributions came from countries that had traditionally provided large numbers of troops (e.g. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh). But several European countries—Obama's primary target—also pledged to send more troops. The UK, for example, promised to send extra forces to Somalia and South Sudan, and they did send an additional 300 soldiers to the UN mission in South Sudan in 2016. Since the summit, Denmark has contributed to the mission in Mali—a contribution regarding special operations consisting of special ops soldiers who are to be followed by a C-130 transport plane as part of a Nordic rotation scheme. The big sur-

prise at the summit was the Chinese announcement of a standing force of 8,000 men for UN use. This is qualitatively and quantitatively new. China is already the permanent member of the UN's Security Council that contributes with the most personnel (3,079 personnel as of August 30, 2015). By comparison, the USA has pledged to double its contribution from 80 to 160 troops.⁴¹

At the same time, the UN cannot expect to be the preferred recipient of any new military investments carried out by the member states. Most Western states also have obligations to NATO and the EU, which are usually of greater importance to them. Moreover, the resources required for more than 120,000 deployed personnel in peacekeeping operations threaten to undermine the member states' willingness to pay.

b) New force register

In July 2015, the UN's new Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) replaced the old Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). The declared purpose of the new system is to achieve greater deployment readiness among the enrolled capabilities—effort is being made to achieve this through closer dialogue between the UN headquarters and the member states that have registered capabilities.⁴² An important difference between the new and old systems is that the new system includes a built-in control regime, meaning that the UN will follow up on the capabilities that are included in the new force register. More specifically, the system has four levels. First, a troop-contributing country submits a formal commitment and provides information regarding the unit's training level, self-sustainment equipment, specialists etc. (Level 1). The registered units that fulfil the UN standards proceed to Level 2. Next come the aforementioned assessment and, which is carried out by a team from UN headquarters.. If the outcome is satisfactory, the unit is promoted to Level 3. Level 4 is referred to as the Rapid Deployment Level and is achieved when the contributing country commits itself to being able to deploy the registered unit within 30, 60, or 90 days, depending on the request made by the UN. Bangladesh is currently the country that has gone furthest with one of its registered units. Even though it is not yet possible to define the frequency of these country visits (and therein also the cost entailed for the UN), the new readiness system and the work with these distinctions between levels is well underway, which can be seen as an illustrative example of the current efforts being made by the UN and its member states to improve the military dimension of UN peacekeeping operations, including improvements to deployment readiness.

c) Rotation arrangements

In order to increase the contribution to UN peace operations, a number of Western countries have joined forces on various schemes whereby they share the obligations for creating specific contributions. Ireland and Finland, for example, have teamed up to deploy a battalion to the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL).⁴³ Such working arrangements can help deal with challenges that might otherwise make it difficult for many UN member states to establish and maintain the special skills demanded by the UN. The Netherlands have headed the cooperation on ASIFU to the mission in Mali, which also includes Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland. Under the auspices of the Danish NORDEFCON presidency, Denmark established a rotation scheme regarding a C-130 transport aircraft to the mission in Mali. In June 2016, the UN ambassadors from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, and Portugal signed a declaration concerning a rotation arrangement whereby the five countries committed to taking turns sending a C-130 for a 6-month period to the mission in Mali. The rotation arrangements provide the participating countries with savings in connection with deployments; for example, it is only necessary to establish a base once. At the same time, the participating countries are compensated by the UN for making troops and equipment available, which can render the actual operating costs very low.

These initiatives represent a number of efforts to remedy some of the shortcomings regarding the use of force in connection with UN peace operations, not least the importance of the UN being able to muster well-trained and well-equipped soldiers.

3.3 Political challenges and political disagreement

Even if all of the soldiers who are deployed to UN missions were trained and equipped optimally, the use of military force in connection with UN missions might still be problematic. This is due to the other challenges that also have a significant impact on the effectiveness of UN missions.

The mismatch between mandates and expectations to the solution of UN missions includes the challenge that sufficient numbers of sufficiently equipped soldiers are not enough for the mission to produce sustainable solutions and to ensure reconstruction and the achievement of other ambitious objectives as outlined in the mandates for the missions.

Another challenge is less about the practical contributions and more about the policies and logic that have an impact on how member states prioritize their contributions. Here, there is a risk that the major financial contributors among the UN member states primarily focus their

contributions on the UN missions in which they have an immediate interest.⁴⁴ To the extent that a nationally focused prioritization logic dominates, this implies a risk of creating a situation where certain missions are not prioritized (the UN mission in the Central African Republic an example since the mission is still not fully staffed 3 years into its existence). Another challenge that such a prioritization logic risks producing is that the non-troop-contributing countries do not prioritize the equipment that is necessary for the mission but which the partners themselves are unable to contribute.⁴⁵ This risks creating a situation where the forces that are deployed to a mission cannot perform optimally because they do not have the necessary equipment to do the work required by the mandate in a context including risks such as enemy attacks.

Another challenge that is political by nature concerns the command structure. Most troop-contributing countries have reservations about what their soldiers can do in UN missions, often requiring that deployments are ordered nationally instead of by the UN force commander. These reservations often result in a discrepancy between the orders that the force commander of a specific UN mission wants to issue and the guidelines that the soldiers have received from their capital. This can result in a significant deterioration of the utility of these military capabilities in connection with the work to resolve key aspects of a given UN mission.

These challenges partly reflect how, despite the broad acceptance that UN soldiers have to be able to protect themselves and civilians, the various UN member states view the principles for the exercise of force on UN missions differently. As mentioned above, despite the general consensus regarding the necessity of military force for protection, there is some measure of political disagreement among the UN member states that should not be ignored. While some member states want the UN to limit the use of military force and adhere to the original principle about how the UN's impartiality and the consent of the conflicting parties was what protected the blue UN helmets, other member states are of the opinion that if the UN is to continue to be relevant with respect to dealing with contemporary global security challenges, it is unrealistic to do so without considering changes to the peacekeeping principles.⁴⁶ As an example, it is pointed out how it is not possible for a UN mission to be impartial in cases where the parties to a conflict include actors who are regarded as terrorists. Moreover, impartiality becomes "mission impossible" if there is no clear definition of the term "terrorist;" in such cases, the use of such terminology becomes inseparable from politically sensitive questions about the legitimacy of various actors and different positions on how active the UN

ought to be in its support for or attempts to neutralize certain players. Such controversies are part of a broader lack of agreement between the member states that want reforms regarding the UN's use of military force to lead to a more proactive UN versus the member states that want to retain the traditional principles for the UN's peacekeeping operations.

This lack of agreement is also reflected in the HIPPO report. On the one hand, the panel emphasizes the importance of UN missions providing protection of civilians “irrespective of the origin of the threat”⁴⁷—which can mean that, in certain cases, the UN does not view all of the parties to the conflict as being “moral equals.”⁴⁸ At the same time, the panel emphasizes the importance of strengthening the UN's “impartial posture” on the grounds that UN missions experience dramatic difficulties if they are not perceived as being impartial.⁴⁹ In other words, the HIPPO report reflects—rather than responds to—this lack of agreement among the UN member states, which for example plays out in C-34, the special committee for peacekeeping operations. The Committee member states that are usually represented by their military advisors use it to discuss the technical military aspects of peacekeeping. The discussions in C-34 show how the distinction referred to above largely goes between major troop-contributing countries—as the advocates for a reactive UN—and the major financial contributors, who argue that a more proactive UN is necessary. This dividing line is also highlighted in the HIPPO report.⁵⁰ These positions should not be exaggerated, however, as we are also seeing a trend that would otherwise not be captured; that is, that large African troop-contributing countries do not necessarily have the same reactive perspective on the use of force and are becoming willing to assume more risky tasks, as was the case for the Force Intervention Brigade that was deployed in 2013 to strengthen the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly with respect to neutralizing M23 and other rebel groups. While it is important to keep this development in mind, it is not a model that has overcome the political differences. With the exception of certain African countries that have conflicts very close by and might therefore have other reasons for contributing troops, we are arguably witnessing a trend whereby the countries that are willing to send large numbers of soldiers to UN missions are also sticking to the traditional principles that are believed to best ensure the security of their soldiers. On the other side are the countries that pay but rarely have their own nationals participating in the most dangerous parts of a mission: these are generally more willing for the UN to assume risks in order to achieve mission objectives.

3.4 UN peace operations: two tracks

Improving the use of military force on all of these fronts would still not prevent an overloaded UN, as it would not help provide long-term political solutions to the existing conflicts and make little difference in terms of preventing new conflicts. In Mali, for example, it is necessary to exercise military force to protect the civilians and UN soldiers alike. At the same time, this mission illustrates how it would not be possible to solve the conflict in Mali by narrowly focusing on the military aspect of the UN efforts alone. Even though military means are necessary in Mali in the current situation, there are limits to what can be achieved by military means alone. There is broad recognition of the necessity for the UN to become more proficient at bringing other means into play to address challenges such as radicalization, recruitment, and the dissatisfaction resulting from impunity.⁵¹ The UN's own reports, member states, and professional military experts therefore all concur that the diplomatic aspect of the UN's peace operations has not been prioritized sufficiently. In order to emphasize the UN's diplomatic work, the other—and larger—track concerning the ongoing reform process is therefore about the importance of a stronger focus on political solutions rather than a narrow focus on troop deployment.

Once again, the purpose is not to produce these two tracks as necessarily opposed to one another; rather, it is to show how synergy can be found both *within* each track (military as well as diplomatic) and *between* the two tracks (e.g. when the threat of using military force renders the conflicting parties more ready to negotiate and/or more inclined to comply with the agreements),⁵² as well as a number of significant challenges (e.g. when the use of force is regarded as being biased and works against the UN having a prominent role in mediating political solutions). The next chapter analyses the attempts at prioritizing the diplomatic element in UN peace operations, the focus being on the opportunities as well as the practical and political challenges of which it is important to be aware.

4. Renewed focus on UN diplomacy

This chapter summarizes the direction of the recommendations made in a number of different reports and analyses on how to strengthen the UN's peace operations. Generally speaking, they argue that conflict prevention, people, partnerships, and politics should be placed first. These four directions are reviewed one at a time in this chapter (4.1). This review includes points in which there is synergy between the directions. Then follows a critical analysis of points where there is internal conflict (4.2 and 4.3). Finally, these reports and the recommended actions are placed in a broader political context, which this part of the reform work addresses to a limited degree (4.4).

4.1 Agreement on the direction for UN diplomatic peace operations: Placing prevention, partnerships, people, and politics first

Where previous chapters were primarily about military means, this chapter focuses on diplomatic means. This is not to say that military means have no place in peace operations, but that the focus for the efforts to renew peace operations lies elsewhere.

This chapter focuses on how the four directions for reform speak to how military and diplomatic instruments should be improved. The main emphasis in the reports and analyses, upon which the proposed reforms are based, is on diplomatic efforts.

In many ways, the four directions are not really that new, as many of these ideas have been presented in the past. What is important about the ongoing reform process is that it helps attract renewed attention to these directions.

The directions also serve as a focusing tool whereby we prioritize certain aspects of the ongoing reform discussion while other elements are omitted. We refrain from reviewing past reforms and attempts at improving the UN peace operations, choosing instead to focus on the description and analysis of the ongoing reforms—with emphasis on the HIPPO report and the Secretary-General's implementation report.

When examining the statements made by member states at the open Security Council meeting in November 2015, it becomes clear that, generally speaking, there is broad consensus among the Western countries on the four directions. The Nordic countries spoke in unison in the Security Council, and just like most of the other member states they supported all four directions of the proposed reforms.⁵³ In May 2016, the UN General Assembly held a special session arranged by Chairman Mogens Lykketoft entitled “A new commitment to peace.”

Lykketoft gathered conclusions and observations from the meeting in a letter to all of the member states, repeating and emphasizing a number of central points from the HIPPO report, which was only possible because there was broad consensus on the direction for the reforms that are recommended in the report.⁵⁴

4.1.1 Conflict prevention first

As already mentioned, conflict prevention is hardly new to the UN system; over time there have been a number of attempts at strengthening the UN's capabilities in the area. The UN Charter begins with a statement about protecting future generations from war, and the practice for several decades has been to emphasize that this is best achieved through prevention. Nevertheless, the UN often lacks the right instruments, resources, and the necessary political will to be able to live up to the declarations concerning preventive measures.⁵⁵ The emphasis in the HIPPO report on prevention must therefore be understood as a reinforced effort and interest in achieving broader agreement on some of the ways prevention can take place. Prevention is uncontroversial as long as the UN as an organization maintains a predominantly facilitating role, thereby allowing the governments of the countries at risk to maintain their autonomy. In practice, the Secretary-General often appoints a mediator in a particular conflict. It is crucial that the conflicting parties regard this person as being independent and neutral.⁵⁶

The HIPPO report points out that an important reason why the UN can assume (and has eventually also succeeded to expand) this role is due to its many years of experience, its impartiality, and its universal membership.⁵⁷ A major innovation of importance to the UN's preventive work is that the UN system itself has widely recognized that peacebuilding endeavours must be continuous—not limited to a certain part of a conflict cycle.⁵⁸ As far as prevention is concerned, this means that peacebuilding is not limited to being only about efforts before an armed conflict breaks out but also during and after the conflict; as long as the conflict continues, the task is to prepare for a future peace. Once a truce has been reached, the work becomes about avoiding a flare-up in the conflict. In theory, then, prevention requires sustained engagement.

Need for information

The ambition to be able to act more preventively has fed the demand for more, faster, and more accurate information to the UN system about (potential) conflicts. This applies especially to the Security Council and Peacebuilding Commission, which require information from

the secretariat. This demand is clearly stated in the HIPPO report, where the panel emphasizes that the Security Council ought to reinforce its monitoring of emerging disputes and expand the dialogue with the secretariat about how preventive measures and mediation efforts are best supported.⁵⁹ Information, particularly to the Security Council, has historically been monopolized by the Secretary-General, who has delegated briefings to the Security Council to the DPA and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), respectively.⁶⁰ The DPA has focused on information about the dynamics among the political actors in the countries that they are responsible for providing briefings about, while DPKO has focused on reporting on a more narrowly defined security situation and the UN's own operations. They have generally been retrospective briefings that have not prioritized matters such as social dynamics or human rights violations. These elements have first relatively recently been regarded as being key to conflict prevention.⁶¹ In recent years, it has become increasingly common for other parts of the UN, particularly the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), to report to the Security Council about their assessment of the situation in a given country. The OHCHR in particular has proven willing to point out signs of danger and detect the onset of spiraling violence before such conflicts have become apparent to everyone. This involvement of other UN organizations and the increased focus on the importance of updated and timely information has provided better opportunity to make use of preventive diplomacy, as has been the case in connection with the crisis in Burundi (see the Box on the demand for information from Burundi).

Box 1. Demand for information from Burundi

Since the beginning of the crisis in April 2015, the UN system discussed how escalation could be avoided, particularly in light of fears of another genocide. It quickly became apparent that impartial information was necessary. UN representatives on the ground regularly briefed the headquarters in New York, particularly via the political office, the election mission, and the human rights office; only those from the latter actually moved around the country to gather information. When the Security Council (SC) began meeting, these sources still provided the basic information that the SC was receiving. Between November 2015 and July 2016, the SC passed three resolutions. The first illustrates how considerable emphasis was placed on information, as the SC requested an update from the Secretary-General within 15 days with a focus on the security situation, human rights violations, and inciting hate crimes between different groups in Burundi (S/RES/2248 (2015)). The third resolution solidifies this demand for information. Contrary to ordinary practice, Resolution 2303 went directly against requests from the Burundian Government by deciding to send 228 police officers. If they are able to work, these officers will be responsible for monitoring the security situation and assisting OHCHR in connection with the monitoring of human rights violations (S/RES/2303 (2016)). As such, the SC has thus breached the sovereignty of Burundi in its efforts to gain access to information from credible sources.

Is conflict prevention only civilian or also military?

The HIPPO report is marked by a clear prioritizing of prevention as civilian/political work.⁶²

The Secretary-General views the situation more broadly, with Ban Ki-moon focusing on political and civilian measures while also prioritizing increased willingness from military peacekeepers to using power preventatively; that is, as conflict prevention: “Where missions have an explicit mandate to protect civilians, uniformed personnel must play their part, including, where necessary, through the use of force. This has been defined to mean preventive, pre-emptive and tactical use of force to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.”⁶³

The Secretary-General has the final word in relation to the panel, so when he writes that the use of military force can possibly prevent conflict, the peacekeeping operations pick up this signal. He limits the number of cases significantly, however, by only dealing with situations where a UN mission is already present with an explicit mandate to protect civilians. In other words, this is not about considering new interventions as conflict prevention.

At the same time, these different perceptions of preventive peace operations mean that HIPPO and the Secretary-General describe different needs for resources to be able to improve the UN’s preventive efforts. HIPPO repeatedly refers to this as primarily being a question of resources. Among the panel’s recommendations is a considerable strengthening and more stable arrangement of the secretariat’s resources for prevention and mediation, including monitoring and analysis.⁶⁴ Together with a number of concrete proposals for implementation, this

provides an image of how the panel judges that the UN is on track with its preventive efforts but still lacks the capacity to cover more in scope and depth. The Secretary-General agrees but adds that there are also challenges associated with the skills, abilities, and commitment of the deployed soldiers.

Preventive operations are associated with numerous challenges. One such challenge is that the impact of preventive diplomacy is difficult to measure and to report on. It might even become necessary to give the parties to the conflict all the credit for not escalating a tense situation, leaving no credit for the UN's preventive diplomacy. So despite consensus that prevention is a good investment, the "invisibility" of preventive work might render it less interesting for member states to finance conflict prevention—for why make extra effort to prevent conflict if you do not get recognition for doing so? As the HIPPO report points out, the necessity of maintaining a low profile when working with preventive diplomacy has contributed to two closely related situations: a) lack of understanding of the scope of the work of the Secretary-General and his special envoys—and of the UN's conflict prevention operations more generally and b) chronic underfunding of the UN's preventive work.⁶⁵

Box 2. Preventive diplomacy in Burundi

In 2015–16, Burundi was in the spotlight for extraordinary diplomatic efforts, not least from the UN. The Security Council (SC) visited twice and the UN Peacebuilding Commission has a country configuration that has visited and which has been particularly active in New York, the AU Peace and Security Council has dealt with the situation, and various regional presidents have been involved. Everyone has asked the parties to speak together, avoid violence and downplay the ethnic factors in the conflict. The UN estimates that more than 500 have been killed in connection with political violence in the period from April 2015 to April 2016. The question is whether you choose to view it as a success with respect to prevention because it has not become even worse or whether the number of deaths and reports about torture, disappearances, and other human rights violations instead illustrate that prevention has failed. Opinions are divided—also within the UN itself.

4.1.2 Partnerships first

A central message in the HIPPO panel report is that UN peace operations should focus more on partnerships. The idea that regional organizations can contribute to strengthening UN peace operations is not new; it is even described in the UN Charter. But partnerships were not in focus during the Cold War. This changed in the course of the 1990s—namely with Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report from 1992, which focused partly on so-called burden-sharing and the importance of partnerships for a UN that already then was asked to solve significantly more

tasks than during the Cold War. The HIPPO report—together with the Secretary-General’s implementation report—continues this focus on partnerships and burden-sharing.⁶⁶ The panel recommends, among other things, that the UN plays a more active role with respect to making regional organizations better able to take part in peace operations.

The analyses highlight three reasons why partnerships are important for UN peace operations. These three reasons all relate to a notion about how those who are close to a conflict are often better able to a) act quickly, b) understand the dynamics in the conflict, and c) foster and sustain the necessary political will that an intervention often demands.⁶⁷ In other words, proximity is seen as an important element in the strength of partnerships.⁶⁸ Moreover, the partner organizations can be willing to take on peace enforcement obligations that the UN itself is unable to muster the political will to be able to carry out but which it is politically possible to delegate. In that sense, partnerships have long been in focus in many ways and these benefits are not new. The more significant changes regarding the UN and partnerships called for in the HIPPO report can be summarized in three headings: renewed international commitment, the UN in a supporting role as enabler, and AU as central partner.

Renewed international commitment

According to the HIPPO panel report, the UN ought to work to produce renewed international engagement with respect to the mobilization of partnerships.⁶⁹ The ad hoc approach that has been the basis for operations should be rethought and replaced by a more visionary and courageous approach, including a long-term commitment and effort to gather the capabilities of the UN and regional organizations in order to strengthen the work for global peace and security. The HIPPO panel makes some more specific proposals for who should be doing what in order to create renewed engagement in partnerships: the Secretary-General ought to focus on gathering support for such a vision, the Security Council should actively approach the regional organizations’ governing bodies, and the member states should address the resources and other limiting factors, particularly regarding the so-called standby arrangements.⁷⁰ The panel is thus encouraging the UN member states to commit themselves to allocating more resources (politically, with respect to manpower, and financially), as this is required to strengthen partnerships and to achieve more efficient collective burden-sharing.

UN in a support function (enabler)

Another new detail is how the HIPPO report highlights that stronger partnerships require that the UN increasingly assumes the role as the “enabler of others.”⁷¹ The UN should be ready to

assume a role whereby it provides more active support to regional organizations to participate in UN peace efforts.⁷² More specifically, the panel proposed an increased focus on capacity building and stronger “*global training partnerships*” in order to address special training needs. Reference is made to the need for training in order to improve the speed, capabilities, and performance of uniformed personnel⁷³ as well as the need for programs supporting the AU’s efforts to integrate human rights into their peace operations. The HIPPO report also mentions both bilateral and regional training partnerships.

AU as central partner: proximity, burden-sharing and prevention

Given that proximity is an essential element in the partnership logic, the fact that approximately 75% of the UN peacekeeping forces are deployed in Africa means that the partnership discussion is now particularly focused on the AU. The African capabilities also represent an important resource for the UN: African countries contributed roughly 50% of the UN’s uniformed peace forces and some 60% of the UN’s civilian personnel in connection with peace operations.⁷⁴ Both the HIPPO panel and the Secretary-General highlight the AU as a particularly important strategic partner with which the UN ought to expand its partnership in a more collaborative form.⁷⁵ The points emphasized in the HIPPO report as being essential for a closer and more effective partnership include: the importance of partnerships being formed as *equal partnerships*; the importance of being able to reach agreement on *financial questions* (e.g. the question about the mission support to African peace operations, such as the AU mission in Somalia); the necessity of the AU developing clear policy for due diligence regarding human rights; and practical considerations regarding the need for *training*. As such, the ambition is a reinforced partnership with AU connected with a number of important considerations of both principled and practical nature. These questions are predominantly discussed in situations where the focus in connection with UN–AU partnerships has been on military means. As presented in the box below, however, the UN–AU cooperation in connection with the crisis in Burundi also illustrates how partnerships can be valuable in connection with civilian efforts.

Partnerships and prevention

The HIPPO report also highlights another important dimension: that partnerships are important for the UN’s conflict-prevention efforts. The synergy between conflict prevention and partnerships is also clear, as when the UN and a vast range of regional and sub-regional organizations and individual countries contribute to preventive diplomacy. The HIPPO panel therefore recommends that the UN involves its partner organizations more in decision-

making processes as an important part of shifting the focus to conflict prevention.⁷⁶ Through such consultations, preventive measures can gain greater political support in the state in which said measures are taking place.⁷⁷ Despite these advantages of partnerships, the HIPPO report highlights how it is important to be aware that regional and sub-regional actors also have their own interests, which might mean that they are not regarded as being impartial.⁷⁸ We return to this and other dilemmas in Chapter 5.

Box 3. UN–AU partnership on conflict prevention in Burundi

AU observers have contributed to the UN being able to expand its prevention work in Burundi. Their presence is seen as increasing the total capacity. Specifically, the AU’s human rights observers are working in Burundi closely together with UN observers to produce analyses for preventive diplomacy and the promotion of peace and stability in Burundi.

4.1.3 People first

The suggestions made in the HIPPO report about orienting peace operations towards a focus on people are mostly about two ways whereby peacekeeping operations can be improved: the protection of civilians and inclusion in the political process.

Protection of civilians

The one general purpose of placing people first is to remind those posted by the UN that their role is to protect civilians. According to the HIPPO panel, this is best achieved via so-called unarmed strategies,⁷⁹ which include mediation, human rights monitoring, and advocacy. When situations arise in which civilians are in immediate danger, however, the UN forces are obligated to use all necessary means to protect them, including armed force. Of all of the peacekeeping operations, 98% have such a mandate. This means that civilians are to be protected even though other considerations might speak against doing so, such as particular rules for troops from the one country or another.⁸⁰ This also means that UN troops must have the right structures together with the right training and equipment and that they are obligated to use the mandate fully.

Protecting civilians is a difficult task for the UN and its partner organizations.⁸¹ Since 2007, the UN–AU partnership has involved the protection of civilians, and at a Security Council meeting in May 2016 on stronger partnerships, several member states pointed out that the UN is not always the best actor to respond in connection with a conflict. Here, AU was emphasized as an important partner, also with respect to protecting civilians: “The UN would not always be able or best-positioned to respond to crises and the AU could be a particularly ef-

fective partner in conducting offensive operations where there were grave threats against civilians.”⁸² In connection with the protection of civilians, proximity can mean that AU is better able to obtain the necessary political will required in connection with the safety of deployed personnel. Another advantage is that AU has enjoyed acceptance from local governments in situations where the country in question has not accepted the UN’s presence. In 2007, AU was thus the only actor whose military presence Sudan would recognize and therefore the only actor capable of protecting the civilians in the Darfur region.⁸³

In May 2015, the protection of civilians received a political boost with the adoption of the so-called Kigali Principles. The participating countries agreed on 18 principles that should strengthen their political support and render them and their personnel better able to live up to their responsibility to protect civilians, also when they could be tempted to prioritize other considerations.⁸⁴ In September 2016, 37 countries had signed the principles, including all of Denmark’s neighboring countries, but not Denmark.⁸⁵

Inclusion of multiple perspectives in analyses and decision-making

The other general reason for placing people first in the UN’s peace operations is that civilians as well as uniformed peacekeeping soldiers must be closer to and more involved with the people they have been sent to help. The point is both that this will provide the UN employees with better understanding of what is going on around them—including the worries and aspirations of local residents—and that they will help make the UN more accessible for the local communities.⁸⁶ The literature refers to this as the local turn⁸⁷ in order to highlight how solutions should be found locally if they are to be successful.⁸⁸ In a sense, this focus on the importance of the local level is also criticism of how the UN has worked in the past; that is, to have global standards for how conflicts are to be understood and solved. The focus in the HIPPO report on people thus represents an interest in not basing work on universal templates for how peacekeeping operations should be planned and instead tailoring each new operation to the specific situation.

By emphasizing the importance of human rights, the Secretary-General’s implementation report includes a more concrete interpretation of what it possibly means to place people first.⁸⁹ In his report, Ban Ki-moon stresses that he wants the UN personnel to do more than merely interact with the local residents in order to understand them. He wants his personnel to work closely together with a broader group of local actors and to provide them with oppor-

tunity to help define how their rights are best promoted. This approach is also understood as contributing to conflict prevention.

Human rights violations and abuses can serve as an indicator of whether a conflict is brewing or about to escalate. This can lead to synergy between placing prevention and people first, respectively, if the preventive information can be increased and UN employees from all levels report on possible human rights violations. This would render the UN better able to gather information and analyze trends in order to assess whether or not there is a risk of a conflict escalating. Ideally, this will provide better conditions for the timely design of a prevention strategy.

Box 4. UN placing people first in Burundi

In 2016, OHCHR published a pamphlet with descriptions of the actors who, in one way or another, work with human rights in Burundi. In addition to the UN, diplomatic missions, and government institutions, the list includes 57 NGOs. The goal is to increase the cooperation with the civil society and to create networks that are able to promote peace and stability in Burundi (OHCHR, 2016: Répertoire des Acteurs des Droits de l'Homme au Burundi).

At the same time, the UN has received strong criticism for how some of their deployed personnel have abused local community members. This has included sexual abuse committed in connection with numerous different missions. In addition to the direct consequence—that the civilians who peacekeeping operations are mandated to protect are instead endangered and violated—these events have an impact on the legitimacy of the UN. At worst, they risk leading to resistance against the UN mission—and at minimum undermine the credibility that is necessary for the UN to be able to go about its work. A first step in connection with placing people first is, then, completely preventing any form of abuse perpetrated by those who are sent as part of the mission. Ban Ki-moon has launched initiatives for this purpose, but it remains unclear whether they will solve the problem.⁹⁰

4.1.4 Politics first

The emphasis on placing politics first comes in the wake of a number of trials with peace enforcement; that is, the use of military force to neutralize armed groups and stabilize conflict areas. Particularly since the 1990s, peacekeeping has involved an element of enforcement but basically only to protect a mission's mandate and troops. A radical, new step was taken in 2013 in connection with the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUSCO, which received a mandate to neutralize specific groups. The same year, French

troops also received a mandate to go into northern Mali and combat extremist rebel groups that were threatening to take over the entire territory.⁹¹ The HIPPO report suggests another direction, however, which can be seen as a reaction to the trend with more offensive mandates.

The HIPPO panel highlights three factors that shift the focus to politics first—and military means are not among them: a) the necessity to find *political solutions* to the conflicts in which the UN intervenes, b) the importance of the UN’s impartiality as premise for successfully producing political solutions, and c) that in connection with this work, there is a need for increased *political commitment* and support from the international community. Despite the importance of finding political solutions, the panel emphasizes that there has previously been far too little focus on this element in UN peace operations. It therefore recommends placing politics first in UN’s future peace operations. The panel highlights how, in connection with the panel’s extensive consultations, its faith has been confirmed that the UN has *genuine political strengths* and a unique position for promoting the political processes that are necessary to find political solutions to a conflict.

As the HIPPO panel describes, a requirement for the other three reform directions is the primacy of politics. Without political will, it is impossible for the UN to carry out preventive work, to protect civilians, or to enter into meaningful partnerships. This reasoning is central to the recommendation about how political solutions and political will should be prioritized if the UN is to continue to be able to function as an effective tool in international efforts for peace and security.

Political solutions

The HIPPO report emphasizes how political solutions are important for the UN’s work with peace and security; not least because “Lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions”⁹² and not just via military or technical means.⁹³

The UN is characterized by its “exceptional reach across the globe” and a “universal membership”, which provides the organization with a particular “ability to bring together disparate interests for common purposes.”⁹⁴ This is a peculiar strength of the UN, which is crucial for the ability of the organization to assist countries in conflicts to find political solutions that can bring an end to violent conflicts. “Primacy of politics” is not to be understood in the sense of the UN being political or ‘doing politics’. What is meant here is the UN strengthening its role

with respect to “identify and implement impartial strategies that can lead to political solutions.”⁹⁵

The argument for strengthening this role is partly that the role of the UN as facilitator is one of the organization’s greatest strengths. The panel thus proposes that, in connection with any peace operation, the UN “should lead or play a leading role in the political efforts prior to and during peace processes, and after agreements are reached.”⁹⁶ This leading role can be strengthened by allowing the Secretary-General to appoint a special mediator, who can be his special representative and be authorized to manage or play a key role in connection with peace negotiations.⁹⁷

The panel also notes how its recommendation to prioritize the UN’s political work is in line with a trend that we can already see in the UN’s peace operations in the form of an increasing number of political missions; that is, primarily civilian missions, including monitoring teams and mediation efforts. As of October 2016, the UN has had 26 political missions and so-called good offices.⁹⁸ “Good offices” is UN-speak for the role of the organization in connection with diplomatic processes and covers everything from giving the parties to a conflict a neutral meeting place to mediating more actively. The panel also identifies a need among the UN political missions for improved support from headquarters and enhanced support from the member states, not least the Security Council. The UN’s work to provide political solutions is affected, in other words, largely by the level of agreement and support from the permanent members of the Security Council.

Impartiality

The HIPPO panel emphasizes the UN’s impartiality as another factor of crucial significance to the “UN’s capacity to lead political processes and negotiations,”⁹⁹ and at the same time points out that this impartiality is tested, as highlighted by research in the area.¹⁰⁰ The mission in Mali provides one of the numerous examples of the impartiality of the UN being tested. Overall, there are three types of armed actors in Mali: the government, rebel groups, and terrorist groups. The rebel groups are defined as the groups that have participated in the peace process, and the UN does not engage in mediation with terrorist groups. One of the mission’s tasks is to support government efforts to re-establish the authority of the state and its ability to maintain law and order throughout Malian territory.¹⁰¹ Among the rebel groups, support to the government is not perceived as being impartial, which affects the UN’s ability to promote efforts to reach political solutions.

The mission in Mali is also an example of how these tests of the UN's impartiality cannot be seen isolated from the tendency for the UN to be asked increasingly often to become involved in complex situations, some of which are characterized by ongoing combat and fighting. These situations are marked by considerable challenges since the parties to the conflict cannot always be assumed to be readily receptive to the political processes facilitated by the UN, and since, as flagged by HIPPO, in the worst case, military means can exacerbate the conflict and actually inhibit the UN's endeavours to facilitate peace processes.¹⁰²

One of the crucial questions therefore becomes how, in the future, the UN can become involved militarily in order to reduce the human costs of ongoing conflicts while managing to prioritize the work with political solutions in such situations, which according to the panel requires maintaining and in certain cases re-establishing the UN's role as an impartial actor. In relation to this challenge, without clarifying what the solution is, the HIPPO panel emphasizes the importance of the UN missions working on the basis of "realistic political strategies."¹⁰³

Finally, it is pointed out how an important parameter for the sustainability of the political solutions reached via dialogue and negotiations is that as many of the parties to a conflict as possible have participated in the process. For example, the panel emphasizes that in situations where inclusive political agreements have not been reached, unrest and violence have again erupted.¹⁰⁴ As regards the upgrading of the role of the UN in the efforts to find political solutions to conflicts and shifting the focusing to being on people, there is clear synergy in the political processes in which the diversity of the community increasingly becomes part of the political dialogue and political agreements, thus using a people-centered approach. This logic is part of the background for *Women, Peace and Security*, which is largely about involving women in decisions on peace and security. The theory is that inclusive political dialogue leads to inclusive political agreements that address the underlying causes of conflict, thereby increasing the chance for the included parties subsequently being interested in respecting the agreement. As seen in the ongoing negotiations in Burundi, however, reaching agreement on who is to be included is no simple matter; that is, who should actually be sitting at the negotiating table. This dilemma can lead to conflict between the interest in inclusion and the interest in being able to reach a political solution, as discussed below.

4.2 Political disagreement: prevention, mediation, or undue meddling

As for *political consensus and support in the international community*, the panel emphasizes that UN missions have often proven to be effective instruments in the situations where a UN mission has been accompanied by broad political support to the work with identifying and implementing peaceful solutions.¹⁰⁵ In this connection, the panel also points out that the international consensus and commitment have often been inadequate and in some cases entirely absent. UN mediators have not always received the necessary political support from a unified international community, which has limited—or even undermined—the UN peace work. In this light, the HIPPO panel recommends that if the UN’s peace operations is to be able to serve as an efficient instrument in efforts to ensure international peace and security, these efforts must be accompanied by support from a unified international community.

There are also countries that are skeptical about parts of the reform proposals, countries that are traditionally more UN-skeptical, primarily forces in the Non-Aligned Movement (Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan), which prefer a less proactive UN. The same tendency is found among the so-called BRICS countries: Here, the Russian criticism is loudest, while China is the most subdued. The skepticism among these countries stems from suspicion that the reforms will allow the Security Council to involve itself in more situations (countries) and earlier in the process—a development that risks undermining the sovereignty of countries in the Global South.¹⁰⁶

The countries calling for a proactive UN talk about early warning and early action as being necessary for preventing conflicts, not least in the light of the UN’s unfortunate role in Srebrenica, in connection with the genocide in Rwanda, and the war in Sri Lanka. The reform process is clearly moving in the direction of earlier involvement in crisis situations. But countries do not want to be regarded as requiring early action and many countries in the Global South consider this line of thought as being exclusively directed at developing countries. They see this as being about giving the West further opportunity to decide over the internal affairs of developing countries. Burundian officials, when clearly rejecting AU and UN deployments in our interviews, referred to attempts at early warning and action as “early aggression”. Our respondents did not believe that the situation had reached a point where UN involvement was necessary or desirable.

Box 5. Burundi—a divided Security Council

The lack of strong support from a unified international community—and the fact that this has great importance for UN peace operations—is also seen in Burundi: in late April 2015, in response to violent protests over Pierre Nkurunziza’s announcement of his candidacy for president, France drafted an official statement from the Security Council (SC) on the situation in Burundi, which Russia and China blocked. The Russian UN ambassador declared that the SC should not interfere in a sovereign state’s constitutional affairs. This split in the SC has limited the UN political work, also in terms of making it easier for the Burundian government to ignore UN calls for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

4.3 Practical challenges: contradictions in the reform process

The UN system and the think tanks working with UN reforms tend to focus on the synergy between the four directions in the reform process.¹⁰⁷ While this is important, there are numerous risks in overlooking how conflict and contradictions can also emerge when what is proposed as part of the four directions are pursued simultaneously. How can the UN simultaneously place prevention, people, partnerships, and politics first? Is it possible to prioritize all four directions at the same time? Which challenges might one expect to result from doing so?

This section analyzes the risks emerging from placing prevention, people, partnerships, and political solutions first at the same time. For while considering the individual reform initiatives is one thing, investigating how they interact is an entirely different question. Considering these elements against one another is important, as even though the reform proposals are formulated in the same documents and by the same actors, they are sometimes pulling in different directions. The chapter closes with a general assessment of how the built-in idealism in the UN system has contributed to the internal tension identified in the reform process.

4.3.1 Prevention first vs. people first

Retaliation against informants: Increased focus on prevention in the form of human rights monitoring, which requires the involvement of witnesses and victims, can also include risks for those involved. For example, if the government of Burundi succeeds in getting access to sensitive information collected by AU and UN human rights observers, this might endanger witnesses. According to some of our sources, witnesses risk reprisals if they are seen to expose events that the government does not want publicized.

4.3.2 Prevention first vs. partnerships first

Usable capabilities: the risk of conflict between the ambition of placing partnerships first and prevention first partly depends on the type of partnership. The capabilities that the UN and

some countries help build among partners through programs such as rapid deployment capacity training are not necessarily useful for prevention purposes. As regards the efforts of the international community to prevent the conflict in Burundi from escalating, it became apparent that military capabilities that have been built up through various partnership programs had no utility with respect to prevention. Burundi's government was only ready to accept civilian observers and a limited number of police advisers. The AU proposal to send 5,000 peacekeeping soldiers from the standby force to Burundi that was supported by the West to prevent the escalation of the conflict met great opposition from the government in Bujumbura, which regarded such a force as an invasion force and a violation of its sovereignty. The proposal was shelved and AU ultimately did not deploy military forces. In the course of our interview, this and other examples led one of our informants to conclude that "even though the Blue Helmets are a strong brand, there are scenarios where states are opposed to deploying military forces"—regardless of whether there is talk of UN or AU forces.

4.3.3 Prevention first vs. politics first

Prevention can be seen as biased: The UN's prevention efforts possibly lead to the organization being perceived as biased, which compromises the UN's role as mediator. In Burundi, the UN preventive human rights monitoring led to criticism of the government's treatment of the population—criticism that had consequences for how the government viewed the UN and for their reluctance towards allowing the UN to play a central role in connection with the political negotiations. On the one hand, the UN risks becoming a "silent accomplice"¹⁰⁸ if abuse, torture, disappearances, homicides, etc. go unreported. On the other hand, UN reports on such matters can influence how the UN is perceived by parties to the conflict, which can affect its ability to play a leading role in connection with subsequent mediation processes and political negotiations. The question therefore becomes whether and how the UN can do both. Among the government sources and internally within the UN, distinction is sometimes drawn between the UN's various different offices and tasks. The Burundi Foreign Ministry has faith in certain UN offices while remaining skeptical towards others: The UN's political office is perceived as neutral because it does not criticize the government, while other UN offices are accused of colluding with the opposition. UN employees are left unclear on how they should navigate such ambiguity.

4.3.4 People first vs. partnerships first

Responsibility for unintended consequences: in the cases where partnership means the outsourcing of the use of force to regional organizations, usually AU, this leads to the addition of

a layer of organization and further distance between the UN and the actual implementation. This means a loss of control and sanctions (the principal–agent problem). For example, it becomes more difficult to ensure compliance with UN policies that demand that missions are carried out in accordance with the protection of civilians, human rights, and humanitarian law. This obviously not only applies to AU forces but to all of the partners that the UN works together with on peace and security, not least the regional organizations and bilateral partners with military capabilities with whom the UN must share the burden. In other words, it is important to be aware of how the risk of unintended consequences increases for each additional link that is added to the chain, so to speak.¹⁰⁹ The policy is clear that the UN is responsible for ensuring that the organization’s partners do no harm (e.g. violating the civilian population that they have been sent to protect). The UN therefore makes an effort to vet its partner countries, partner organizations, and their troops. This is incredibly important for the protection of civilians and the UN’s legitimacy. But it can make it more difficult to find enough partners who are willing to risk difficult missions. The presence of Burundian soldiers in the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been up for debate after they were high-lighted as problematic in the vetting process. Another example is the force sent by Chad to the UN mission in Mali, where the recruitment of child soldiers became a controversial topic in the vetting process in connection with this contribution.¹¹⁰

4.3.5 People first vs. politics first

Lack of clarity about who should be included: Reaching agreement on who is to be included in a political dialogue on conflict resolution tends to be problematic. Who is to be viewed as representing the people, thereby gaining access to negotiations because the focus is supposed to be people-centered? This challenge becomes particularly apparent in Burundi, where there was disagreement on who had the right to participate in the Arusha II negotiations. The sitting Burundian government does not want to negotiate with those who stood behind the attempted coup in May 2015. Parts of the opposition believe that this is about excluding them as legitimate representatives. This leads to a dilemma between either negotiating with the coup plotters or compromising on the principle about inclusion. In other situations, the UN has also stuck to the principle about how persons are to be held responsible for, e.g. the violence committed in connection with the coup, which further complicates matters. At the same time, there is a risk that those who are not included will have no interest in supporting—or might even want to spoil—a peace agreement from which they have been excluded. In the

summer of 2016 this dilemma meant that the Arusha II negotiations never even got started, but stalled at the question of who should be represented.

Impartiality as a constraint on protection: The importance of impartiality—as a premise for the UN’s role in political dialogue—places restrictions on UN involvement in actual situations in order to protect civilians. UN principles regarding the consent of the parties, minimal use of force, and impartiality¹¹¹ are necessary for the UN to be accepted as mediator. These principles risk being misunderstood, however, in the sense that UN personnel avoid getting involved in what is going on in a country out of fear of being regarded as biased. This can pertain to civilians who do not object to the government’s policies as well as soldiers who fail to provide protection for civilians.¹¹² Even though Ban Ki-moon has made it clear that UN personnel have a duty to protect civilians, the image still becomes unclear in light of how the UN also places great emphasis on impartiality and state sovereignty. This dilemma between the obligation to protect civilians and remaining politically impartial is greatest when there is disagreement within in a country on the causes of a conflict. In Burundi, the government and the opposition, including the international community, disagree on the situation in the country. The government believes that things are moving in the right direction and that the people feel safe and do not want outside meddling. Conversely, the opposition believes that the people have been suppressed and feel threatened by the government and its security forces. This disagreement means that impartiality is impossible if the civilians are simultaneously to be protected from attack committed with government involvement. In order to step in where protection is necessary, the UN at minimum must analyze who is right, which is impossible without taking a stance on the competing interpretations presented by the government and the opposition. Naturally, this is extremely unpopular among the party whose interpretation of the situation is rejected by the UN. When said party is the government, as in Burundi, it becomes even more difficult to intervene.

4.3.6 Partnerships first vs. politics first

Partnering for the use of force inhibits opportunities for placing politics first: in practice, it is not merely for the sake of consultation that partners are included early in the process. Often, particularly in difficult conflicts, the Security Council provides a mandate to partners being able to use force in order to stabilize a conflict to the degree that the UN can thereafter initiate a political process. The use of force being outsourced to partners in order to stabilize a situation before the UN moves in cannot be said to be in accordance with the recommendation place politics first. Specifically, the use of force is placed ahead of political dialogue.

This might seem necessary in cases where the security situation means that it is not immediately possible to initiate a political process, as we have mentioned in connection with the mission in Mali, but it weakens the credibility of the ambition to place politics first.

Bias among the partner organization: the proximity that can be a strength for the involvement of regional actors in peace processes can at the same time be an Achilles' heel with respect to the impartiality of these parties. Being close to a conflict possibly means that a partner has particular interests and that some of the parties to a conflict therefore regard them as being biased and therefore unwanted. As regards the role of the East African Community (EAC) in connection with negotiations on the political future of Burundi, questions have been raised regarding the EAC's impartiality: "If key actors in the region (Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and—to a lesser extent—Tanzania) have vested interests, are they then 'honest brokers'?"¹¹³ If asking representatives from the Burundian government as to why they are more positive toward the EAC than the UN in connection with the negotiations, the answer would also be "in EAC, all of the countries, with the exception of Rwanda, are on Burundi's side."¹¹⁴ Where the UN, partly because of the organization's government-critical human rights reports, is regarded as being on the side of the opposition,¹¹⁵ the EAC is regarded as being on the side of the government—partly because the EAC's heads of state have not applied any meaningful pressure on the Burundian government.¹¹⁶ In the future, if striving for the increased involvement of partners in mediation and negotiation processes, it is important to be aware of the risk that the chosen partner can be biased and might reduce the incentive for finding a peaceful solution. Governments that do not want to follow the UN line can attempt to find support for their respective positions among the UN's partners, thereby putting the UN on the sidelines as a result of the UN's own insistence on including as many partners as possible.

Table 1. Examples of synergy and contradiction when prevention, people, partnerships, and political solutions are placed first in the UN’s peace work

	Prevention	People	Partnerships	Political solutions
Prevention		Retaliation against witnesses	Usefulness of capacities?	Prevention can be seen as bi-ased
People	If UN reporting of human rights violations increase, it can strengthen the preventive information needs		Responsibility for unintended consequences	Lack of clarity about who is to be included Impartiality as a hindrance for protection
Partnerships	AU observers have helped expand the UN’s preventive work in Burundi Increased consultation with regional partners in order to develop early, preventive measures	Regional partner organizations are sometimes better placed to protect civilians		Partnerships involving the use of force inhibit the opportunity to place politics first Bias among the partner organizations
Political solutions	Inclusive political processes prevent escalation of conflict by reducing the risk of spoilers	Involvement in the political dialogue and political agreements contribute to lasting solutions in connection with peace talks	Partners’ understanding in conflict dynamics can help identify political solutions	

4.4 From built-in idealism to internal conflict

The reform process would thus appear to be based on rather idyllic political analyses. Common throughout the reports is that they do not tackle the problematic situations in which there is genuine disagreement about what represents the best solution. The reports encourage the international community—not least the Security Council—to stand together in order to create lasting peace. Without explaining how to do so. For example, the HIPPO report does not relate to how the sovereignty concept can stand in the way of the capacity of the UN to place prevention, partnerships, people, and politics first. As long as the Security Council is not united in using its authority under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, governments will be able to

invoke their sovereignty and deny the UN access. This is the basis for many of the possible contradictions mentioned above.

The HIPPO report can also be criticized for failing to adequately deal with the reality in which robustness and large numbers of casualties are something that the Security Council—and the UN member states—most likely cannot avoid having to consider in the near future.¹¹⁷ For example, the HIPPO panel highlights how, due to their composition and character, the UN's peace operations do not lend themselves to military anti-terrorism operations,¹¹⁸ but at the same time it is not always possible for UN missions to isolate themselves from terrorism activities that hit the mission's forces in some places.

By only discussing peaceful means, the HIPPO report thus places itself outside of a major part of the debate on the UN of the future envisioned by its member states. In other words, the reports upon which the reform initiatives are based make the mistake of ignoring that UN member states act on the basis of their own interests—which are not always the same as those of the organization. In that sense, they make the same mistake that others have identified in earlier, seminal reports about the role of the UN with respect to peace and security, not least *An Agenda for Peace*.¹¹⁹ What would appear to be a naïve understanding of the political dynamics at play in the UN is largely rooted in the secretariat still saying what the member states *want* to hear as opposed to what they *need* to hear—as already called for in the Brahimi report.¹²⁰ The result is the tension described above.

5. Denmark, the UN, and reform: which way forward?

This chapter summarizes the content of the report and draws conclusions with respect to the opportunities and challenges resulting from the reforms. The reforms are discussed as being motivated by a number of tragic events, which the UN has been strongly criticized for having dealt with poorly and have resulted in massive losses of human life. Finally, we make a number of recommendations about what Denmark can do to strengthen the UN as an instrument in Danish security policy.

5.1 The reform agenda: opportunities and challenges

On the one hand, the ongoing reform process reflects increasing ambitions for the UN peace work, as seen from the renewed efforts to strengthen the UN's prevention and conflict resolution capabilities and improving the capacity of the UN to protect civilians. On the other hand, there are a number of political and practical challenges that are getting in the way of increasing ambitions. On the background of the analyses presented in this report, we offer two general points related to Danish involvement in UN peace operations.

Firstly, the report describes how the general support for reform and the UN's peace work is marked by disagreement among the UN member states on how pro- or reactive the UN ought to be in connection with how peace work is conducted. This political disagreement affects the direction of the ongoing reform work, not least in terms of how the UN will look in the future as a result of the reforms. One of the major issues is therefore that UN member states should consider how they want to position themselves with respect to these political disagreements.

Secondly, the report describes how the reform work is about a number of more practical questions about how the UN can improve its ability to prevent new conflicts and de-escalate and solve the ongoing ones. Here, both military and diplomatic measures are necessary, and each of them is insufficient in isolation. The military dimension in UN peace work cannot stand alone, as a conflict cannot be ended without a political solution. At the same time, there are situations where the political dimension alone is insufficient. The relationship between the two tracks (including the question as to under which conditions military efforts create space for political processes) and how they are balanced in relation to each other (including the question of support to the UN's military and political efforts) are therefore important to

consider. The second point is therefore about the need to consider the relationship and balance between military and diplomatic efforts.

The report also analyzes a number of opportunities and challenges in the military and diplomatic tracks—opportunities and challenges that are necessary to be aware of in connection with the ongoing attempts at improving the UN’s peace work (chapters 3 and 4, respectively). These opportunities and challenges are summarized in the tables below. The literature includes numerous analyses of the opportunities and challenges that emerge when the UN uses military force in connection with peacekeeping efforts (Table 2).

Table 2. Use of military force

	Synergy	Challenges
Politics	When the use of military power creates room for political processes, negotiations and the work to bring about durable political solutions to the conflict.	When the way in which military force is used causes the UN to be seen as biased, which gets in the way of the UN’s capacity to assist in the pursuit of political solutions. When the use of power intended to stabilize a situation before the UN intervenes means that the work with pursuing political solutions is overridden.
People	When military power is used in a manner that results in increased protection of civilians (and of own UN peacekeepers).	When the use of military power to protect civilians is weakened due to reservations among the troop-contributing governments or inadequate equipment. When poorly trained soldiers abuse civilians instead of protecting them.
Partnerships	When a partner helps the UN to de-escalate a situation, thereby enabling the UN presence. When the UN contributes to building up the peacekeeping capabilities of the partners	When outsourcing to partners results in a loss of control and sanctions and it therefore becomes more difficult to comply with UN policy on the protection of civilians. When partnerships are seen as the cheap solution with the result that soldiers are poorly equipped.
Prevention	When military means have positive influence on the willingness of actors to participate in and ensure progress in political processes/to abide by peace agreements etc.	When preventive measures fail because military means prove useful for preventive purposes (e.g. in Burundi).

The UN’s diplomatic work has not been marked by the same focus on challenges. Key reform documents are built on ideal scenarios and optimistic assumptions, which various think tank reports have tacitly accepted. Subsequently, the reforms are predominantly focused on the synergy between the four directions that the reforms recommend be placed first. But as we point out in this report (Chapter 4), there is also a risk of conflict when attempt is made to upgrade all of these directions for reform—conflict that has not been sufficiently taken into account (Table 3).

Table 3. Use of diplomatic means

	Synergy	Challenges
Politics	When increased focus on and prioritization of the UN’s political work helps to ensure that more conflicts are resolved.	When widespread violence and insecurity make it difficult for the UN to place politics first. When disagreement on who should be included in political negotiations means that the process stagnates or is perceived as illegitimate (by those who are not included).
People	When focus on the inclusion of different groups in the political process increases the likelihood of finding lasting political solutions (reducing the risk of so-called spoilers)	When focus on human rights violations and reporting them, means that the UN is regarded as being biased, there is a risk of negative spill-over to the UN’s mediation work. When the interest in impartiality leads to inactivity regarding the protection of civilians.
Partnerships	When partners’ insight into conflict dynamics contribute positively to the process of designing preventive measures/identifying political solutions.	When negotiations stall because the government plays different mediators against each other When regional actors are not the best mediators because there are special interests in play that render them biased
Prevention	When UN officials’ reports on human rights violations contribute to the preventive need for information. When AU observers contribute to expanding the UN’s preventive work/presence (Burundi).	When obtaining preventive information involves a risk of witnesses being victimized. When attempts at prevention are used to legitimize the continuation of the conflict (the Security Council’s visit to Burundi was used by the government to signal that all is well).

Even though the reform work, as per the analyses in the report and the tables above, is associated with a number of challenges, it is important to remember the possible consequences should the reforms fail.

If the UN cannot help prevent violent conflict, there is a risk of an increase in the number of ongoing conflicts, which would increase the pressure on the international community and the UN to deal with even more conflicts despite its limited capabilities. If the capacity of the UN to de-escalate and solve conflicts is not boosted, there are no other instruments on hand to achieve this objective. All told, this means that the reform work has great significance for the UN's continued relevance as an instrument in Danish foreign and security policy, as a weakened UN would be less able to help prevent, de-escalate, and solve conflicts and would therefore be limited in terms of its ability to reduce the negative impact of even distant conflicts on Danish security.

5.2 Reforms motivated by historical mistakes

The ambition regarding a UN with improved capabilities with respect to preventing conflict and de-escalating violent conflict, protecting civilians, and reaching political solutions once conflict has broken out is based on historical experience. In other words, the reform agenda cannot be understood on the basis of reference to casualties and the challenges in connection with current missions alone. The ambition to strengthen the UN's peace operations must also be seen in the light of tragic events that have resulted in deep scars in the UN system and its member states. The efforts at improving the UN's mediation skills are thus related to an ambition to provide the UN with better opportunity to reduce the risk of situations such as that in Syria, where the Security Council has been unable to act constructively, which has had catastrophic consequences for civilian Syrians and triggered massive streams of migration. The efforts to improve the use of military force by UN soldiers in order for them to be able to protect civilians better is linked to the ambition to not see a new Srebrenica, where atrocities were carried out right before the eyes of UN soldiers who felt that they had neither the mandate nor the capacity to intervene. The UN system has an interest in being able to speak out and work with conflict resolution in situations where the governments are not willing to allow it to do so, which became apparent after the UN's failure in Sri Lanka in 2006–09. Finally, the efforts to improve the UN's preventive capabilities as well as the efforts towards a more optimal use of military force for protection are inextricably linked to the broad recognition of the need to ensure that we will never witness another genocide such as that which occurred in Rwanda.

If the UN's capabilities are not improved on these points, we risk squandering its unique global legitimacy. Should that be the case, it will not be possible to use the capabilities to deal with some of the most key security challenges in the current global political landscape.

5.3 Recommendations: Denmark in the UN

The year 2017 and those to come represent not only a rare opportunity to reform the UN's peace work but also opportunity for work to be carried out in Denmark to define and seek to realize Danish visions for the UN of the future. The work with improving and renewing the UN peace operations is expected to be high on the new Secretary-General's agenda; and despite disagreement on how proactive/reactive UN peace work ought to be, there is strong focus on this reform work at the present moment.

On the background of the analysis in this report, we present the following recommendations for how Denmark can play a constructive role in connection with the reforms on two levels; that is, the policy level and the mission level in the UN's work for peace. The recommendations are generally focused on ensuring that the Danish contribution strengthens the UN in a manner that supports Danish security policy.

5.3.1 Policy level

a) Which vision for the UN? Denmark ought to define the UN's role in security policy

There ought to be a clear vision for the direction that Denmark wants the UN to develop when it comes to security policy. At the political level, Denmark should consider the general question as to which UN it wants and which reform proposals it therefore wishes to support. Alternatively, Denmark will contribute to the internal contradictions in the reform process emphasized in this report. Such a vision would help ensure that Danish contributions are guided by a centrally defined policy rather than being defined ad hoc by different agencies. Depending on how the Danish ambitions are defined, such a stance would send an important political signal about Danish support to these countries (including the US, UK, and France), which are key advocates for a more proactive UN.

Such policy would need to clarify both the overall direction and level of ambition that Denmark has for UN peace operations and how Denmark weighs the balance between the work with improving the use of military force in missions with robust mandates and increasing the focus of the reforms on renewing and strengthening the UN's work with prevention and conflict resolution. This is not either-or but rather two distinct tracks in the UN's work with peace, where it is important to consider the relationship and balance between the two. Re-

ardless of which direction Denmark prioritizes, in the near future the UN will continue to use armed force and to attempt to solve conflicts by peaceful means.

We also recommend that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense—preferably in coordination and together with the Defence Command and other relevant authorities—consider the following actions:

b) Maintain the political momentum for reform efforts

Actively support the Peacebuilding Commission’s work to promote and maintain the current momentum in the reform dialogue. Prioritize participation (through Nordic rotation) in all open debates in the Security Council, partly to follow the development in the current reform discussions and partly to show support.

c) Let the contribution of Danish troops be driven by demand from the UN

We recommend that Denmark focuses on strengthening the UN as a global player, including allowing Danish contributions to be driven by demand from the UN. The current reform discussions can be viewed as occasion to reconsider how Denmark can optimize its attempts at ensuring that the capabilities that it wants to contribute are tied to UN missions where they can be of the greatest possible benefit. Here, it is worth considering the Canadian experience: In April 2016, Canada decided to contribute 600 personnel to UN peace missions. Canadian representatives first later visited a great number of missions in order to identify where this contribution would make the greatest difference.¹²¹ Such an approach requires political will to contribute to UN missions, also if they are playing out in countries/regions that are not necessarily Danish priority countries. However, the priority should be ensuring an effective UN with global reach.

5.3.2 Missions level: military, non-military and cross-cutting means

As regards Danish contributions to UN missions, our recommendations fall into three general categories reflecting the report’s analysis and conclusions. The balance between the recommendations within these three categories will largely depend on the aforementioned political choices and the question as to the kind of UN that Denmark wants to support.

Military means

Better protection of civilians and UN peacekeepers: If the international community wants a UN with the capacity to intervene in ongoing conflicts, we recommend that Denmark consider the following:

a) Take the lead with respect to protecting civilians

Denmark ought to give the personnel deployed from Denmark the greatest possible leeway, including permission to follow the orders from the mission leadership and to protect civilians actively. Denmark should openly declare its support to the Kigali Principles and put its money where its mouth is by contributing to the protection of civilians and encouraging other troop-contributing countries to also support these principles. Finally, Denmark could use its C-34 membership to highlight the Danish military manual on international law in international operations. By following these recommendations, Denmark can serve as an example worth following with respect to the political focus on the efforts to strengthen the ability of the UN to protect civilians.

b) Support capacity building to increase the ability of UN soldiers to provide protection

Denmark should make it a permanent feature of the task entrusted to deployed soldiers to contribute to the training of the other troop contingents on such missions. When Danish soldiers train others, this training should always include normative aspects concerning the use of military capabilities—which can be based on the Danish military manual on international law in international operations.

c) Investigate whether new rotation schemes can help ensure that missions have the necessary equipment

In light of the positive experiences and potential savings, we recommend examining the opportunity for further rotation schemes for specialized capabilities. In order to avoid equipment deficiencies that risk inhibiting the utility of deployed forces, Denmark ought to identify possible rotation schemes for requested enablers, such as helicopters and special operations forces. Rotation schemes also present an opportunity to contribute to the UN's peace work in a manner whereby costs are minimized. Rotation schemes can also render it possible for Denmark to provide special skills that the UN is requesting but which Denmark alone will not be able to provide or maintain.

Non-military means

Renewed focus on UN diplomatic work: Danish contributions to the UN have made a positive difference and contributing more would strengthen the UN's peace work. But this is not to say that the only option is more of the same. There are also a number of other ways in which Denmark can focus its contributions that take into account the challenges identified in this report.

a) Support the UN's analytical capacity

Denmark should be deploying or financing more civilian experts, including mediators, analysts, and human rights experts to UN missions. This might include peacekeeping operations, be in connection with the planned upgrading of personnel to the Secretary-General's special envoys, and the UN's regional political offices. Further along these lines, we recommend that Denmark consider how they can support efforts to develop a better financial model for the political missions.

Denmark should strengthen the analytical capacity of the secretariat more directly. For example, political and financial support to establish a dedicated analytical unit in the Secretary-General's office would render him better able to carry out peace work. Similarly, modest support to the Secretary-General's "Human Rights up Front" initiative would help anchor the organization so that it can unfold its potential in connection with conflict prevention. Last but not least, Denmark should continue to contribute to the preventive analysis work by supporting the DPA—it would be worth considering earmarked support to the mediation unit. Relatively small investments are required to make it possible to make a genuine difference and at the same have a say in key parts of the UN system.

b) Build capabilities with a focus on preventive tasks

Denmark should consider how to prioritize support to the development of the military capabilities of its partner nations and regions. We recommend continuing with the capacity building of the AU as an institution and AU peacekeeping forces but at the same time considering exactly which soldiers Denmark trains and limiting this training to where deployment is politically feasible for preventive purposes. In this context, Denmark should contribute to building up capabilities that can strengthen the partners' prevention and mediation skills.

Cross-cutting means

a) Create equal and respectful partnerships

Much can be achieved via stronger partnerships, but more than just trained troops are required if these partnerships are to serve their purpose. There also has to be a willingness to contribute equipment, medical units, and other so-called key enablers. Otherwise we risk a situation where the troops from the partner countries are unable to live up to their mandate. In other words, it is important that partnerships are not seen as the easy or cheap solution. If we lose sight of this, we risk wasting resources to build up capabilities that are not fully usable.

b) Use Danish expertise to take the lead in connection with the implementation of new technology

In addition to the aforementioned rotation schemes for traditional military capabilities, we recommend that a decision be made regarding a position on the new category of so-called “Technology-Contributing Countries.”¹²² Denmark has already contributed to a report on the use of new technology in connection with UN peace work, and the HIPPO report points out how technology in support of UN peace work plays an important role in connection with efforts to convert UN policy into practice. Since the utility of new technology is not limited to missions related to the use of military power, this is a cross-cutting recommendation.

6. Appendix 1: The UN peace and security architecture—who does what?

The UN has established an array of institutions to work with peace and security policy. Some are intergovernmental, meaning that they consist of member states as represented by national diplomats. They are placed in the UN headquarters, primarily in New York. Others consist of the UN organizations' own personnel, either in the secretariat or in diverse funds and agencies. These institutions are headquartered in New York, some with field missions in hotspots around the world. The UN regards this as the overall architecture for peacebuilding and security.

6.1 Headquarters level

Intergovernmental structures

- The Security Council: The most important organization in the UN peace and security architecture is the Security Council (SC). On behalf of all of the UN member states, the SC is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. In order to accomplish this task, the UN Charter allows the SC to impose sanctions or authorize military force. The SC consists of 15 members—5 permanent and 10 that are elected for two-year terms. The five permanent members are the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China. Denmark was most recently a member of the SC in 2005–06 and is running for re-election in 2025–26. Until then, Denmark is able to participate in so-called open debates in which the Nordic countries have a tradition for taking turns speaking on behalf of one another. The SC also holds informal consultations with the troop-contributing countries in connection with discussion of the individual peacekeeping operations.
- The Peace Building Commission: In 2005, the Peace Building Commission was created. Its task is building bridges between the SC and the UN General Assembly (i.e., all 193 member states). The Peace Building Commission's 31 member states are elected by the General Assembly, the SC, and the UN Economic and Social Council and consists of the countries that contribute the most troops and finances. The Commission describes its mission as bringing together donors, financial institutions, governments, and troop contributors. The Commission has an advisory role for the SC regarding peacebuilding. In addition to its general work, the Commission currently has six country-specific groups that are dealing with the situations in Burundi, Sierra Leone,

Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and the Central African Republic.¹²³ The Commission report on the UN peace architecture is an essential part of the ongoing reform initiatives. An important part of the report is the vision about making peacebuilding an ongoing process.¹²⁴

- The special committee for peacekeeping operations (C-34): C-34 brings together 147 current and former troop-contributing countries, and it has 14 member states and international organizations as observers. The Committee is responsible for analyzing the UN's peacekeeping operations.¹²⁵ C-34 shares very few of its internal discussions with the public. Some of the most military-technical negotiations take place in C-34.

6.2 UN-organizations

The secretariat is the biggest and best known part of the UN and is headed by the Secretary-General. The UN Charter gives special status to the secretariat and sets out the powers of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General is somewhat comparable to a prime minister with a number of ministers under him. The most important departments in the secretariat related to security are the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).¹²⁶ They are led by the Deputy Secretary-General or, in the case of the PBSO, an Assistant Secretary-General.

- Department of Political Affairs (DPA): The DPA advises the Secretary-General with political analyses of developments in the UN system and around the world. The DPA employees plan and carry out the UN's so-called good offices work and preventive diplomacy. As part of this, the DPA serves as the secretariat for the Security Council. The DPA is also responsible for implementing the UN's assistance in connection with electoral processes.¹²⁷
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO): The DPKO is responsible for the headquarters functions for the UN peacekeeping operations in the field. The operations office sets the general strategic and operational direction for the missions and a unit for evaluation and training formulates the underpinning guidelines. The office for military affairs works to improve the capabilities of the missions, while another office supports the work of the missions with respect to security sector reform, the police, and judicial institutions.¹²⁸

- Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO): The PBSO is responsible for coordination and guidance in connection with UN peacebuilding. Compared to the others, it is a relatively small and new office. It serves as a secretariat for the PBC and administrates the Peacebuilding Fund,¹²⁹ which is the UN's internal fund for being able to allocate financing quickly to various peacebuilding projects and be able to facilitate the achievement of political solutions to conflicts.¹³⁰ The fund has a modest budget, but a number of countries—including the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands—have ambitions about the fund being able to allocate US\$ 300 million annually.¹³¹
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): The Human Rights Office is responsible for promoting human rights around the world, including in the UN's own work.¹³² As the UN system has gradually accepted that peace and security are linked to both development and human rights, the office has received a more central role in security policy.¹³³ This means, among other things, that policies have been formulated for how human rights should be included in UN peacekeeping missions.¹³⁴ Moreover, human rights experts are part of most peacekeeping operations.¹³⁵

6.3 In the field

The UN field missions are divided in peacekeeping operations and political and peacebuilding missions. They are generally referred to as UN peace operations, and this is where you find the characteristic blue helmets. Additionally, different parts of the UN go on short missions to achieve specific results.

Peacekeeping operations


In 2016, the UN had 16 active peacekeeping operations headed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). These 16 operations had a total of 118,792 personnel. Of these, 110,746 were in uniform: 85,808 soldiers, 13,200 police, and 1,738 military observers. They come from 121 countries but all operated under the UN flag. Denmark contributed 56 soldiers, 13 military experts, and six policemen. For all 16 operations, the price amounted to US\$ 8.27 billion annually,¹³⁶ corresponding to 0.47% of the world's total military expenses.¹³⁷

This is not the first time that the UN peace work has been under reform. Since the UN was established, the organization's work has undergone significant development, from classic peacekeeping operations, where UN soldiers observe compliance with a ceasefire or withdrawal agreement to operations in which the parties to the conflict agree on allowing the UN

to assist in connection with the provision and implementation of political solutions to a conflict within a state to missions in which the UN assumes responsibility for carrying out peace work in situations where the UN's presence does not enjoy the consent of all of the parties to the conflict. Moreover, we see today that UN soldiers on certain missions have received a mandate to carry out offensive operations—a development that has received extensive attention, also in connection with the reform processes that are dealt with in this report.

Today, the vast majority of the UN's missions are in Africa. Among these are the largest operations with the broadest mandates. There are also three relatively minor operations in the Middle East, all of which are classic operations. The map below provides an overview of the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations.

Figure 1: Overview of deployment of UN peacekeeping operations¹³⁸



Political and peacebuilding operations

The UN operates 11 political missions and several new ones are planned for the years to come. They are primarily entrusted to act as a link between the UN headquarters in New York and the countries and regions in which they work. Political missions can partly be compared with embassies, as they represent the UN in a number of countries and regions where the UN has no peacekeeping operation. These missions are led by special envoys for the Secretary-General who, on the S-G's behalf, can perform the so-called good offices work,

which involves working to create space for peace negotiations and more or less actively mediating where conflicts would appear to be brewing.

According to the latest report (November 2015), the UN has 11 political missions with 3,701 employees: 950 international civilian employees, 838 in uniform , 1,819 local civilians, and 94 UN volunteers. Geographically, the missions cover Africa with country-specific missions in Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, and Libya together with regional offices for Western Africa and Central Africa. The other missions cover the Middle East and Central Asia. The map below provides a full overview of the political missions.

Figure 2: Overview of location of the UN's political missions¹³⁹



7. Appendix 2: UN's preventive efforts and the situation in Burundi

This report has used the UN's work in Burundi in 2015–16 to exemplify how the reforms have been implemented in connection with specific initiatives. This appendix therefore presents a brief examination of the political crisis that Burundi has undergone in this period and the reason why the UN has become involved. The individual points are not exhaustive but rather selected to provide sufficient background knowledge to be able to set the examples in the right context. That Burundi is a relevant example in relation to this report on the reform of UN peace work is partly due to the overlap between some of the proposed reforms and the experiences made during the Burundi crisis. The crisis flared up at a time when the recommendation to upgrade prevention diplomacy had just been presented and discussed. The situation in Burundi thus also represented an opportunity for various UN organizations to test some of the ideas in practice. In other words, Burundi is both example and experiment when it comes to reforming the UN's peace operations.

The UN political mission to Burundi, BNUB, concluded on January 1, 2015. A small human rights office (OHCHR) was set up to replace it together with a mission with a mandate to assist Burundi with technical support in connection with the forthcoming election (MENUB). The result was a significantly reduced UN presence. On April 25, 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would run for re-election on June 26, 2015 (postponed to July 15, 2015). The opposition believed that this violated Burundi's constitution, as Nkurunziza had already served as president for two terms. Nkurunziza pointed out that he had been appointed—not elected—in his first term. This disagreement led to protests and demonstrations in the streets of Bujumbura. The protests started peacefully but were handled roughly and turned violent. Given its history, fears grew that the conflict would assume an ethnic dimension, which still evokes dark memories of the civil war that ravaged the country for 10 years and the previous genocide. The situation in Burundi has since been monitored closely by the international community. On May 13, 2015, the part of the army that opposed the president's third period attempted a military coup. The coup failed and the government forces regained control the next day. Just days before the election, the UN announced that the organization would withdraw its support for the elections because the situation was not favorable for holding open, inclusive, and credible elections. The elections went ahead regardless, and Nkurunziza was re-elected. The UN's election observation mission concluded that the election did

not meet the necessary requirements and the mission later completed its mandate on November 18, 2015.

The protests continued after the election. In October 2015, the Security Council expressed its deep concern with the development in the country with respect to human rights violations, such as summary executions, arbitrary arrests, and so forth. Between the election and the summer of 2016, more than 450 persons were killed and 300,000 had fled. The Council's announcement was followed by SC Resolution 2248 (November 2015), where the Secretary-General was asked to update the SC and present different options for the UN's future presence in Burundi. The Secretary-General presented three options: 1) a "light footprint" police force consisting of 20–50 men, 2) increased monitoring presence of 228 police officers, and 3) a protection and monitoring deployment of up to 3,000 police officers. The Burundian government would only accept the UN sending 50 police advisors, and they pointed out that their function should be to support the Burundi national police. In the following months, there were continued reports of violent unrest, and the SC visited Burundi in January 2016. The most recent development has been that the SC has taken the unprecedented step of ignoring the government's objections. With Resolution 2303, the SC decided in July 2016 to send a police force of 228 men. Burundi's government refused to allow them to enter the country.¹ Parallel to the discussions about the UN's presence, the AU and EAC have also attempted to get the parties to the conflict to meet at the negotiating table in Arusha, Tanzania. As we touch upon in the report, this process has been marked by inflexible posturing combined with disagreement on who is to be invited. For example, the government does not want to negotiate with those who were behind the attempted coup in May 2015.

8. Notes

¹ Peter Taksøe-Jensen, *Dansk diplomati i en brydningstid: vejen frem for Danmarks interesser og værdier mod 2030. Udredning om dansk udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik* (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016), IV. Own translation.

² Taksøe-Jensen, *Dansk diplomati i en brydningstid*, 30. Own translation.

³ Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (eds), "Conclusion," in *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 829.

⁴ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people* (New York: United Nations, 2015); Ban Ki-moon, *The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations* (New York: United Nations, 2015); Peacebuilding Commission Advisory Group of Experts, *The challenge of sustaining peace* (New York: United Nations, 2015). See also von Einsiedel et al., "Conclusion," 850: "Indeed, reliance on the use of force often detracts from the importance of nurturing the political processes that are ultimately required to solve deep-seated political problems."

⁵ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*; Ki-moon, *The future of United Nations peace operations*.

⁶ The authors' interviews.

⁷ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*; Ki-moon, *The future of United Nations peace operations*.

⁸ Arthur Boutellis, "From HIPPO to SG legacy: What prospects for UN peace operations reform?," *IPI Global Observatory*, September 24, 2015, accessed October 21, 2016, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/hippo-peacekeeping-peacebuilding-united-nations>.

⁹ International Peace Institute, "Etats des lieux des opérations de paix de l'ONU: Un an après la sortie du rapport du HIPPO", July 2016, accessed October 21, 2016, <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IPI-E-RPT-Etat-des-lieuxFrench.pdf>.

¹⁰ Taksøe-Jensen, *Dansk diplomati i en brydningstid*.

¹¹ Ideals, which are defined in the so-called Capstone Doctrine of 2008, which describes the principles and guidelines for the UN's peacekeeping operations; United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and guidelines* (New York: United Nations, 2008).

¹² The authors' interviews.

¹³ Eli Stamnes and Kari M. Osland, *Synthesis Report: Reviewing UN Peace Operations, the UN Peace-building Architecture and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016); Arthur Boutellis and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, *Working Together for Peace: Synergies and Connectors for Implementing the 2015 UN Reviews* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2015).

¹⁴ The Non-Aligned Movement consists of 115 member states and primarily represents the interests of developing countries. The movement emerged from an Afro-Asian meeting held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. Read

more here: The Non-Alignment Movement. "Non-aligned Movement: Description and History," accessed December 6, 2016, <http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm>.

¹⁵ Dimitri Trenin, "Russia in the Security Council" in von Einsiedel et al. (eds), *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 105-120.

¹⁶ Zhu Wenqi and Leng Xinyu, "China in the Security Council," in von Einsiedel et al. (eds), *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 83-104.

¹⁷ Groups, which in the UN are referred to as, respectively, "Western Europe and others" and JUSCANZ (Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Japan et al.).

¹⁸ Von Einsiedel et al., "Conclusion," 832.

¹⁹ The authors' interviews.

²⁰ This dependence on political will is seen as a contrast to collective security systems or for that matter a genuine alliance, such as NATO.

²¹ Adam Roberts, "The use of force: A system of selective security," in von Einsiedel et al. (eds), *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 349-372.

²² See e.g. Einsiedel et al., "Conclusion," 843.

²³ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*.

²⁴ Ban Ki-moon, *The future of United Nations peace operations*.

²⁵ Peacebuilding Commission Advisory Group of Experts, *The challenge of sustaining peace*.

²⁶ UN Women, *Global study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325* (New York: United Nations, 2015).

²⁷ United Nations, "Deputy Secretary-General's remarks at briefing of the General Assembly on Rights Up Front [as prepared for delivery]," December 17, 2013, accessed October 21, 2016, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/dsg/statement/2013-12-17/deputy-secretary-generals-remarks-briefing-general-assembly-rights>.

²⁸ Security Council, *S/RES/2171*, August 21, 2014, accessed October 26, 2016, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SRES2171-SystApproachConflictPrev-en.pdf>.

²⁹ Already in 1985 and possibly earlier, there was talk in the UN about being aware of so-called nascent causes. See e.g. a briefing to the UN Security Council by then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar: Security Council, *S/PV.2608*, September 26, 1985, accessed October 26, 2016, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_2608.pdf

³⁰ Security Council Report, "UN Security Working Methods - Horizon-Scanning Briefings," November 1, 2016, accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/horizon-scanning-briefings.php>.

³¹ International Peace Institute: "Etats des lieux des opérations de paix de l'ONU," 2.

³² In addition to a movement away from the principle of a minimum use of force, this is yet another departure from previous practice, where the UN operated with the consent of the parties to the conflict and therefore did not experience being the direct target of enemy attacks in the same manner.

³³ United Nations, "MINUSMA Fact and Figures," accessed October 21, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/facts.shtml>.

³⁴ United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Mission and Appointment Type," accessed October 21, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_3.pdf.

³⁵ The authors' interviews; See also The Challenges Project, *Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination* (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2005); Katharina Coleman, "Token Troop Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (eds), *Providing Peacekeepers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

³⁶ For drones as for other technology and other equipment, their use cannot be considered in isolation from where and how they can actually be used on specific missions. In Mali, it has been pointed out that drones do not necessarily add much value if they cannot be used in the northern regions where the need is greatest. This is not only the case for drones but for contributions more generally; the value is vital and the value of contributions can be significantly reduced if they are not deployed where the need is greatest. While this might appear rather obvious, there are a number of examples of how conflicting considerations (e.g. risk minimization against optimal utility) result in a practice where this is not the case; in other words, where valued contributions from European countries do not have the optimal effect because their use is limited to Bamako and Gao despite the need being greatest in northern Mali.

³⁷ The authors' interviews.

³⁸ Many thanks to the anonymous external reviewer for highlighting this point.

³⁹ Olga Abilova and Alexandra Novosseloff, *Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2016), 3.

⁴⁰ The member states "recognized the need to improve the preparedness of troops;" see International Peace Institute, "Fourth Ministerial Dinner on Peace Operations", September 21, 2016, accessed December 7, 2016, <https://www.ipinst.org/2016/09/fourth-ministerial-dinner-on-peace-operations#5>

⁴¹ China is also the UN's second-largest financial contributor to peacekeeping. This is not to be understood as indicative of political will, as the financial contribution is calculated by the General Assembly as a percentage of the expenses to peacekeeping and is not determined by the individual country.

⁴² United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, Overview," 2015, accessed October 21, 2016, <https://www.cc.unlb.org/UNSAS%20Documents/PCRS%20Overview%20Aug%202015.pdf>

⁴³ Donald C.F. Daniel, Paul D. Williams and Adam C. Smith, *Deploying Combined Teams: Lessons Learned from Operational Partnerships in UN Peace keeping* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2015).

⁴⁴ The authors' interviews.

⁴⁵ The authors' interviews.

⁴⁶ The authors' interviews.

⁴⁷ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 32.

⁴⁸ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 32.

⁴⁹ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 33.

⁵⁰ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 32.

⁵¹ Arthur Boutellis and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, *Waging Peace: UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism and Violent Extremism*. New York, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2016).

⁵² Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁵³ See the Norwegian speech on behalf of the Nordic countries at the open debate in the Security Council: UN Security Council, S/PV.7561, November 17, 2015, accessed October 26, 2016, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/spv_7561.pdf.

⁵⁴ Mogens Lykketoft, "Conclusions and Observations by the President of the seventieth session of the UN General Assembly", May 20, 2016, accessed December 7, 2016: <http://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2015/08/Thematic-Debate-on-UN-Peace-and-Security-Conclusions-Observations-20-May-2016-1.compressed.pdf>

⁵⁵ See e.g. then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's speech to the Security Council: UN Security Council, S/PV.2608.

⁵⁶ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 17.

⁵⁷ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 20.

⁵⁸ Peacebuilding Commission Advisory Group of Experts, *The challenge of sustaining peace*, 14.

⁵⁹ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 18.

⁶⁰ Connie Peck, "Special Representatives of the Secretary-General," in von Einsiedel et al. (eds), *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 457-475.

⁶¹ See e.g. UN Security Council, S/RES/2171.

⁶² HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 31.

⁶³ Ban, *The future of United Nations peace operations*, 5.

⁶⁴ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 21.

⁶⁵ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 17.

⁶⁶ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, xii; Ki-moon, *The future of United Nations peace operations*, 7.

⁶⁷ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 10.

⁶⁸ “There are several reasons in theory why the latter [regional organizations] have a comparative advantage in such operations. Members of regional organizations are closer to the crisis” (Thomas Weiss and Martin Welz, “The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond: a shotgun wedding?”, in *International Affairs* 90 (2014): 889-905).

⁶⁹ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, ix.

⁷⁰ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 13.

⁷¹ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 15

⁷² HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, xii.

⁷³ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 21.

⁷⁴ Cedric de Coning (2015). The Need for a Strong UN-African Union Partnership for Peace in Africa. *MUNPlanet*. December 18, 2015, accessed December 7, 2016, <https://www.munplanet.com/articles/international-security/the-need-for-a-strong-un-african-union-partnership-for-peace-in-africa>

⁷⁵ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, xii.

⁷⁶ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 9.

⁷⁷ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 18; 21.

⁷⁸ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 14.

⁷⁹ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 23.

⁸⁰ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 23.

⁸¹ “Performing such a role is among the most contested and inherently difficult for the UN itself as well as for non-UN actors” (Linnea Bergholm, *The African Union, the United Nations and civilian protection challenges in Darfur* (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 2010), 3.

⁸² “The UN would not always be able or best-positioned to respond to crises and the AU could be a particularly effective partner in conducting offensive operations where there were grave threats against civilians” (Samantha Power in UN Security Council, *Stronger United Nations Partnership with African Union Possible Due to Re-*

vamped Regional Arrangements, Security Council Presidential Statement Says, SC/12370, May 24, 2016, accessed October 26, 2016, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12370.doc.htm>).

⁸³ Linnea Bergholm, *The African Union*.

⁸⁴ International Conference on the Protection of Civilians, “International Conference on the Protection of Civilians: The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians”, May 28–29, 2015, accessed October 21, 2016, http://civilianprotection.rw/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/REPORT_PoC_conference_Long-version.pdf.

⁸⁵ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. “The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians: Member State Endorsements”, accessed October 21, 2016, www.globalr2p.org/media/files/kigali-signatories1.pdf.

⁸⁶ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 15.

⁸⁷ Including the importance of involving the local civil society to strengthen the relationship between the state and civil society and to understand the perspectives of the local community (see e.g. Cedric De Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, John Karlsrud (eds), *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection & New Threats*. Oxford: Routledge, 2017, 18; de Coning et al. *Towards More People-Centric Peace Operations*, 4; Niels Nagelhus Schia, Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik, and John Karlsrud. *What people think does matter: Understanding and integrating local perceptions into UN peacekeeping*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2013, 2.)

⁸⁸ See e.g. Roger MacGinty and Oliver P. Richmond, “The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace,” *Third World Quarterly* 34 (2013), 763-783.

⁸⁹ Ban, *The future of United Nations peace operations*, 5.

⁹⁰ UN News Centre, “UN chief presents Security Council with special measures to curb sexual exploitation”, March 10, 2016, accessed October 21, 2016, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53409#.V9hj3k3r3mQ>.

⁹¹ John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali,” *Third World Quarterly*, 36:1 (2015), 40-54.

⁹² HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*.

⁹³ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*.

⁹⁴ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 8.

⁹⁵ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 8.

⁹⁶ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 12.

⁹⁷ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 12.

⁹⁸ United Nations, “UNDPA Special Political Missions: Overview,” 2014, accessed October 21, 2016, <https://www.un.org/undpa/en/in-the-field/overview>.

⁹⁹ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 9.

¹⁰⁰ Emily Paddon Rhoads, *Taking Sides in Peacekeeping: Impartiality and the Future of the United Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

¹⁰¹ UN Security Council, *Security Council Adopts Resolution 2295 (2016), Authorizing “More Proactive and Robust” Mandate for United Nations Mission in Mali*, SC/12426, June 29, 2016, accessed October 26, 2016, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12426.doc.htm>.

¹⁰² HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*.

¹⁰³ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 10.

¹⁰⁴ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 19.

¹⁰⁵ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 4.

¹⁰⁶ See the open debate in the UN Security Council, November 17, 2015: Security Council, *S/PV.7561*.

¹⁰⁷ UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2015/22*, November 25, 2015, 3; Stamnes and Osland, *Synthesis report*; Alexander Ilitchev, “Implementing the HIPPO report: Sustaining peace as a new imperative” in *International forum for the challenges of peace operations, Policy Brief 5* (2015); Aditi Gorur and Lisa Sharland, *Prioritizing the protection of civilians: Analyzing the recommendations of the HIPPO report* (Washington: Stimson Center, 2016); Boutellis, “From HIPPO to SG legacy” in Security Council Report: *The Security Council and UN peace operations: Reform and deliver* (New York: SCR, 2016).

¹⁰⁸ Ban, *The future of United Nations peace operations*, 5.

¹⁰⁹ As well as the risk of diluting the Security Council’s role as “the principal body responsible for maintaining international peace and security.”

¹¹⁰ UN Security Council, *Children and armed conflict, report for the Secretary-General, A/67/845-S/2013/245*, May 15, 2013, accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/CAAC-Annual-Report-2013.pdf>; Lydia Lim, “Doubts Linger Over U.N. Troops’ Preparedness to Enter Mali,” *IPS News*, July 5, 2013, accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/07/doubts-linger-over-u-n-troops-preparedness-to-enter-mali/>.

¹¹¹ See e.g. United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and guidelines*, 31 (the Capstone Doctrine).

¹¹² This problem is further described as a general challenge to the UN internal control institution: Office of Internal Oversight Services, *Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations*, A/68/787, March 7, 2014, accessed October 26, 2016, https://www.oios.un.org/resources/ga_report/a-68-787-dpko.pdf.

¹¹³ The authors’ interviews. The claim was based on, among other things, the example that EAC elected Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni (who has been in power for 30 years) to lead the negotiations, the irony of

which even Museveni appreciated, when he commented at the negotiations that Burundi's politicians should "do as he said and not as he did."

¹¹⁴ The authors' interviews.

¹¹⁵ October 11, 2016, Burundi decided to cease cooperation with the OHCHR on the background of critical reporting. At the same time, the country declared three human rights experts for *persona non grata*: Pierre Emmanuel Ngendakumana, "Bujumbura continues its crusade ...", *IWACU English News*, October 17, 2016, accessed October 21, 2016, <http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/englishnews/bujumbura-continues-its-crusade/>

¹¹⁶ The authors' interviews.

¹¹⁷ The HIPPO panel has made clear that the UN should refrain from conducting anti-terrorism activities and that the use of military force is not among the UN's many strengths, that the HIPPO report recommends should be increased and made a focal point; the use of force risks opposing what the panel sees as the forces of the UN. As such, the HIPPO report is based on a built-in idealism that means that the report and its recommendations do not take into account that something that is both reminiscent of anti-terror and the use of power are currently part of the UN's peace work—and an aspect that is not likely to disappear.

¹¹⁸ HIPPO, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel*, 31.

¹¹⁹ For more on this criticism of Agenda for Peace, see: Mats Berdal, "The Security Council and Peacekeeping" in Vaughan Lowe et al. (eds), *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 187-188.

¹²⁰ Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (the Brahimi report), August 21, 2000, accessed October 20, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305.

¹²¹ Canada is hosting the ministerial summit on UN peace work in 2017. This might mean that the question about a match between the member state contributions and the UN's global peace work are set on the agenda.

¹²² Walter Dorn, "Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations", IPI (2016).

¹²³ United Nations, "United Nations Peacebuilding Commission," accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/>.

¹²⁴ PBC Advisory Group of Experts, *Challenge of sustaining peace*, 43.

¹²⁵ United Nations, "General Assembly and Peacekeeping, Special Political and Decolonization (Fourth) Committee", accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/CTTEE.htm>.

¹²⁶ Here, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Department of Field Support, and Department of Safety and Security have deliberately been omitted, as they fall outside the focus of the report. The same applies to the UN's other funds and agencies, which only indirectly participate in peace operations.

¹²⁷ United Nations, “United Nations Department of Political Affairs,” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.un.org/undpa/en/overview>.

¹²⁸ United Nations, “United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations,” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/>.

¹²⁹ United Nations, “United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office,” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/about.shtml>.

¹³⁰ United Nations, “The Secretary General’s Peacebuilding Fund” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/PBF-Brochure-Niche-with-examples-final-May-2016.pdf>.

¹³¹ Pledging Conference, “Pledging Conference for the Secretary General’s Peacebuilding Fund,” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.pbfpledgingconference.org/>.

¹³² OHCHR, “OCHHR Management Plan 2014-2017”, 2.

¹³³ See e.g. Kofi Annan’s renowned report from 2005: *In Larger Freedom*, 55, where he writes that development and security depend on one another and that both depend on respect for human rights: *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005*, March 21, 2005, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/2005

¹³⁴ The policy is not public, but a summary is found on the official UN website: United Nations, “United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library,” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/387432>

¹³⁵ OHCHR, “OCHHR Management Plan 2014-2017,” 16, accessed December 2, 2016, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/OHCHRreport2014_2017/OMP_Web_version/media/pdf/0_THE_WHOLE_REPORT.pdf

¹³⁶ Figures from the DPKO website: United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet,” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>. Figures for uniformed personnel were updated July 31, 2016, while the figures for civilian personnel were updated July 31, 2015. The number of Danish personnel in uniform is also from the DPKO website: United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors,” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.

¹³⁷ Global Peace Operations Review, “Top 10 Financial Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Budget (AUG 2016),” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://peaceoperationsreview.org/infographic/top-10-financial-contributors-to-un-peacekeeping-budget-aug-2016/>

¹³⁸ United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” accessed December 2, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote0716.pdf>.

¹³⁹ United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations map,” accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/D_P_A.pdf.

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